github/awesome-copilot / skills/github-actions-hardening
github-actions-hardening
VerifiedSecurity hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like "is this workflow safe?", "review my CI for security issues", "why is pull_request_target dangerous here?", "pin my actions", or "lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target / workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV/GITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.6 KB |
| references/injection.md | markdown | 3.0 KB |
| references/permissions-and-tokens.md | markdown | 2.7 KB |
| references/report-format.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/supply-chain.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/triggers-and-privilege.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
references/permissions-and-tokens.md
View on GitHub# Permissions and Tokens
Every workflow run gets an automatic `GITHUB_TOKEN`. Its scope is the blast radius if a step is
compromised, so scope it to the minimum.
## The Default Is Too Broad
If a workflow has no `permissions:` block, it inherits the repository/organization default. On
older or permissive repos that default is **read/write to most scopes**. A single injected command
or malicious dependency then runs with the ability to push code, publish releases, or approve PRs.
## Least-Privilege Recipe
Set a restrictive default at the top level, then elevate per job only where needed.
```yaml
# Deny by default
permissions: {}
jobs:
build:
permissions:
contents: read # checkout only
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: [...]
comment:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write # this job posts a comment; nothing else
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: [...]
```
Common scopes: `contents`, `pull-requests`, `issues`, `actions`, `packages`, `id-token`,
`deployments`, `checks`, `statuses`. Each is `read`, `write`, or `none`.
## Findings to Flag
* No `permissions:` block anywhere → MEDIUM (inherits possibly-broad default).
* `permissions: write-all` → HIGH.
* A `write` scope the job's steps never use → HIGH (drop it).
* Top-level `write` that should live on one job → MEDIUM (move it down).
## OIDC Instead of Long-Lived Cloud Secrets
Storing static cloud keys (`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, etc.) as repo secrets means a leak is permanent
until manually rotated. Prefer OpenID Connect: the workflow requests a short-lived token the cloud
provider trusts, scoped to that repo/branch, expiring in minutes.
```yaml
permissions:
id-token: write # required to request the OIDC token
contents: read
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@<sha>
with:
role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/my-ci-role
aws-region: us-east-1
# no AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY secrets needed
```
The same pattern exists for Azure (`azure/login`), GCP (`google-github-actions/auth`), HashiCorp
Vault, and others. On the cloud side, scope the trust policy to the specific repo and ideally a
specific branch/environment so a fork or another repo cannot assume the role.
## Secret Hygiene
* Reference secrets only in the jobs that need them.
* Never `echo` a secret or enable shell tracing (`set -x`) in a step that handles one.
* Don't pass secrets into third-party actions you haven't pinned and reviewed.
* Remember fork `pull_request` runs get no secrets — don't try to "fix" that by switching to
`pull_request_target` (see `triggers-and-privilege.md`).
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