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executive-onboarding-playbook

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Plan a VP or CPO 30-60-90 day diagnostic onboarding path. Use when entering a new executive product role and avoiding premature change.

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examples/sample-lifesciences.md

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# Executive Onboarding Example — Life Sciences

The `sample.md` example follows a VP Product into a SaaS company. This one follows the same
playbook into **Brightwater Biologics**, a clinical-stage biotech whose product team builds
Trialpath, the platform its trial sites and monitors run on.

**Why the org shape changes the onboarding:** the product organization is not the company's main
event. The therapy program is. A product leader here has to establish what product work is *for*
before establishing how it should run — and the answer determines whether the role is real.

---

## Context

Marcus was hired as VP Product at Brightwater after eight years in enterprise SaaS. ~180 employees,
roughly a quarter in clinical operations, no approved product, no product revenue. He inherits a
team of four PMs and a platform two CRO partners have asked to license.

---

## Phase 0 (Before Day 1): Pre-Entry Checks

**Inputs gathered before accepting**

The five questions, and what the CEO's answers revealed:

- *First 90 days / first year?* — "Get Trialpath ready to sell." **Specific, and alarming.** Nobody
  had assessed whether it could be sold.
- *All-stars?* — Named two PMs, both described in terms of responsiveness to clinical operations
  rather than product outcomes. **Signal about what the org currently rewards.**
- *Gaps?* — "The team is reactive." Marcus noted this as a hypothesis to test, not a finding —
  reactive teams are usually a structural symptom.
- *Constraints?* — Engineering capacity is shared with the trial data pipeline. **The real
  constraint, stated plainly and early.**
- *Success at one year?* — "Three external customers on Trialpath."

**Risk signals identified**

- Success defined as an outcome (three customers) that depends on a regulatory gate nobody had
  assessed — vendor-grade validation documentation
- Shared engineering with the trial program means every product decision is a capital allocation
  decision against the company's actual mission
- No product leadership predecessor; the function was run out of clinical operations

**Decision**

Accepted — with one negotiated change: the one-year goal was restated as *"a validated,
sellable platform with a demonstrated pilot,"* not three signed customers. Marcus's reasoning:
he could commit to the work, not to a sales outcome gated by an unassessed regulatory question.

**Why this matters:** taking the original goal would have meant owning a number whose feasibility
nobody had established. The negotiation *was* the diligence.

---

## Phase 1 (Month 1): Diagnose

**Actions**

- 30-minute conversations with four PMs, the clinical ops director, the head of engineering, the
  CFO, and — critically — two study coordinators at partner sites who use Trialpath daily
- Included site coordinators deliberately: they're the users, they don't work for Brightwater, and
  no previous product leader had spoken to them

**Pattern signals (3+ independent sources)**

- Trialpath's roadmap is set by whichever clinical operations request is loudest that month
- "Validation documentation" surfaced in every engineering conversation and none of the leadership
  ones
- Coordinators at both sites had built spreadsheet workarounds for the same workflow

**Single-source, held loosely**

- One PM's assertion that the CRO partners "will definitely sign." Incentive noted: he had sourced
  the conversations.

**Things he wanted to fix and did not**

| What | Why it looks broken | What he didn't yet know |
|---|---|---|
| No roadmap process | Requests go straight to backlog | Whether that's dysfunction or a rational response to a trial program that genuinely reprioritizes |
| Team labeled "reactive" | Matches the CEO's account | Whether the structure permits anything else |

---

## Phase 2 (Month 2): Validate

- **Hypothesis: the team is reactive by disposition.** *Broke.* The PMs had twice attempted
  quarterly planning; both times a trial timeline change invalidated it within weeks. **They're
  responding rationally to genuine volatility.** The CEO's diagnosis was wrong, and Marcus now had
  evidence rather than an opinion.
- **Hypothesis: validation documentation is a compliance task.** *Broke.* Regulatory confirmed it's
  a prerequisite for selling to anyone, and no one had scoped it. **This is the gate on the CEO's
  entire one-year goal.**
- **Unwritten strategy:** the company optimizes for the trial program, correctly. Product's real job
  is to make trials run better; licensing is a possibility, not a mandate. Nobody had said this out
  loud, and the stated goal implied the opposite.

---

## Phase 3 (Month 3): Act with Evidence

**Shared assessment (to CEO and team):**

- The team is not reactive by disposition — it's structurally unable to hold a quarterly plan
  against trial volatility. Fixing it means changing the planning cadence, not the people
- Vendor-grade validation is the gate on external licensing, unscoped, and estimated at two
  engineer-quarters
- Recommendation: **treat licensing as a funded pilot with a kill criterion, not a commitment.**
  Assess validation first; decide after

**Changes underway (three, not twenty):**
1. Six-week planning cycles instead of quarterly, matching the volatility the team actually faces
2. Validation scoping as the first funded workstream
3. Standing monthly contact with two site coordinators — the users nobody was talking to

**People:** the PM described as an all-star was strong at clinical-ops responsiveness and had never
been asked for product judgment. Given the validation workstream as a stretch assignment.

---

## What this example teaches that the SaaS one can't

- **The Phase 0 negotiation was the highest-leverage act of the whole onboarding.** Restating the
  one-year goal from a sales outcome to a delivery outcome prevented owning a number gated by an
  unassessed regulatory question. That happened before day one.
- **The CEO's people diagnosis was wrong, and evidence — not diplomacy — resolved it.** "Reactive"
  was structural. Acting on the CEO's framing in Month 1 would have targeted the wrong problem and
  probably the wrong people.
- **The product org isn't the main event, and pretending otherwise fails.** Product's real job is to
  make trials run better. Naming the unwritten strategy out loud reframed licensing from mandate to
  option.
- **The users didn't work for the company.** Site coordinators had never been interviewed by a
  product leader. In SaaS your users are a support ticket away; here reaching them is a deliberate
  act that has to be built into the cadence.
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