Skip to content

github/awesome-copilot / skills/github-actions-hardening

github-actions-hardening

Verified

Security hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss β€” untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like "is this workflow safe?", "review my CI for security issues", "why is pull_request_target dangerous here?", "pin my actions", or "lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target / workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV/GITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.

references/report-format.md

View on GitHub
# Report Format

Use this structure for every workflow hardening review.

## 1. Summary Table (always first)

```
GitHub Actions Hardening β€” <workflow file(s) reviewed>

| Severity   | Count |
| ---------- | ----- |
| πŸ”΄ CRITICAL | 1     |
| 🟠 HIGH     | 2     |
| 🟑 MEDIUM   | 1     |
| πŸ”΅ LOW      | 1     |
| βšͺ INFO     | 0     |
```

If nothing was found: `No issues found. Checked: triggers, injection sinks, permissions, action
pinning, secret handling.`

## 2. Findings (grouped by issue type, not by file)

For each finding use a card:

```
### πŸ”΄ CRITICAL β€” Script injection via PR title on a privileged trigger

File: .github/workflows/triage.yml  (line 14)
Trigger: pull_request_target

Offending code:
    - run: echo "New PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

Risk: pull_request_target runs with a read/write token and repository secrets, and any
contributor can open a PR with a title like  "; <attacker-command> #  which is executed as shell.
This allows secret exfiltration and pushes with the workflow token.

Fix:
    - env:
        PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
      run: echo "New PR: $PR_TITLE"

Confidence: High
```

## 3. Remediation Blocks

Every CRITICAL and HIGH finding includes a concrete before/after. Preserve the author's
indentation, step names, and surrounding structure β€” change only what fixes the issue, and add a
one-line comment explaining the change where it isn't obvious.

## 4. Closing Note

End with the explicit line:

> Review each change before committing. Nothing has been modified.

## Style Rules

* Quote the exact offending line and give its location.
* Explain risk in plain English β€” what an attacker actually does, not just the rule name.
* Per-finding confidence: High / Medium / Low.
* Don't inflate severity: a fork `pull_request` (read-only token, no secrets) running untrusted
  code is not CRITICAL on its own.
rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit.Stars: 467kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure.Stars: 467kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics.Stars: 467kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first.Stars: 193kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall