goSprinto/compliance-skills / pii-detector
pii-detector
VerifiedProactive PII add-on — augments the main response with PII guidance. Auto-trigger on any form, schema, migration, model, API route, GraphQL resolver, auth flow, or data design discussion. Also fires on: middleware, webhooks, workers, seed/fixture/factory files, delete/export/purge/anonymize functions, cron jobs, HTTP clients, controllers, services, resolvers. Trigger phrases: "build a form", "collect X data", "what fields should I include", "how should I design the schema", "POC / lead / contact / user / customer information", "store / save / persist X", "sign up / login / auth / registration", "share thoughts on how to build". Trigger on field names: email, phone, name, dob, ssn, card, cvv, password, token, secret, api_key, health, biometric, ip_address, salary, session, device_id, notes, metadata (on user-facing models).
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| README.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 6.3 KB |
| layers/api-layer.md | markdown | 8.9 KB |
| layers/auth-sessions.md | markdown | 6.6 KB |
| layers/data-in-transit.md | markdown | 7.1 KB |
| layers/data-lifecycle.md | markdown | 9.3 KB |
| layers/frontend.md | markdown | 5.8 KB |
| layers/legal-consent.md | markdown | 3.9 KB |
| layers/testing-seeding.md | markdown | 6.0 KB |
| modes/inline.md | markdown | 5.7 KB |
| modes/planning.md | markdown | 4.7 KB |
| modes/repo-scan.md | markdown | 6.5 KB |
| patterns/fields.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| rules/leakage-vectors.md | markdown | 5.7 KB |
| rules/non-negotiables.md | markdown | 3.5 KB |
layers/auth-sessions.md
View on GitHub# Layer: Auth & Sessions
## When This Layer Loads
Auto-trigger inline when Claude is about to generate:
- A login, logout, signup, or registration flow
- Any JWT creation, signing, or verification code
- Any token (access, refresh, reset, API key) generation or storage
- Any session creation, validation, or invalidation
- OAuth / SSO integration code
- Password reset or MFA / OTP flows
- Any `auth`, `session`, `token`, or `credential` handling
Also loads during full repo scan.
---
## A-01: PII in JWT Payload
What to grep:
```
jwt.sign(
jsonwebtoken.sign(
JWT.encode(
jose.SignJWT(
sign(payload
new SignJWT({
```
Flag when:
- PII fields in JWT payload: `{ email, name, ssn, dob, role, phone }`
- Health or financial data in token
- Full user object signed into JWT
Why it matters: JWT payloads are base64-encoded, not encrypted. Anyone who
intercepts or decodes the token can read every field in the payload.
`atob(token.split('.')[1])` in any browser reveals it all.
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
const token = jwt.sign({
userId: user.id,
email: user.email, // PII — readable by anyone
role: user.role,
ssn: user.ssn, // critical — never in JWT
plan: user.plan
}, secret)
// Right — opaque ID only, look up everything else server-side
const token = jwt.sign({
sub: user.id, // subject — opaque ID only
iat: Date.now(),
exp: Date.now() + 3600 // always set expiry
}, secret)
// Fetch user.email, user.role from DB on each request using sub
```
Regulation: CCPA, HIPAA (if health data in token), FTC Act
---
## A-02: Token Stored in localStorage
What to grep:
```
localStorage.setItem('token'
localStorage.setItem('jwt'
localStorage.setItem('access_token'
localStorage.setItem('auth'
sessionStorage.setItem('token'
```
Flag when:
- Any auth token stored in localStorage or sessionStorage
- JWT, access token, refresh token, or API key in client-side storage
Why it matters: localStorage is accessible to any JavaScript on the page.
An XSS vulnerability anywhere on the domain exposes all tokens.
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
localStorage.setItem('token', accessToken)
// Right — server sets HttpOnly cookie, JS never touches the token
// Server-side:
res.cookie('access_token', token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: 'strict',
maxAge: 3600000
})
// Client-side: token is sent automatically with requests, JS can't read it
```
Regulation: CCPA, FTC Act, PCI-DSS
---
## A-03: No Token Expiry
What to grep:
```
jwt.sign({ (check for missing exp/expiresIn)
expiresIn: (check value — flag if > 24h for access tokens)
jwt.sign(payload, secret) (no options = no expiry)
createToken( (check implementation)
```
Flag when:
- JWT signed with no `exp` or `expiresIn`
- `expiresIn` set to days/weeks for access tokens (> 24h)
- Refresh tokens with no expiry at all
- Session tokens with no `maxAge` or `expires`
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
const token = jwt.sign({ sub: user.id }, secret) // no expiry — lives forever
// Right
const accessToken = jwt.sign({ sub: user.id }, secret, { expiresIn: '15m' })
const refreshToken = jwt.sign({ sub: user.id }, refreshSecret, { expiresIn: '7d' })
// Refresh tokens stored in DB so they can be revoked
```
Regulation: FTC Act, PCI-DSS (session timeout requirements)
---
## A-04: Password Reset Tokens — Single-Use Not Enforced
What to grep:
```
reset_token
password_reset_token
forgot_password
resetToken
verifyToken(
findOne({ reset_token:
```
Flag when:
- Reset token stored but no `used_at` or `expires_at` field
- Token not invalidated after use (can be reused)
- Token expiry too long (> 1 hour is too long for password reset)
- Token stored as plaintext (should be hashed like a password)
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
await User.update({ reset_token: token }, { where: { id: userId } })
// Token never expires, never marked used
// Right
await User.update({
reset_token_hash: await bcrypt.hash(token, 12), // hash it
reset_token_expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 3600000), // 1 hour
reset_token_used_at: null
}, { where: { id: userId } })
// On use:
await User.update({
reset_token_hash: null,
reset_token_expires_at: null,
reset_token_used_at: new Date()
}, { where: { id: userId } })
```
Regulation: FTC Act, HIPAA (for health platforms)
---
## A-05: OAuth Scope Over-Request
What to grep:
```
scope:
scopes:
'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/
offline_access
openid profile email
passport.use(
```
Flag when:
- Requesting `offline_access` when refresh tokens aren't needed
- Requesting full profile scope when only email is used
- Google: requesting drive, calendar, or contacts when only email needed
- GitHub: requesting `repo` (full repo access) when only user info needed
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
const scopes = ['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'offline_access',
'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive']
// Right — request only what you actually use
const scopes = ['openid', 'email']
```
Regulation: FTC Act (data minimization principle), CCPA
---
## A-06: Session Not Invalidated on Logout
What to grep:
```
app.post('/logout'
router.post('/logout'
def logout(
async logout(
signOut(
```
Flag when:
- Logout only deletes client-side cookie/token without server-side invalidation
- No session store deletion on logout
- JWT-based auth with no token blocklist or short enough expiry
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong — client-side only logout
app.post('/logout', (req, res) => {
res.clearCookie('session') // cookie gone but server doesn't know
res.json({ success: true })
})
// Right — invalidate server-side too
app.post('/logout', async (req, res) => {
const token = req.cookies.session
await SessionStore.delete(token) // invalidate in DB/Redis
await TokenBlocklist.add(token) // blocklist if JWT
res.clearCookie('session', { httpOnly: true, secure: true })
res.json({ success: true })
})
```
Regulation: FTC Act, PCI-DSS, HIPAA
---
## A-07: MFA / OTP Codes Stored Plaintext or Without Expiry
What to grep:
```
otp_code
mfa_code
verification_code
two_factor_code
totp_secret
backup_codes
```
Flag when:
- OTP stored as plaintext integer/string without expiry
- TOTP secret stored without encryption
- Backup codes stored plaintext (should be hashed like passwords)
- No `expires_at` on OTP codes
Fix pattern:
```javascript
// Wrong
await User.update({ otp_code: 123456 }, { where: { id: userId } })
// Right
await User.update({
otp_code_hash: await bcrypt.hash('123456', 12), // hash it
otp_expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 600000), // 10 min max
otp_attempts: 0 // rate limit attempts
}, { where: { id: userId } })
```
Regulation: FTC Act, HIPAA, PCI-DSS
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