aiskillstore/marketplace / skills/0xdarkmatter/security-patterns
security-patterns
VerifiedSecurity patterns and OWASP guidelines. Triggers on: security review, OWASP, XSS, SQL injection, CSRF, authentication, authorization, secrets management, input validation, secure coding.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 4.8 KB |
| references/auth-patterns.md | markdown | 7.9 KB |
| references/crypto-patterns.md | markdown | 6.7 KB |
| references/owasp-detailed.md | markdown | 7.6 KB |
| references/secure-headers.md | markdown | 6.2 KB |
| scripts/dependency-audit.sh | script | 2.2 KB |
| scripts/security-scan.sh | script | 2.4 KB |
| skill-report.json | config | 100.8 KB |
references/owasp-detailed.md
View on GitHub# OWASP Top 10 Detailed Guide
In-depth coverage of OWASP Top 10 2021 vulnerabilities.
## A01: Broken Access Control
### Description
Access control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside their intended permissions.
### Examples
- Bypassing access control by modifying URL, state, or HTML
- Viewing or editing someone else's account
- Privilege escalation (acting as user without login, or user acting as admin)
- Metadata manipulation (replay/tampering JWT, cookies, hidden fields)
- CORS misconfiguration allowing unauthorized API access
- Force browsing to authenticated pages or privileged pages
### Prevention
```python
# WRONG - Client-side check only
if user.role == "admin":
show_admin_button()
# CORRECT - Server-side enforcement
@app.route("/admin/users")
def admin_users():
if not current_user.has_role("admin"):
abort(403)
return render_template("admin/users.html")
# CORRECT - Deny by default
def get_resource(resource_id):
resource = Resource.get(resource_id)
if resource.owner_id != current_user.id:
raise Forbidden("Not your resource")
return resource
```
### Checklist
- [ ] Deny by default except for public resources
- [ ] Implement access control once, reuse everywhere
- [ ] Record access control failures, alert on repeated attempts
- [ ] Disable web server directory listing
- [ ] Ensure file metadata not accessible
## A02: Cryptographic Failures
### Description
Failures related to cryptography leading to exposure of sensitive data.
### Examples
- Data transmitted in clear text (HTTP, SMTP, FTP)
- Old/weak cryptographic algorithms (MD5, SHA1, DES)
- Default or weak crypto keys
- Improper certificate validation
- Passwords stored without salted hashing
### Prevention
```python
# WRONG - Weak hashing
import hashlib
password_hash = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
# CORRECT - bcrypt with cost factor
import bcrypt
password_hash = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12))
# WRONG - ECB mode
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.ECB())
# CORRECT - GCM mode with random IV
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.GCM(iv))
```
### Checklist
- [ ] Classify data by sensitivity
- [ ] Don't store sensitive data unnecessarily
- [ ] Encrypt all sensitive data at rest
- [ ] Use TLS for all data in transit
- [ ] Use strong, standard algorithms
- [ ] Store passwords with bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2, or PBKDF2
## A03: Injection
### Description
Hostile data sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query.
### Examples
- SQL Injection
- NoSQL Injection
- OS Command Injection
- LDAP Injection
- XPath Injection
- Template Injection
### Prevention
```python
# WRONG - SQL Injection
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{name}'"
# CORRECT - Parameterized query
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?", [name])
# WRONG - Command Injection
os.system(f"ping {host}")
# CORRECT - Use subprocess with list
subprocess.run(["ping", "-c", "4", host], capture_output=True)
# WRONG - Template Injection
template = Template(user_input)
# CORRECT - Safe templating
template = env.get_template("page.html")
template.render(user_data=user_input)
```
### Detection Patterns
```bash
# Find SQL injection risks
rg "execute\(f['\"]|format\(|\.format\(" --type py
# Find command injection
rg "os\.system\(|subprocess\.(run|call|Popen)\([^,\[]*\+" --type py
```
## A04: Insecure Design
### Description
Missing or ineffective security controls from design phase.
### Prevention
- Use threat modeling during design
- Integrate security requirements in user stories
- Use secure design patterns
- Write unit and integration tests for security controls
- Segregate tenants robustly
## A05: Security Misconfiguration
### Description
Missing or improper security hardening across the application stack.
### Examples
- Default accounts enabled
- Unnecessary features enabled
- Error messages revealing stack traces
- Missing security headers
- Out of date software
### Prevention
```yaml
# Secure headers middleware
security_headers:
Content-Security-Policy: "default-src 'self'"
X-Frame-Options: "DENY"
X-Content-Type-Options: "nosniff"
Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=31536000"
# Disable debug in production
DEBUG: false
ALLOWED_HOSTS: ["example.com"]
```
## A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components
### Description
Using components with known vulnerabilities.
### Prevention
```bash
# Python - pip audit
pip install pip-audit
pip-audit
# JavaScript - npm audit
npm audit
npm audit fix
# General - Snyk
snyk test
snyk monitor
# GitHub Dependabot
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: "pip"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
```
## A07: Identification and Authentication Failures
### Description
Confirmation of user's identity and session management weaknesses.
### Examples
- Permits brute force attacks
- Permits weak passwords
- Weak credential recovery
- Plain text or weakly hashed passwords
- Missing MFA
- Session IDs in URL
### Prevention
```python
# Rate limiting
from flask_limiter import Limiter
limiter = Limiter(app, key_func=get_remote_address)
@app.route("/login", methods=["POST"])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute")
def login():
# Login logic
# Secure session configuration
app.config.update(
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True,
SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY=True,
SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE='Strict',
PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME=timedelta(hours=1)
)
```
## A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures
### Description
Code and infrastructure without integrity verification.
### Examples
- Insecure CI/CD pipeline
- Auto-update without verification
- Untrusted deserialization
### Prevention
```python
# WRONG - Pickle from untrusted source
import pickle
data = pickle.loads(user_input) # RCE vulnerability!
# CORRECT - Use JSON for untrusted data
import json
data = json.loads(user_input)
# Verify signatures
import hmac
def verify_webhook(payload, signature, secret):
expected = hmac.new(secret, payload, 'sha256').hexdigest()
return hmac.compare_digest(expected, signature)
```
## A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
### Description
Without logging and monitoring, breaches cannot be detected.
### What to Log
- Login successes and failures
- Access control failures
- Input validation failures
- High-value transactions
### Prevention
```python
import logging
security_logger = logging.getLogger("security")
def login(username, password):
user = authenticate(username, password)
if user:
security_logger.info(f"Login success: {username}")
return user
else:
security_logger.warning(f"Login failed: {username}")
raise AuthenticationError()
# Alert on suspicious patterns
if failed_logins_count > 10:
security_logger.critical(f"Brute force detected: {ip_address}")
alert_security_team(ip_address)
```
## A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
### Description
Application fetches remote resource without validating user-supplied URL.
### Examples
- Accessing internal services
- Reading cloud metadata
- Port scanning internal network
### Prevention
```python
# WRONG - Direct URL fetch
import requests
def fetch(url):
return requests.get(url) # Can fetch internal URLs!
# CORRECT - Validate URL
from urllib.parse import urlparse
ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"api.example.com", "cdn.example.com"}
def fetch(url):
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
raise ValueError("Host not allowed")
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError("Scheme not allowed")
return requests.get(url)
```
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