hashgraph-online/awesome-codex-plugins / plugins/AltByteSG/personal-data-protection-skill/skills/personal-data-protection
personal-data-protection
VerifiedPersonal-data-protection compliance reference for engineers building applications subject to Singapore PDPA, Indonesia UU PDP, Thailand PDPA, Malaysia PDPA, Philippines DPA (RA 10173), or Vietnam PDPL (91/2025/QH15). Use when reviewing or modifying code that touches personal data — signup/auth/consent, data export, account deletion, retention/purging, admin access to personal-data stores, third-party processors, breach response, or privacy/T&C documents.
jurisdictions/_index.md
View on GitHub# Jurisdictions Index
> ⚠ **Reference material only — not legal advice.** See [DISCLAIMER.md](https://github.com/AltByteSG/personal-data-protection-skill/blob/main/DISCLAIMER.md). Verify against the official statute and consult a qualified DPO / lawyer.
This skill covers Singapore PDPA, Thailand PDPA, Indonesia UU PDP, Malaysia PDPA, and Philippines DPA today, and Vietnam PDPL (Law 91/2025/QH15, in force since 1 January 2026).
| Jurisdiction | Code | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Singapore PDPA 2012 (post-2020 Amendments) | [`sg-pdpa`](sg-pdpa/) | ✅ Populated |
| Thailand PDPA B.E. 2562 (2019) | [`th-pdpa`](th-pdpa/) | ✅ Populated |
| Indonesia UU PDP No. 27/2022 | [`id-pdp`](id-pdp/) | ✅ Populated |
| Malaysia PDPA 2010 (with 2024 Amendments — Act A1727) | [`my-pdpa`](my-pdpa/) | ✅ Populated |
| Philippines Data Privacy Act 2012 (RA 10173) | [`ph-dpa`](ph-dpa/) | ✅ Populated |
| Vietnam Law on Personal Data Protection 91/2025/QH15 | [`vn-pdpl`](vn-pdpl/) | ✅ Populated |
## Cross-jurisdiction comparison
| | Singapore PDPA | Thailand PDPA | Indonesia UU PDP | Malaysia PDPA | Philippines DPA |---|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **In force since** | 2014 (orig); 2020 Amendments commenced 2021 / 2022 | 1 Jun 2022 (delayed twice from 2019 enactment) | 17 Oct 2024 (2-year transition from 17 Oct 2022 enactment) | 15 Nov 2013 (orig); 2024 Amendments (Act A1727) staged 1 Jan / 1 Apr / **1 Jun 2025** | 8 Sep 2012 (orig); IRR effective 9 Sep 2016 | **1 January 2026** (Điều 38(1)); replaced Decree 13/2023 via Decree 356/2025/NĐ-CP |
| **Lawful bases** | Consent + 1st/2nd Sch enumerated cases | 6 GDPR-style bases (s24) | 6 GDPR-style bases (Pasal 20(2)) | Consent default + s6(2) carve-outs (contract, legal obligation, vital interests, justice administration, statutory functions) | **6 GDPR-style bases for PI (§ 12)** including legitimate-interests with balancing test; narrower bases for SPI (§ 13) — explicit consent default | **Consent is the rule** (Điều 9); Điều 19 is the closed list of no-consent cases — no legitimate-interest balancing |
| **Breach notification window** | **3 calendar days** to PDPC after assessment (s26D(1)) | **72 hours** to PDPC from awareness (s37(4)) | **72 hours** from awareness — to **both** subject AND regulator (Pasal 46(1)) | **72 hours** to Commissioner from discovery (s12B(1) + JPDP Guideline 25 Feb 2025); **7 days** to subject post-Commissioner | **72 hours** from knowledge / reasonable belief — to **both** NPC AND affected subject (§ 38 IRR + NPC Circular 16-03); **annual** Security Incident Report by 31 March | **72 hours from *detection of the act*** (Điều 23(1)) — harm-based trigger (incl. **honour, dignity**), no scale threshold; Điều 23(3) also makes purpose-creep and rights failures notifiable |
| **Sensitive data** | Deemed-significant-harm categories per PDP NDB Regulations 2021 | Broad list (s26): racial, ethnic, political, religious, sexual behavior, criminal, health, disability, trade union, genetic, biometric | "Specific" Personal Data category (Pasal 4) — scope refined by implementing PP; typically health, biometric, genetic, criminal records, children's data, financial | s4: health, political opinion, religious beliefs, alleged offences, **biometric data (added 2024)**; explicit consent under s40 | § 3(l) "Sensitive Personal Information" — race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, colour, religious / philosophical / political affiliations, health, education, genetic, sexual life, criminal proceedings, **government-issued identifiers (SSS / GSIS / TIN / PhilHealth / PhilSys)**; explicit consent under § 13 | **Closed list, Decree Điều 4** — incl. **positioning-service location**, e-ID credentials + ID-card images, bank credentials / card / transaction / credit data, and **behaviour-tracking on telecom, social and online services**. Basic data is residual (Decree Điều 3(11)) |
| **Penalty cap (org)** | SGD 1M / 10% SG turnover (s48J(3)) | THB 1M / 3M / 5M tiered (s82–84); plus criminal up to THB 1M / 1 year (s79) | **2% of annual revenue per violation** (Pasal 57(3)); plus corporate criminal — fines up to 10× of natural-person max + suspension / **dissolution** (Pasal 70) | **RM 1M / 3 years per principle breach** (s5(2), raised 2024 from RM 300k / 2y); per-offence not annual-turnover-based; multiple offences stack | Per-offence criminal fines: **₱5M / 6 years** for combination (§ 33); **₱4M / 6 years** for SPI offences (§§ 25(b), 26(b)); **§ 35** imposes max-period when ≥ 100 persons affected | **5% of revenue** for cross-border violations (Điều 8(4)) — highest here; **10× the gain** for buying/selling data (Điều 8(3)); administrative, criminal and compensation all available (Điều 8(1)) |
| **DPO requirement** | Always (s11) | For (1) public authorities, (2) large-scale regular monitoring, (3) core sensitive-data activity (s41) | For (1) public-interest processing, (2) large-scale regular monitoring, (3) core sensitive-data or criminal-records processing (Pasal 53) — same shape as TH | Always for controller and processor (s12A, in force 1 Jun 2025); JPDP Guideline threshold: >20k individuals / >10k sensitive subjects | Always for every PIC and PIP (§ 14 IRR + NPC Advisory 17-01) — paperwork; engineering surface only | **Always — every organisation** must designate qualified personnel or engage a provider (Điều 33(2)); no threshold. 5-year opt-out for small/startup, outright exemption for household/micro (Điều 38(2)–(3)), both lost if processing sensitive data or data of a large number of subjects |
| **Individual criminal liability** | Yes — s48D/E/F (knowing/reckless disclosure, misuse, re-identification) — SGD 5,000 / 2 years | Yes — s79 (sensitive-data misuse), s80 (duty-holder disclosure), **s81 (director / manager omission)** broader than SG | Yes — Pasal 67 (4–5 years + IDR 4–5B), Pasal 68 (6 years + IDR 6B); corporate criminal liability (Pasal 70) extends to dissolution | Yes — s130 unlawful collecting (RM 500k / 3y); **s133 deeming liability** for directors / officers / managers unless they prove no-knowledge + due diligence | **Yes — § 34 personal liability for responsible officers** for prison terms of corporate offences; **§ 30 concealment of breach is its own offence** (1.5–5y + ₱500k–₱1M); **§ 37 court-ordered restitution to victims** | Yes — Điều 8(1) routes to criminal prosecution; Điều 7 lists prohibited acts incl. **appropriating, intentionally disclosing or losing** personal data, and buying/selling |
| **Right to restrict processing** | Not in PDPA | Yes (s34) | Yes (Pasal 11) — 72-hour SLA | Yes (s42) — prevent processing causing damage / distress | Yes — § 16(e) right to **erasure or blocking** (suspend further processing) | Yes — Điều 4(1)(d) and Điều 10, available on doubt as to scope, purpose or accuracy; not retroactive (Điều 10(4)) |
| **Right to object to automated decision-making** | Not explicit | Implicit via consent withdrawal | Yes — explicit standalone right (Pasal 10) | Not explicit; partially via s38 consent withdrawal | Yes — § 16(b) right to object includes *"automated processing or profiling"* | Objection right is explicit (Điều 4(1)(d)); AI and big-data processing separately regulated (Điều 30 + Decree Điều 9, 10) |
| **Right to data portability** | Not in PDPA | Not in PDPA | Pasal 13 — explicit | **Yes — s43A (new 2024)**, transmit to another controller subject to technical feasibility / format compatibility | Yes — NPC Circular 18-01; user receives the export (no controller-to-controller default) | Provision/export right (Điều 4(1)(d), Điều 15); domestic transfer in Điều 17 — no controller-to-controller default |
| **Within-affiliate transfer mechanism** | Sub-processor DPA / contractual binding clauses | s29 PDPC-certified Personal Data Protection Policy (BCR-equivalent) | Pasal 56 3-tier hierarchy: adequacy → adequate-and-binding safeguards → consent | s129(3)(f) due-diligence basis (post-A1727; whitelist deleted 1 Apr 2025) — controller takes the burden of proof | § 21 PIC-accountability — no whitelist, no SCCs; "contractual or other reasonable means"; NPC Circular 2020-03 for private-sector data sharing | No adequacy or SCC regime — **file a cross-border transfer impact assessment within 60 days** of first transfer (Điều 20(2)); authority may inspect yearly and **suspend transfers** (Điều 20(4)–(5)) |
| **Operational SLAs (correction / access / withdrawal / restrict)** | "As soon as reasonably possible" (PDPC guidance: 30 days for access) | Generally per request | **3 × 24 hours (72h)** for correction (Pasal 30), access (Pasal 32), stop on consent withdrawal (Pasal 40), suspend / restrict (Pasal 41) — most aggressive of the three | **21 days** for access (s31) and correction (s35) — extendable once by 14 days; data portability (s43A) period to be prescribed | **15 calendar days** default (NPC Circular 2022-04 § 11), extendable once by 15 days for complex requests | Not fixed in the Law — performed "within the period prescribed by law" (Điều 10(3)); see Decree Điều 5 for the exercise of rights |
| **Children's data threshold** | 13 (under-13 cannot give valid consent); applications often gate at 16 | s20 — under 10 requires parental consent; 10+ minors handled per Civil and Commercial Code | Pasal 25 — children's processing requires parental / guardian consent (age threshold per other Indonesian law) | Not statutorily fixed; common practice ≥ 18 (age of majority) or per applicable code of practice | Minors (< 18 per Family Code) require parental / guardian consent (§ 12(g) IRR by reference to general civil law) | Children and persons lacking or with limited civil act capacity protected under Điều 24 |
| **Mandatory DPIA** | Not statutory; PDPC guidance recommends | Not statutory | Yes — Pasal 34 with 7 enumerated triggers (similar to GDPR Art. 35) | Not statutory; JPDP guidance encourages | Not statutory; NPC Advisory 2017-03 strongly encourages PIA for high-risk processing | **Yes, and it must be *filed*** — one original to the authority within **60 days of first processing** (Điều 21(1)), plus a separate cross-border dossier (Điều 20(2)); both updated 6-monthly (Điều 22) |
When operating in multiple jurisdictions, **the strictest rule applies in each dimension**. Singapore's 3-calendar-day breach clock (s26D(1)) starts at **assessment**, while MY / TH / ID's 72-hour clocks start at **awareness / discovery** — so the awareness-based clocks bite *earlier* in practice and control the multi-jurisdiction deadline; Indonesia requires notifying the Data Subject in **all** breaches (vs SG / MY / PH significant-harm and TH high-risk thresholds); Indonesia's 72-hour SLAs for routine subject-rights requests is the most aggressive operational pressure; **Vietnam carries the highest revenue-based penalty** — 5% for cross-border violations (Điều 8(4)), above Indonesia's 2% — and is the only regime here that requires impact assessments to be **filed with the regulator**, within 60 days of first processing and of first cross-border transfer (Điều 21(1), Điều 20(2)); **Vietnam's sensitive-data list is also the broadest**, reaching positioning-service location, financial and transaction data, and behaviour-tracking on online services (Decree Điều 4(1)(h), (k), (l)) — ordinary product analytics is sensitive personal data there; Malaysia's bilingual-notice obligation under s7(3) is unique-to-MY; **Philippines is the highest-stakes criminal regime** — § 34 makes responsible officers personally liable for prison terms of corporate offences, § 30 makes concealment of breaches its own offence, and § 35 aggravates penalties to the maximum period when at least 100 persons are affected.
## Choosing your active jurisdiction(s)
Active jurisdiction is determined by **where the application's users are located**, not where the company is registered — **with one exception: Vietnam follows citizenship.** Điều 1(2)(c) of Law 91/2025/QH15 reaches anyone processing the personal data of Vietnamese citizens, with no establishment, targeting or equipment test, so a Vietnamese citizen using your product from anywhere puts you in scope. Many applications need to comply with multiple regimes simultaneously:
- App operated by a Singapore company, used by users in Singapore only → SG PDPA
- App operated by a Singapore company, used by users in SG + ID + TH + MY + PH → all five
- App operated by an Indonesian company, used only by Indonesian users → ID PDP
- App operated by a foreign company **using equipment in Malaysia** to process personal data → MY PDPA applies (s3(1)(b))
When in doubt, treat all jurisdictions where you actively market or accept users as in-scope.
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