hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/coding-mastery
coding-mastery
VerifiedUse when writing security tooling, exploits, scanners, or C2 in Python/C/Go/Rust/ASM — systems & network programming, automation, cryptography implementation
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 14.8 KB |
| scripts/_lib/action_guard.py | script | 12.8 KB |
| scripts/_lib/cmd_parser.py | script | 10.9 KB |
| scripts/_lib/http_creds.py | script | 2.9 KB |
| scripts/_lib/private_tag.py | script | 3.9 KB |
| scripts/_lib/redact_headers.py | script | 5.1 KB |
| scripts/_lib/safe_subprocess.py | script | 18.6 KB |
| scripts/_lib/scope_guard.py | script | 11.7 KB |
| scripts/_lib/secret_scan.py | script | 5.7 KB |
| scripts/_lib/unicode_scan.py | script | 4.3 KB |
| scripts/lib.sh | script | 2.0 KB |
scripts/_lib/unicode_scan.py
View on GitHub#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""unicode_scan.py - detect/strip invisible & bidi & ASCII-smuggling codepoints.
Untrusted content we ingest (proxy traffic via redact_headers, fetched pages, retrieved
artifacts) can carry codepoints that are invisible to a human reviewer but steer a model:
zero-width characters, bidirectional overrides (Trojan-Source), the Unicode Tag block
(U+E0000-E007F "ASCII smuggling"), invisible-math operators, and stray BOM/word-joiners.
This ports the taxonomy of ecc's check-unicode-safety.js.
scan(text) -> [Hit{codepoint, index, name}] (empty = clean)
strip(text) -> text with every dangerous codepoint removed
Legitimate content (accents, CJK, emoji) is NOT flagged - only the invisible/steering set.
CLI:
unicode_scan.py --file path # exit 1 if any dangerous codepoint, else 0
unicode_scan.py --file path --write # strip in place, exit 0
unicode_scan.py --text "..."
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import sys
import unicodedata
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
# explicit dangerous singletons
_DANGEROUS = {
0x200B, # zero-width space
0x200C, # zero-width non-joiner
0x200D, # zero-width joiner
0x200E, # left-to-right mark
0x200F, # right-to-left mark
0x2060, # word joiner
0x2061, # function application (invisible)
0x2062, # invisible times
0x2063, # invisible separator
0x2064, # invisible plus
0xFEFF, # zero-width no-break space / BOM
0x061C, # arabic letter mark
0x115F, # hangul choseong filler
0x1160, # hangul jungseong filler
0x3164, # hangul filler
0xFFA0, # halfwidth hangul filler
}
# dangerous ranges (start, end inclusive)
_DANGEROUS_RANGES = [
(0x202A, 0x202E), # bidi embeddings/overrides (LRE..RLO..PDF)
(0x2066, 0x2069), # bidi isolates (LRI..PDI)
(0xE0000, 0xE007F), # Unicode Tag block - ASCII smuggling
(0xFE00, 0xFE0F), # variation selectors (used to hide payloads)
]
def _is_dangerous(cp: int) -> bool:
if cp in _DANGEROUS:
return True
for lo, hi in _DANGEROUS_RANGES:
if lo <= cp <= hi:
return True
return False
@dataclass
class Hit:
codepoint: str # e.g. "U+200B"
index: int # 0-based position in the string
name: str
def to_dict(self) -> dict:
return {"codepoint": self.codepoint, "index": self.index, "name": self.name}
def scan(text: Optional[str]) -> list[Hit]:
if not text:
return []
hits: list[Hit] = []
for i, ch in enumerate(text):
cp = ord(ch)
if _is_dangerous(cp):
try:
name = unicodedata.name(ch)
except ValueError:
name = "UNNAMED"
hits.append(Hit(f"U+{cp:04X}", i, name))
return hits
def strip(text: Optional[str]) -> str:
if not text:
return text or ""
return "".join(ch for ch in text if not _is_dangerous(ord(ch)))
def main(argv: Optional[list[str]] = None) -> int:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Detect/strip invisible & smuggling codepoints.")
g = p.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
g.add_argument("--file", help="scan this file")
g.add_argument("--text", help="scan this literal text")
p.add_argument("--write", action="store_true", help="strip dangerous codepoints in place (files only)")
p.add_argument("--json", action="store_true")
args = p.parse_args(argv)
try:
if args.file:
with open(args.file, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
text = fh.read()
else:
text = args.text
hits = scan(text)
if args.write and args.file:
cleaned = strip(text)
with open(args.file, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="") as fh:
fh.write(cleaned)
return 0
if args.json:
import json
print(json.dumps([h.to_dict() for h in hits]))
else:
for h in hits:
print(f"{h.index}: {h.codepoint} {h.name}")
if not hits:
print("ok: no dangerous codepoints")
return 1 if hits else 0
except Exception as exc:
print(f"error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit. | Stars: 470k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure. | Stars: 470k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics. | Stars: 470k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |