johnalbertini14-glitch/openclaw-skills / skills/0xbeekeeper/security
agentguard
FlaggedGoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard. Automatically blocks dangerous commands, prevents data leaks, and protects secrets. Use when reviewing third-party code, auditing skills, checking for vulnerabilities, evaluating action safety, or viewing security logs.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 15.8 KB |
| _meta.json | config | 453 B |
| action-policies.md | markdown | 8.3 KB |
| evals.md | markdown | 2.6 KB |
| scan-rules.md | markdown | 12.4 KB |
| scripts/action-cli.ts | script | 6.6 KB |
| scripts/auto-scan.js | script | 4.8 KB |
| scripts/data/registry.json | config | 56 B |
| scripts/guard-hook.js | script | 3.2 KB |
| scripts/package-lock.json | manifest | 784 B |
| scripts/package.json | manifest | 109 B |
| scripts/trust-cli.ts | script | 4.2 KB |
| web3-patterns.md | markdown | 5.5 KB |
action-policies.md
View on GitHub# Action Evaluation Policies Reference
Detailed detector rules and policies for the `action` subcommand.
## Network Request Detector
### Webhook / Exfiltration Domains (auto-block if not in allowlist)
| Domain | Service |
|--------|---------|
| `discord.com` / `discordapp.com` | Discord webhooks |
| `api.telegram.org` | Telegram bot API |
| `hooks.slack.com` | Slack webhooks |
| `webhook.site` | Webhook testing |
| `requestbin.com` | Request inspection |
| `pipedream.com` | Workflow automation |
| `ngrok.io` / `ngrok-free.app` | Tunneling |
| `beeceptor.com` | API mocking |
| `mockbin.org` | HTTP mocking |
### High-Risk TLDs
`.xyz`, `.top`, `.tk`, `.ml`, `.ga`, `.cf`, `.gq`, `.work`, `.click`, `.link`
Domains with these TLDs are flagged as medium risk. POST/PUT to high-risk TLD escalates to high risk.
### Request Body Secret Scanning
Scan request body for sensitive data. Priority determines risk level:
| Secret Type | Priority | Risk Level | Decision |
|------------|----------|------------|----------|
| Private Key (`0x` + 64 hex) | 100 | critical | DENY |
| Mnemonic (12-24 BIP-39 words) | 100 | critical | DENY |
| SSH Private Key (`-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY`) | 90 | critical | DENY |
| AWS Secret Key (`[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}` near AWS context) | 80 | high | CONFIRM |
| AWS Access Key (`AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`) | 70 | high | CONFIRM |
| GitHub Token (`gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}`) | 70 | high | CONFIRM |
| Bearer/JWT Token (`ey[A-Za-z0-9-_]+\.ey[A-Za-z0-9-_]+`) | 60 | medium | CONFIRM |
| API Secret (generic `api.*secret` patterns) | 50 | medium | CONFIRM |
| DB Connection String (`(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://`) | 50 | medium | CONFIRM |
| Password in Config (`password\s*[:=]`) | 40 | low | CONFIRM |
### Network Decision Logic
1. Invalid URL -> DENY (high)
2. Domain in webhook list & not in allowlist -> DENY (high)
3. Body contains private key / mnemonic / SSH key -> DENY (critical)
4. Body contains other secrets -> risk based on priority
5. High-risk TLD & not in allowlist -> CONFIRM (medium)
6. POST/PUT to untrusted domain -> escalate medium to high
7. Domain in allowlist -> ALLOW (low)
## Command Execution Detector
### Dangerous Commands (always DENY, critical)
| Command | Risk |
|---------|------|
| `rm -rf` / `rm -fr` | Recursive delete |
| `mkfs` | Format filesystem |
| `dd if=` | Raw disk write |
| `:(){:\|:&};:` (and space variants) | Fork bomb (regex: `:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{.*:\s*\|\s*:.*&.*\}`) |
| `chmod 777` / `chmod -R 777` | World-writable permissions |
| `> /dev/sda` | Disk overwrite |
| `mv /* ` | Move root contents |
| `wget\|sh` / `curl\|sh` | Download and execute |
| `wget\|bash` / `curl\|bash` | Download and execute |
### Sensitive Data Access (high)
| Command | Target |
|---------|--------|
| `cat /etc/passwd` | User database |
| `cat /etc/shadow` | Password hashes |
| `cat ~/.ssh` | SSH keys |
| `cat ~/.aws` | AWS credentials |
| `cat ~/.kube` | Kubernetes config |
| `cat ~/.npmrc` | npm auth tokens |
| `cat ~/.netrc` | Network credentials |
| `printenv` / `env` / `set` | All environment variables |
### System Modification Commands (medium)
`sudo`, `su`, `chown`, `chmod`, `chgrp`, `useradd`, `userdel`, `groupadd`, `passwd`, `visudo`, `systemctl`, `service`, `init`, `shutdown`, `reboot`, `halt`
### Network Commands (medium)
`curl`, `wget`, `nc`/`netcat`/`ncat`, `ssh`, `scp`, `rsync`, `ftp`, `sftp`
### Shell Injection Patterns (medium)
| Pattern | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `; command` | Command separator |
| `\| command` | Pipe |
| `` `command` `` | Backtick execution |
| `$(command)` | Command substitution |
| `&& command` | Conditional chain |
| `\|\| command` | Or chain |
### Sensitive Environment Variables
Flag env vars containing: `API_KEY`, `SECRET`, `PASSWORD`, `TOKEN`, `PRIVATE`, `CREDENTIAL`
### Safe Command Allowlist
Commands matching the safe list are allowed without restriction, **unless** they contain shell metacharacters (`;`, `|`, `&`, `` ` ``, `$`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`) or access sensitive paths.
| Category | Commands |
|----------|----------|
| **Basic** | `ls`, `echo`, `pwd`, `whoami`, `date`, `hostname`, `uname`, `tree`, `du`, `df`, `sort`, `uniq`, `diff`, `cd` |
| **Read** | `cat`, `head`, `tail`, `wc`, `grep`, `find`, `which`, `type` |
| **File ops** | `mkdir`, `cp`, `mv`, `touch` |
| **Git** | `git status`, `git log`, `git diff`, `git branch`, `git show`, `git remote`, `git clone`, `git checkout`, `git pull`, `git fetch`, `git merge`, `git add`, `git commit`, `git push` |
| **Package managers** | `npm install`, `npm run`, `npm test`, `npm ci`, `npm start`, `npx`, `yarn`, `pnpm`, `pip install`, `pip3 install` |
| **Build & run** | `node`, `python`, `python3`, `tsc`, `go build`, `go run`, `go version`, `cargo build`, `cargo run`, `cargo test`, `make`, `rustc --version`, `java -version` |
### Exec Decision Logic
1. Matches fork bomb (regex) -> DENY (critical)
2. Matches dangerous command -> DENY (critical)
3. Matches safe command (no metacharacters, no sensitive paths) -> ALLOW (low)
4. Exec not allowed in capability model -> CONFIRM (non-critical) — balanced mode prompts user
5. Matches sensitive data access -> flag HIGH
6. Matches system command -> flag MEDIUM
7. Matches network command -> flag MEDIUM
8. Contains shell injection pattern -> flag MEDIUM
9. Sensitive env vars passed -> flag evidence
**Note**: In balanced mode, non-critical blocked commands (step 4) trigger a user prompt instead of a hard block. Only critical threats (steps 1-2) are always denied regardless of protection level.
## Default Policies
```
secret_exfil:
private_key: DENY (always block)
mnemonic: DENY (always block)
api_secret: CONFIRM (require user approval)
exec_command: DENY (default, unless capability allows)
web3:
unlimited_approval: CONFIRM
unknown_spender: CONFIRM
user_not_present: CONFIRM
network:
untrusted_domain: CONFIRM
body_contains_secret: DENY
```
## Capability Presets
### none (Most Restrictive)
```json
{
"network_allowlist": [],
"filesystem_allowlist": [],
"exec": "deny",
"secrets_allowlist": []
}
```
### read_only
```json
{
"network_allowlist": [],
"filesystem_allowlist": ["./**"],
"exec": "deny",
"secrets_allowlist": []
}
```
### trading_bot
```json
{
"network_allowlist": [
"api.binance.com", "api.bybit.com", "api.okx.com",
"api.coinbase.com", "*.dextools.io", "*.coingecko.com"
],
"filesystem_allowlist": ["./config/**", "./logs/**"],
"exec": "deny",
"secrets_allowlist": ["*_API_KEY", "*_API_SECRET"],
"web3": {
"chains_allowlist": [1, 56, 137, 42161],
"rpc_allowlist": ["*"],
"tx_policy": "confirm_high_risk"
}
}
```
### defi
```json
{
"network_allowlist": ["*"],
"filesystem_allowlist": [],
"exec": "deny",
"secrets_allowlist": [],
"web3": {
"chains_allowlist": [1, 56, 137, 42161, 10, 8453, 43114],
"rpc_allowlist": ["*"],
"tx_policy": "confirm_high_risk"
}
}
```
## GoPlus Integration
The `action-cli.ts decide` command integrates with the [GoPlus Security API](https://docs.gopluslabs.io/) for enhanced Web3 action evaluation. GoPlus provides three checks:
| Check | Description | Triggers |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| **Phishing Site Detection** | Checks if the transaction origin URL is a known phishing site | `PHISHING_ORIGIN` → DENY (critical) |
| **Address Security** | Checks if the target address is blacklisted, associated with phishing, stealing attacks, or honeypots | `MALICIOUS_ADDRESS` → DENY (critical), `HONEYPOT_RELATED` → flag (high) |
| **Transaction Simulation** | Simulates the transaction to detect balance changes, approval changes, and risk indicators | `UNLIMITED_APPROVAL` → CONFIRM (high), `SIMULATION_FAILED` → flag (medium) |
### Environment Variables
```
GOPLUS_API_KEY=your_key # Required for simulation
GOPLUS_API_SECRET=your_secret # Required for simulation
```
Phishing site detection and address security checks work without API keys. Transaction simulation requires configured credentials.
### Degradation Strategy
When GoPlus is unavailable (no API keys, network errors, rate limiting):
1. The `SIMULATION_UNAVAILABLE` or `SIMULATION_FAILED` risk tag is set
2. Phishing and address checks that fail are silently skipped
3. The decision falls back to **policy-based rules only** (capability model, webhook detection, secret scanning)
4. For `web3_tx` and `web3_sign` without GoPlus, the skill should apply prompt-based rules and note the limitation in the output
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |