hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/incident-response
incident-response
FlaggedUse when responding to or forensically investigating an incident — triage acquisition (Velociraptor/KAPE), Volatility 3 memory forensics, Chainsaw/Hayabusa EVTX timelining, anti-forensics detection, cloud IR, ransomware/ESXi response
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.8 KB |
| references/anti-forensics-detection.md | markdown | 7.1 KB |
| references/cloud-ir.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| references/memory-forensics.md | markdown | 8.5 KB |
| references/ransomware-esxi-ir.md | markdown | 7.7 KB |
| references/repo-compromise-forensics.md | markdown | 3.9 KB |
| references/triage-collection.md | markdown | 9.3 KB |
| references/windows-evtx-timeline.md | markdown | 6.9 KB |
| scripts/cloud_ir_collect.py | script | 8.4 KB |
| scripts/dangling_commit_finder.py | script | 6.6 KB |
| scripts/ebpf_rootkit_hunt.sh | script | 6.5 KB |
| scripts/evtx_hunt.sh | script | 5.6 KB |
| scripts/gharchive_recover.py | script | 6.5 KB |
| scripts/ransomware_triage.ps1 | script | 7.3 KB |
| scripts/timestomp_detect.py | script | 6.6 KB |
| scripts/triage_collector.py | script | 10.1 KB |
| scripts/vol3_triage.py | script | 8.2 KB |
scripts/ransomware_triage.ps1
View on GitHub<#
.SYNOPSIS
ransomware_triage.ps1 - Rapid Windows ransomware/extortion triage for IR scoping (read-mostly).
.DESCRIPTION
Collects high-signal indicators to scope an active/suspected ransomware incident BEFORE
eradication, aligned with 2025 TTPs (Scattered Spider/UNC3944, LockBit 5.0/DragonForce, and
Velociraptor abuse CVE-2025-6264). Does NOT decrypt, reboot, or remove anything.
Collects:
- Volume Shadow Copy status (vssadmin) - were shadows deleted? (T1490)
- Security/System log-clear events (1102/104) - anti-forensics
- Ransom-note + ransomware-extension hits across drives
- File-extension change burst from the USN journal (encryption window)
- Recently created/modified services + scheduled tasks (persistence)
- Suspect Velociraptor install (version vs 0.73.5 = CVE-2025-6264)
- Backup-admin group membership additions (e.g. "Veeam Administrators")
.PARAMETER OutDir
Output directory for the triage report and CSVs (use an off-host / clean path if possible).
.PARAMETER ScanPaths
Roots to scan for ransom notes / encrypted extensions (default: all fixed drives).
.EXAMPLE
powershell -ep bypass -File ransomware_triage.ps1 -OutDir C:\IR
.NOTES
Run as Administrator. Capture RAM first (winpmem) on a live host. Assume the operator may be
watching internal comms (UNC3944 joins IR bridges) - coordinate out-of-band.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$OutDir = "$env:SystemDrive\IR_triage",
[string[]]$ScanPaths,
[int]$MaxNoteHits = 200
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$ts = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString('yyyyMMddTHHmmssZ')
$OutDir = Join-Path $OutDir "ransom_triage_$ts"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $OutDir | Out-Null
$report = Join-Path $OutDir 'findings.txt'
function Flag([string]$sev,[string]$msg){ $line="[FLAG][$sev] $msg"; Write-Host $line; Add-Content $report $line }
function Info([string]$msg){ Write-Host "[INFO] $msg"; Add-Content $report "[INFO] $msg" }
Add-Content $report "=== Ransomware triage host=$env:COMPUTERNAME $ts ==="
if (-not $ScanPaths) {
$ScanPaths = (Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | Where-Object { $_.Used -gt 0 }).Root
}
$ransomExt = @('*.lockbit','*.babuk','*.dragonforce','*.play','*.warlock','*.encrypted','*.locked','*.crypt')
$noteNames = @('*ransom*note*','*readme*decrypt*','*how_to_*decrypt*','*restore*files*','*_readme.txt','*decrypt*instructions*')
# 1) Shadow copy status (deleted shadows == T1490)
$vss = & vssadmin list shadows 2>&1
$vss | Out-File (Join-Path $OutDir 'vssadmin.txt')
if ($vss -match 'No items found' -or -not ($vss -match 'Shadow Copy ID')) {
Flag 'HIGH' 'No Volume Shadow Copies present - possible vssadmin delete shadows (T1490 Inhibit Recovery)'
} else { Info 'Shadow copies present (good - candidate for recovery).' }
# 2) Log-clear events (anti-forensics)
foreach ($pair in @(@('Security',1102), @('System',104))) {
$log=$pair[0]; $id=$pair[1]
$ev = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$log; Id=$id} -MaxEvents 5 2>$null
if ($ev) {
foreach ($e in $ev) { Flag 'HIGH' "Event $id ($log) log cleared at $($e.TimeCreated.ToUniversalTime())Z" }
$ev | Select TimeCreated,Id,@{n='User';e={$_.UserId}} |
Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir "logclear_$log.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
}
# 3) Ransom notes + encrypted-extension hits
$noteHits = foreach ($root in $ScanPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $root -Recurse -Include $noteNames -File -Force 2>$null |
Select-Object FullName,Length,CreationTimeUtc,LastWriteTimeUtc
}
$noteHits | Select-Object -First $MaxNoteHits |
Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir 'ransom_notes.csv') -NoTypeInformation
if ($noteHits) { Flag 'HIGH' ("Ransom note(s) found: {0} (see ransom_notes.csv)" -f @($noteHits).Count) }
$extHits = foreach ($root in $ScanPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $root -Recurse -Include $ransomExt -File -Force 2>$null |
Select-Object FullName,Length,LastWriteTimeUtc
}
$extHits | Select-Object -First 1000 |
Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir 'encrypted_files.csv') -NoTypeInformation
if ($extHits) { Flag 'HIGH' ("Files with ransomware extensions: {0} (encrypted_files.csv)" -f @($extHits).Count) }
# 4) USN extension-change burst (encryption window). Best-effort via fsutil.
$sys = $env:SystemDrive
$usn = & fsutil usn readjournal $sys csv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and $usn) {
$usn | Out-File (Join-Path $OutDir 'usn_raw.csv')
$renames = ($usn | Select-String 'RENAME|FILE_CREATE' | Measure-Object).Count
Info "USN RENAME/FILE_CREATE records (recent): $renames (inspect usn_raw.csv for the burst window)"
} else { Info 'fsutil usn readjournal unavailable (journal may be cleared - itself an IOC).' }
# 5) Recently installed/modified services + scheduled tasks (persistence)
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service |
Select-Object Name,DisplayName,PathName,StartMode,State,StartName |
Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir 'services.csv') -NoTypeInformation
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
[pscustomobject]@{
TaskName=$_.TaskName; Path=$_.TaskPath; State=$_.State
Action=($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { $_.Execute + ' ' + $_.Arguments }) -join ' ; '
}
} | Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir 'scheduled_tasks.csv') -NoTypeInformation
Info 'Enumerated services + scheduled tasks (review services.csv / scheduled_tasks.csv).'
# 6) Suspect Velociraptor (CVE-2025-6264 - abused as persistence, Talos/Storm-2603 Aug 2025)
$vrSvc = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match 'velociraptor' }
$vrBin = Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Program Files','C:\ProgramData','C:\Windows\Temp' -Recurse `
-Include 'velociraptor*.exe' -File -Force 2>$null | Select-Object -First 5
if ($vrSvc -or $vrBin) {
Flag 'HIGH' 'Velociraptor present on host - verify it is YOUR deployment, not adversary persistence (CVE-2025-6264).'
foreach ($b in $vrBin) {
$v = (& $b.FullName version 2>$null | Select-String -Pattern '(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)').Matches.Value
if ($v) {
$parts = $v.Split('.') | ForEach-Object { [int]$_ }
if (($parts[0] -lt 0) -or ($parts[0] -eq 0 -and ($parts[1] -lt 73 -or ($parts[1] -eq 73 -and $parts[2] -lt 5)))) {
Flag 'HIGH' "Velociraptor $v at $($b.FullName) is < 0.73.5 -> CVE-2025-6264 vulnerable (abused build 0.73.4.0)."
} else { Info "Velociraptor $v at $($b.FullName) (>=0.73.5)." }
}
}
}
# 7) Backup-admin abuse (operators add themselves to backup admins before encrypting)
foreach ($g in @('Veeam Administrators','Backup Operators','Administrators')) {
$members = (Get-LocalGroupMember -Group $g 2>$null)
if ($members) {
$members | Select-Object Name,PrincipalSource |
Export-Csv (Join-Path $OutDir ("group_" + ($g -replace '\s','_') + ".csv")) -NoTypeInformation
}
}
Info 'Captured privileged/backup group membership (review group_*.csv for actor-added accounts).'
Write-Host ''
Write-Host "=== SUMMARY (full report: $report) ==="
$flags = Select-String -Path $report -Pattern '^\[FLAG\]'
if ($flags) {
$flags | ForEach-Object { Write-Host $_.Line }
Write-Host '[!] Active/likely ransomware indicators. PRESERVE (image + RAM) before eradication.'
Write-Host ' Containment in PARALLEL: identity (disable+revoke), hypervisor (ESXi SSH/mgmt),'
Write-Host ' backups (verify immutability). Coordinate IR on an OUT-OF-BAND channel.'
} else {
Write-Host 'No strong ransomware indicators from these checks (absence != clean; correlate with EDR/timeline).'
}
Write-Host "Output: $OutDir"
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