hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/windows-boundaries
windows-boundaries
VerifiedUse when crossing a Windows security boundary or escaping a sandbox — kernel/user crossing (win32k/dxgkrnl UAF CVE-2025-24983), BYOVD kernel R/W, UAC/COM elevation, AppContainer/LPAC & Chromium-Mojo sandbox escape (CVE-2025-2783), PPL bypass, RPC/ALPC & named-pipe impersonation
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.9 KB |
| references/byovd-kernel-rw.md | markdown | 7.4 KB |
| references/integrity-uac-com.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/kernel-user-boundary.md | markdown | 8.0 KB |
| references/ppl-protected-process.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| references/rpc-alpc-boundary.md | markdown | 8.3 KB |
| references/sandbox-appcontainer-escape.md | markdown | 8.3 KB |
| scripts/byovd_kernel_rw.c | other | 7.8 KB |
| scripts/enum_boundaries.ps1 | script | 6.3 KB |
| scripts/ioctl_fuzzer.py | script | 5.8 KB |
| scripts/named_pipe_impersonate.c | other | 4.4 KB |
| scripts/ppl_byovdll.c | other | 5.2 KB |
| scripts/sandbox_escape_probe.py | script | 5.8 KB |
| scripts/uac_com_elevate.cpp | other | 4.9 KB |
references/ppl-protected-process.md
View on GitHub# PPL — Protected Process Light Boundary
PPL is the boundary that protects critical/AV processes from even SYSTEM. It is the wall in
front of LSASS credential theft (`RunAsPPL`) and EDR self-defense (PPL-Antimalware). This
cluster covers how PPL works and the 2023-2026 ways to defeat it *without* a vulnerable
kernel driver (BYOVDLL, live-dump, WER) plus the BYOVD fallback.
## Theory / Mechanism
A process's protection is the `PS_PROTECTION` byte in `EPROCESS` = `Type` (PP vs PPL) +
`Signer` level. Signer levels, high→low: **WinSystem > WinTcb > Windows > Lsa >
Antimalware > Authenticode**. A process may only open another protected process with full
access if its own signer level is **≥** the target's. Consequences for an attacker holding
SYSTEM but no protection:
- `OpenProcess` with `PROCESS_VM_READ`/`VM_WRITE`/`CREATE_THREAD` → access denied.
- `ReadProcessMemory` / `MiniDumpWriteDump` / `CreateRemoteThread` / debugging → denied.
So dumping LSASS (PPL-Lsa) or tampering with an EDR (PPL-Antimalware) needs one of:
### 1. BYOVDLL — "Ghost in the PPL" (no kernel driver) — itm4n
PPL verifies a loaded DLL is **Microsoft-signed**, but **not that it is the current
version**. Replace a current DLL with an **older, still-catalog-signed, vulnerable** one;
PPL loads it and its exploitable code path runs *inside* the PPL context. itm4n's chain
targets the CNG Key Isolation path inside LSASS:
- `keyiso.dll` — **CVE-2023-28229** (UAF in KeyIso) / **CVE-2023-36906** (OOB read).
- `ncryptprov.dll` (Microsoft Software KSP) — loadable **without a reboot** by registering
a custom Key Storage Provider via the undocumented `BCryptRegisterProvider`
(from `bcrypt_provider.h`), then opening it (`NCryptOpenStorageProvider`) so LSASS/CNG
loads the attacker-pointed (vulnerable) DLL into its PPL.
`ppl_byovdll.c` implements the staging half: register a KSP name pointing at the chosen
provider DLL, trigger the load, and unregister for cleanup. The CVE exploit itself runs
from a payload DLL inside the resulting PPL context.
### 2. Live kernel dump via `NtSystemDebugControl` (Win11 23H2+) — slowerzs
Win11 23H2 introduced `LivedumpProcessFiltering`: a user-mode caller with
**`SeDebugPrivilege`** can call `NtSystemDebugControl` with `IncludeUserSpaceMemoryPages`
to produce a kernel **live dump that contains the user-space pages of PPL processes** —
no vulnerable driver needed. From the dump you parse out PPL process memory (e.g.
`services.exe` COM secrets, RPCSS `IRundown` IPID/OXID) and can subsequently invoke
`IRundown::DoCallback` to inject into the PPL target. Affects the specific live-dump
filtering behavior introduced on Win11 23H2.
### 3. WER / minidump-broker on modern Win11 — zerosalarium (2025)
"Old but gold": abuse **Windows Error Reporting** to have a trusted broker generate the
process dump on your behalf, sidestepping the direct `OpenProcess` denial against
PPL-Lsa LSASS.
### 4. BYOVD kernel-write to clear `EPROCESS.Protection` (fallback)
With kernel R/W (see `byovd-kernel-rw.md`), zero the target's `PS_PROTECTION` byte. The
process is now unprotected, so a *normal* `OpenProcess`/`MiniDumpWriteDump`/Mimikatz
`sekurlsa::logonpasswords` works. **Restore the byte afterward** to avoid leaving a
critical process in an inconsistent state. `byovd_kernel_rw.c ppl <pid>` documents this.
### 5. Userland exploit inside a PPL process
A DLL-hijack or logic bug *in* a PPL process gives execution within the PPL context, from
which its own memory is fully accessible (BYOVDLL is a specialized instance of this).
## Modern 2024-2026 Variants (verified)
- **CVE-2023-28229** / **CVE-2023-36906** — the keyiso/CNG bugs that make BYOVDLL ("Ghost
in the PPL") work against LSASS without a driver (itm4n).
- **NtSystemDebugControl live-dump** PPL read on **Win11 23H2** (`LivedumpProcessFiltering`)
— driverless PPL injection/read (slowerzs).
- **WER-based LSASS dump on modern Win11** (zerosalarium, Sep 2025) — broker-mediated dump.
- **PPLBlade** — protected-process dumper that obfuscates the dump and supports remote
upload, used to evade Defender's LSASS-dump detection while bypassing PPL.
- 2026 EDR-killer context: kernel access via BYOVD bypasses PPL entirely — **PPL offers no
protection once Ring 0 is owned**; Qilin tooling specifically targets PPL-protected EDR
processes by zeroing protection from the kernel.
## Complete Workflow
```cmd
:: --- Driverless: BYOVDLL staging against LSASS (CNG KSP) ---
ppl_byovdll.exe register C:\stage\vuln_ncryptprov.dll GhostKsp
ppl_byovdll.exe trigger GhostKsp :: LSASS loads the old (vulnerable) DLL into PPL
:: ... run the CVE-2023-28229/36906 payload DLL inside the PPL context ...
ppl_byovdll.exe unregister GhostKsp :: cleanup KSP registration
:: --- Fallback: BYOVD clear Protection, then dump normally ---
byovd_kernel_rw.exe C:\test\driver.sys ppl 712 :: 712 = lsass PID
:: now a normal dump works:
rundll32 C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 712 C:\t\out.dmp full
```
Check whether LSASS is even PPL first (`enum_boundaries.ps1` reports `RunAsPPL`):
```powershell
(Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa').RunAsPPL
```
## Detection
```yaml
title: PPL Bypass / LSASS Access Indicators
id: a31f0c77-2e94-4b6d-9f10-pplbyp001
logsource: { product: windows }
detection:
lsass_access: # Sysmon EID 10
EventID: 10
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess:
- '0x1010' # PROCESS_VM_READ|QUERY_LIMITED
- '0x1410'
- '0x1438'
- '0x143a'
ksp_dll_load: # Sysmon EID 7 inside lsass
EventID: 7
Image|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: ['\ncryptprov.dll', '\keyiso.dll']
# alert when the loaded version is OLDER than the OS build's shipped version
livedump: # 4688/Sysmon 1
EventID: 1
CommandLine|contains: 'IncludeUserSpaceMemoryPages'
condition: lsass_access or ksp_dll_load or livedump
level: high
```
- **Old DLL version inside LSASS** (Sysmon EID 7 ImageLoad of `keyiso.dll`/`ncryptprov.dll`
whose file version < the OS-shipped version) is the BYOVDLL tell — version-mismatch is the
IOC, not the load itself.
- **`HKLM\...\Cryptography\Providers` writes** (KSP registration) from a non-installer
process.
- **Sysmon EID 10** access to `lsass.exe` with read/dump access masks (Defender, Elastic,
and most EDRs ship this).
- **`NtSystemDebugControl` / live-dump** invocation and large kernel dump files appearing
(`MEMORY.DMP`-style) outside crash scenarios.
- **`EPROCESS.Protection` flips to 0** on a critical process — a kernel-callback / EDR
self-integrity check can flag it; once it is 0 the EDR may already be blinded.
## OPSEC
- **What it touches**: BYOVDLL registers a provider in HKLM and triggers an ImageLoad in
LSASS (no driver, no `OpenProcess` against PPL). Live-dump/WER produce large dump files on
disk. The Protection-clear path mutates kernel memory.
- **Cleanup**: `ppl_byovdll.c` unregisters the KSP; delete staged DLLs; for the kernel path
**restore the original `Protection` byte**; delete any dump files and WER artifacts.
- **Evasion**: driverless techniques (BYOVDLL, live-dump, WER) avoid the loud BYOVD service
+ driver-load telemetry entirely and are the preferred 2024-2026 approach against
mature EDR. Obfuscate dumps (PPLBlade) to dodge content-based LSASS-dump detection.
- **Hard stops**: BYOVDLL is mitigated by Microsoft re-signing / blocklisting the
vulnerable DLL versions; HVCI + Credential Guard move secrets into VTL1 (LSAIso) where
even a PPL-context read returns isolated/encrypted material rather than plaintext creds.
## References
- itm4n — "Ghost in the PPL Part 1: BYOVDLL" (keyiso/ncryptprov, CVE-2023-28229 /
CVE-2023-36906, undocumented `BCryptRegisterProvider`).
- slowerzs — "Injecting code into PPL processes without vulnerable drivers on Windows 11"
(`NtSystemDebugControl` `IncludeUserSpaceMemoryPages`, IRundown::DoCallback).
- zerosalarium — "Dumping LSASS with WER on modern Windows 11" (Sep 2025).
- tastypepperoni — **PPLBlade** protected-process dumper + Defender LSASS-dump bypass.
- Tactical Adversary / CyberAdvisors — "Bypass LSA Protection" credential-dumping series.
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