davila7/claude-code-templates / .claude-plugin/skills/owasp-security
owasp-security
UnverifiedComprehensive OWASP-aligned security guidance across six standards - Top 10 (2021) for web apps, ASVS 5.0, MASVS v2.1.0 for mobile, API Security Top 10 (2023), Kubernetes Top 10 (2022), and the Agentic Applications 2026 edition for AI/LLM. Use for security reviews, vulnerability audits, secure auth/crypto/access-control implementation, Kubernetes manifest hardening, and LLM/agent prompt-injection defense - including indirect requests like "is this login flow secure?", "review this endpoint", or "audit my pod spec".
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| README.md | markdown | 8.5 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 29.2 KB |
| examples/api-auth-bypass.js | script | 3.0 KB |
| examples/broken-access-control.py | script | 7.0 KB |
| examples/cryptographic-failures.js | script | 7.5 KB |
| examples/injection.js | script | 2.0 KB |
| examples/k8s-rbac.yaml | config | 4.5 KB |
| examples/logging-monitoring-failures.py | script | 14.2 KB |
| examples/prompt-injection.txt | markdown | 9.9 KB |
| examples/security-misconfiguration.py | script | 12.0 KB |
| examples/xss.html | other | 4.3 KB |
| owasp-css-instructions.md | markdown | 4.2 KB |
| skill.json | config | 11.9 KB |
examples/k8s-rbac.yaml
View on GitHub# Kubernetes RBAC Misconfiguration Example
# For detailed guidance, see: SKILL.md#section-5-owasp-kubernetes-top-10-2022
#
# This YAML demonstrates Kubernetes security misconfigurations:
# - K02: Overly Permissive RBAC (wildcard permissions)
# - K01: Insecure Workload Configurations (privileged pods, no resource limits)
# - K03: Secrets Management Failures (unencrypted secrets)
---
# VULNERABLE: Service account with wildcard permissions (K02)
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: overpower-role
rules:
- apiGroups: ["*"]
resources: ["*"]
verbs: ["*"] # DANGEROUS: Allows everything!
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: overpower-binding
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: overpower-role
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: app-sa
namespace: default
---
# VULNERABLE: Privileged pod with no resource limits (K01)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: privileged-app
namespace: default
spec:
serviceAccountName: app-sa
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:latest # VULNERABLE: No tag (always pulls latest)
securityContext:
privileged: true # DANGEROUS: Full host access!
runAsUser: 0 # DANGEROUS: Runs as root (UID 0)
# MISSING: No resource limits - can exhaust node resources
# MISSING: No readinessProbe/livenessProbe
volumeMounts:
- name: secret
mountPath: /etc/secret
readOnly: false # DANGEROUS: Writable secret mount
volumes:
- name: secret
secret:
secretName: app-secret
---
# VULNERABLE: Secret stored in plaintext YAML (K03)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: app-secret
type: Opaque
stringData:
database_password: "MySecurePassword123!" # DANGEROUS: Plaintext in YAML
api_key: "sk-abc123xyz789"
# In etcd this is only base64 encoded, not encrypted!
---
# SECURE: Proper RBAC with least-privilege
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: reader-role
namespace: default
rules:
# SECURE: Specific permissions only
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["configmaps"]
verbs: ["get", "list"] # Explicit verbs
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
resources: ["deployments"]
resourceNames: ["my-app"] # Specific resource only
verbs: ["get"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: reader-binding
namespace: default
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: reader-role
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: app-sa
namespace: default
---
# SECURE: Hardened pod configuration (K01)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: secure-app
namespace: default
spec:
serviceAccountName: app-sa
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 2000
containers:
- name: app
image: myapp:v1.2.3 # SECURE: Specific version tag
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
securityContext:
privileged: false # SECURE: No privileged access
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true # SECURE: Immutable root FS
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL # SECURE: Drop all dangerous capabilities
add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE # Only add what's needed
# SECURE: Resource limits enforced
resources:
requests:
memory: "64Mi"
cpu: "100m"
limits:
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "500m"
# SECURE: Health checks
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ready
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
volumeMounts:
- name: secret
mountPath: /etc/secret
readOnly: true # SECURE: Read-only
- name: tmp
mountPath: /tmp
volumes:
- name: secret
secret:
secretName: app-secret
defaultMode: 0400 # SECURE: Restricted permissions
- name: tmp
emptyDir: {}
---
# SECURE: Secret managed external or with encryption
# In production, use:
# - Kubernetes Secrets encryption-at-rest in etcd
# - External secret management (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager)
# - Do NOT store in YAML files
# - Do NOT commit secrets to Git
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: app-secret
type: Opaque
data:
# Data should be base64 encoded only (not in yaml files!)
# Example: echo -n "password" | base64 => cGFzc3dvcmQ=
database_password: cGFzc3dvcmQ=
# In production: Enable encryption-at-rest in etcd
# --encryption-provider-config=/etc/kubernetes/encryption.yaml
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