dirien/yet-another-agent-harness / .claude/skills/security-audit
security-audit
UnverifiedComprehensive security audit covering OWASP Top 10, secrets detection, supply chain security, threat modeling, and language-specific vulnerability patterns. Investigates actual code paths rather than grep-matching keywords. Generates a scored SECURITY_AUDIT.md with prioritized remediation. Use when assessing application security, preparing for a security review, or onboarding to a codebase with security concerns.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.7 KB |
| references/language-security.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/owasp-patterns.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| references/report-template.md | markdown | 3.1 KB |
| references/secrets-and-supply-chain.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/threat-model.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
references/owasp-patterns.md
View on GitHub<!-- Copyright 2025-2026 Richard Shade. Licensed under Apache-2.0. -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 -->
# OWASP Top 10 analysis patterns
For each category, investigate actual code paths — not just grep
matches. Read surrounding code to determine if a match is a real
vulnerability, a false positive, or already mitigated.
## A01: Broken access control
**Investigate:**
- API handlers/routes: do they check authorization before acting?
- Direct object references: can users access resources by changing
IDs in URLs?
- Missing function-level access control: are admin endpoints
protected?
- CORS misconfiguration: is `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` used?
**Evidence to look for:**
- Handlers without middleware/decorator for auth checks
- ID parameters used directly in database queries without ownership
verification
- Admin routes accessible without role checks
- CORS allowing all origins in production config
## A02: Cryptographic failures
**Investigate:**
- Password storage: bcrypt/argon2/scrypt, or weak MD5/SHA1?
- Data in transit: TLS enforced? HTTP redirects to HTTPS?
- Sensitive data at rest: encrypted? Which algorithm?
- Random number generation: crypto/rand or math/rand?
**Language-specific patterns:**
- Go: `crypto/rand` (secure) vs `math/rand` (insecure for security)
- Node: `crypto.randomBytes` (secure) vs `Math.random` (insecure)
- Python: `secrets` module (secure) vs `random` (insecure)
## A03: Injection
**Investigate:**
- SQL: string concatenation in queries vs parameterized statements
- Command injection: user input in exec/system calls
- NoSQL: `$where`, `$regex`, unsanitized operators in MongoDB queries
- LDAP, XPath, template injection patterns
- GraphQL: unbounded queries, introspection in production
**Key distinction:** A query using `fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM users
WHERE id = %s", userInput)` is vulnerable. The same query using
`db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1", userInput)` is safe.
Read the actual query construction, not just the presence of `Query`.
## A04: Insecure design
**Investigate:**
- Rate limiting on authentication endpoints
- Account lockout after failed login attempts
- Input validation at trust boundaries (API entry points)
- Business logic flaws: can workflows be bypassed or reordered?
- Missing CAPTCHA on public-facing forms
## A05: Security misconfiguration
**Investigate:**
- Debug mode enabled in production configs
- Default credentials still active
- Unnecessary features enabled (directory listing, stack traces)
- Security headers missing (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
- Overly permissive CORS, file permissions, or IAM policies
- Error messages leaking internal details
## A06: Vulnerable and outdated components
**Tools to run (if available):**
```bash
# Multi-language
trivy fs --severity HIGH,CRITICAL .
# Go
govulncheck ./...
# Node
npm audit --audit-level=moderate
# Python
pip-audit
# Rust
cargo audit
```
**Also check:** Are lockfiles committed? Does CI run vulnerability
scanning? When were dependencies last updated?
## A07: Identification and authentication failures
**Investigate:**
- Password complexity requirements enforced?
- Session tokens: secure, httpOnly, sameSite flags on cookies?
- JWT: short expiry? Refresh token rotation? Algorithm pinned
(not `alg: none`)?
- Credential stuffing protection: rate limiting + account lockout?
- Password reset: token-based with expiry, or insecure
(security questions, email link without token)?
## A08: Software and data integrity failures
**Investigate:**
- CI/CD pipeline: are secrets injected securely?
- Dependency resolution: lockfile committed and verified?
- Code signing: are releases signed?
- Deserialization: untrusted data deserialized without validation?
**Language-specific deserialization risks:**
- Python: unsafe deserialization (pickle, shelve, yaml.load)
- Node: dynamic code execution on user input
- Go/Java: custom deserialization of untrusted input
## A09: Security logging and monitoring failures
**Investigate:**
- Are login attempts (success and failure) logged?
- Are authorization failures logged?
- Are logs protected from tampering?
- Is sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) excluded from logs?
- Is there alerting on suspicious patterns?
## A10: Server-side request forgery (SSRF)
**Investigate:**
- HTTP clients that accept user-provided URLs
- URL validation: allowlist vs blocklist approach?
- Internal network access from user-controlled requests
- Redirect following: disabled or limited?
- Cloud metadata endpoints accessible (169.254.169.254)?
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