datarobot-oss/datarobot-agent-skills / skills/datarobot-gap-analysis
datarobot-gap-analysis
FlaggedUse when the user wants to assess whether an AI agent repository (DataRobot-built or not) is enterprise-ready, run a gap analysis / readiness scan against security, governance, reliability, or regulatory standards, score an agent against EU AI Act requirements, or find and fix gaps (secrets, unpinned models, missing CI, missing guardrails, over-permissioned identity, etc.) before deploying an agent to production. Works on any repository, not only ones built with DataRobot.
scripts/taxonomy.yaml
View on GitHub---
# Enterprise-Readiness Gap Analysis — Condition Registry
#
# The single source of truth for what the agent looks for. A Layer-2 condition
# needs only an entry here plus its prompt file; Layer-1 and Layer-3 conditions
# also need their detector wired in scanners.py / conformance.py.
#
# Fields per condition:
# id stable identifier (PILLAR-NNN)
# pillar SEC | IDN | AIG | OPS | REL | ITA (POL is Layer 4, generated at runtime)
# layer 1 = deterministic scanner
# 2 = LLM reasoning over code
# 3 = conformance vs. policy YAML
#
# Layer 4 (regulatory / POL) conditions are not defined here: they are generated
# at runtime from the mitigations the org's DataRobot risk-management policy
# requires (see gap_analysis/risk_management.py and risk_management_mitigations.yaml).
# severity critical | high | medium | low (default; policy can override)
# title short human-readable name
# description what the gap is / why it matters
# files_glob which files to feed the detector (list of globs)
# relational true if the check needs >1 file group or is skipped-with-warning
# detector L1: scanner name | L2/L4: prompts/<file> | L3: conformance rule key
# remediation one-line guidance shown in the report
# fix_type auto | assisted | advisory (drives the remediation phase)
# fix_strategy template/codemod name (auto) or prompts/<fix file> (assisted) or null
# fix_risk OPTIONAL plumbing | business_logic | none — blast radius of the fix.
# Defaults from fix_type (auto->plumbing, assisted->business_logic,
# advisory->none); set explicitly to override (e.g. an assisted fix that
# only swaps a config value is plumbing, not business_logic).
# structural OPTIONAL true if this gap is an architectural deficiency that cannot be
# surgically patched. Feeds the remediation-posture (patch vs re-platform)
# decision. Any advisory finding at high/critical is treated as structural.
version: 1
conditions:
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Pillar 1 — Security (SEC)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: SEC-001
pillar: SEC
layer: 2
severity: critical
title: Secret reachable by the LLM context
description: >
A credential value (API key, token, password) flows into a prompt, system message, or tool description that reaches
the model at inference time, exposing it to logging, prompt-injection exfiltration, and the model provider.
files_glob: ["**/config.py", "**/auth.py", "**/agent.py", "**/prompt*.py", "**/*prompt*", "**/system_message*"]
relational: true
detector: prompts/sec-001-secret-in-context.md
remediation: Inject secrets only into the API client/transport layer, never into model-visible text.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-002
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: critical
title: Long-lived static API key in code/config
description: >
Credential-shaped strings hardcoded in source or config (vendor keys such as sk-, AKIA…, xox…, ghp_, AIza…, or generic
api_key/secret/token = "…") with no refresh/broker call.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.js", "**/*.json", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.env*", "**/*.toml"]
relational: false
detector: secret_scan
remediation: Move the secret to an environment variable / secret manager and rotate it.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: secret_to_env_var
- id: SEC-003
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: critical
title: Secret in committed env vars / plaintext config
description: >
Credential patterns found specifically in checked-in configuration (.env, *.yaml, *.json, docker-compose*) that leak
through version control history and CI logs.
files_glob: ["**/.env*", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.json", "**/docker-compose*"]
relational: false
detector: secret_scan
remediation: Remove from VCS, add to .gitignore, rotate, and load from a secret store.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: secret_to_env_var
- id: SEC-004
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: high
title: Secret logged or printed
description: >
A credential-shaped string passed to a logging/print/trace call (print(...), console.log(...), logger.x(...)). L1 surfaces
the candidate; a L2 pass confirms it is truly sensitive.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.js"]
relational: false
detector: secret_scan
remediation: Remove the secret from log statements; redact before logging.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-sec-004-redact-log.md
- id: SEC-005
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: high
title: Secret in git history
description: >
A credential was committed at some point and remains in the repository history even if the current tree no longer contains
it; anyone with clone access can recover it.
files_glob: ["**/*"]
relational: false
detector: gitleaks
remediation: Rotate the credential first (deleting it does not revoke it), then purge it from history if the repository
is or will be shared.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-006
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: high
title: Same secret across environments
description: >
Identical credential values appearing in more than one environment's config (dev.env, staging.yaml, prod.yaml) — extract
all secrets and flag exact duplicates across environments.
files_glob: ["**/dev*", "**/staging*", "**/prod*", "**/*.env*"]
relational: true
detector: secret_scan
remediation: Use distinct per-environment credentials; never share prod secrets with lower envs.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-010
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: high
title: Dependency vulnerabilities / known CVEs
description: >
Declared dependencies have known published vulnerabilities.
files_glob: ["**/requirements*.txt", "**/pyproject.toml", "**/poetry.lock", "**/package.json", "**/package-lock.json",
"**/uv.lock"]
relational: false
detector: pip-audit, npm-audit, trivy
remediation: Upgrade affected packages to the patched versions.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: bump_vulnerable_dependency
- id: SEC-011
pillar: SEC
layer: 2
severity: high
title: Injection risk (prompt / command / deserialization / SSRF)
description: >
Untrusted input reaches a dangerous sink — shell execution, eval, unsafe deserialization (pickle/yaml.load), SQL string
concatenation, server-side request building, or an LLM prompt without sanitization.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.js"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/sec-011-injection.md
runtime_only: true
remediation: Validate/parameterize inputs; use safe loaders; isolate untrusted content from instructions.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-sec-011-injection.md
hint_patterns:
- "subprocess|os\\.system|os\\.popen|shell=True|\\beval\\(|\\bexec\\("
- "pickle\\.loads?|yaml\\.load\\(|marshal\\.loads?|execute\\(f|SELECT .*\\+|requests\\.\\w+\\(f"
- id: SEC-012
pillar: SEC
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: Missing input validation on tool inputs & external data
description: >
Tool/function inputs and external API responses are consumed without type/range/schema validation.
files_glob: ["**/tools.py", "**/tools/**", "**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/sec-012-input-validation.md
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add schema validation (e.g. pydantic) at trust boundaries.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-sec-012-validation.md
hint_patterns:
- "BaseModel|@validator|field_validator|model_validate|jsonschema|TypeAdapter"
- "@tool|@mcp\\.tool|def \\w*tool|Field\\("
- id: SEC-013
pillar: SEC
layer: 2
severity: high
title: Weak or missing encryption / TLS verification disabled
description: >
Plaintext transport, disabled certificate verification (verify=False), weak ciphers/hashes, or secrets/data persisted
unencrypted.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.js"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/sec-013-encryption.md
remediation: Enforce TLS with verification; encrypt data at rest; drop weak algorithms.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-sec-013-encryption.md
hint_patterns:
- "verify\\s*=\\s*False|CERT_NONE|check_hostname\\s*=\\s*False|http://"
- "hashlib\\.(md5|sha1)|Fernet|encrypt|ssl_context|create_default_context"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Pillar 1 — Identity (IDN)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: IDN-001
pillar: IDN
layer: 2
severity: high
title: Agent authenticates as a human / shared account
description: >
The agent uses a personal access token, a human user's OAuth token, or a single shared service account rather than its
own dedicated workload/agent identity.
files_glob: ["**/auth.py", "**/client.py", "**/agent.py", "**/main.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/idn-001-human-identity.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Provision a dedicated workload identity (e.g. service account / OIDC) for the agent.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: IDN-002
pillar: IDN
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No credential rotation / no token expiry
description: >
Credentials are static with no rotation mechanism or expiry handling.
files_glob: ["**/auth.py", "**/client.py", "**/config.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/idn-002-rotation.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Use short-lived tokens with automatic refresh/rotation.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
hint_patterns:
- 'expires|ttl|refresh_token|rotate|session_max_age'
- id: IDN-003
pillar: IDN
layer: 2
severity: high
title: Over-permissioned identity
description: >
Scopes/roles/permissions granted to the agent are broader than the tools and resources it actually uses (admin, wildcard
scopes, '*' resources).
files_glob: ["**/permissions.yaml", "**/*iam*", "**/*policy*", "**/manifest*", "**/scopes*", "**/tools.py", "**/tools/**"]
relational: true
detector: prompts/idn-003-over-permissioned.md
remediation: Reduce granted scopes to the minimum the code actually exercises.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-idn-003-narrow-scope.md
- id: IDN-004
pillar: IDN
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No least-privilege boundary / missing RBAC on actions
description: >
High-impact actions are not gated by role/permission checks; no authorization boundary between callers and privileged
operations.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/idn-004-rbac.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add authorization checks before privileged actions; separate roles.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-014
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: low
title: CI supply chain not hardened (unpinned actions, no dependency cooldown)
description: >
GitHub Actions referenced by a moving tag or branch, or package managers with no cooldown / minimum release age, let
an upstream push change what runs in CI.
files_glob: ["**/.github/workflows/**", "**/.github/dependabot.yml", "**/pyproject.toml", "**/package.json"]
relational: false
detector: action_pinning
remediation: Pin third-party actions to a commit SHA; add a dependency cooldown (Dependabot `cooldown`, uv `exclude-newer`,
npm `minimumReleaseAge`).
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-015
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: low
title: No automated dependency updates
description: >
Neither Dependabot nor Renovate is configured, so vulnerable dependencies stay in place until someone notices.
files_glob: ["**/.github/dependabot.yml", "**/renovate.json"]
relational: false
detector: dependency_updates
remediation: Add `.github/dependabot.yml` covering every ecosystem in the repo, including `github-actions`.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: SEC-016
pillar: SEC
layer: 1
severity: medium
title: No vulnerability scanning in CI
description: >
No pipeline step scans dependencies or container images for known CVEs (trivy, grype, pip-audit, npm audit, dependency-review,
…).
files_glob: ["**/.github/workflows/**", "**/.harness/**", "**/Taskfile*.y*ml", "**/Makefile"]
relational: false
detector: vuln_scan_presence
remediation: Add a scheduled and per-PR vulnerability scan (trivy or pip-audit / npm audit) with a reviewed ignore policy.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Pillar 2 — AI/LLM Governance (AIG)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: AIG-001
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: high
title: No guardrails (toxicity / PII / jailbreak / output filtering)
description: >
Model inputs/outputs pass through with no moderation, PII redaction, jailbreak detection, or output validation.
files_glob: ["**/agent.py", "**/*llm*", "**/*model*", "**/prompt*"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-001-guardrails.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add input/output guardrails (moderation, PII filter, jailbreak checks).
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-aig-001-guardrails.md
hint_patterns:
- "guard|moderation|jailbreak|toxicity|pii|redact|OutputParser|output_validator"
structural: true # guardrails belong in the agent architecture, not a point patch
- id: AIG-002
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: Model not version-pinned (floating model id)
description: >
The model identifier has no version/date suffix, so behavior can drift silently when the provider updates the alias.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.toml"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-002-model-pinning.md
remediation: Pin the model to a dated/versioned id.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-aig-002-model-pinning.md
hint_patterns:
- "model\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']|model_id|model_name|MODEL\\b|gpt-|claude-|gemini-|llama"
context: llm_gateway_catalog
- id: AIG-003
pillar: AIG
layer: 3
severity: high
title: Unapproved LLM provider/model used
description: >
A model is used that is not on the organization's approved-model allowlist in the policy file.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.toml"]
relational: false
detector: models_allowlist
remediation: Switch to an approved model from the policy allowlist.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-aig-003-approved-model.md
fix_risk: plumbing # swaps a model id; does not touch business logic
- id: AIG-004
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No evaluation / eval harness for prompts
description: >
No automated evaluation or regression tests covering prompt/agent behavior.
files_glob: ["**/eval*", "**/test*", "**/*.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-004-evals.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add an eval/regression suite for prompts and agent trajectories.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
structural: true # an eval harness is a workstream, not a patch
hint_patterns:
- 'deepeval|ragas|promptfoo|langsmith.*evaluate|trajectory|golden'
- id: AIG-005
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: high
title: No human-in-the-loop for high-risk/irreversible actions
description: >
The agent can take irreversible or high-impact actions (delete, pay, send, deploy) without a human approval gate.
files_glob: ["**/tools.py", "**/tools/**", "**/agent.py", "**/*.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-005-human-in-loop.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add an approval/confirmation gate before irreversible actions.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: AIG-006
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No cost/token controls or rate limiting on model calls
description: >
Model calls have no max-token caps, budget limits, or rate limiting, risking runaway cost.
files_glob: ["**/*llm*", "**/*model*", "**/agent.py", "**/*.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-006-cost-controls.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Set max-token limits, budgets, and rate limiting on model calls.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-aig-006-cost-controls.md
hint_patterns:
- 'max_tokens|max_output_tokens|max_completion_tokens|token_budget|budget'
- id: AIG-007
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No grounding/citation; hallucination risk on factual output
description: >
Factual outputs are produced without retrieval grounding or source citation.
files_glob: ["**/agent.py", "**/*rag*", "**/*retriev*", "**/*.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-007-grounding.md
remediation: Ground factual answers in retrieved sources and cite them.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: AIG-008
pillar: AIG
layer: 2
severity: low
title: Prompts not versioned/externalized
description: >
System/instruction prompts are hardcoded inline with no versioning or externalization, hindering review and rollback.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/aig-008-prompt-versioning.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Externalize prompts to versioned files/registry.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Pillar 3 — Ops & Reliability (OPS, REL)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: OPS-001
pillar: OPS
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No structured logging / audit trail of agent actions
description: >
Agent actions and tool calls are not logged in a structured, auditable form.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/ops-001-logging.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add structured logging with an audit trail of tool calls/decisions.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-ops-001-logging.md
hint_patterns:
- 'logging\.getLogger|structlog|JSONFormatter|json_format|log_format|jsonlogger'
- 'logger\.(info|warning|error|debug)\(.*extra='
- 'instrument\(|OTLPLogExporter|LoggingHandler'
- id: OPS-002
pillar: OPS
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No tracing/telemetry (OpenTelemetry / DataRobot monitoring)
description: >
No distributed tracing or telemetry export for observability and monitoring.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/ops-002-tracing.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Instrument with OpenTelemetry / DataRobot agent monitoring.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-ops-002-tracing.md
structural: true # tracing/telemetry is cross-cutting; favors re-platform when absent
hint_patterns:
- 'opentelemetry|instrument\(|start_as_current_span|tracer'
- id: OPS-003
pillar: OPS
layer: 2
severity: low
title: No health checks / metrics endpoints
description: >
Service exposes no health/readiness or metrics endpoints.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/main.py", "**/app.py"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/ops-003-health.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add health/readiness and metrics endpoints.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
hint_patterns:
- '/health|/healthz|/livez|/readyz|/ready\b|/metrics'
- 'health_endpoint|DataRobotASGIMiddleware|HealthCheck'
- id: REL-001
pillar: REL
layer: 1
severity: high
title: No tests or low coverage
description: >
The repository has no test suite (or negligible coverage).
files_glob: ["**/test*", "**/tests/**", "**/*_test.*", "**/*.spec.*"]
relational: false
detector: tests_presence
remediation: Add a unit/integration test suite with meaningful coverage.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: scaffold_test_stub
- id: REL-002
pillar: REL
layer: 1
severity: medium
title: No CI/CD pipeline
description: >
No continuous integration configuration found.
files_glob: ["**/.github/workflows/**", "**/.gitlab-ci.yml", "**/azure-pipelines.yml", "**/Jenkinsfile"]
relational: false
detector: ci_presence
remediation: Add a CI pipeline running lint, tests, and security scans.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: scaffold_ci_workflow
- id: REL-003
pillar: REL
layer: 2
severity: medium
title: No error handling / retries / timeouts on external calls
description: >
External/API/model calls lack try-except, retries, timeouts, or circuit breakers.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/rel-003-resilience.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add timeouts, bounded retries with backoff, and error handling on external calls.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-rel-003-resilience.md
hint_patterns:
- 'timeout\s*=|request_timeout|Timeout\('
- 'tenacity|@retry|backoff|max_retries|Retry\('
- id: REL-004
pillar: REL
layer: 2
severity: low
title: No graceful degradation / fallback path
description: >
No fallback behavior when a dependency or model is unavailable.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts"]
relational: false
detector: prompts/rel-004-fallback.md
scope: repo
runtime_only: true
remediation: Add fallback/degraded-mode handling for dependency failures.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
hint_patterns:
- "fallback|circuit|degrad|except .*(Timeout|ConnectionError)|retry"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Pillar 4 — IT Conformance (ITA) — all driven by policy YAML
- id: REL-005
pillar: REL
layer: 1
severity: medium
title: No lint / format / type-check gate
description: >
No linter or type checker is configured (ruff, mypy, eslint, …) or nothing in CI, a Taskfile or a Makefile runs one,
so style and type errors reach main.
files_glob: ["**/pyproject.toml", "**/ruff.toml", "**/mypy.ini", "**/eslint.config.*", "**/Taskfile*.y*ml", "**/.github/workflows/**"]
relational: false
detector: lint_gate
remediation: Configure ruff + mypy (or eslint) and run them from a `lint-check` task in CI on every pull request.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: REL-006
pillar: REL
layer: 1
severity: medium
title: Dependencies not locked
description: >
A Python or JavaScript manifest has no lockfile (uv.lock, poetry.lock, package-lock.json, …) and no pinned requirements,
so builds are not reproducible.
files_glob: ["**/pyproject.toml", "**/requirements*.txt", "**/package.json"]
relational: false
detector: lockfile_presence
remediation: Commit a lockfile next to every manifest (`uv lock`, `npm install` with `package-lock.json`) and verify it
in CI (`uv lock --locked`, `npm ci`).
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- id: ITA-001
pillar: ITA
layer: 3
severity: high
title: Python version below required minimum
description: >
The declared/target Python version is below the policy minimum.
files_glob: ["**/pyproject.toml", "**/setup.py", "**/setup.cfg", "**/.python-version", "**/runtime.txt", "**/Dockerfile"]
relational: false
detector: python_min_version
remediation: Raise the project's Python version to the policy minimum.
fix_type: auto
fix_strategy: pin_python_version
- id: ITA-002
pillar: ITA
layer: 3
severity: medium
title: Disallowed library used / required library missing
description: >
A dependency or import is on the deny list, not on a non-empty allow list, or a required library is missing.
files_glob: ["**/requirements*.txt", "**/pyproject.toml", "**/package.json", "**/*.py"]
relational: false
detector: libraries_allow_deny
remediation: Remove disallowed libraries; add required ones per policy.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: ITA-003
pillar: ITA
layer: 3
severity: high
title: Unapproved LLM model (IT-admin view)
description: >
A model id is not on the IT-admin approved-model allowlist. Mirrors AIG-003 from the conformance angle.
files_glob: ["**/*.py", "**/*.ts", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.toml"]
relational: false
detector: models_allowlist
remediation: Use an approved model id from the policy.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-aig-003-approved-model.md
fix_risk: plumbing # swaps a model id; does not touch business logic
- id: ITA-004
pillar: ITA
layer: 3
severity: medium
title: OSS license non-compliance
description: >
A dependency carries a license on the policy deny list (e.g. copyleft).
files_glob: ["**/requirements*.txt", "**/pyproject.toml", "**/package.json"]
relational: false
detector: license_check
remediation: Replace dependencies with denied licenses; obtain legal approval if required.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: ITA-005
pillar: ITA
layer: 3
severity: medium
title: Unapproved base image / runtime
description: >
A Dockerfile FROM image is not on the approved base-image allowlist.
files_glob: ["**/Dockerfile", "**/*.dockerfile", "**/containerfile"]
relational: false
detector: base_image_allowlist
remediation: Switch to an approved base image.
fix_type: assisted
fix_strategy: prompts/fix-ita-005-base-image.md
fix_risk: plumbing # swaps a Dockerfile base image; does not touch business logic
- id: ITA-006
pillar: ITA
layer: 1
severity: low
title: No CODEOWNERS
description: >
No CODEOWNERS file names a team accountable for reviewing changes.
files_glob: ["**/CODEOWNERS"]
relational: false
detector: codeowners_presence
remediation: Add `.github/CODEOWNERS` naming a real GitHub team for the whole repo.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
- id: ITA-007
pillar: ITA
layer: 1
severity: medium
title: Container or infrastructure misconfiguration
description: >
A Dockerfile, Kubernetes manifest or Terraform/Pulumi file violates container and IaC hardening rules (running as root,
unpinned base images, secrets in build args, permissive settings).
files_glob: ["**/Dockerfile*", "**/*.dockerfile", "**/*.yaml", "**/*.yml", "**/*.tf"]
relational: false
detector: trivy_misconfig, hadolint
remediation: Fix the flagged instruction; the rule id links to the tool's documentation for the exact change.
fix_type: advisory
fix_strategy: null
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics. | Stars: 472k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |