hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/mobile-pentest
mobile-pentest
UnverifiedUse when pentesting an Android/iOS app — Frida 17 instrumentation, SSL-pinning & root/jailbreak bypass, Android 14/15 CA injection, exported-component/content-provider abuse, deep-link/WebView chains, biometric bypass, Flutter/React-Native RE
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 10.7 KB |
| references/android-component-attacks.md | markdown | 10.5 KB |
| references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.md | markdown | 8.9 KB |
| references/environment-interception.md | markdown | 12.1 KB |
| references/insecure-storage-crypto.md | markdown | 8.7 KB |
| references/ios-offensive.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md | markdown | 9.3 KB |
| scripts/android_ca_inject.sh | script | 2.8 KB |
| scripts/component_fuzz.sh | script | 4.1 KB |
| scripts/hermes_triage.py | script | 5.6 KB |
| scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js | script | 6.0 KB |
| scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py | script | 8.2 KB |
| scripts/universal_unpin.js | script | 6.7 KB |
scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py
View on GitHub#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
manifest_attack_surface.py — Parse an APK's AndroidManifest into a structured attack-surface map.
Flags: exported activities/services/receivers/providers (explicit OR implicit pre-API-31),
permission protection levels, deep-link schemes/hosts, dangerous flags (debuggable, allowBackup,
usesCleartextTraffic, no networkSecurityConfig), task-hijacking exposure (taskAffinity / launchMode),
and grantUriPermissions providers. Output is JSON consumed by component_fuzz.sh.
USAGE:
python3 manifest_attack_surface.py base.apk -o surface.json
python3 manifest_attack_surface.py AndroidManifest.xml # already-decoded text/binary manifest
DEPENDENCIES:
pip install androguard # preferred (handles binary AXML + resolves <permission> levels)
(fallback: if androguard is missing and given a TEXT xml, uses stdlib ElementTree)
SCOPE: static analysis helper for authorized assessments.
"""
import argparse, json, sys, os
ANDROID_NS = "http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
def _attr(elem_attrib, name):
return elem_attrib.get("{%s}%s" % (ANDROID_NS, name)) or elem_attrib.get(name)
def analyze_with_androguard(apk_path):
from androguard.core.apk import APK # androguard >= 4.x
a = APK(apk_path)
axml = a.get_android_manifest_xml()
pkg = a.get_package()
min_sdk = int(a.get_min_sdk_version() or 0)
target_sdk = int(a.get_target_sdk_version() or 0)
# protection level of locally-defined custom permissions
custom_perms = {}
for perm in axml.findall(".//permission"):
nm = _attr(perm.attrib, "name")
lvl = _attr(perm.attrib, "protectionLevel") or "normal"
if nm:
custom_perms[nm] = lvl
app_el = axml.find(".//application")
app_flags = {}
if app_el is not None:
for f in ("debuggable", "allowBackup", "usesCleartextTraffic", "networkSecurityConfig"):
app_flags[f] = _attr(app_el.attrib, f)
components = {"activity": [], "service": [], "receiver": [], "provider": []}
deep_links = []
for tag in components:
for el in axml.findall(".//" + tag):
name = _attr(el.attrib, "name")
exported_attr = _attr(el.attrib, "exported")
perm = _attr(el.attrib, "permission")
has_filter = el.find("intent-filter") is not None
# API 31+: must be explicit. Pre-31: implicitly exported if it has an intent-filter.
if exported_attr is not None:
exported = exported_attr.lower() == "true"
else:
exported = has_filter and target_sdk < 31
rec = {
"name": name,
"exported": exported,
"exported_attr": exported_attr,
"permission": perm,
"permission_level": custom_perms.get(perm, "n/a" if not perm else "platform/unknown"),
"has_intent_filter": has_filter,
}
if tag == "provider":
rec["authorities"] = _attr(el.attrib, "authorities")
rec["grantUriPermissions"] = _attr(el.attrib, "grantUriPermissions")
if tag == "activity":
rec["taskAffinity"] = _attr(el.attrib, "taskAffinity")
rec["launchMode"] = _attr(el.attrib, "launchMode")
# task-hijack exposure: launcher/important activity w/o empty taskAffinity
rec["task_hijack_risk"] = (rec["taskAffinity"] != "")
# deep links
for f in el.findall("intent-filter"):
actions = [_attr(a.attrib, "name") for a in f.findall("action")]
cats = [_attr(c.attrib, "name") for c in f.findall("category")]
for d in f.findall("data"):
scheme = _attr(d.attrib, "scheme")
host = _attr(d.attrib, "host")
if scheme:
deep_links.append({
"component": name, "scheme": scheme, "host": host,
"browsable": "android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" in cats,
"autoVerify": (_attr(f.attrib, "autoVerify") == "true"),
"actions": actions,
})
components[tag].append(rec)
return {
"package": pkg,
"min_sdk": min_sdk,
"target_sdk": target_sdk,
"application_flags": app_flags,
"custom_permissions": custom_perms,
"components": components,
"deep_links": deep_links,
}
def analyze_text_xml(path):
# Manifests are untrusted input -> use defusedxml to block XXE / billion-laughs.
try:
import defusedxml.ElementTree as ET # pip install defusedxml
except ImportError:
sys.exit("[!] pip install defusedxml (stdlib XML parsers are XXE-vulnerable on untrusted input)")
root = ET.parse(path).getroot()
pkg = root.attrib.get("package", "?")
target_sdk = 0
uses = root.find("uses-sdk")
if uses is not None:
target_sdk = int(_attr(uses.attrib, "targetSdkVersion") or 0)
components = {"activity": [], "service": [], "receiver": [], "provider": []}
deep_links = []
for tag in components:
for el in root.iter(tag):
name = _attr(el.attrib, "name")
exported_attr = _attr(el.attrib, "exported")
has_filter = el.find("intent-filter") is not None
exported = (exported_attr.lower() == "true") if exported_attr is not None else (has_filter and target_sdk < 31)
rec = {"name": name, "exported": exported, "permission": _attr(el.attrib, "permission"),
"has_intent_filter": has_filter}
if tag == "provider":
rec["authorities"] = _attr(el.attrib, "authorities")
components[tag].append(rec)
for f in el.findall("intent-filter"):
cats = [_attr(c.attrib, "name") for c in f.findall("category")]
for d in f.findall("data"):
scheme = _attr(d.attrib, "scheme")
if scheme:
deep_links.append({"component": name, "scheme": scheme,
"host": _attr(d.attrib, "host"),
"browsable": "android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" in cats})
return {"package": pkg, "target_sdk": target_sdk, "components": components, "deep_links": deep_links}
def summarize(data):
out = ["[summary]"]
c = data["components"]
for tag in c:
exp = [x["name"] for x in c[tag] if x.get("exported")]
out.append(" exported %-9s: %d %s" % (tag, len(exp), exp[:6]))
risky = data.get("application_flags", {})
for f in ("debuggable", "allowBackup", "usesCleartextTraffic"):
if str(risky.get(f)).lower() == "true":
out.append(" [!] application android:%s=true" % f)
if not risky.get("networkSecurityConfig"):
out.append(" [i] no networkSecurityConfig (user CA may be trusted)")
for a in c.get("activity", []):
if a.get("exported") and a.get("task_hijack_risk"):
out.append(" [!] task-hijack exposure: %s (taskAffinity=%r launchMode=%r)"
% (a["name"], a.get("taskAffinity"), a.get("launchMode")))
out.append(" deep links: %d %s" % (len(data["deep_links"]),
sorted({d["scheme"] + "://" + (d.get("host") or "") for d in data["deep_links"]})[:8]))
return "\n".join(out)
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("target", help="APK or AndroidManifest.xml")
ap.add_argument("-o", "--out", help="write JSON here")
args = ap.parse_args()
if args.target.lower().endswith(".apk"):
try:
data = analyze_with_androguard(args.target)
except ImportError:
sys.exit("[!] androguard required for APKs: pip install androguard")
else:
try:
data = analyze_with_androguard(args.target) # androguard also parses standalone AXML
except Exception:
data = analyze_text_xml(args.target)
print(summarize(data))
if args.out:
with open(args.out, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
json.dump(data, fh, indent=2)
print("[+] wrote " + args.out)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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