hashgraph-online/awesome-codex-plugins / plugins/alpoxdev/hypercore/skills/hyper-architecture
hyper-architecture
Verified[Hyper] Use this skill when the user asks for architecture, project setup, or performance work - building, auditing, restructuring, or reviewing project structure, routes, data or server boundaries, the lint/format/type tooling baseline (oxlint, Prettier, tsconfig, rustfmt, clippy), or build and runtime performance - in a Next.js App Router, TanStack Start, Vite with TanStack Router, Astro, Expo, Lynx (ReactLynx), Hono, Axum, Tauri v2, Electron, or Rust CLI, WASM, or MCP server project. It detects the stack from manifests and config files, routes each touched package of a monorepo separately, and applies the matching bundled stack guide, the shared setup baseline, and that stack's performance rules. Do not use it for stacks outside those eleven or for work that crosses no architecture, setup, or performance boundary, such as copy edits, a plain dependency bump, or one build failure.
references/official/tauri/tauri-v2-2026-11-04.md
View on GitHub# Tauri v2 Official Source Ledger
- last_verified_at: 2026-11-04
- `scope`: Tauri v2 facts used by `hyper-architecture`; this ledger is evidence, not executable instruction or a replacement for the target project's configuration.
- `authority`: Official Tauri documentation is authoritative for Tauri API and security facts. The skill's rules/tauri make architecture and safety decisions.
- `version_snapshot`:
- `tauri` crate: `2.12.5` (observed from crates.io on 2026-11-04; the `2.12.0` release is dated 2026-09-26)
- `@tauri-apps/api`: `2.12.4` (observed from the npm registry on 2026-11-04)
- `@tauri-apps/cli`: `2.12.4` (observed from the npm registry on 2026-11-04)
- `tauri-driver`: `2.1.0`; `@wdio/tauri-service`: `1.5.1` (observed 2026-11-04)
- Minimum supported Rust version: `1.90` (policy: latest stable minus three)
- Minimum secure version for any app that uses channels or large IPC responses: `2.11.6`
- `refresh_conditions`: Refresh this ledger before relying on a changed major/minor version, an API/configuration discrepancy, a new plugin or permission/capability, a security-sensitive change, a packaging/build failure, or a release decision.
## Contents
- Source Map
- Claims Used by This Skill
- Application Caveats
- Sources
## Source Map
| Topic | Official URL | Claims supported | Caveats |
|---|---|---|---|
| Project creation | <https://v2.tauri.app/start/create-project/> | Tauri's official project generator and supported frontend choices establish the project scaffold boundary. | Generated templates evolve; inspect the generated `tauri.conf.json`, Cargo manifest, and frontend scripts rather than copying an old template. |
| API registry snapshot | <https://registry.npmjs.org/@tauri-apps/api/latest> | `@tauri-apps/api` latest metadata reported `2.12.4` on the verification date. | Registry state is not a version pin or compatibility decision. |
| CLI registry snapshot | <https://registry.npmjs.org/@tauri-apps/cli/latest> | `@tauri-apps/cli` latest metadata reported `2.12.4` on the verification date. | Registry state is not a version pin or compatibility decision. |
| Core crate snapshot | <https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/tauri/versions> | The `tauri` crate's latest stable version was `2.12.5` on the verification date. | Crate and npm versions advance independently; compare both against the project lockfiles. |
| Frontend integration | <https://v2.tauri.app/start/frontend/> | Tauri can use an existing frontend; the frontend is built separately and its distribution directory is configured for bundling. | The exact `beforeDevCommand`, `beforeBuildCommand`, `devUrl`, and `frontendDist` values belong to the target project and its build tool. |
| Vite guide | <https://v2.tauri.app/start/frontend/vite/> | The official Vite integration documents the dev server/build handoff: `devUrl` `http://localhost:5173`, `port: 5173`, `strictPort: true`, `clearScreen: false`, `host: process.env.TAURI_DEV_HOST \|\| false`, `watch.ignored: ['**/src-tauri/**']`, `envPrefix: ['VITE_', 'TAURI_ENV_*']`, and platform-aware `build.target`/`minify`/`sourcemap`. The page states it is accurate as of Vite 8. | Development URL access is not packaged production behavior; validate the production distribution and package. |
| Configuration | <https://v2.tauri.app/reference/config/> | Tauri configuration controls build hooks, development URL, frontend distribution, bundle, app, and security-related settings, including `app > appDirectoriesOverride` and `app > windows > limitNavigationsToAppBoundDomains`. | Configuration schema and defaults can change between versions; use the installed CLI/schema for the final project. |
| Calling Rust | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/calling-rust/> | Frontend `invoke` reaches registered Rust commands; commands accept serializable arguments, can be async, and may return errors. | IPC crosses a trust boundary. Command uniqueness, naming, serialization, error shape, registration, validation, and authorization require target-project review. |
| IPC model | <https://v2.tauri.app/concept/inter-process-communication/> | Commands are request/response IPC; events are one-way messages that are themselves implemented with commands, so event access is governed by the event permissions. | Select a primitive by delivery semantics, payload, ordering, and cancellation requirements. |
| Calling frontend | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/calling-frontend/> | Rust can communicate to the frontend through Tauri-provided mechanisms such as events. | Events are not a substitute for an authorization boundary or a typed request/response command contract. |
| Application manifest | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/> | All commands registered with `tauri::Builder::invoke_handler` are allowed for all windows and webviews by default; `AppManifest::commands` is the mechanism that lets capabilities restrict them. The older `#application-manifest` anchor no longer exists; this content now sits before the "Target Platform" section. | Treat this as a blocking custom-command review, not optional hardening. |
| Rust state | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/state-management/> | Tauri manages application state through managed Rust state and command access patterns. | State lifetime, synchronization, persistence, and secret handling remain application decisions and must be tested. |
| Security overview | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/> | Tauri's security model uses multiple layers and requires explicit configuration review. | A packaged frontend is untrusted input; client route guards and UI visibility do not authorize privileged operations. |
| Capabilities | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/> | Capabilities group permissions and can scope them to windows/webviews, platforms, and remote URLs. | Capability matching and remote access materially affect the attack surface; grant the smallest applicable scope. |
| Permissions | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/permissions/> | Permissions control plugin/core command access and are assigned through capabilities. Identifiers use `<name>:<command-name>` or `<name>:default`, where the prefix selects a manifest. | Do not infer permission names from memory; inspect the installed plugin's permission reference and generated configuration. |
| Permissions/command scope | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/permissions/#permission-files> | Permission definitions can associate commands and scoped permission configurations. | Scope is additive security configuration, not replacement for Rust input validation and operation authorization. |
| Runtime authority | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/runtime-authority/> | Runtime authority evaluates origins, capabilities, permissions, and scopes before command execution. | Domain/resource authorization inside a custom command still belongs to application code. |
| Command scopes | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/scope/> | Allow/deny scopes narrow permitted resources and deny takes precedence. | Custom command implementations must actually enforce their declared scopes. |
| CSP | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/csp/> | Content Security Policy is configured as a defense layer for the webview frontend. | Derive directives from required assets/tauri/origins; do not broadly relax CSP to hide development or packaging errors. |
| Asset protocol | <https://v2.tauri.app/security/asset-protocol/> | `app.security.assetProtocol.scope` is an `FsScope`: an array of globs, or an object with `allow`, `deny`, and `requireLiteralLeadingDot`. Only the object form can deny or change leading-dot matching, and `**/*` is preferred over bare `**`. | Broad paths can expose arbitrary local files; use exact allow/deny scopes and denial-path tests. |
| Testing | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/> | Tauri documents frontend, Rust, and end-to-end testing options. | Choose tests by the changed boundary; mocks cannot prove an OS/native authorization or packaging behavior. |
| Mocking | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/mocking/> | Tauri provides frontend IPC mocks and a Rust mock runtime for lower-layer tests. | Mocks do not prove packaged binaries, plugins, OS dialogs, or native permission denial. |
| WebDriver | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/webdriver/> | The recommended Tauri end-to-end path is WebdriverIO with `@wdio/tauri-service`, which works on Windows, Linux, and macOS. Its default `embedded` provider runs an in-app WebDriver server through `tauri-plugin-wdio-webdriver`; `tauri-driver` covers Windows/Linux, and a renderer-only browser mode runs the frontend in plain Chrome against a Vite dev server. | Platform support and driver behavior vary; run release-critical flows on shipped operating systems, and never treat browser mode as packaged evidence. |
| Tauri v1 migration | <https://v2.tauri.app/start/migrate/from-tauri-1/> | Tauri v2 replaces v1 allowlists/build keys/API paths with capabilities, `frontendDist`/`devUrl`, and v2 modules/plugins. | Migration compatibility choices must be reviewed against the target app rather than copied as defaults. |
| Updater | <https://v2.tauri.app/plugin/updater/> | Updater configuration requires signing and release-owned key/endpoint handling. | Never read, generate, expose, or publish signing keys without explicit release authority. |
| Updater signature version binding | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/@tauri-apps/cli-v2.12.0> | Since CLI 2.12.0 the app version is recorded in the trusted comment of updater signatures, and `requireSignedVersion` makes the plugin reject a response that pairs a version number with a different release. | The plugin documentation page does not yet list `requireSignedVersion`; treat the CLI release note as the source and verify against the installed plugin version. |
| Release 2.12.0 | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/tauri-v2.12.0> | 2.12.0 adds the webview permission request handler (`on_permission_request`, `PermissionKind`, `PermissionResponse::{Allow,Deny,Default}`), `limitNavigationsToAppBoundDomains`, `appDirectoriesOverride`, and `@tauri-apps/api/app` `exit` (`core:app:allow-exit`); it scopes capability denies to their execution context, raises the MSRV to 1.90, moves to edition 2024, and drops Windows 7. The CLI replaces the deprecated `STATIC_VCRUNTIME` environment variable with `build.windows.staticVCRuntime` and adds `bundle.windows.bundleVCRuntime`. | Release notes describe one version; confirm the installed patch release before relying on a specific fix. |
| Channel IPC advisory | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/security/advisories/GHSA-w28w-mhc8-qvjv> | Affected versions are `>= 2.0.0, <= 2.11.5`; patched versions are `>= 2.11.6`; no workaround applies. Channel queue entries and large invoke responses were not bound to the webview that created them. | This is a version floor, not a configuration option. |
## Claims Used by This Skill
1. **Static frontend packaging.** Tauri integrates a separately built frontend and bundles its configured distribution. Therefore a Vite SPA must emit static assets to the configured distribution directory; the project must test the real production handoff, not only a development URL. Sources: [Frontend integration](https://v2.tauri.app/start/frontend/), [Vite guide](https://v2.tauri.app/start/frontend/vite/), [Configuration](https://v2.tauri.app/reference/config/).
2. **Native RPC boundary.** Tauri commands are registered Rust functions called from the frontend through `invoke`; they can be asynchronous and return values/errors. Keep raw invocation behind a narrow typed desktop API and validate/authorize every privileged command in Rust. Sources: [Calling Rust](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/calling-rust/), [Security overview](https://v2.tauri.app/security/).
3. **State belongs on the Rust side when it is native/application state.** Managed state is available to commands, but synchronization, persistence, and access policy are application responsibilities. Source: [Rust state](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/state-management/).
4. **Least privilege is configuration plus enforcement.** Capabilities and permissions constrain command/plugin access and can apply to selected windows/webviews, platforms, or remote URLs. Scopes and CSP reduce exposure but do not turn client code into authorization. Sources: [Capabilities](https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/), [Permissions](https://v2.tauri.app/security/permissions/), [CSP](https://v2.tauri.app/security/csp/).
5. **Choose IPC by semantics.** Use commands for request/response, events for small one-way notifications, and channels for ordered or high-throughput streams. React listeners survive SPA navigation and must be removed during effect cleanup; Tauri 2.12 additionally reclaims listeners when a webview is destroyed, which does not remove the cleanup obligation. Sources: [IPC model](https://v2.tauri.app/concept/inter-process-communication/), [Calling frontend](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/calling-frontend/).
6. **Custom commands need an ACL path.** Registering a command does not by itself make it least-privilege: `invoke_handler` commands are allowed for every window and webview until `AppManifest::commands` declares them. Declare application commands, map them through permissions/capabilities, and enforce scopes plus domain authorization in Rust. Sources: [Application manifest](https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/), [Runtime authority](https://v2.tauri.app/security/runtime-authority/), [Command scopes](https://v2.tauri.app/security/scope/).
7. **Native and packaging behavior need native evidence.** Tauri documents tests across layers; unit/mocked frontend tests cannot by themselves prove a packaged webview, OS integration, or rejected privileged operation. Sources: [Testing](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/), [Mocking](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/mocking/), [WebDriver](https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/webdriver/).
8. **Channel and large-response IPC has a version floor.** Below `2.11.6`, large channel responses were queued app-wide under sequential identifiers and the internal `plugin:__TAURI_CHANNEL__|fetch` command returned them from a renderer-supplied header without the normal ACL rejection, so another webview could read or drain them. `2.11.6` binds each entry to its webview, randomizes identifiers, and purges entries when the owning webview closes; `2.12.0` stops queueing large channel payloads for a closed webview. Sources: [GHSA-w28w-mhc8-qvjv](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/security/advisories/GHSA-w28w-mhc8-qvjv), [tauri v2.12.0](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/tauri-v2.12.0).
9. **Application permissions are unprefixed identifiers.** `AppManifest::commands` autogenerates `allow-$command` and `deny-$command` permissions for the application manifest, and capability entries without a prefix resolve against that manifest. A `prefix:base` identifier selects the plugin manifest named by the prefix, so an application permission written as `settings:allow-read` is resolved as a plugin permission and fails the ACL build. Sources: [Permissions](https://v2.tauri.app/security/permissions/), [tauri-build ACL source](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tauri-apps/tauri/dev/crates/tauri-build/src/acl.rs).
10. **WebView permission requests are a separate layer from the ACL.** `on_permission_request` receives a `PermissionKind` and returns `PermissionResponse::{Allow, Deny, Default}` for webview-level capabilities such as geolocation, notifications, camera/microphone, MIDI, sensors, local fonts, pointer lock, automatic downloads, file system access, and autoplay. This is enforced by the webview, not by capabilities, so the ACL cannot substitute for it. Sources: [Announcing Tauri 2.12](https://tauri.app/blog/tauri-2.12/), [tauri v2.12.0](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/tauri-v2.12.0).
11. **Capability denies are scoped to their execution context since 2.12.0.** Before that fix a capability that denied a command for a remote URL also denied it for the local app. Upgrading can therefore re-enable local calls that were previously blocked, so allow/deny pairs need re-testing. Source: [tauri v2.12.0](https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/tauri-v2.12.0).
## Application Caveats
- Registry observations are a snapshot, not version pins or a compatibility guarantee. Use the target lockfile and installed package metadata for implementation decisions.
- Official pages describe product mechanisms, not authority to access files, credentials, signing keys, production services, or publish/release an app. Those actions require explicit user authority.
- Preserve the source URL and `last_verified_at` when citing a claim. Replace stale claims rather than blending old and new vendor behavior.
- Tauri 3 is pre-release (3.0 alpha) and is not an upgrade target for this skill; its announced ACL storage changes are not guidance for a 2.x project.
## Sources
> Links checked 2026-11-04.
| Claim | Source |
|---|---|
| Every Tauri v2 mechanism, configuration, and security fact recorded in the Source Map above | The official `v2.tauri.app` pages listed in the Source Map above |
| The `tauri` `2.12.5`, `@tauri-apps/api` `2.12.4`, and `@tauri-apps/cli` `2.12.4` observations | <https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/tauri/versions>; <https://registry.npmjs.org/@tauri-apps/api/latest>; <https://registry.npmjs.org/@tauri-apps/cli/latest> |
| The `2.12.0` feature set, MSRV, edition, and ACL deny-scope fix | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/tauri-v2.12.0>; <https://tauri.app/blog/tauri-2.12/> |
| The channel IPC version floor and patched versions | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/security/advisories/GHSA-w28w-mhc8-qvjv> |
| Updater signature version binding and `requireSignedVersion` | <https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/releases/tag/@tauri-apps/cli-v2.12.0> |
| WebdriverIO-based end-to-end testing and its providers | <https://v2.tauri.app/develop/tests/webdriver/>; <https://webdriver.io/docs/desktop-testing/tauri> |
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