ericrisco/rsc-harness / skills/wordpress
wordpress
VerifiedUse when building or hardening WordPress sites or WooCommerce stores and treating WordPress as the product rather than just writing PHP — block themes with theme.json, plugins with block.json and proper hooks, wp-config security hardening, performance (object cache, asset loading, autoloaded options), and WP-CLI operations. NOT a Laravel app (that is `laravel`).
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 11.6 KB |
| evals/README.md | markdown | 852 B |
| evals/cases.yaml | config | 3.1 KB |
| references/hardening.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/performance.md | markdown | 3.2 KB |
| references/woocommerce.md | markdown | 2.6 KB |
| scripts/verify.shexecutable | script | 3.3 KB |
references/hardening.md
View on GitHub# WordPress hardening
The full baseline behind the SKILL.md security section. Apply top-down; each item closes a real attack path.
## wp-config.php constants
```php
// Block code edits from the dashboard entirely
define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true ); // no Theme/Plugin code editor
define( 'DISALLOW_FILE_MODS', true ); // also no install/update from UI (lock managed hosts)
// Transport & cookies
define( 'FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true );
// Updates — keep minor/security patches automatic
define( 'WP_AUTO_UPDATE_CORE', 'minor' );
// Move wp-config one level above webroot when the host allows it.
```
Regenerate the salt keys (`AUTH_KEY`, `SECURE_AUTH_KEY`, `LOGGED_IN_KEY`, `NONCE_KEY` and their salts) from `https://api.wordpress.org/secret-key/1.1/salt/`. These are the only "secrets" that belong in `wp-config.php`. Never commit a real `wp-config.php` with live values — ship a `wp-config-sample.php` and inject via environment on deploy.
## File permission matrix
| Target | Mode | Note |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Directories | `755` | `find . -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \;` |
| Files | `644` | `find . -type f -exec chmod 644 {} \;` |
| `wp-config.php` | `600` (or `640`) | readable only by the web user |
| `wp-content/uploads` | `755`, no PHP execution | block `*.php` there |
The web server user should own files but not be able to write to core/theme/plugin dirs in production — write access is what turns a single upload bug into RCE.
## Block PHP execution in uploads
nginx:
```nginx
location ~* /wp-content/uploads/.*\.php$ { deny all; }
```
Apache (`wp-content/uploads/.htaccess`):
```apache
<FilesMatch "\.php$">
Require all denied
</FilesMatch>
```
## Security headers
nginx:
```nginx
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
```
## Login & account hardening
- Enforce strong passwords and a 2FA/passkey plugin; WP 6.8 introduced bcrypt password hashing so legacy hashes are upgraded transparently on next login.
- Rate-limit `wp-login.php` (fail2ban, host WAF, or a lockout plugin). Brute force is the most common automated attack.
- Never ship a user literally named `admin`. Use least-privilege roles; editors do not need `manage_options`.
## Application Passwords (machine auth)
For REST/API access — a headless front end, CI, an integration — issue an Application Password (WP 5.6+) per consumer:
```bash
wp user application-password create admin "ci-deploy" --porcelain
```
They are individually revocable, do not grant `wp-login.php` access, and bypass interactive 2FA for machines. Send as HTTP Basic over TLS:
```bash
curl --user 'admin:xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx' https://example.com/wp-json/wp/v2/posts
```
Revoke from Users → Profile → Application Passwords (or `wp user application-password delete`) when a consumer is retired.
## Reduce attack surface
```php
// Stop user enumeration via the REST users endpoint for anonymous callers
add_filter( 'rest_endpoints', function ( $endpoints ) {
unset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users'], $endpoints['/wp/v2/users/(?P<id>[\d]+)'] );
return $endpoints;
} );
// Remove version disclosure
remove_action( 'wp_head', 'wp_generator' );
```
Disable XML-RPC unless something genuinely needs it (`add_filter('xmlrpc_enabled','__return_false')`) — it is a pingback-amplification and brute-force vector. Block `/xmlrpc.php` at the server when fully unused.
## Update discipline
2024 logged 7,966 new ecosystem vulnerabilities (+34% YoY); nearly all exploited installs were running a known-vulnerable plugin/theme. The cheapest defense is patching:
```bash
wp core update && wp core update-db
wp plugin update --all
wp theme update --all
```
Automate via cron + a staging smoke test before production.
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