davila7/claude-code-templates / .claude-plugin/skills/owasp-security
owasp-security
UnverifiedComprehensive OWASP-aligned security guidance across six standards - Top 10 (2021) for web apps, ASVS 5.0, MASVS v2.1.0 for mobile, API Security Top 10 (2023), Kubernetes Top 10 (2022), and the Agentic Applications 2026 edition for AI/LLM. Use for security reviews, vulnerability audits, secure auth/crypto/access-control implementation, Kubernetes manifest hardening, and LLM/agent prompt-injection defense - including indirect requests like "is this login flow secure?", "review this endpoint", or "audit my pod spec".
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| README.md | markdown | 8.5 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 29.2 KB |
| examples/api-auth-bypass.js | script | 3.0 KB |
| examples/broken-access-control.py | script | 7.0 KB |
| examples/cryptographic-failures.js | script | 7.5 KB |
| examples/injection.js | script | 2.0 KB |
| examples/k8s-rbac.yaml | config | 4.5 KB |
| examples/logging-monitoring-failures.py | script | 14.2 KB |
| examples/prompt-injection.txt | markdown | 9.9 KB |
| examples/security-misconfiguration.py | script | 12.0 KB |
| examples/xss.html | other | 4.3 KB |
| owasp-css-instructions.md | markdown | 4.2 KB |
| skill.json | config | 11.9 KB |
examples/broken-access-control.py
View on GitHub# OWASP Top 10 - A01: Broken Access Control
# For detailed guidance, see: SKILL.md#section-1-owasp-top-10-2021
#
# This example demonstrates broken access control vulnerabilities where users can
# access resources they shouldn't have permission to view or modify.
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify, session
from functools import wraps
app = Flask(__name__)
app.secret_key = "secret"
# Simulated user database
users_db = {
1: {"name": "Alice", "email": "alice@example.com", "role": "user"},
2: {"name": "Bob", "email": "bob@example.com", "role": "admin"},
3: {"name": "Charlie", "email": "charlie@example.com", "role": "user"},
}
orders_db = {
1: {"user_id": 1, "product": "Laptop", "price": 999},
2: {"user_id": 1, "product": "Mouse", "price": 25},
3: {"user_id": 2, "product": "Keyboard", "price": 75},
4: {"user_id": 3, "product": "Monitor", "price": 300},
}
# ===== VULNERABLE: No Authorization Check =====
@app.route("/vulnerable/user/<int:user_id>", methods=["GET"])
def vulnerable_get_user(user_id):
"""
VULNERABLE (A01): No authentication AND no authorization check. Any caller -
authenticated or not - can read any user's profile, including email and other
sensitive data. The secure version below adds @require_auth (authentication)
plus an ownership/role check (authorization) to fix both gaps.
"""
if user_id not in users_db:
return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404
user = users_db[user_id]
return jsonify(user), 200
# ===== VULNERABLE: No Function-Level Authorization =====
@app.route("/vulnerable/orders/<int:order_id>/refund", methods=["POST"])
def vulnerable_refund_order(order_id):
"""
VULNERABLE: No check that user owns the order. Any authenticated user
can refund any order, including other users' orders.
"""
if order_id not in orders_db:
return jsonify({"error": "Order not found"}), 404
# Directly process refund without verifying ownership
order = orders_db[order_id]
return jsonify({
"message": f"Refunded ${order['price']} for order {order_id}",
"status": "success"
}), 200
# ===== VULNERABLE: Client-Side Security Only =====
@app.route("/vulnerable/admin/settings", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def vulnerable_admin_settings():
"""
VULNERABLE: Admin check only in frontend via hidden field.
Server doesn't verify admin role; attacker can bypass by sending
direct POST request without checking.
"""
if request.method == "POST":
# No server-side role verification!
setting_name = request.form.get("setting")
setting_value = request.form.get("value")
# Just apply settings regardless of user's actual role
return jsonify({
"message": f"Setting {setting_name} updated to {setting_value}",
"status": "success"
}), 200
return jsonify({"settings": "admin-panel"}), 200
# ===== SECURE: Server-Side Authorization Check =====
def require_auth(f):
"""Decorator to check if user is logged in."""
@wraps(f)
def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
if "user_id" not in session:
return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized"}), 401
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return decorated_function
def require_role(required_role):
"""Decorator to check if user has required role."""
def decorator(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
if "user_id" not in session:
return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized"}), 401
user_id = session["user_id"]
if user_id not in users_db:
return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404
user = users_db[user_id]
if user["role"] != required_role:
return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden - insufficient permissions"}), 403
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return decorated_function
return decorator
@app.route("/secure/user/<int:user_id>", methods=["GET"])
@require_auth
def secure_get_user(user_id):
"""
SECURE: Server-side authorization check. Only allow users to view
their own profile or admin viewing others.
"""
current_user_id = session.get("user_id")
current_user = users_db.get(current_user_id)
# Validate the session's user still exists before checking roles
if current_user is None:
return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404
# Authorization logic:
# 1. User can view their own profile
# 2. Admin can view any profile
if current_user_id == user_id or current_user["role"] == "admin":
if user_id not in users_db:
return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404
return jsonify(users_db[user_id]), 200
else:
return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden - cannot view other users' profiles"}), 403
@app.route("/secure/orders/<int:order_id>/refund", methods=["POST"])
@require_auth
def secure_refund_order(order_id):
"""
SECURE: Function-level authorization. Verify:
1. Order exists
2. Current user owns the order OR is admin
3. Then process refund
"""
current_user_id = session.get("user_id")
current_user = users_db.get(current_user_id)
# Validate the session's user still exists before checking roles
if current_user is None:
return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404
if order_id not in orders_db:
return jsonify({"error": "Order not found"}), 404
order = orders_db[order_id]
# Authorization: User owns order OR is admin
if order["user_id"] != current_user_id and current_user["role"] != "admin":
return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden - you do not own this order"}), 403
# Now safe to process
return jsonify({
"message": f"Refunded ${order['price']} for order {order_id}",
"status": "success"
}), 200
@app.route("/secure/admin/settings", methods=["GET", "POST"])
@require_role("admin")
def secure_admin_settings():
"""
SECURE: Server-side role verification using decorator.
Admin endpoints require explicit role check at function level.
"""
if request.method == "POST":
setting_name = request.form.get("setting")
setting_value = request.form.get("value")
return jsonify({
"message": f"Setting {setting_name} updated to {setting_value}",
"status": "success"
}), 200
return jsonify({"settings": "admin-panel"}), 200
# ===== CHECKLIST =====
"""
✓ Authorization on server for all sensitive ops (not just frontend)
✓ Default-deny principle (explicitly allow, don't assume access)
✓ No reliance on client-side security (role/admin flags, hidden fields)
✓ Verify user owns resource before allowing modifications
✓ Implement function-level authorization for API endpoints
✓ Use decorators/middleware for consistent access control
✓ Log all access control failures for monitoring
✓ Test with multiple user roles (user, admin, attacker)
"""
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