hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/cicd-supply-chain
cicd-supply-chain
FlaggedUse when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions, dependency confusion, registry worms, runner backdoors, OIDC trust abuse, SLSA/provenance
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.2 KB |
| references/action-dependency-compromise.md | markdown | 7.5 KB |
| references/build-integrity-defense.md | markdown | 8.2 KB |
| references/package-registry-attacks.md | markdown | 7.6 KB |
| references/pipeline-poisoning.md | markdown | 9.5 KB |
| references/runner-attacks.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| scripts/dependency_confusion.py | script | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py | script | 9.4 KB |
| scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
| scripts/provenance_verify.sh | script | 3.5 KB |
| scripts/runner_recon.sh | script | 5.1 KB |
| scripts/workflow_auditor.py | script | 7.9 KB |
references/build-integrity-defense.md
View on GitHub# Build Integrity & Provenance Defense (the counterweight)
ATT&CK (defends against): T1195 / T1195.001/.002 (Supply Chain Compromise) · CWE-347 (Improper
Verification of Cryptographic Signature), CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check),
CWE-1357 (Reliance on Insufficiently Trustworthy Component). Frameworks: SLSA, in-toto, Sigstore,
NIST SSDF, OWASP CICD-SEC.
## Theory / Mechanism
Every offensive technique in this skill produces a **build whose output does not match a trustworthy
record of how it was built**. Provenance + signing turns that into a detectable, *enforceable* gap:
- **SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts).** v1.0 (Apr 2023) defines a Build track,
Levels 0-3. L1 = provenance exists; L2 = signed provenance from a hosted build service; L3 =
non-falsifiable provenance from an isolated, ephemeral builder the build script can't tamper with.
- **in-toto attestation + DSSE.** Provenance is an in-toto predicate (builder identity, build
instructions, parameters, env, dependency digests) wrapped in a DSSE envelope and signed. This is
what `slsa-github-generator` emits and what `slsa-verifier` checks.
- **Sigstore (Fulcio + Rekor) keyless signing.** `cosign` signs with a short-lived cert tied to an
**OIDC identity** (the workflow's own identity) issued by Fulcio; the event is logged in the
append-only transparency log **Rekor**. No long-lived signing key to steal — the exact key-theft
vector from action/runner compromise disappears.
- **Enforcement gate.** Attestations are worthless unless something *verifies before promote*:
`slsa-verifier` / `cosign verify-attestation` in the release job, plus admission control
(Kyverno / OPA-Gatekeeper / Sigstore policy-controller) so K8s only runs signed images matching the
expected builder, repo, and ref.
Critical anti-pattern this defeats: a poisoned pipeline (PPE) or compromised action *can* edit a build
script, but with an L3 builder-provided generator the script **cannot lie about its own inputs**, and
a verifier rejects any artifact whose provenance identity/repo/ref doesn't match policy.
## Working defensive implementation (complete)
### A. Generate SLSA L3 provenance + keyless cosign signing in CI
```yaml
# .github/workflows/release.yml
permissions: { id-token: write, contents: write, packages: write, attestations: write }
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs: { digest: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }} }
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@<40-char-sha> # SHA-pin everything
- id: push
run: |
IMG=ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
docker build -t "$IMG" . && docker push "$IMG"
echo "digest=$(docker buildx imagetools inspect "$IMG" --format '{{.Manifest.Digest}}')" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# GitHub-native build attestation (provenance), keyless via the workflow OIDC identity:
- uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@<40-char-sha>
with: { subject-name: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}, subject-digest: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}, push-to-registry: true }
# SLSA L3 provenance from the trusted reusable generator (script can't forge it):
provenance:
needs: build
permissions: { id-token: write, contents: write, packages: write, actions: read }
uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@<sha>
with: { image: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}, digest: ${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }} }
```
### B. Verify BEFORE promote (the gate) — used by scripts/provenance_verify.sh
```bash
# Verify SLSA provenance: artifact must come from THIS repo via the trusted builder
slsa-verifier verify-image "ghcr.io/org/app@sha256:DIGEST" \
--source-uri github.com/org/app \
--builder-id 'https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@refs/tags/v2.0.0'
# Verify cosign keyless signature: identity must match the expected workflow + issuer
cosign verify-attestation "ghcr.io/org/app@sha256:DIGEST" --type slsaprovenance \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/org/app/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com'
```
### C. Admission control — only run verified images (Kyverno)
```yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata: { name: require-slsa-provenance }
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
rules:
- name: verify-ghcr
match: { any: [ { resources: { kinds: [Pod] } } ] }
verifyImages:
- imageReferences: [ "ghcr.io/org/*" ]
attestations:
- type: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/org/app/.github/workflows/release.yml@*"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
rekor: { url: "https://rekor.sigstore.dev" }
conditions:
- all:
- key: "{{ buildDefinition.externalParameters.workflow.repository }}"
operator: Equals
value: "https://github.com/org/app"
```
### D. Defensive recon — SBOM + pin audit + provenance check in one pass
```bash
syft packages dir:./repo -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json # inventory for confusion/typosquat triage
python3 scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py --path ./repo --check-pins # all actions SHA-pinned?
bash scripts/provenance_verify.sh --image ghcr.io/org/app:tag --repo org/app
```
## Modern 2024-2026 status (verified)
- **GitHub-native build attestations** (`actions/attest-build-provenance`, GA 2024) make SLSA L2
achievable "in an afternoon"; `slsa-github-generator` reusable workflows reach L3 on GHA.
- **`cosign` keyless + Rekor** is the de facto signing path; container registries (GHCR, Google
Artifact Registry) store attestations alongside artifacts. Verification with `slsa-verifier` /
`cosign verify-attestation` is the enforceable gate.
- **Kyverno / Sigstore policy-controller / OPA-Gatekeeper** provide admission-time verification;
NIST SSDF maps SLSA as the concrete technical control for software-integrity practices.
- Lesson from tj-actions/Shai-Hulud: SHA-pinning + provenance verification + secret rotation +
egress allowlisting are the controls that would have contained each 2025 incident.
## Detection (verification = detection, here)
- **Provenance mismatch** (builder id, source repo, ref, or digest != policy) at the verify gate or
admission controller = blocked deploy and an alert — the direct detection of a poisoned/forged build.
- **Sigma — unsigned/unverified image admitted (control failure):**
```yaml
title: Image Admitted Without Valid SLSA Provenance
id: e8b0d2c1-5a44-4b9f-9c10-cicddef0001
logsource: { product: kubernetes, service: kyverno }
detection:
sel: { policy: 'require-slsa-provenance', result: 'fail' }
condition: sel
level: high
```
- **IOCs of a control gap:** images with no Rekor entry; provenance whose `externalParameters`
repo/ref differs from the deployed source; cosign cert identity not matching the release workflow;
actions not SHA-pinned in the workflow that built a release.
## OPSEC (defender's note)
- These are *defensive* controls, but red teams should map them during recon: a target enforcing
cosign keyless + `slsa-verifier` + Kyverno admission + SHA-pinned actions + egress allowlist defeats
the mutable-tag, cache-poisoning, and forged-build vectors — pivot instead to identity/runner
compromise (still in scope) or pre-signing PPE (compromise *before* the signed step).
- Demonstrating a provenance bypass (e.g. forging inputs against a non-L3 generator, or compromising
the signing step itself) is a high-value finding for the report.
## References
- SLSA spec v1.0 (slsa.dev); in-toto attestation framework; DSSE.
- Sigstore (Fulcio, Rekor), cosign docs; `slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator`; `slsa-verifier`.
- GitHub Docs, "Using artifact attestations" (`actions/attest-build-provenance`).
- Kyverno `verifyImages` / Sigstore policy-controller; OPA-Gatekeeper.
- Legit Security, "Deep Dive Into SLSA Provenance and Software Attestation"; JFrog, "What is SLSA."
- NIST SSDF (SP 800-218) mapping to SLSA controls.
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