jaktestowac/awesome-copilot-for-testers / plugins/testing-application-security/skills/testing-application-security
testing-application-security
UnverifiedApplies OWASP-informed security testing within a tester scope: an authorization gate before any probing, authorization matrices, broken access control and IDOR checks, input validation and injection observation, session and auth behaviour, and safe reporting of findings. Use when testing auth-protected features, when a security review needs QA coverage, when an exploratory session surfaced something security-shaped, or when access control needs a systematic check rather than a spot check.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 11.5 KB |
| resources/authz-matrix-template.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| resources/finding-report-template.md | markdown | 5.9 KB |
| resources/owasp-test-angles.md | markdown | 7.4 KB |
| resources/scope-and-authorization-gate.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
resources/finding-report-template.md
View on GitHub# Security Finding Report
## Where this goes
**Not the public issue tracker.** A security finding filed publicly is a disclosure.
Route, in order of preference:
1. The team's documented security disclosure path, if one exists
2. A private security channel or a restricted-visibility tracker project
3. Directly to the security owner or engineering manager, by a private channel
Ask before filing when unsure. The cost of asking is a message; the cost of guessing wrong is publishing a vulnerability.
---
# [Finding title: what is wrong, in one line]
- **Severity**: [Critical / High / Medium / Low]
- **Category**: [OWASP category]
- **Reported by**: [name], [date]
- **Environment**: [staging / production]
- **Authorization**: [link to the authorization record]
- **Status**: [New / Confirmed / Fixed / Accepted]
## What the application claims
[The stated behaviour: from the specification, the permission model, the UI, or the documentation. Without this, a finding is an observation with no oracle.]
> Orders are visible only to the customer who placed them and to users with the admin role.
## What it does
[The observed behaviour, in one or two sentences.]
> Any authenticated user can read any order by its id, regardless of who placed it. The API applies no ownership check on `GET /api/orders/{id}`.
## Minimum reproduction
The smallest sequence that demonstrates it. Not a full attack chain.
```
1. Sign in as sec-user-a@example.com. Place an order. Note its id: 8a1f3c...
2. Sign in as sec-user-b@example.com, a different customer in the same tenant.
3. Request, with user B's token:
GET /api/orders/8a1f3c...
Authorization: Bearer <user B token>
4. Response: 200, with user A's full order including the delivery address.
Expected: 403.
```
Include the exact request and the status code. "It leaks data" is not reproducible.
## Impact
What an attacker with this could reach. Stated plainly, without embellishment and without minimizing.
> Any authenticated user can read any order in the system given its id, including delivery
> addresses and contact details. Order ids are UUIDs and are not enumerable from the API,
> so this requires an id obtained elsewhere: a shared link, a screenshot, a support thread,
> or a referrer header. It does not permit modification; `PATCH` on the same path is
> correctly restricted.
That last sentence matters. Stating the limits makes the rest credible and helps the reader triage accurately.
## Scope
| Aspect | Detail |
| --- | --- |
| Affected endpoints | `GET /api/orders/{id}`, `GET /api/orders/{id}/attachments/{id}` |
| Affected roles | Any authenticated user |
| Cross-tenant | **Yes**, verified with a tenant-2 account |
| Requires | A valid session and a known order id |
| Present in | Staging, build `[version]`. Production not tested. |
## Evidence
- Request and response with personal data redacted
- Screenshot with identifying fields masked
- The matrix cell, in context
**Redact before attaching.** Evidence for a security finding routinely contains exactly the data the finding is about. See `handling-sensitive-test-data`.
## Where testing stopped
The section that tells the reader what is proven and what is unknown.
> Confirmed the read on two order ids, one same-tenant and one cross-tenant. Did not enumerate
> further, did not test whether ids are predictable, did not test the production environment.
> Whether `attachments` has the same gap on other parent resources is untested.
## Suggested direction
Optional, and offered as a direction rather than a prescription.
> The ownership check appears to be applied in the collection handler but not the item handler.
> Worth reviewing every item-level handler for the same pattern rather than fixing only this one.
## Verification
For when it is fixed:
- [ ] The reproduction above returns 403
- [ ] The matrix cell passes
- [ ] Related endpoints found by the same pattern also pass
- [ ] A regression test exists in the authorization matrix suite
---
## Severity guidance
Rough, and deliberately conservative when uncertain.
| Severity | Shape |
| --- | --- |
| **Critical** | Unauthenticated access to sensitive data or functions; remote code execution; full account takeover; cross-tenant data access at scale |
| **High** | Authenticated access to another user's data or functions; privilege escalation; authentication bypass; injection with confirmed data access |
| **Medium** | Information disclosure with limited impact; missing rate limiting on a sensitive operation; session invalidation failures; business logic bypass with a financial effect |
| **Low** | Missing security headers; verbose errors; version disclosure; issues requiring an improbable precondition |
Adjust for:
- **exposure**: internet-facing raises it, internal-only lowers it
- **data**: special category or financial data raises it
- **preconditions**: needing a valid session lowers it, needing nothing raises it
- **scale**: affecting every record raises it above affecting one
When two severities are arguable, take the higher and say why. A triage that downgrades is cheap; one that misses a serious finding is not.
## Reporting several findings
One report per finding, not one report listing twelve. They get fixed, triaged, and verified separately.
An index is useful when there are many:
| # | Finding | Severity | Endpoint | Status |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Order read without ownership check | High | `GET /api/orders/{id}` | New |
| 2 | Admin user creation not role-checked | High | `POST /api/admin/users` | New |
| 3 | Session valid after logout | Medium | All | New |
| 4 | No `Content-Security-Policy` header | Low | All | New |
## What not to include
- a working exploit, or anything closer to one than the minimum reproduction
- unredacted personal data
- speculation about impact you did not verify
- raw scanner output presented as findings
- anything obtained outside the authorized scope
- an assessment of whose fault it is
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