github/awesome-copilot / skills/github-actions-hardening
github-actions-hardening
VerifiedSecurity hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like "is this workflow safe?", "review my CI for security issues", "why is pull_request_target dangerous here?", "pin my actions", or "lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target / workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV/GITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.6 KB |
| references/injection.md | markdown | 3.0 KB |
| references/permissions-and-tokens.md | markdown | 2.7 KB |
| references/report-format.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/supply-chain.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/triggers-and-privilege.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
references/supply-chain.md
View on GitHub# Supply Chain
A workflow runs other people's code every time it `uses:` an action. Those actions execute with
your token and (on privileged triggers) your secrets, so their integrity is your integrity.
## Pin Third-Party Actions to a Commit SHA
Tags (`@v4`) and branches (`@main`) are **mutable** — the upstream owner (or anyone who compromises
them) can repoint them to new code without you changing a line. A full 40-character commit SHA is
immutable.
```yaml
# Mutable — the tag can be moved to malicious code
- uses: some-org/some-action@v3
# Pinned — this exact tree, forever
- uses: some-org/some-action@3f1e0a9c8b7d6e5f4a3b2c1d0e9f8a7b6c5d4e3f # v3.2.1
```
Rules:
* Third-party actions (anything not `actions/*` or `github/*`) → **MUST** be SHA-pinned. Flag tags
and branches as HIGH.
* `@main` / `@master` → HIGH regardless of publisher; that is unversioned "latest".
* First-party `actions/*` → SHA-pinning is the hardened recommendation (LOW if only tag-pinned).
* Keep a trailing `# vX.Y.Z` comment so humans and Dependabot can read the intended version.
This is not theoretical: real incidents have seen popular actions' tags repointed to code that
exfiltrated secrets from every workflow that referenced the mutable tag.
## Let Dependabot Update the Pins
SHA pins go stale. Enable Dependabot for the `github-actions` ecosystem so updates arrive as
reviewable PRs (it understands the `# vX.Y.Z` comment and bumps the SHA):
```yaml
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
```
## Artifact and Cache Poisoning
* An artifact uploaded by an untrusted `pull_request` build is **untrusted data**. A privileged
`workflow_run` may download it, but must treat it as data only — never execute it, and validate
paths when extracting (a crafted artifact can contain `../` path-traversal entries).
* Caches are keyed and can be populated by less-privileged runs; do not trust cached build outputs
to be untampered in a privileged context.
## Self-Hosted Runners on Public Repos
Default (GitHub-hosted) runners are ephemeral — a fresh VM per job, destroyed after. **Self-hosted
runners persist**, so untrusted fork PR code running on one can:
* Leave behind tools/backdoors for the next job,
* Read other repositories' checkouts or credentials on the same machine,
* Pivot into your network.
Never use self-hosted runners for workflows that public forks can trigger. If you must, use
ephemeral, isolated, single-use runners and never expose secrets to fork-triggered jobs.
## `checkout` Credential Persistence
`actions/checkout` writes the token into `.git/config` by default so later `git` steps can push.
If the job subsequently runs untrusted code, that code can read the token. Set
`persist-credentials: false` when you don't need to push, especially before running build/test of
untrusted code.
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