hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/cicd-supply-chain
cicd-supply-chain
FlaggedUse when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions, dependency confusion, registry worms, runner backdoors, OIDC trust abuse, SLSA/provenance
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.2 KB |
| references/action-dependency-compromise.md | markdown | 7.5 KB |
| references/build-integrity-defense.md | markdown | 8.2 KB |
| references/package-registry-attacks.md | markdown | 7.6 KB |
| references/pipeline-poisoning.md | markdown | 9.5 KB |
| references/runner-attacks.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| scripts/dependency_confusion.py | script | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py | script | 9.4 KB |
| scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
| scripts/provenance_verify.sh | script | 3.5 KB |
| scripts/runner_recon.sh | script | 5.1 KB |
| scripts/workflow_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py
View on GitHub#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
oidc_trust_auditor.py - Audit cloud IAM trust policies tied to a CI OIDC provider for the
classic GitHub-Actions-OIDC misconfigurations:
1. NO_SUB -> trust validates only `aud` (no `sub` condition): ANY repo on github.com can assume.
2. ORG_WILDCARD -> wildcard bleeds into the org segment, e.g. sub like `repo:acme*` -> any org
starting "acme" can assume.
3. STRINGEQ_WILD -> StringEquals used with a wildcard value (mis-scoped / never matches as intended).
4. ORG_BROAD -> `repo:org/*` allows every repo in the org (forks/dependabot/new repos).
5. PR_TRUST -> sub ends `:pull_request` -> any PR author (incl. external) runs under this trust.
Clouds:
--cloud aws : reads IAM roles via boto3 (needs configured creds; ReadOnly is enough).
--cloud gcp : parses a Workload Identity pool/provider config JSON (--file) for attribute mapping.
--cloud azure : parses federated-credential JSON (--file) for subject/issuer scoping.
--file PATH : audit a policy/config JSON offline (works for any cloud without live creds).
Usage:
python3 oidc_trust_auditor.py --provider github --cloud aws --profile target
python3 oidc_trust_auditor.py --provider github --cloud aws --file trust_policies.json
python3 oidc_trust_auditor.py --provider github --cloud gcp --file wif_provider.json
Dependencies: boto3 only for live --cloud aws (pip install boto3). Offline --file needs nothing extra.
"""
import argparse, json, re, sys
GH_ISSUER = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
def classify_aws_statement(stmt):
"""Return list of (severity, code, detail) findings for one trust-policy statement."""
out = []
principal = stmt.get("Principal", {})
fed = principal.get("Federated", "")
if isinstance(fed, list):
fed = " ".join(fed)
if GH_ISSUER not in str(fed):
return out # not a GitHub OIDC trust
cond = stmt.get("Condition", {}) or {}
# gather every sub/aud value across StringEquals / StringLike
sub_vals, aud_present, op_for_sub = [], False, None
for op in ("StringEquals", "StringLike", "ForAllValues:StringLike", "ForAnyValue:StringLike"):
block = cond.get(op, {}) or {}
for k, v in block.items():
kl = k.lower()
vals = v if isinstance(v, list) else [v]
if kl.endswith(":sub"):
sub_vals.extend(vals)
op_for_sub = op
if kl.endswith(":aud"):
aud_present = True
if not sub_vals:
out.append(("CRITICAL", "NO_SUB",
"trust validates no `sub` condition (aud only) -> ANY github.com repo can assume"))
return out
for sv in sub_vals:
# ORG_WILDCARD: wildcard before the first '/' (i.e. inside the org segment)
org_seg = sv.split("/", 1)[0]
if "*" in org_seg or "?" in org_seg:
out.append(("CRITICAL", "ORG_WILDCARD",
f"sub `{sv}` wildcards the ORG segment -> foreign orgs matching it can assume"))
if op_for_sub == "StringEquals" and ("*" in sv or "?" in sv):
out.append(("HIGH", "STRINGEQ_WILD",
f"sub `{sv}` uses StringEquals with a wildcard (use StringLike or split)"))
if re.search(r"^repo:[^/]+/\*(:\*)?$", sv):
out.append(("HIGH", "ORG_BROAD",
f"sub `{sv}` allows every repo in the org (forks/dependabot/new repos)"))
if sv.endswith(":pull_request") or ":pull_request" in sv:
out.append(("HIGH", "PR_TRUST",
f"sub `{sv}` trusts pull_request refs -> any PR author can assume"))
if not aud_present:
out.append(("MEDIUM", "NO_AUD",
"no `aud` condition; also pin aud to sts.amazonaws.com"))
return out
def audit_aws_live(profile):
import boto3
sess = boto3.Session(profile_name=profile) if profile else boto3.Session()
iam = sess.client("iam")
findings = []
paginator = iam.get_paginator("list_roles")
for page in paginator.paginate():
for role in page["Roles"]:
doc = role.get("AssumeRolePolicyDocument", {})
stmts = doc.get("Statement", [])
if isinstance(stmts, dict):
stmts = [stmts]
for st in stmts:
for sev, code, detail in classify_aws_statement(st):
findings.append({"severity": sev, "role": role["RoleName"],
"arn": role["Arn"], "code": code, "detail": detail})
return findings
def audit_file(path, cloud):
data = json.load(open(path, encoding="utf-8"))
findings = []
if cloud == "aws":
# accept a single policy, a list, or {RoleName: policyDoc}
items = data if isinstance(data, list) else (
list(data.items()) if isinstance(data, dict) and "Statement" not in data else [("(policy)", data)])
for name, doc in (items if items and isinstance(items[0], tuple) else [(d.get("RoleName", "(role)"), d) for d in (data if isinstance(data, list) else [data])]):
doc = doc.get("AssumeRolePolicyDocument", doc) if isinstance(doc, dict) else doc
stmts = doc.get("Statement", []) if isinstance(doc, dict) else []
if isinstance(stmts, dict):
stmts = [stmts]
for st in stmts:
for sev, code, detail in classify_aws_statement(st):
findings.append({"severity": sev, "role": name, "code": code, "detail": detail})
elif cloud == "gcp":
cond = json.dumps(data)
if GH_ISSUER not in cond and "githubusercontent" not in cond:
print("note: GitHub issuer not found in GCP WIF config")
if "attribute.repository" not in cond and "attributeCondition" not in cond:
findings.append({"severity": "CRITICAL", "role": data.get("name", "(wif)"),
"code": "NO_ATTR_COND",
"detail": "no attributeCondition mapping repository/ref -> any repo can federate"})
if re.search(r'assertion\.sub|attribute\.repository_owner["\s:]+[^"]*\*', cond):
findings.append({"severity": "HIGH", "role": data.get("name", "(wif)"),
"code": "OWNER_WILD", "detail": "repository_owner wildcarded in WIF condition"})
elif cloud == "azure":
subj = data.get("subject", "")
if not subj or subj.strip() == "*":
findings.append({"severity": "CRITICAL", "role": data.get("name", "(fic)"),
"code": "NO_SUBJECT", "detail": "federated credential subject empty/wildcard"})
if "pull_request" in subj:
findings.append({"severity": "HIGH", "role": data.get("name", "(fic)"),
"code": "PR_TRUST", "detail": f"subject `{subj}` trusts pull_request"})
return findings
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Audit CI OIDC cloud trust policies")
ap.add_argument("--provider", default="github", choices=["github"])
ap.add_argument("--cloud", required=True, choices=["aws", "gcp", "azure"])
ap.add_argument("--profile", help="AWS profile for live audit")
ap.add_argument("--file", help="audit a policy/config JSON offline")
ap.add_argument("--out")
args = ap.parse_args()
if args.file:
findings = audit_file(args.file, args.cloud)
elif args.cloud == "aws":
findings = audit_aws_live(args.profile)
else:
sys.exit("live audit only implemented for --cloud aws; use --file for gcp/azure")
order = {"CRITICAL": 0, "HIGH": 1, "MEDIUM": 2, "LOW": 3}
findings.sort(key=lambda f: order.get(f["severity"], 9))
for f in findings:
print(f"[{f['severity']:8}] {f.get('role','?'):35} {f['code']:14} -- {f['detail']}")
print(f"\n{len(findings)} OIDC trust finding(s).")
if args.out:
json.dump(findings, open(args.out, "w", encoding="utf-8"), indent=2)
print(f"wrote {args.out}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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